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MANUALS OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY.

OUTLINES

OF

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

Rev. J. H. Ellis

BY

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PREFACE.

In this Second Volume of *Outlines of Dogmatic Theology* the same plan is pursued as in the First. In one respect the matter here to be treated differs from that which was dealt with in the First Volume; it is less controversial, for it treats mostly of subjects as to which there is general agreement among all who bear the name of Christian. At the same time, there is perhaps no Treatise which is altogether clear of points on which the records of Revelation are variously interpreted. But, as has been already said, the object of the work is mainly exposition, and therefore the aim of the writer has been to treat each point with the fulness proportioned to its importance as part of the whole body of Revelation.

Much difficulty has been experienced in the selection of matter to be set forth in these pages. Brevity has been studied as much as possible; but three small volumes are far from affording space

for even the scantiest notice of all that it would be desirable to treat. If a reader feel disappointed at finding no notice of some matter in which he is interested, he is requested to remember how difficult is the task of selecting among many deserving candidates.

The Third Volume will appear before the end of the present year.

S. J. H.

Stonyhurst College, Blackburn,
May, 1895.

CONTENTS.

Preface to the Second Volume.

TREATISE THE SEVENTH. THE ONE GOD.

Chapter I. The Knowledge of God.

331. Plan of the Treatise. 332. The Triune God. 333. Subject of the Chapter. 334. Two Opposite Errors. 335. Traditionalism. 336. The Catholic Doctrine. 337. God easily known. 338. Are there Atheists? 339. True Office of Tradition. 340. Fundamental Truths. 341. Ontologism. 342. The doctrine explained. 343. The Catholic Doctrine. 344. Recapitulation . . . . Pp. 1—25

Chapter II. The Existence of God.

345. Subject of the Chapter. 346. The Metaphysical Argument. 347. Necessary and Contingent. 348. The Wise Designer. 349. Other Proofs. 350. The Sight of God. 351. God Incomprehensible. 352. God Ineffable. 353. The Names of God. 354. The Tetragrammon. 355. The Revelation on Horeb. 356. The Word "Lord." 357. Recapitulation Pp. 26—49

Chapter III. The Divine Perfections.

358. Subject of the Chapter. 359. Attributes of God. 360. The Attributes, how distinct. 361. The Metaphysical Essence of God. 362. God Infinite. 363. God One. 364. Objections. 365. God Simple. 366. Anthropomorphism. 367. Idolatry. 368. God Immense. 369. Omnipresence. 370. God Unchanging. 371. God Eternal. 372. The Attributes defined. 373. Recapitulation . . . Pp. 50—80

Chapter IV. God's Knowledge.

374. Subject of the Chapter. 375. God a Spirit. 376. The Divine Knowledge. 377. Simple Intelligence. 378. Knowledge of Vision. 379. *Scientia Media.* 380. Difficulties. 381. Free-Will. 382. Recapitulation . Pp. 81—101

CHAPTER V. GOD'S WILL AND POWER.

383. Subject of the Chapter. 384. Objects of God's Will. 385. Divisions of God's Will. 386. Moral Qualities. 387. The Power of God. 388. Permission of Evil. 389. The Will to Save. 390. Various Views. 391. The Book of Life. 392. Recapitulation. 393. Close of Treatise Pp. 102—144

TREATISE THE EIGHTH. THE BLESSED TRINITY.

CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY.

394. Plan of the Treatise. 395. Subject of the Chapter. 396. Terms explained. 397. The Doctrine stated. 398. Scripture teaching. 399. The Doxology. 400. Errors classified. 401. Creeds. 402. The Trinity a Mystery. 403. The Old Testament. 404. Recapitulation Pp. 145—175

CHAPTER II. THE DIVINE SON, OR WORD.

405. Subject of the Chapter. 406. The Divine Sonship. 407. Objections. 408. The Word is God. 409. Difficulties. 410. Recapitulation . . . . Pp. 176—188

CHAPTER III. THE HOLY SPIRIT.

411. Subject of the Chapter. 412. The Spirit is God. 413. The Double Procession. 414. Difficulties. 415. The *Filioque*. 416. Recapitulation . . Pp. 189—198

CHAPTER IV. THE THREE IN ONE.

417. Subject of the Chapter. 418. God is One. 419. Perichoresis. 420. The Ante-Nicene Fathers. 421. The Processions. 422. Rules of Language. 423. Recapitulation. 424. Close of Treatise . . Pp. 199—215

TREATISE THE NINTH. THE CREATION. THE ANGELS.

CHAPTER I. CREATION IN GENERAL.

425. Plan of the Treatise. 426. Subject of the Chapter. 427. Definitions of the Church. 428. Creation. 429. The Doctrine of Scripture. 430. The Tradition of the Church. 431. The Blessed Trinity in Creatures. 432. Can Creatures create? 433. The End of Creation. 434. Creation Free. 435. Recapitulation . . . Pp. 216—241

CHAPTER II. THE MATERIAL WORLD.

436. Subject of the Chapter. 437. Creation and Ordering. 438. Conservation and Concurrence. 439. Creation in Time. 440. The Six Days. 441. Recapitulation Pp. 216—264

CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF THE ANGELS.

442. Subject of the Chapter. 443. The Existence of Angels. 444. Origin of the Angels. 445. The Nature of the Angels. 446. Distinctions among the Angels. 447. Cherubim and Seraphim. 448. The Probation of the Angels. 449. Recapitulation . . . . . Pp. 265—292

CHAPTER IV. THE ANGELS IN THE WORLD.

450. Subject of the Chapter. 451. Action on Matter. 452. Action on Souls. 453. The Guardian Angels. 454. The Evil Spirits. 455. Magic. 456. Recapitulation. 457. Close of Treatise . . . Pp. 293—311

TREATISE THE TENTH. MAN CREATED AND FALLEN.

CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF MAN.

458. Plan of the Treatise. 459. Subject of the Chapter. 460. The Excellence of Man. 461. The Body of Man. 462. The Achievements of Man. 463. The Soul of Man. 464. Activity of the Soul. 465. The Soul One. 466. Mode of Union. 467. The Soul Immortal. 468. Recapitulation Pp. 312—336

CHAPTER II. THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

469. Subject of the Chapter. 470. The Account in Scripture. 471. The Interpretation. 472. Evolution. 473. Origin of the Soul. 474. The One Parent. 475. The Age of Man. 476. Recapitulation . . . . Pp. 337—360

CHAPTER III. THE ELEVATION OF MAN.

477. Subject of the Chapter. 478. Various Errors. 479. The Catholic Doctrine. 480. "Natural." 481. "Supernatural." 482. "Preternatural." 483. States of Man. 484. The Grace of Paradise. 485. Concupiscence. 486. Integrity. 487. Other Gifts. 488. The Gifts not Natural. 489. Pure Nature. 490. Recapitulation . . Pp. 361—393

CHAPTER IV. THE FALL OF MAN.

491. Subject of the Chapter. 492. The Sin of Adam. 493. Original Sin. 494. Anathema. 495. Anglican Doctrine. 496. Erroneous Views. 497. The Doctrine Proved. 498. Other Proofs. 499. False Notions. 500. The Nature of Original Sin. 501. Some Further Points. 502. Adamite Heresies. 503. Recapitulation. 504. Close of the Treatise . . . . . Pp. 394—420

TREATISE THE ELEVENTH. THE INCARNATION.

CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY.

505. Plan of the Treatise. 506. Subject of the Chapter. 507. Errors. 508. Possibility. 509. Congruity. 510. Which Person? 511. What Nature? 512. The Incarnation Free. 513. Recapitulation . . . . . Pp. 421—440

CHAPTER II. GOD AND MAN.

514. Subject of the Chapter. 515. Jesus. 516. Christ. 517. The Messiah. 518. Christ is God. 519. Objections. 520. Christ is Man. 521. Portraits of Christ. 522. Origin of the Manhood. 523. The Passible Nature. 524. Recapitulation . . . . . Pp. 441—472

CHAPTER III. THE UNION OF THE NATURES.

525. Subject of the Chapter. 526. Nestorius. 527. Eutyches. 528. The Catholic Doctrine proved. 529. The Two Wills. 530. The Actions of Christ. 531. The Liberty of Christ. 532. The Union Permanent. 533. The Son by Nature. 534. The Knowledge of Christ. 535. The Worship of Christ. 536. The Sacred Heart. 537. Rules of Language. 538. Recapitulation . . . . . Pp. 473—505

CHAPTER IV. CHRIST THE REDEEMER.

539. Subject of the Chapter. 540. Titles of Christ. 541. The Need of Redemption. 542. The Redemption. 543. The Redemption Universal. 544. Recapitulation Pp. 506—525

CHAPTER V. MYSTERIES OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

545. Subject of the Chapter. 546. The Circumcision. 547. The Baptism of Christ. 548. The Transfiguration. 549. The Tombs opened. 550. The Opened Side. 551. The Descent into Hell. 552. The Resurrection. 553. Recapitulation. 554. Close of the Treatise . . . . Pp. 526—559

TREATISE THE TWELFTH. THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY.

CHAPTER I. THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.

555. Plan of the Treatise. 556. Subject of the Chapter. 557. The Doctrine stated. 558. The Doctrine probable. 559. The Holy Scripture. 560. Tradition. 561. The Controversy. 562. Difficulties. 563. The Sinless One. 564. Recapitulation . . . . Pp. 560—566

CHAPTER II. THE PERPETUAL VIRGINITY.

565. Subject of the Chapter. 566. The Doctrine stated. 567. The Virginal Birth. 568. The Perpetual Virginity. 569. The Brethren of the Lord. 570. Recapitulation Pp. 567—576

CHAPTER III. TITLES AND FEASTS.

571. Subject of the Chapter. 572. The Mother of God. 573. The *Magnificat*. 574. The Co-redeemer. 575. The Name of Mary. 576. The Assumption. 577. Recapitulation. 578. Close of the Volume . Pp. 577—587

OUTLINES OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

Treatise the Seventh.
The One God.

CHAPTER I.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

331. *Plan of the Treatise.*—With this Seventh Treatise, On the one God, we enter on the discussion of Theology properly so called in the older sense of the term, and we deal with the matter which occupies the first twenty-six questions of the First Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. At the time when this great work was written, the subjects of the fundamental Treatises with which we have so far been concerned were not so prominent as now (n. 8), and in fact were not recognized as belonging to Theology, and it will be vain to search for them in any works composed earlier than the sixteenth century. In dealing with these fundamental subjects, we assumed the existence and

providence of God (nn. 15, 20, 162), promising to justify this assumption in due time. This time has now come, and we address ourselves to the task.

According to Catholic doctrine, God is one in substance, but in this one God there are three Persons, having certain relations one to another. The present Treatise is concerned with God considered as One, His Being and Attributes. We shall see that much on this subject can be learned by natural reason without the aid of revelation; but there are other matters which cannot be known except by revelation, which throws great light even upon those parts of the subject where it is not absolutely necessary.

In strictness, Dogmatic Theology is not concerned with proving the existence of God, for this truth is taught by Natural Theology (n. 3); also, Dogmatic Theology is busied with God, and with all things else as having relation to God, so that God is the principal object of this science; but it is no part of a science to prove the existence of its own object, which is assumed as one of the first principles which the science accepts as given from other sources; just as the architect does not concern himself with discussing the origin of the stone in which his designs are to be embodied: see St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, p. 1. q. 1. Nevertheless, in order to fulfil our promise given in the places just referred to, and that the present work may contain the outline of our matter, complete, however imperfect, we shall sketch very briefly the arguments by which Natural Theology establishes the

Being of God and something of His Attributes. This matter will occur more or less throughout the Treatise, but more especially in the second chapter. It is hoped that the reader will find that the assumptions provisionally made in the course of our earlier Treatises are justified by the Treatise which is now before him.

332. *The Triune God.*—It may be well at once to devote a paragraph to guarding against a misconception. In the present Treatise we speak of the one God: that which follows will be concerned with the Blessed Trinity. It will there be seen that each of the three Divine Persons is identified with the one God, and that the two Treatises do not deal with different Beings, but with the same infinite Being who is regarded under different aspects. This division is not necessary, and in fact was not adopted by Peter Lombard, the great Paris doctor of the twelfth century, who was almost the first in the Western Church who attempted to throw the whole of Theology into one system. Peter gained the name of the Master of Sentences, from the title of his great work which held its place as text-book in the theological schools, until it was superseded in the following century by the *Summa* of St. Thomas. Peter's first book is headed, "On the Mystery of the Trinity," but it contains under this title all that the author has to say on the Unity of God. Perhaps he may have been influenced by the example of the theologically-minded lawgiver Justinian, the monuments of whose industry were attracting many enthusiastic students in the days of

Peter, and who devotes the first title in the first book of his Code to the Blessed Trinity. Gratian also, whom legend made to have been born at one birth with Peter the theologian and Peter the compiler of Church history, seems to have been under the same influence, for a title on the Blessed Trinity opens his Decree, in which he does for the Canon Law of the Church what Justinian had done for the law of Rome. We need not stay to discuss the convenience of the arrangement adopted by Peter; it was rendered at least natural by the history of the controversies which engaged the attention of the authors from whom that writer drew his materials: it is enough to say that most theologians have followed the example of St. Thomas, who first devotes twenty-five questions (p. 1. qq. 2—26.) to God, One in essence, and then in seventeen more (qq. 27—43.) speaks of the Three Persons.

It may be observed that there are three ways of speaking of God as One, without mentioning the Three Persons. The division may be made merely for convenience, as is done in this place: or the silence may be due to ignorance, as in those to whom this mystery has not been made known, such as the heathen, who received no revelation at all, and the Hebrews, to whom the revelation came so obscurely that few among them recognized it: or the revelation which the Church has received may have come to the knowledge of a writer but have been rejected by him, on account of some imagined difficulty: such rejection is of course heretical, but it has been not unfrequent in all ages: those who

were led to it under various forms received in the earlier centuries the general name of Monarchians, as asserting that a sole Person was the principle of all things in God. (μόνος, ἀρχή.) In modern times they have been called Unitarians, as maintaining the unity of Person in God. Some details of the history of these sects will be found in the next Treatise. (n. 399.)

333. *Subject of Chapter.*—In the present chapter we shall show by the testimony of revelation that man is capable of attaining to the knowledge of God by the contemplation of the visible universe, and that in fact no man can remain long in the world without this truth forcing itself upon his mind.

The chapter is chiefly controversial, being directed against certain schools of philosophy which in many instances originated with Catholics or were favoured by them, but certain tenets of which have been declared by the Church to be opposed to the teachings of revelation. We shall barely touch the philosophical argument, which belongs to Natural Theology (see Boedder, pp. 8—29); but we shall draw our proofs from Scripture and Tradition, the authority of which sources is admitted by our adversaries.

334. *Two opposite Errors.*—The erroneous views with which we are here concerned are, to a certain extent, opposite. The one, which goes by the name of Traditionalism, unduly depreciates the powers of the natural reason of man: the other, which has existed and exists in countless forms, may be called

Ontologism, although this word properly denotes a phase of opinion which is heartily rejected by many disciples of the school. These attribute more to human reason than is its due, tending to make it independent of experience, whereas the Traditionalists consider that reason is powerless to attain to a knowledge of God without the aid of revelation. We will speak first of Traditionalism, notwithstanding that by so doing we depart from chronological order.

335. *Traditionalism.*—The history of France in the eighteenth century is a most instructive study, especially if attention be directed to the connection which exists among the various phenomena that it offers for observation. Religion was represented by the Jansenistic heresy (n. 390, vi.), which presented a view of the Christian system that was philosophically altogether indefensible, while it offered encouragement to every form of revolt against authority. It endeavoured to force upon men an austere standard of conduct, and denounced as libertines all who taught that the yoke of Christ is sweet and His burden light. (St. Matt. xi. 30, and see xxiii. 4.) Men refused to submit to this excessive restraint, and had some excuse for saying that the Gospel was presented to them as necessarily involving intolerable rigour; so that many who began by being followers of the sect, in the end renounced all pretence of observing the Christian law, and, as was inevitable, they soon passed on to disregard the natural law also, and the utmost license prevailed. A theoretical defence for the new view of

morality was needed, and it was found in the assertion of the independence of man: the rule of God over the world, and then His very existence, was denied; the idea of duty was discarded, and the bonds of civil society were loosened. The result was the overthrow of social order, and the extravagances of the Revolution followed soon, as is inevitable in such cases, by a military despotism. As soon as order and settled government were restored, it was found that nothing but the influence of religion could secure a firm basis for civil society; and the Catholic reaction began.

Reactions are apt to go too far in the direction most opposed to the system which is superseded; and it was not unnatural that men who had seen how much mischief has resulted when human reason had been allowed to assert its independence of control, should believe that this reason was of itself incapable of doing good work, and that it absolutely needed supernatural help to enable it to attain to a knowledge even of natural truths. The history of the reaction affords many illustrations of what is here said; but nothing concerns us except to remark that a school of writers arose who taught that man, left to himself, could not attain to a certain knowledge of the existence of God: this certain knowledge was, they said, originally communicated to the race by a Divine revelation, the remembrance of which was handed down by tradition. Hence the name of Traditionalism given to the theory. The best known names among the Catholic supporters of this school are those of the

Viscount de Bonald, a statesman of the French Restoration, and Louis Bautain, who became Professor of Philosophy at Strasburg in 1819, but who was removed from his chair within three years, because it was judged that he combated materialism on unsound principles. He used every endeavour to vindicate his orthodoxy; and among other things, on September 8, 1840, he subscribed a proposition which may be regarded as the contradictory of the traditionalist position: "Reason can establish with certainty the existence of God." (Denz. 1488.)

336. *The Catholic Doctrine.*—The doctrine contained in this proposition was no longer doubted in Catholic schools, but it was not formally declared to be an article of faith (n. 94) until the year 1870, when the Vatican Council taught (Sess. 3, *De Revelat.* c. 2; Denz. 1634) that it is possible for the existence of God, the Beginning and End of all things, to be gathered with certainty from created things, by the aid of the natural light of human reason: and the first canon, on Revelation, of the same Session condemns all who should say that the existence of the one and true God cannot be gathered with certainty from creatures by the aid of the natural light of human reason. (Denz. 1653.)

It is our business to prove the doctrine here set forth from the records of revelation. It would not be sufficient to prove it by demonstrating the existence of God, however conclusively it were done; for this course would merely prove the truth of the doctrine, and would not show that it was a part of the revelation which the Church has received, and

so would not justify the decree of the Council. (n. 326.) The proof is not difficult: the doctrine is expressly taught in Holy Scripture. Thus we read that the heavens declare the glory of God (Psalm xviii. 1); that God has not left Himself without witness, doing good from Heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons (Acts xiv. 16); and the same doctrine is implied in the address of St. Paul to the Athenians. (Acts xvii. 24—28.) The same Apostle teaches also (Romans ii. 14, 15) that when the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature those things that are of the law, these having not the law are a law unto themselves, who show the work of the law written in their heart, their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another. This passage will come before us again; at present it is enough to say that the Apostle understands by Gentiles persons to whom no revelation has been given, and that these know they are bound by a law, which cannot be unless they know that there is a lawgiver having the right to control them.

But the most explicit statement of the doctrine is found in the Book of Wisdom (xiii. 1—8) and in the remarkable parallel passage in the Epistle to the Romans. (i. 19—25.) We are here taught that all men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God, where the word "vain" signifies that they have foolishly neglected to make use of their opportunities: God, who is invisible, is understood by the things that are made; so that they are

inexcusable: with much more to the same purpose. The point to be observed in all this is, that there is no hint of any revelation beyond that which is conveyed by the existence of the visible world, so that the force of the argument is recognized by man through the natural force of reason, without the need of any supernatural aid: and this is the doctrine which we support.

That our doctrine was held by the Fathers of early times follows from the way in which the apologists excuse themselves from insisting on anything so plain. It will be enough to quote two passages. One is from Clement of Alexandria (*Stromat.* v. 1; *P.G.* 9, 16): "It may be thought that there is no need to demonstrate the existence of God, so clearly is His providence taught by the mere sight of all His works;" the other from St. Augustine, who urges (*In Psalm* lxxiii. n. 25; *P.L.* 36, 944) that if from the actions of the man before us we conclude that he is living, so from the creatures that we see we should conclude that their Creator lives.

It may be observed that Traditionalism can scarcely be disentangled from the false doctrine that man lost his natural reason through the sin of Adam. (see n. 501.) Its supporters rely chiefly on certain philosophical considerations, which they regard as proving that the finite intelligence of man *cannot* know the Infinite Being, as to which view we shall have something to say presently. (n. 351.) They get no support from Scripture; and such passages of the Fathers as seem to lend them

countenance are explained by the consideration that revelation has made it easier for men to attain to the natural knowledge of God, and has added much to our knowledge which could not have been attained by natural means.

337. *God easily known.*—The texts which have been just quoted prove more than the doctrine which they have been adduced to support: they prove not merely that it is possible for man, by the use of the natural powers of his reason, to come to a knowledge of God, but that it is easy for him to do so. We are not dealing with a merely speculative possibility which is sure never to be realized, but with a perfectly practical matter. All the truths of geometry have been discovered by man by the use of his natural powers, and what man has done man can do: in a certain true sense, therefore, it is possible for every man to work out an elaborate system of geometry for himself, but practically the most gifted of men can hope for no more than to add a little to the store of truths that have been accumulated. This being so, it would be absurd to blame any one for not becoming an expert geometer, by the use of his own unaided reason: but the Scripture blames those who do not rise from the contemplation of creatures to a knowledge of the Creator (Wisdom xiii. 1), and pronounces them inexcusable. (Romans i. 20.) It follows that the attainment of the knowledge of God from creation is not merely speculatively possible, but practically easy. As we read in Job, the beasts and the birds, the earth and the sea, cry aloud that they are the

work of the hand of the Lord (Job xii. 7—9), and none can fail to hear their voice.

It is hardly worth while to quote the Fathers in support of this doctrine, for none of those who call it in question will admit that any weight attaches to the tradition of the Church, even though they may wish to show respect for the authority of the Scripture. It will suffice, therefore, to give one passage, to prove that our doctrine is not novel; it shall be that where St. Gregory Nazianzen declares that a man is very stupid (λίαν ἀγνώμων) who does not recognize the force of the demonstration from existing things. (Orat. 34 al 28, n. 6; *P.G.* 36, 33.) St. Thomas goes so far as to teach, as it seems, that the first thought of a man, on his reaching years of discretion, is one which involves a recognition of the being of God and His rights. (*Summa*, 1. 2. q. 89. a. 6. c.) But the teaching of the holy Doctor in this article is not commonly followed. (See Suarez, *De Peccato*, disp. 2, sec. 8.)

338. *Are there Atheists?*—It follows from what has been said that, if ever the belief in the existence of God is wanting to any man, there has been in the past some sin on that man's part: he is inexcusable: his ignorance is not inculpable nor invincible: if he applied his faculties honestly to the question and did his known duty in other respects, his ignorance would even now be dispelled. Such is, we hold, the plain teaching of revelation, and certainly revelation affords no basis for objections to the doctrine. But we are told that this doctrine is opposed to facts, and examples are

adduced of men who are atheists in good faith. As to these, we remark, in the first place, that our doctrine concerns men in whom the use of reason is developed, and it is possible, though not we think probable, that there are communities of men, nations of savages, whose intellectual powers never rise above the level of childhood: who are grown-up babies. With these, if such there be, we have nothing to do in this place; they are theologically to be still looked upon as infants. Then, all accounts which tell of the existence of godless nations are to be received with the greatest distrust. Many causes combine to make it most rash to feel confidence in the sufficiency of inquiries which have yielded a negative result as to the religion of savages. The subject is excellently discussed by Professor Flint (*Antitheistic Theories*, Lecture vii.), where it is remarked that "disinterested curiosity is what an uncivilized man cannot understand, and to question him is often of itself sufficient to render him suspicious and evasive." In the Appendix to the same work (notes 26—31), the author deals with the evidence adduced by Sir John Lubbock and others as proving the existence of certain nations of atheists: all of which turns out, on examination, to be insufficient for its purpose.

It is to be remarked that all the alleged examples of godless tribes are taken from savage life; but it is also said that the existence of a personal God is denied by some nations who are in possession of a literature which lets us know their mind, and who are pantheists. Such is said to be the case with

the Hindoos, Chinese, and Japanese. Now it is quite true that a system which gives the character of God to the universe at large, is for our purposes indistinguishable from atheism: the great point is whether there exist a God in whom are faculties corresponding to our intellect and will, and who is outside of, and superior to, all that we ordinarily see and feel, and who takes interest in the doings of men: but it is doubtful whether there exists any nation of pantheists. The Asiatic peoples that have been mentioned have among them men of learning who hold some more or less pantheistic theory of the universe (n. 342): but these theories have no hold on the multitude, who offer worship of some sort to persons, and pay no attention to the attempts of the philosophers to explain that these various persons are merely so many forms of the one eternal universe: and so, these peoples form no exception to the rule that we have established.

It remains to consider the case of individuals. In all ages there have been scattered instances of persons who have been called atheist. Sometimes this name is given to men who are far from accepting it, and it means that they seem to live as if they had no belief in God: thus used, the word is merely a groundless term of reproach, the use of which assumes, contrary to the fact, that a man's conduct is always in harmony with his belief. At other times, atheism is ascribed to speculators by admirers who think to pay a compliment to the boldness in thought which they would wish to emulate, were they able: and in some comparatively few instances

men have avowed themselves atheists; declaring that they have considered the question and have come to the conclusion that there is no God: or they may take the name of agnostics (ἀ privative and γνωστικός knowing), declaring that they do not know what to believe about it. In some of these cases, the avowal means no more than a declaration that these see difficulties which they cannot answer, which make against the argument for the being and providence of God: but these unanswered difficulties do not furnish ground for a true conviction, for it cannot honestly be denied that there are difficulties in the way of accepting the atheistic or agnostic theory: and what Dr. Johnson said in the controversy concerning the Cartesian philosophy is of wide application: "There are difficulties against a *plenum* and there are difficulties against a *vacuum*, yet one of them *must* be true." Besides this, mistakes arise from persons attaching different ideas to the word God, the Jews and early Christians, for example, being accused of atheism, because they refused to worship images as gods. (See Athenag. *Leg. pro Christo*, n. 4; *P.G.* 6, 897. The Jews were said to worship nothing but clouds.) Sometimes the claim to be an atheist may be mere bravado and falsehood: and lastly, we do not know how far the light of the intellect may be darkened in men who yield to a course of sin, and especially to pride, and its frequent sequels of a coarser nature; so we give heed to the admonition of St. Paul (Romans ii. 1), and pass judgment on no man, but leave all judgment to God; but we recognize the truth of the

terrible account which the same Apostle gives in the preceding chapter of the results of the blinding which comes of having the will set against believing.

339. *True Office of Tradition.*—While, for the reasons given, we hold as of faith that man's unassisted reason is competent to arrive at a knowledge of God from the contemplation of the world, and that in fact this knowledge is so easy of attainment that no man can blamelessly lack it; yet we are far from saying that it regularly is attained without the aid of tradition. Regularly and naturally man grows up and lives in the society of his fellows, and he hears from his parents or others that there exists a Person who is distinct from the world and is its Master, to whom observance of some sort is due: and he readily believes this truth, for there is nothing in his experience but what harmonizes with it: in fact, the more nearly he approaches to the conception of God as perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness, the more clearly he sees how the belief in God supplies answers to the multitude of riddles that nature proposes and which were else insoluble; and in this way he verifies the truth of what he had been told.

340. *Fundamental Truths.*—The belief in the being of God is, in some respects, in the same position as the belief in the fundamental truths of arithmetic and geometry. No one who understands the question doubts that twice three is six, always and everywhere, nor does he think that under some possible conditions of time and space two straight

lines may enclose a space: nor can there be room for doubt that the human mind is capable of discovering these truths for itself, although in fact probably no man now living has done so; all who have any belief at all upon the subject have, in fact, derived it from some other man. The truths can be known by unaided reason, but they are really first learned from tradition. Also, there have been thinkers who have speculated upon the grounds on which the universal belief rests, and have been unable to find any that seem to suffice: difficulties can be brought against all that are proposed: these men have therefore said that they see no reason to believe that the truths are universal, but at the same time they do not really doubt the universality: they do in fact believe, though they profess themselves unable to assign what seems to them a sufficient reason for the belief. It is probable that the state of mind of some professed atheists is similar to that of these sceptics in arithmetic and geometry.

341. *Ontologism.*—The Traditionalist school made too little of the natural powers of the human intellect. A counter-tendency is observable in another school of thought which has numbered many adherents among Catholic philosophers, but which in some of its phases has led to conclusions that have been condemned by the highest authority. This system goes by the name of Ontologism; and it may be said shortly that as the Traditionalist declares that apart from revelation man could not think of God at all, so the thorough-going Ontologist would say

that man cannot think of anything but God. Some remarks on the name will not be out of place.

The word Ontologism, according to its Greek etymology, signifies a discussion concerning existence (τὰ ὄντα, λόγος); and the word Ontology has the same origin, but the meaning is quite different. Ontology and Ontologism are alike in that they are concerned with existence, or with existing things considered in a highly abstract manner, but the manners are not the same. Ontology is a branch of Philosophy which discusses what there is that can be affirmed or denied concerning all things, whether actual or merely possible, as that they have a certain oneness, truth, goodness, beauty; they are caused or causeless, finite or infinite, and so on; and this discussion, in a rightly ordered arrangement, comes immediately after the two parts of Logic, and before the treatises on the Soul, on the World, and on God, which deal with particular existences, and constitute Special Metaphysics. Ontology is also called General Metaphysics, or First Principles, under which name it is treated by Father John Rickaby, in one of the volumes of the Stonyhurst Series. Some of the questions discussed in Ontology are among the deepest speculations of which the human mind is capable, and the student has abundant opportunities of falling into error; but the name is not used to denote any particular school of thought, and we have no further concern with it at present.

To prevent a possible confusion, it may be noticed that the word Deontology has no connection

with the words of which we have just been speaking: it is a word invented by Jeremy Bentham about the year 1800, as a name for the science of duty (*τὸ δέον*), which is more commonly known as Ethics, or Moral Philosophy.

342. *The Doctrine explained.*—In all ages and countries there have been thinkers who have dwelt upon the nature of existing things, endeavouring to detect what there is that is common to them all; and when they have allowed their speculations to go on their course without the check of constant comparison with the results of daily experience, they have sometimes brought themselves to overlook the differences among things, and to regard each thing as identical with all things else, as if each were merely a manifestation of the one common nature which they found in all. The result is that pantheistic systems of philosophy have been set up from time to time, and find favour with people of a dreamy, unpractical turn. Their adherents disclaim the name of atheist, for they declare that they recognize God in all that is: as if the thing they saw was God, instead of being merely His creature, the contemplation of which may lead us to a knowledge of the Creator. But this pantheistic God, who is identical with the world, cannot have personal attributes, such as intellect, or will; nor can His providence rule the world with which He is identified; nor can He, by His sanction of the moral law, exercise control over the acts of man, for these are His own acts: so that in many respects pantheism is indistinguishable from atheism, at the

same time that it exercises an attraction, which may almost be called a fascination, even on some persons who would detest anything that they recognized as opposed to the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Thus it is that the Jew Spinoza, the originator of much modern European pantheism, is described as "God-intoxicated" by the Catholic novelist Novalis, while the scoffer Bayle thinks to compliment him when he calls him a systematic atheist. (See Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, 2, 162.)

We may notice in passing the strange religious system originated by Auguste Comte, a Frenchman, who died in 1857, and who still has followers who call themselves Positivists. This name is derived from certain philosophical views held by them, and by its use they arrogate to themselves the exclusive possession of trustworthy knowledge. They have a religion full of ascetic practice, prayer, saints' days, and the like: in fact, Comte, like the Emperor Julian (n. 223), saw the wisdom of the practices used by the Catholic Church, and transferred them to a new purpose. The object of the positivist religion is Humanity, the race of men as a whole. In truth, Pantheism and Positivism alike are *fetich* religions, where the worshipper arbitrarily ascribes personal qualities to a mere thing: Humanity and the Universe are as true fetiches as any bit of rag that holds a negro in awe. They are *factitious* gods; and this word "factitious," with which the word fetich is identical, was used by the early Portuguese navigator of the degrading superstitions that they found prevailing on the coast of Africa.

Of course the Ontologistic school of philosophy is far from holding the pantheistic position that the world of sense actually is God; but their views are exposed to attack from the pantheistic forces, just as the traditionalist finds it hard to defend himself against the atheist who asks why a man should believe in God because of a revelation made known by tradition, unless he already knows from other sources that there is a God, and that His utterances cannot prudently be rejected? The fundamental position of Ontologism may be thus described: that God is seen by the mind of man directly and immediately: that God is the first object of all our knowledge, and that all else that we know is seen by us as a modification of this first knowledge. Among precursors of Ontologism may be reckoned certain mystics, who have held that it is possible even in this life to attain by ascetic practices to a clear vision of God, such as is in truth reserved for the Blessed in Heaven, who see God in the light of glory, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Four Last Things. Phases of this doctrine were condemned, at different times, especially at the Council of Vienne in 1311. (Denz. 403.) The modern school may be said to have originated with Des Cartes, who died in 1650; the doctrine was put into shape by Malebranche (1715), a priest of the French Oratory; and among its followers may be mentioned Gioberti (1852), Rosmini (1855), and Ubaghs. It is no longer possible for a Catholic to uphold the ontologistic theory in the fulness with which it has sometimes been proposed, for

there are authoritative utterances of the Holy See, to be quoted immediately, which stand in the way: but the tendency of the human mind which gave birth to the doctrine still remains, and will manifest itself in forms that must be discussed by the philosophers and theologians of the future, whose labours will winnow away whatever error there may be lurking among much that is true.

343. *The Catholic Doctrine.*—A decree of the Congregation of the Inquisition, dated September 18, 1861, declared that seven propositions there set forth could not be safely taught. There is some controversy as to the precise force of this declaration (see the question discussed, Bucceroni, *Enchiridion*, Appendix to first edition), but this at least seems to be true, that no proposition which nad been qualified in these terms has afterwards turned out to be the accepted doctrine of the Church; there is, therefore, strong reason to believe that these seven propositions (Denz. 1516—1523) are inadmissible. Some of them concern Universals, and belong to Philosophy, another will come before us when we speak of God as Creator (n. 427); but there are three that bear immediately on the subject of this chapter. They run as follows: (1) The immediate knowledge of God, at least by way of habit, is essential to the intellect of man, so that without it the intellect is unable to know anything; for it is itself the light of the intellect. (2) That Being which we understand in all things, and without which we understand nothing, is the Being

of God. (5) All other ideas are nothing but modifications of the idea by which God is understood as simply Being.

Another decree of the Inquisition, dated December 14, 1887, passes a severer censure upon forty propositions, extracted from certain works purporting to be written by Rosmini, but published after his death. These propositions are reprobated, condemned, and proscribed in the proper sense of the author, and the Bishops of the Catholic world are earnestly warned not to allow them to be taught in their Seminaries: and this decree was approved and confirmed by the Pope. All these propositions show more or less tendency towards Ontologism. It will be enough for our purpose to quote the first and the fifth.

(1) In the sphere of creation there is manifested immediately to the intellect of man something Divine in itself, that is to say, something that belongs to the Divine Nature.

(5) The being of which man has intuition must necessarily be something belonging to a being which is necessary and eternal, the Cause that creates, determines, and limits all contingent beings: and this is God.

Another concerns our knowledge of the Blessed Trinity. (n. 402.)

We leave to writers on Natural Theology the task of minutely discussing the bearing of these and kindred propositions, and refuting them from reason (see Boedder, *Nat. Theol.* 12—29): our work will be to justify the condemnation that has been passed

upon them by showing that they are opposed to the clear teaching of Scripture. That which is immediately made known to the intellect is *seen*, in the only sense in which sight can be attributed to a spiritual substance, such as the soul: it is seen as it is, in itself without there being need of any contrivance to assist the sight: but the Scripture teaches that to *see* God is a happiness reserved for the Blessed in the next life; most specially for the clean of heart (St. Matt. v. 8), which Beatitude St. Thomas connects with cleanness of the bodily eye as disposing to clearness of sight. (*Summ. Theol.* 1. 2. q. 69. a. 4. c., and compare 2. 2. q. 8. a. 7.; see also St. Aug. Serm. 53 [14], *De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, c. 6, n. 6; *P.L.* 38—366.) St. John tells us that when God shall appear, we *shall* be like to Him, for we *shall* see Him as He is (1 St. John iii. 2); and nothing can be more express than the teaching of St. Paul (1 Cor. xiii. 12), who speaks of the time when faith and hope shall be done away, and charity shall remain; and declares that "we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." The translation here is perhaps not very happy, and the sense would be expressed more clearly if for "through a glass," we said, "by the aid of a mirror" (*δι' ἐσόπτρου, per speculum*); the meaning is clear, that at present God is seen as reflected in the mirror of His creatures; but the time will come when the faithful Christian will see Him by direct vision, without the need of a mirror. More will be said on this matter when we come to speak of the condition of the

Blessed in Heaven, in the Treatise on the Four Last Things.

344. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have tried to explain the opposed systems of Traditionalism and Ontologism; we have shown that man is capable of attaining to some knowledge of God without the aid of tradition, though this renders its attainment easier; and that in fact it is so easy of attainment, that regularly no man can be without it: and we have cited passages of Holy Scripture proving that Catholic philosophers who maintain that man has no immediate knowledge of God, are using natural reason in support of revealed doctrine.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

345. *The Subject of the Chapter.*—The proof of the existence of God does not in strictness belong to Dogmatic Theology, for this science discusses the contents of the records of revelation (nn. 3, 4), and if there be no God there can be no revelation. Nevertheless, it will be convenient in this chapter, to sketch some of the proofs furnished by Philosophy for this fundamental conviction, and they shall be illustrated from Holy Scripture and from the Fathers. We shall explain the sense in which the word "incomprehensible" is applied to God, and some remarks on the Names of God will close the chapter.

346. *The Metaphysical Argument.*—In the first place, we will give a sketch of one form of what is called the metaphysical proof of the existence of God, which endeavours to show that the mere contemplation of the idea of an infinite being leads to the conviction of the existence of such a being. This form is that invented by St. Anselm, an Italian, who was long a monk at Bec, in Normandy, and then Archbishop of Canterbury, and who died in 1109. It is too famous in the history of the subject

to be omitted, although there is by no means general agreement as to its force. It is sometimes called the ontological argument, because it proceeds upon an analysis of the idea of being (*τὸ ὄν*); but the sense of the word used in this connection has nothing to do with the kindred words which we have already discussed. (n. 341.)

The argument in question is contained in a short tract, which first appeared without any name of author, or title properly so called, but with merely the heading, Faith in search of Understanding (*Fides quærens intellectum*): but it was subsequently issued with the author's name, and the title *Proslogion*, or Address on the Existence of God; it is so-called, because the discourse is thrown into the form of an address to God, and thus differs from a former work of the same writer's, which is a Monologium, or Soliloquy. The history of the composition of the *Proslogion* is told by St. Anselm himself, in the Introduction (*P.L.* 158, 223), and a few particulars are added by his friend and biographer, Eadmer. (*Ibid.* 63.) St. Anselm, while yet a monk at Bec, conceived a great desire to discover some one short argument to prove the existence of God, and that He has the attributes which faith ascribes to Him. He found the task too difficult for him, and he despaired and endeavoured to put away the thought, especially as he observed that the question forced itself on him in time of prayer, and would not be banished. At length the moment came, and one night, while he was singing Matins, "the grace of God shone upon his heart and the thing became

clear to his intellect, filling all his interior with immense joy and jubilation." The precious thoughts were hastily committed to writing, and after some perils had been happily surmounted (see Mr. Rule's *Life of St. Anselm*, I, 196), they finally took the shape in which we now have them. Speaking of the fool who has said in his heart, There is no God (Psalm xiii. 1), the author endeavours to convict him out of his own mouth of self-contradiction; for the fool can, he says, think of something, the greatest thing that can be thought of; and this thing must exist, for were it non-existent, then the same thing thought of as existing would be greater than the greatest, which is absurd: therefore, there exists something than which nothing greater can be thought of, "and this art Thou, our Lord God." From this foundation, the attributes of God are deduced. In this way, St. Anselm attained what he had prayed for, that he might know God so far as God knew it to be expedient for him.

St. Anselm was well aware of the danger of putting forward novelties in Theology. He would have been glad (Epist. I, 74; *P.L.* 158, 1144) to have restricted the circulation of his Soliloquy, for he feared that it would come into the hands of some who were more bent on blaming than on understanding what they read, and if they came across anything new they would cry out that the doctrine was unheard of and absurd: but he had no objection to intelligent criticism. When then another monk, Gaunilo by name, wrote an apology for the fool (*P.L.* 158, 241), pointing out what

seemed a weak point in Anselm's argument, while he declared that apart from this flaw, all was to be received with great praise and veneration, St. Anselm took care that Gaunilo's critique should always be copied as a sequel to his *Proslogion*, together with his own reply to the criticism (Eadmer; *P.L.* 158, 64), and thus the whole argument came under the eyes of the reader.

St. Anselm was the first of the schoolmen in point of time (n. 6), and not far from being the first in intellectual power, while his character is still regarded with enthusiastic affection by many of those who are at the pains to become acquainted with his works. Regret, therefore, must be felt that the argument of which the inventor thought so highly has not been approved by other thinkers. It still has its defenders. In particular it must not be confounded with the error of the Ontologists, according to whom, reasoning is no more needed to prove the existence of God, than to prove that there is a sun in the heavens; what we see we do not know by reasoning. St. Anselm, on the contrary, deduces the existence of God by a process of thought, which is certainly reasoning, whatever may be considered to be its value. The flaw that Gaunilo pointed out is expressed as follows by St. Thomas (*Summa*, 1. q. 2. art. 1. ad 2.): It does not follow that what is the greatest possible object of thought exists in reality, unless it be granted that there is something existing in reality which is the greatest possible object of thought; which is not granted by those who deny that God exists. This

remark is commonly regarded as fatal to the argument.

347. *Necessary and Contingent.*—It is clear that things exist in the world that are subject to change; that might be other than they are. Thus the earth, for instance, has a certain size; but there is no impossibility in its being larger or smaller. But it cannot have fixed its own size, which must, therefore, have been fixed for it by something different from itself; and if it be said that its present existence in its actual size is the outcome of fixed laws by which matter acts, yet these fixed laws must have had a certain quantity of matter to act on, and had there been more matter or less the result would have been different from what it actually is: and so, the speculations on the origin of the universe which go by the name of the nebular hypothesis or the like, merely put back the question; as physical theories they are more or less plausible, and they may have some pretension to be accepted as explaining the proximate cause of the size of the earth: but all such theories start with the supposition that a certain quantity of matter existed, and the remark recurs that this matter cannot have determined how bulky it should be: this must have been determined for it by some cause outside it. Also, this mass of matter must have had in its beginning some particular distribution through space, and there must have been some reason for its having this particular distribution, and no other; but this reason must have been something distinct from the matter of which it determines the distribu-

tion. The same argument may be applied to countless other matters, and we are always brought to something which is itself uncaused but is the cause of all things else: in technical language, contingent existence implies necessary existence. And this necessary Being is God, who is infinite and unlimited. The development of this argument, and the discussion of objections that may be urged against it, must be sought from Philosophy.

This argument from what is caused to what is uncaused was familiar to St. John of Damascus, who died in 754, having done much to put the theology of the Eastern Fathers in systematic shape. He argues (*De Fid. Orthod.* i. 3; *P.G.* 94, 796) that what is changeable must have been created, and that the creating cause must either itself have been created, in which case the argument recurs; or it was uncreated, and this is the causeless, unchanging God. And among the Latins, St. Augustine has the same argument. (*De Civit. Dei*, 8, 6; *P.L.* 41, 231.)

348. *The Wise Designer.*—Wisdom is said to consist in the adaptation of means to ends, and the universe is full of instances where two things are adapted one to the other so as to produce a result. Thus, to take a simple instance, the feet of a man are suited for supporting him in an upright position, and his head is poised on the top of his back-bone in such a way as is suited for the same posture. Both the form of the feet and the situation of the head differ from those of all other animals, and one would be useless without the

other. We have, then, here an arrangement which presents the character of being wise, and we infer that it is the work of a wise Arranger; and it does not matter whether He Himself made the arrangement, or whether it is the result of the working of blind laws, which had been arranged by Him to lead up to the useful combination: the indication of wisdom is the same. Every reader will easily find illustrations of this argument in his own observation, and a profusion of them are collected in the Bridgwater Treatises. A loud-voiced clique of writers in England and Germany have of late years devoted themselves to crying down this argument, calling attention to the explanations, more or less fanciful, by which they think that the existence of the present order of things may be accounted for, as the result of the operation of blind laws: they are heedless of the truth that their guesses at most throw back the time when the conscious Agent made His arrangements: the needles of an electric telegraph move according to blind laws, but if their movements convey an intelligible message, no one can help believing that there is an intelligent operator at the other end: nor will a writer be listened to who tries to explain that the laws of electricity necessarily led to the movements that were observed: he will be told that this may be, and doubtless is so, if he only means that the act of the sender of the message necessarily produced the observed result; but he will be asked whether it is not plain that the receipt of the message is the result of the action of one who foresaw and

intended that it should go: he adapted means to an end, and so was wise.

Let us imagine that there was a company of men who knew nothing of God, but who were discussing all the instances of adaptation which are collected in the Bridgwater Treatise on the Hand, the work of Sir Charles Bell. They would be wholly at a loss to account for what they saw, until the suggestion was made that all would be clear, if there were a very wise and all-powerful Being, whose works were before them. It would be at once acknowledged that this was a sufficient explanation, and the only possible explanation of the observed facts. They would be led to acknowledge the existence of the Wise Designer. On all this matter, some writings of Father John Gerard may be consulted with advantage. (*Science and Scientists*, and others.)

This argument was familiar to Job, as we see from the twelfth chapter of his book, verses 7—9: "Ask the beasts and they shall teach thee, and the birds of the air and they shall tell thee. Speak to the earth and it shall answer thee, and the fishes of the sea shall tell. Who is ignorant that the hand of the Lord has made all these things?" The same idea is developed at length in chapters xxxvii.—xli. See too Psalm ciii., Wisdom xi., Ecclus. xliii., St. Matt. vi. 25—30, Acts xiv. 16, &c.

It would be endless to transcribe all the passages in which the Fathers urge this same argument. A very few specimens must suffice. St. Athanasius says (*Contra Gentes*, n. 35; *P.L.* 25, 69) that when

we see a work of the excellent sculptor Phidias, we recognize the hand of the unseen artist in the proportion of the parts and the grace of the whole: so, the universe around us tells the greatness of the unseen Creator: and the same Father goes on to point out that the motions of the heavenly bodies, so orderly yet so diversified, irresistibly lead to the conviction that they are under guidance. The beauty of the world impressed itself upon St. Augustine, no less than the power that it indicated (*De Civit. Dei*, xi. 4, 2; *P.L.* 41, 319); and he declares that it must come from the hand of a God, ineffably and invisibly great, ineffably and invisibly fair.

349. *Other Proofs.*—We can but mention the proof of the being of God which many writers find in the sense of an essential difference between right and wrong, which is an integral part of man's nature. Great as is the diversity in the moral judgments of men, the fruit of unrestrained indulgence of passion on the part of themselves or of those to whom they owe their education, yet all men as a matter of fact recognize that there is a sense in which some of their actions are right, and others wrong, just as they recognize that some lines are straight and others crooked; and to recognize this implies that they recognize that there is a law which binds them, and a Lawgiver who is guardian of this law, rewarding and punishing. In this way man recognizes that in his own heart, no less than in the world outside him, there is an order which must be the work of an ordainer; and thus man is termed

a microcosm, or little world, as distinguished from the macrocosm, or visible universe. An elaborate account of the senses in which man is a microcosm may be read in the Life of Pythagoras, given in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius. (Cod. 249; *P.G.* 103, 1584.)

The consent of men, at least morally universal, furnishes another convincing proof of the existence of God. (See n. 338.) For an estimate of the comparative value of these proofs, and the answer to certain objections raised against them, we refer to Father Boedder's work. (*Natural Theology*, Stonyhurst Series, chapter 2.) *Theism*, by Dr. Flint, is also excellent. See also Ward's *Essays on Theism*.

350. *The Sight of God.*—The proofs that have been adduced, and others that might be collected, teach us something about God, namely, that He exists: we proceed to show how imperfect is our knowledge. In the first place, we are accustomed to regard our sight as the sense which gives us the fullest information about things; but it is plainly impossible for a living man to see God with the eyes of his body, for God is a Spirit, without body, as will be shown (nn. 365, 366), and therefore there is no aptitude in the bodily eye to see Him: and so St. Paul declares that God is invisible (1 Timothy i. 17), and that He inhabiteth light inaccessible, who no man hath seen nor can see. (1 Timothy vi. 16.) Perhaps the contrary doctrine has not been upheld by any Christian, except certain Greek monks, whose absurdities may be read in Petavius. (*De Deo*, i. 13.) These men were accustomed to bend themselves double into a constrained position, and they

then thought that they saw light flowing from their nostrils, and this light was God Himself; they were condemned by a Synod held at Constantinople in 1330.

Not only is this so, but it is also impossible for the eye of the body to be raised to the capacity to see God in Himself: the needful change would in fact be such a change of the eye as amounted to the destruction of it. This follows from what has been already said on the want of proportion between the bodily organ and a pure spirit, which want of proportion must always exist as long as the nature remains unchanged. The bodily eye can see the effects of God's working, and in this way may be said to see God, as it may be said that we see the life of a man when we see his movements. This is plainly taught by St. Augustine (Epist. 147 [112], *Ad Paulin.* c. 9, n. 22; *P.L.* 33, 606), where he says that neither in this life nor in the next can God be seen by man, in the same way as visible things are seen. And although in another place (*De Civit. Dei*, xxii. 29, 3; *P.L.* 41, 799) the holy Doctor uses some words which, taken alone, might seem to suggest that he thought that the eyes of the Blessed in Heaven were elevated so as to be capable of seeing incorporeal substances, yet if the whole passage is read, it will be seen to mean no more than that the eye will see the effects of the action of pure spirits. When Job says (xix. 26), "In my flesh I shall see God," he refers to the body which will be restored to him at the resurrection, and he trusts that while clothed with this body he will have the intellectual

vision of God which constitutes the blessedness of the saints: he will see God *in* the body, but not by the bodily organ. Again, when he says (Job xlii. 5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee," his words are to be explained of intellectual vision, as St. Paul speaks of the eye of the heart. (Ephes. i. 17.)

We shall see in our Treatise on the Four Last Things, in the third volume, that it is possible for man to be raised supernaturally to have an intellectual vision of God which is described as seeing Him "face to face." (1 Cor. xiii. 12.)

We often read in the Old Testament that God was seen by holy men, as Abraham (Genesis xviii. 1), Moses (Exodus xxxiii. 18—24), Isaias (vi. 1), and others. In all probability, what was seen on these occasions was an Angel, deputed to assume a material body and represent his invisible Master: the discussion of the matter will be found in the commentators. The three men who appeared to Abraham, and who speak as one (verse 10), are believed to correspond to the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity. See the fourth epistle of Pope Nicholas I. to the Emperor Michael (*P.L.* 119, 777, and *post*, n. 403); the peculiar phrase used of the partial vision granted to Moses, is taken to indicate the knowledge of the Creator which is to be gained from the study of creation.

351. *God incomprehensible* (n. 372).—The word "incomprehensible" is used of that which cannot be completely embraced by the mind; of that of which none but an imperfect knowledge can be gained. We

proceed to show that in this sense, God is incomprehensible to every created intellect. Not that He is all-unknown to His creatures, but that He is essentially not all-known.

It is recorded of the profane heretic Aetius, one of the coarser sort of Arians of the fourth century, that his boast was, "I know God thoroughly; I know Him better than I know myself." To know God in this way, he would say, is all that God requires of us, and we need not heed the commandments, for Christ teaches (St. John xvii. 3) that to know God is eternal life. (St. Epiphan. *Hær.* 76, c. 4; *P.G.* 42, 521.)

In opposition to this novel profanity, as St. Chrysostom calls it (Hom. 2, *De Incomprehens.* n. 3; *P.G.* 48, 712), the Lateran Council of 1215, declared that God is incomprehensible (Denz. 355), and the declaration is repeated by the Council of the Vatican. (Denz. 1631.) Whatever is the full force of the word "incomprehensible," it certainly includes as much as we have described above, and the proof of the doctrine of the Councils is found in the consideration that if the intellect fully comprehend a thing there is in some measure an equation between the intellect and that which it comprehends; the intellect is adequate to the task; but no equation is possible between the infinite Creator and the essentially finite creature. (n. 347.) There is express revelation upon the subject, as when the friend of Job, whose utterances are adopted by the inspired writer, declares (Job xxxvi. 26) that God is great, exceeding our knowledge. God is great in

counsel and incomprehensible in thought (Jerem. xxxii. 19), and our Lord speaks to the same effect. (St. Matt. xi. 17.) See also 1 Timothy vi. 16, and especially 1 Cor. ii. 10—12, where the doctrine is developed.

For the view of the Fathers, it will be enough to quote St. Gregory of Nazianzum, who declares that in this life no knowledge of God reaches us except a slender stream, a tiny ray shining forth from the mighty Light. (Orat. 28 [34], n. 17; *P.G.* 36, 48.) Origen compares the incapacity of man to gain full knowledge of God to the inability of the human eye to study the sun; the excess of light is the cause of blindness. (*Periarchon*, i. 1; *P.G.* 11, 121.)

352. *God ineffable.*—The Lateran and Vatican Councils, in the places lately quoted, tell us that God is not only incomprehensible, but is also ineffable, unutterable; success cannot possibly attend the attempt to describe Him perfectly by human language. And the one attribute follows from the other, for our words are the signs of our thought; and therefore, since we cannot comprehend Him in thought, so we cannot express Him by words. Nevertheless we read in Exodus (xv. 3), that the Lord is a man of war: Almighty is His name. Thus we have an appearance of contradiction between the Councils and Holy Scripture; but the difficulty disappears as soon as we observe that ineffability merely means that no human word can completely describe the essence of God, and is quite consistent with the possibility of finding words which

signify, however imperfectly, some part of that essence: a phrase which must not be understood to mean that there are parts in God, who is absolutely simple (n. 365), but of whom we are compelled to use such phrases as correspond with the only way of viewing the Creator that is possible to a creature. Thus, Almighty is a name of God, signifying one of His attributes, His unlimited power.

353. *The Names of God.*—Many names are given to God in Holy Scripture; that is to say, He calls Himself by many names out of condescension to the limited capacity of our minds, and in order that we may profit by many glimpses of what He is. The thirteenth question of the First Part of the *Summa* of St. Thomas treats of the Names of God, and theologians, in their comments upon this passage, have some most subtle discussions as to the mode of signification of these Names, how far they are affirmative or negative, substantives or attributes. We do not propose to go into these matters, but shall be content with some remarks upon the more prominent of the Names which are found in Holy Scripture.

We find these Names collected by St. Jerome, in one of the series of letters which he wrote to his studious lady friend, Marcella, replying to the question with which she plied him on various points of Hebrew learning. (Epist. 25 al 136; *P.L.* 22, 428.) We will take the Names in order, as they are given in this letter.

I. *El.*—The Hebrew word *El* signifies the Strong

One, as St. Jerome notices; or sometimes, in the abstract, Strength. (Genesis xxxi. 29.) It is used of Nabuchonosor, the mighty King of Babylon (Ezechiel xxxi. 11) and of the gods of the heathen (Exodus xv. 11), and of idols (Isaias xliv. 10, &c.); but especially of the one true, all-powerful God. It is remarked that in those works it almost always has some kind of epithet, as the living God (Josue iii. 10), or the God of Bethel (Genesis xxxi. 13), *i.e.*, the God who appeared to Jacob in Bethel; and the same is often the case in poetical passages, as the Mighty God (Isaias ix. 6), said by the Prophet of Christ; but it also appears very frequently without any attribute. (Psalm v. 5, &c.) The word *Eli* (St. Matt. xxvii. 46), used by our Blessed Lord on the Cross, signifies "My God;" it is the first word of the Twenty-second Psalm.

II. *Elohim.*—This is the most common word for God, considered as the Ruler of the universe and of all men, and in this way it is used in the first verse of Genesis for the Creator of the world. There is some uncertainty whether this word is connected etymologically with *El,* for it is maintained by some that it comes from a verb which signifies "to revere." It is used of the gods of the heathen (Exodus xii. 12); also of the holy angels (Psalm viii. 6), and even of men in dignified positions, as magistrates (Exodus xxi. 6), but it far more commonly means the one true God. It is to be remarked that the form of the word is plural, as shown by the termination *-im* (compare cherub, cherubim); but it is almost invariably construed

with the verb in the singular (*e.g.*, Genesis i. 1, and see n. 155), but there are exceptions (Genesis xx. 13; 3 Kings xix. 2), for which special reasons can often be assigned: for instance, the plural form was natural in the place last quoted, for the words are those of the polytheist Jezabel (see 3 Kings xxi. 25, 26), who however could be pious enough when it suited her wicked purpose. (verse 10 of the same chapter.)

III. *Eloe* is the next word in St. Jerome's list. It is not of frequent occurrence, and it cannot be distinguished in use from *Elohim*, to which it corresponds in form, as the singular to the plural. With the suffix for "My God," it would give *Eloi*, which is read in St. Mark's Gospel (xv. 34), while St. Matthew has *Eli*.

IV. *Sabaoth*, is not so much a Name of God as an epithet, describing Him as having command over the armies of the angels, the heavenly host. It is in very frequent use, especially in the more elevated and poetical passages (3 Kings xix. 10; Psalm lxxix. 8, 15), but also in simple narrative. (1 Kings i. 3.) The literal meaning of the word is "armies." (Genesis xxi. 22.) The "people of the army" (Numbers xxxi. 32), means the soldiers. The word is represented by St. Luke's phrase, "the multitude of the heavenly host" (St. Luke ii. 13), for the angels who were seen by the shepherds at Bethlehem; and we may compare St. Matt. xxvi. 53, where our Lord speaks of twelve legions of angels.

V. *Elion* has nothing to do with the words *El* and *Elohim*; it is of an entirely different origin, and

is fairly represented by the usual translation, "Most High." It is applied in various ways, as to the upper storey of a building (Ezechiel xlii. 5); but in a special manner as a Name of God: either with *El*, "God most High" (Genesis xiv. 18), or alone, as in the prophecy of Balaam. (Numbers xxiv. 16.) This last use is chiefly poetical.

VI.—IX. St. Jerome gives four names, *Adonai*, *Ieje*, *Ie*, and one which he calls the Tetragrammon, or Four Letters, which, he tells us, some persons ignorantly pronounce PIPI. It will be convenient to treat of these four Names together, after saying what is needed concerning the tenth.

X. *Saddai.*—This name, spelt by St. Jerome as here written, but more usually represented by *Shaddai*, corresponds to the English name, Almighty. It was especially the Name by which God made Himself known to the Patriarchs, as He Himself declared to Moses (Exodus vi. 2, 3), and it is often used in the Book of Genesis. (xvii. 1; xxviii. 3, &c.) It is also very often found in the Book of Job (viii. 3, 5, &c.), and is not unusual elsewhere. It does not call for further remark, so we proceed to explain the four Names that were omitted.

354. *The Tetragrammon.*—There is a Name of God of very frequent occurrence throughout the Old Testament, which is represented by consonants corresponding to the English YHVH, and which, therefore, is often spoken of as the Tetragrammon, or Tetragrammaton, the Greek word for Four Letters: this name was familiar to St. Jerome, as we see from the letter to Marcella, quoted in the

last paragraph. No vowels were used in the old Hebrew writings, and the knowledge of the pronunciation of words was kept alive by oral tradition only. The word before us was, out of reverence, never uttered in public, and the knowledge of the vowels to be used with it was confined to the High Priest and a very few leading men, and it is now utterly lost.

The pronunciation PIPI was, as St. Jerome notes, due to ignorance. The Hebrew letters of the Tetragrammaton have a superficial resemblance to the Greek letters *πιπι*, for which they may be mistaken by one who is unacquainted with the Hebrew alphabet; and these Greek letters correspond to the Roman letters PIPI.

The reverence which forbade all utterance of the sacred Name, extended even to the public reading of the Scriptures, in which this Name is frequently found, and the plan was adopted that so often as it occurred, the reader uttered *Adonai*, which thus became a substitute for the Name of God. *Adonai* is modified from *Adon*, which properly signifies the master of a household, but in the longer form is used of God alone; and in all cases, whether used on its own account or as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton, it is translated in the Septuagint and in the Vulgate by the Greek (*Κύριος*) and Latin (*Dominus*), words which correspond to the English Lord. When, therefore, the word Lord is used in the English version, it is impossible to tell, without further information, whether it represents *Adonai*, or stands for the Tetragrammaton.

The Jews still retain their primitive, reverential practice of substituting *Adonai* for the sacred Name. Christians have adopted the plan of uttering the *o* and *a* of this word with the four consonants, so as to form a word Yehovah, or Jehovah; and this last word is not uncommon in the pages of some English writers, and may be used without objection to represent the Name that we are discussing.

Jehovah is, however, absolutely meaningless and impossible as a Hebrew word, and has no pretence to represent the original pronunciation. The result of the speculations of students upon the subject is that the form Yahveh is now generally supposed to be the nearest attainable approach to the lost sound; and this form is freely used both by Catholics and others, when they have occasion to show regard to the niceties of Hebrew grammar. (See *e.g.*, Cornely, *Introductio*, ii. nn. 30, seq.)

A shortened form of this sacred word is found as the final element in very many Hebrew proper names: thus we have Abdias, the Servant of the Lord; Isaias, the Salvation of the Lord; Ananias, the Favour of the Lord, and many others. The same occurs at the end of the familiar word *Alleluia*, which means, "Praise ye the Lord."

355. *The Revelation on Horeb.*—The Tetragrammaton appears to have been first made known by God to Moses, on the occasion described in the third chapter of the Book of Exodus. (Compare Exodus vi. 2, 3.) It is used in Genesis interchangeably with *Elohim*, and this distinction may often be traced that the unpronounced word is used as the

proper Name of the God who had peculiar care of the nation of the Israelites and of the line of their ancestors, while *Elohim* is the God of Nature (n. 353, ii.), who is not considered as entering into covenants with His creatures. But this distinction is not always obvious, and various speculations have been grounded upon the alternative use of the two Names, into which this is not the place to enter: they are discussed by interpreters or by writers on the special subject of the origin and composition of the Pentateuch. Possibly the Names indicate that Moses availed himself of various sources of information. (n. 140.) But the whole subject is still in doubt, and no certain conclusion can be arrived at.

The circumstances of what seems to have been the first revelation of the Name, are related in the Book of Exodus. God appeared to Moses, and commissioned him to lead the Israelites out of Egypt, giving him assurance of success by the solemn promise to be "with him." (Exodus iii. 12, and compare n. 206.) The misgivings of Moses were removed by these words, but he foresees a difficulty, and proceeds to ask God in what name the message is to be conveyed to Pharao and the people whom he holds in slavery; and so we come to the fourteenth verse, which, with the following verse, may be literally translated as follows:

14. And Elohim said to Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and He said, Thus shalt thou say to the sons of Israel, I AM has sent me to you.

15. And Elohim said further to Moses, Thus shalt thou say to the sons of Israel, YAHVEH, the

Elohim of your fathers, the Elohim of Abraham, the Elohim of Isaac, and the Elohim of Jacob, has sent me to you. This is My Name and My memorial for generation after generation.

The words translated in the first verse are in the Hebrew *Ieye asher Ieye*, and therefore correspond to the seventh in St. Jerome's list of names (n. 353), but it seems better to translate them. They are the assertion by God that in Him is the fulness of Being; the various ways in which this can be truly said, may be seen in Cornelius à Lapide on the place.

It seems natural to suppose that the Tetragrammaton has a similar meaning, and that it would express that God is the Necessary Being. (n. 347.) If so, it is doubtful whether the pronunciation can be Yahveh, for this form, though derived from the verb expressing existence, would most naturally, though not necessarily, mean the Causer of Being, the Creator. (n. 348.) It is enough to indicate that there is a difficulty, the solution of which seems not to have been discovered; and it must be remembered that the pronunciation proposed for the Name, though more probable than any other, is still extremely doubtful. It is commonly adopted, but merely because of the convenience of having some form that can be pronounced.

356. *The word "Lord."*—It follows from what nas been said, that the word "Lord" is used in English Bibles to express at least three very different words of the original. It may stand for the simple *Adon*, which is sometimes a mere title, as when

Urias speaks of "my lord Joab" (2 Kings xi. 11), to show his respect: sometimes it means owner, especially of slaves (Genesis xxiv. 12), and here it is translated "master," which perhaps might be always used to represent it. God is called the Lord or Master of all the earth (Josue iii. 11), and the word *Adon* is often joined with other Divine Names. (Exodus xxiii. 17; Isaias iii. 1.)

The fuller form, *Adonai*, is used of God alone, whether in speaking to Him (Genesis xviii. 30), or of Him (3 Kings xxii. 6); it is of frequent occurrence. The word is preserved, not translated, in two places in the Vulgate. (Exodus vi. 3, and Judith xvi. 16.) As to the first of these, see n. 353, x.; and it is to be observed that the Book of Judith, whatever may have been the language of the original, is not now extant except in Greek, or in versions derived from the Greek. The word *Adonai* occurs, as applicable to Christ, in the second of the "great Antiphons" which the Church sings at the close of Advent.

Lastly, the word "Lord" is continually used in the English version in places where the Hebrew has the Tetragrammaton. This is not to be regarded as intended as a translation of the unutterable Name, but of the word *Adonai* which the Israelites were accustomed to utter in its place. (n. 354.) When so used, it is distinguished in many editions by being printed in spaced type, L o r d. It is the word always used by the Prophets when they introduce their messages with the words, Thus saith the Lord, and the like; also in the formula, "As the Lord liveth." (*e.g.*, 1 Kings xiv. 45, and elsewhere.)

It will be found that all the passages admit, and some seem to require, that the word should be taken as a proper Name, and, therefore, of its own nature incapable of being applied to any but Him whose Name it is, the one true God who had chosen the Israelites as His own peculiar people. There are many passages which receive new force when attention is paid to the distinction between this Name and the other Names of God which we have been discussing. We can only draw attention to the Psalm where men are invited to praise Yahveh (Psalm cxii.) and the question is put, Who is Yahveh, *our* God? Another well-known Psalm (cix.) begins: The Word of Yahveh to my Master. (See St. Matt. xxii. 44.) These instances must suffice to show the advantages to be derived from attention to the distinction, and when attention is directed to it, the reader of the English will generally be able to gather in each case whether the word "Lord" represents *Adon*, *Adonai*, or *Yahveh*.

357. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter, we have indicated the lines of proof given in Philosophy for the existence of God, adding some illustrations from the monuments of revelation; we have shown that God is incomprehensible, and invisible to creatures who do not receive supernatural illumination; and finally we have explained the meaning of the Names by which God is called in the Scriptures.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIVINE PERFECTIONS.

358. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this and the two following chapters we shall speak of some aspects of God as He is presented to our minds: taking first, in the present chapter, those perfections in which He is not contemplated as acting, and reserving for those that follow His knowledge and His will. But first we must justify a proceeding which may look like dealing with parts of that which is truly indivisible.

359. *Attributes of God.*—God is absolutely simple, as will be shown presently. (n. 365.) This simple Being cannot be seen by us in this life (n. 350), nor is it possible for a created intellect to be so raised as to comprehend Him. (n. 351.) Nothing more is possible than to study Him from various points of view, taking in succession certain epithets and showing of some that they can be affirmed of Him, and of others that they can be denied, remembering, however, that all negations are merely ways of asserting that certain corresponding affirmations might be made of Him; which affirmations, however, human language may be unable to express. Thus we say that God is wise, which is an affirma-

tion; and we say that He is unchanging, which word denies that there is change in Him; and this absence of change corresponds to some affirmative perfection for which we have no name; and so of the rest that we are about to discuss.

It would be entirely wrong to suppose that what is attributed to God, these attributes as they are called, are anything distinct from God Himself: they are not to be conceived as something superadded to God Himself, so that they might be absent, or even thought of as absent. God is wise because He has Wisdom, and He is God because He has Divinity: but this Wisdom, this Divinity are God Himself. What is here said forms part of the defined Catholic faith, having been declared by a Council held at Reims in 1148, under Pope Eugenius III., and where St. Bernard was the leading champion of the faith. The decree will be found in Denzinger (n. 329); it has no less force than the decrees of a General Council, for it has been accepted as decisive by the Church (n. 296): besides which, these decrees probably proceeded from the Pope in such a manner as to constitute them ex-cathedral utterances; if this be so they were conclusive, even independently of any acceptance by the Church, as we learn from the Vatican Council. (n. 290.) The occasion of the Council at Reims was the protest made by St. Bernard against certain doctrines taught by Gilbert de la Poirrée, Bishop of Poitiers. Gilbert was a devoted follower and eloquent expounder of the philosophy of Aristotle, by the aid of which he aspired to explain

certain mysteries of revelation, especially in connection with the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity. In this laudable attempt he fell into the mistake of not paying due regard to the teachings of tradition: he therefore failed, wrecked on a shoal which his contemporary, Peter Lombard, avoided, so that Gilbert is known in history as the author of a heresy, which, however, he renounced: it was left to St. Thomas Aquinas, in the following century, to "baptize" Aristotle, by showing how far he could be followed. It is quite beyond the scope of these Outlines to go into the controversy which was terminated by the decrees of Reims. To justify the definition, it will be enough to quote one or two passages from the monuments of revelation. Thus, Christ declares (St. John xiv. 6) that He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, thus claiming to be identified with Truth; it might be said of a creature that he is true, or that he is truthful, but it cannot be said of him that he is the abstract Truth: and a similar argument may be founded on other passages in which it is said that God is Light (1 St. John i. 5) or Love (1 St. John iv. 8), that the Spirit of God is the Spirit of Wisdom (Isaias xi. 2), and the like. We find this interpretation of the texts abundantly illustrated in the writings of the Greek Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, who were engaged in combating the Arian heresy, and addressed themselves to showing that the Trinity of Divine Persons did not introduce composition into God. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria teaches (*Thesaur.* 34; *P.G.* 75, 600), that when God is said to be Love, there is

no difference between Himself and that which is in Him: and St. Gregory of Nyssa (Hom. 7, *In Cant.*; *P.G.* 44, 908) says that the Lord is by His Nature the Substance of Truth and Wisdom and Power. Nor did the Latins teach differently, for St. Hilary held that all that God is is Life (*De Trin.* viii. 43; *P.L.* 40, 269); and St. Leo (Epist. 120 [93] c. 5), that no man is Truth or Wisdom or Justice, but they participate in Truth, Wisdom, and Justice. In God alone there is no participation, so that whatever is said of God is His essence. This matter will recur in the next Treatise. (n. 418.)

360. *The Attributes how distinct.*—Although we have established that there is no real distinction between the absolute attributes of God and His essence, yet it would be wrong to suppose that there is no foundation for the distinction that we make among these attributes. This point was zealously maintained by the Fathers who were engaged in controversy with the Arians, for these heretics endeavoured to show by philosophical argument that the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity as it was held by the Catholics in accordance with the tradition of the Church, involved a contradiction, and among other errors they maintained that whatever assertions could be made concerning God were synonymous; that when we call God Just we say exactly the same as if we call Him Merciful. This absurdity is rebuked by St. Gregory of Nyssa, in his first book against Eunomius.

361. *Metaphysical Essence of God.*—By the metaphysical essence of a being is understood something

which is intrinsic to that being, which is what distinguishes it from other beings; is what first occurs to thought concerning it, and which can be conceived as the fount and origin of all else that belongs to it. Theologians discuss the question what it is that may be considered as the metaphysical essence of God; in other words, what among His absolute Attributes most aptly answer the description just given; but it will be seen that they who give an answer to this question do not make pretension to know God in His essence; a knowledge beyond the capacity of a creature. (n. 351.) Theologians are divided upon this point, which concerns the convenient way of setting forth the truths revealed by God, more than upon these truths themselves. There have been some who make the metaphysical essence consist in the collection of all perfections, but this view finds no favour. The school that takes its name from the Franciscan Doctor, Scotus, assign the infinity of God as His essence; others, His knowledge of Himself, an opinion which is in favour with some of the Thomists; but the great weight of authority is with the maintainers of the view that the metaphysical essence is found in this, that God is the necessary, uncaused Being, or that He is self-existent, as it is expressed. This phrase will of course be understood as in form denying that God is sprung from anything other than Himself. (n. 359.) If taken as in form affirmative, it seems to involve a contradiction, for that which springs from anything must be distinct from that thing; and the same remark applies to the Latin

phrase (*a se*, whence *aseitas*) which is here Englished by self-existent.

This doctrine, which assigns aseity as the metaphysical essence of God, is countenanced by the Fathers, especially in their commentaries on the revelation of the Name of God imparted to Moses. (Exodus iii. 14, and see n. 355.) God is the Necessary Being, and in this affirmation is involved all else that is true concerning Him. The whole matter, however, belongs more to scholastic theology than to the positive science. (nn. 6, 84.)

362. *God Infinite* (n. 372).—When it is said that God is Infinite, the meaning is, not merely that no bounds or limits can be assigned to His Being, of any kind whatever; but also that there is no perfection but what is found in Him, either formally, when they are such as do not involve any imperfection; or eminently, when they are such that in creatures some imperfection accompanies them. The first, or simple, perfections, as they are called, are such that each is better than its opposite, and than whatever else cannot exist along with it: thus, to be wise is a simple perfection, and Wisdom exists formally in God, and is identified with Him, so that He is substantial Wisdom: in like manner, He is substantial Justice, and the like. (n. 359.) There are other perfections which are called mixed, and which are in God, not formally but eminently: these are they which cannot co-exist with something else which is better than they or of equal excellence; if, then, these were formally in God, they would exclude some simple

perfection; if, for example, God had a material body, He would not be a pure Spirit, which is a higher perfection.

That God is Infinite follows from His being uncaused, for the limitation of an effect is a result of its having a cause; also from this, that He is the fount of all Being, which cannot be unless all Being is some way in Him. The proof from revelation is found in the texts of Holy Scripture which declare that of the greatness of God there is no end (Psalm cxliv. 3); that we should glorify the Lord as much as ever we can, for He will yet far exceed (Ecclus. xliii. 32); that of Him and by Him and in Him are all things (Romans xi. 36), for all nations are before Him as if they had no being at all. (Isaias xl. 17.) The same Infinity is considered by the Fathers as involved in His Name, I AM. (n. 355.) The point is in fact one which will not be disputed by any one who admits the authority of the Scriptures; and having in the previous chapter established that which in our first volume we assumed provisionally (nn. 3, 15), we are entitled to treat the proof from Scripture as conclusive. The doctrine of this paragraph is not attacked on grounds of Scripture or Tradition: for the philosophical treatment, see Boedder, Thesis ix.

363. *God One* (n. 372).—That there is one God alone is a truth that will not be called in question by any one who understands what is meant when it is said that God is infinite (n. 362); the co-existence of two infinite Beings is absurd, inasmuch as there can be no difference between them except so far as

one lacks something which the other has, which lack is inconsistent with Infinity.

For the doctrine of Scripture upon the subject, it is enough to quote the words of Moses (Deut. vi. 4), which are adopted by Christ (St. Mark xii. 29), "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord." These words contain the fundamental point of the religion of the Israelites, and they are worthily taken to form the opening of the *Shema*, or form of prayer, which is in familiar use by every Jew: and other passages to the same effect are frequent. (Deut. iv. 35, xxxii. 39; Psalm xvii. 32; Isaias xliv. 6; St. John xvii. 3.)

The Fathers speak with the utmost distinctness upon the point, as might be expected considering that many of them were combating, face to face, with the absurdest polytheism. Thus Tertullian ventures to assert, against the dualist Marcion, that if God be not One, He does not exist, for it is better not to exist than to exist amiss (*Contra Marc.* i. 3; *P.L.* 2, 249); and St. Athanasius maintains that *polyarchy* is *anarchy*, the rule of many is no rule at all. (St. Athan. *Contra Gentes*, n. 38; *P.G.* 25, 76.) The apologists have collected many passages from the works of the heathen poets and philosophers, in which the unity of God is distinctly acknowledged; and they appeal to the common forms of speech in use even among the vulgar, who often exclaim, "Thank God," and do not thank the gods. Tertullian (*Apol.* c. 17; *P.L.* 1, 377) calls this fashion the testimony of a soul which is naturally Christian; we may compare it with the fact that professing atheists

of our own time, and of all times, will call upon God to hear them, as often as their feelings are deeply stirred by fear, by gratitude, or other strong emotion. Also, the argument that we have based on the Infinity of God is familiar to these early writers; for St. Irenæus remarks that if there be two Gods, there is an end of their omnipotence (2, 1, 5; *P.L.* 7, 712); and Lactantius puts it shortly, The more there are the less is each. (*Divin. Instit.* 1, 3: *P.L.* 6, 123.)

364. *Objections.*—No one with whom we have to do, doubts the essential unity of God; but, strange as it may seem, there are writers who maintain that this doctrine is not taught in Scripture, nor by the Fathers. The latter class of difficulties may be put aside for the present, for they turn on the alleged Tritheism of some of the opponents of Arianism, and so belong properly to the Treatise on the Blessed Trinity. (See n. 418.) Of the rest, some are based on the frequency of the occasions when it is recorded that the Israelites, or some of them, fell away from the national faith, and worshipped the gods of the surrounding nations (Judges ii. 11; 3 Kings xviii. 18, &c.), and it is assumed, without a shadow of proof, that in so doing they reverted to the faith of their ancestors; whereas there is no need of far-fetched explanations to account for many yielding to the temptation to join in the religious rites of the heathen, and thus gain some semblance of justification for sharing in practices most attractive to the corrupt heart of man.

Equally arbitrary is the assertion sometimes made

that the Israelites believed that each nation was under the protection of a distinct God, and that their protector, Yahveh (n. 354), was a being of the same nature as Dagon of the Philistines (1 Kings v. 1—5), or Chamosh of Moab (3 Kings xi. 7), although stronger than they. Some such notion appears to have been current among the surrounding peoples (3 Kings xx. 28; 4 Kings xvii. 26); but that this was not the faith of Israel is plain from the declaration made by God (Deut. xxxii. 39): "See ye that I am alone and there is no other God besides Me, . . . there is none that can deliver out of My hand." The truth here declared is the basis of the first command of the Decalogue, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me." (Exodus xx. 3.) These explicit declarations might dispense us from quoting such passages as the contrast drawn by the Psalmist: "All the gods of the Gentiles are devils, but the Lord made the heavens." (Psalm xcv. 5.) We shall recur to this passage before long. (n. 367.)

In face of these testimonies it is vain to urge that the ordinary word for God is Elohim, which is plural in form; as we have pointed out (n. 353, ii.), it is usually treated as a singular, and may be compared with the English use of the plural pronoun "you" of a single person; grammatical forms afford but slender ground for conjecture as to the usage of a language, and are to be neglected when opposed to express declarations. As we remarked in the place just cited, the word is sometimes used of creatures, chiefly of magistrates and

the like, who hold the place of God; it is also employed ironically of those whom the heathens believe to be gods. How rash it is to trust to grammatical forms, in Hebrew as well as in other languages is easily illustrated. No word is more thoroughly masculine in meaning than *Father;* yet in Hebrew this work takes in the plural the feminine form, Aboth, instead of having the masculine plural termination in *-im.*

One passage remains that calls for remark. In Genesis i. 26, we have: "And God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness;" where the plural number is used for the verb; and according to the Vulgate the same occurs again in the following chapter (Genesis ii. 18), where, however, the Hebrew has the singular, Let Me make, or I will make. In the earlier passage, the verb "said" is in the singular, as usual with Elohim. The Jews explained the passage as addressed by God to the angels, as if He left to them the fashioning of the body of man, reserving to Himself the creation of the rational soul, as Philo teaches; and this account or others that have been devised might pass in default of a better: or we might be content to avow our inability to explain the obscure passage, without allowing it to lead us to doubt as to the meaning of the plain declarations of the Divine Unity, that we have quoted. But the difficulty disappears when we remember the teaching of revelation that though God is One in substance, yet in Him there are three Persons. In the light of the traditional interpretation of the verse, we see

that God the Father addresses the Word of God, who is co-eternal with Him, and yet distinct. With this explanation, the verse was much used by the Fathers in controversy with the Arians, who admitted that the Word was addressed, but tried to establish that this Word was not eternally distinct from the Father, and so represented the Father as addressing Himself. St. Augustine (*De Civit.* 16, 6, 1; *P.L.* 41, 484) and St. Cyril may be referred to, but the strongest passage is a canon of the Council of Sirmium in 351, which pronounces an anathema against all who deny that in this place the Father addresses the Divine Son. (Hefele, *Conciles*, 2, 22. The canon is variously numbered 13 or 14.) This Council is not perhaps a binding authority, but its teaching is generally accepted.

365. *God Simple* (n. 372).—What is simple is opposed to what is composed of parts, and therefore capable of division into parts, and hence we derive at once a proof of the perfect simplicity of God, for parts must exist before they can be put together, or at least may be thought of as so existing, whereas nothing can be even thought of as existing prior to God. But it will be well to go a little deeper into the matter, so far at least as we have help from revelation: the full discussion must be left to Philosophy.

Metaphysicians distinguish various sorts of composition, or of ways in which parts can be put together to form a whole. Thus there is first, *logical composition*, of *genus* and *differentia*, as when it is pointed out that man has much in common with

other animals, so that he comes under the *genus* animal: but to complete the idea of a man, something must be added to distinguish him from horse, dog, &c., all of which belong to the same *genus*, in the philosophical sense of the word, which is not necessarily the same as the sense in which the word is employed by writers on zoology: this something is found in the capacity for reason which is found in man but not in other animals, and is the *differentia*, which along with the *genus* animal, constitutes the *species* man. This sort of composition is not found in God, as St. Thomas proves from philosophical considerations (*Summa*, p. 1. q. 3. a. 5.); it does not appear that Theology has anything to add to the proof.

Again, man is free, is sensitive, and countless other assertions may be made concerning him, and he may be considered as made up of these constituents, each of which is really distinct from the man as well as from the rest, but which cannot even be conceived as existing apart from the man. These are called metaphysical constituents of man, and among the rest we must reckon his essence and his existence, in the opinion of those who hold the affirmative on the much-debated question whether these are really distinct in creatures. We have already shown (n. 359) that this metaphysical composition is not found in God, whose attributes are not really distinct from His essence. God is therefore *metaphysically* simple.

Lastly, there is in man a soul and a body, which can be conceived as existing apart, and the

body is extended, having parts outside the other parts: so that we have *physical* composition. It remains, therefore, to show that God has no parts or extension.

The proof is found in the many passages of Scripture, which declare that God is a Spirit, which word is constantly opposed to extended matter. (See St. John iv. 24; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Wisdom i. 7, vii. 25, &c.) Extended matter cannot fill the whole world; nor can it be infinite, in the sense in which we have proved from Scripture (n. 362) that God is Infinite.

As to the teaching of the Fathers, some passages that create difficulty will be noticed directly: meanwhile it will be enough to adduce the concise argumentation of Origen. (*Periarchon*, i. 1, 6; *P.G.* 11, 125.) We must not suppose that God is a body or is in a body, but He is a simple, intellectual nature, not admitting conjunction with anything, so that He must not be supposed capable to be greater or less, but He is in all respects a monad, a mere mind or fount, whence all intellectual nature or mind has its beginning. This proof may suffice: the subject will be further illustrated by the solution of some difficulties.

366. *Anthropomorphism.*—It is well known that the Holy Scripture is full of expressions concerning God which seem to attribute to Him that He has a body, like the body of a man. Thus we read of His eyes and ears (Psalm xxxiii. 16; Isaias xxxvii. 17, &c.), of His mouth, His lips, His tongue (Jerem. xxiii. 16; Psalm lxxxviii. 35; Isaias xxx. 27), and

of His hand. (Psalm viii. 7.) His enemies are His footstool (Psalm cix. 1), just as the Assyrian sculptors represent to us the victorious king supporting his feet on the necks of vanquished princes. But the metaphorical character of these phrases is abundantly evident, and is pointed out in the Scripture itself (Job x. 4); they are of rare occurrence, except in the poetical books of the Old Testament: the reason for their use is that no other forms of language could convey with equal clearness that God knows our doings, that He speaks by warning, promises, and threatenings, and that He has power to carry out His will. These and the many similar phrases that occur are called anthropomorphic, for they represent God under the form of a man. (*ἄνθρωπος, μορφή.*)

There is somewhat more difficulty about certain passages which may be called anthropopathic, as ascribing to God the passions (*πάθη*) of men; such as hatred and weariness (Isaias i. 14), joy (Isaias lxii. 5), grief (Isaias lxiii. 10), pity (Jerem. xxxi. 20), and in particular, repentance, or change of purpose. (Genesis vi. 6; 1 Kings xv. 11; Hebrews vii. 21, &c.) These expressions will not be understood unless they are taken along with other passages where God is described as unchanging (n. 370); but then we shall understand the explanation given by St. Augustine (*De Civit. Dei*, 12, 17, 2; *P.L.* 41, 367): "God is not affected in such sense that there comes to be in His nature something which was not there before. . . He is able to do a new work in pursuance of a design which is not new but eternal."

In fact, when God acts in the way in which a man would act if he repented, He is said to repent, just as He is said to use His hands, when He does that which, if done by a man, would be the work of his hands.

Anthropomorphic conclusions have been drawn from the text (Genesis i. 26) in which it is said that man was created in the image and likeness of God. The matter will recur, when we speak of the creation (n. 431); meanwhile, it is enough to observe that man having a spiritual soul is an image of God in a higher sense than can be found in the material creation.

Anthropomorphic ideas were formulated by certain heretics in early times, and they probably are still not uncommonly held by ignorant persons who have been encouraged to read the Scriptures and make out the meaning for themselves, without the aid of instruction in the tradition of the Catholic Church. There are expressions in certain orthodox writers which have been thought to have an anthropomorphic complexion, but they admit of satisfactory explanation. Thus, Melito wrote on the "Embodied God," meaning the Incarnate Word, but the title was misunderstood by Origen. Tertullian expressly declares that God is a Body, but this author employed a vocabulary of his own, and explains that in his language, "whatever exists is a body of a sort: nothing is bodiless except what does not exist." (*De Carne Christi*, 11; *P.L.* 2, 774.) And Lactantius, combating some pantheistic tenets held by the Stoics, declares that

God has figure and form, but he must be understood as merely alleging His personal existence distinct from the world; in another place he states plainly that God is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal.

It has not been thought necessary to cite the authorities for the above statements: the matter is not in controversy, and the references may be found in Petavius. (*De Deo*, ii. 1.)

It is uncertain whether (see St. Epiphanius, *Hæres.* 70; *P.G.* 42, 339—373) St. Augustine (*Hær.* 50; *P.L.* 42, 39) was right in ascribing anthropomorphic views to an heretical sect, founded by one Audius, Vadius, or Odo, as the name is variously spelt, a Bishop who died in 372: possibly these men taught no more than that man's body is an image of God, which is not the same as ascribing a body to God. The chief reason why they broke away from the Catholic Church seems to have been that they professed to aspire to a stricter observance of the moral law than they found among their fellow-Christians, and made their high standard an excuse for refusing obedience to constituted authority. (See nn. 189, 390, vi.) They were driven from the Roman Empire, and took refuge in the East, but it is uncertain how long the sect survived: it would lead us too far from our subject to collect the few and scattered notices of their history.

As late as the tenth century, anthropomorphism made its appearance in Northern Italy, and engaged the attention of Ratherius, Bishop of Verona, and Atto of Vercelli. Many strange heresies seem to have long had a lurking existence in this district,

and perhaps their presence may have helped to make the mediæval University of Padua the chief seat of the study of the art of magic, as Paris, Bologna, and Montpellier were the homes of students of divinity, law, and medicine respectively.

367. *Idolatry.*—This would be the place to consider what we learn from revelation concerning the worship which the heathen offer to their false gods. Much has been written of late concerning the origin of religion; and often the writers have scarcely or not at all concealed a wish to represent that, as many religions seem to have sprung from no more substantial basis than dreams, or false views of nature or the like, so the Christian religion has no other origin. Those who write in this strain forget that the claim of each religion must be judged on its own merits: that if it be true, as Christians maintain, that one religion alone has had a Divine origin, namely, the Christian religion, considered as the more perfect form of those of the Patriarchs and of the Jews, then the co-existence of many false religions is no more than the analogy of nature would have led us to expect; for in all branches of natural science, astronomy, physics, zoology, and the like, we meet with rules which are observed in the multitude of cases to which they might apply, but which are subject to one or two inexplicable exceptions; also, it is to be observed that the Christian religion stands alone in claiming to be founded on miracle, while it sprang up in an age and among a people familiar with the use of writing and thoroughly civilized and sceptical. The subject

of these inquiries is deeply interesting, but they assuredly have not yet touched the Christian evidences.

The writers just spoken of make much use of etymology, and assume that when they have explained the origin of a word they have made clear the origin and nature of the thing. This is a most unsafe line of argument, and the unwary reader who is not on his guard against it may easily be led to accept the wildest fancies as sober, established truths.

There seem to be two points only on which we learn anything directly from revelation concerning the religion of the heathen; and first we have in Scripture the express declaration that the gods of the Gentiles are devils (Psalm xcv. 5, and see Deut. xxxii. 17, Baruch iv. 7): that is to say, that bad angels succeed in gratifying their pride by inducing men to offer to them the worship which was due only to the one God, their Creator, against whom they had rebelled. This subject will recur in another Treatise, when we speak of the action of Satan and his followers in the world. (n. 455.)

The other point is that worship was paid to images, to masses of metal, stone, or wood, which were believed to be able to hear prayer and to deal out good or evil to those who treated them with honour or with contumely. A theory has been started that the heathen paid to these images no more than a relative honour, as representing some potent being; but the proof to the contrary is overwhelming, and the point would never have been

questioned but for the secret influence of two desires which have warped the judgment of inquirers: first, the desire of Protestants who attack the doctrine and practice of the Church as to honour due to sacred images; and next the desire of infidels to make as little as possible of the influence of revealed religion upon man. The first would wish to turn against Catholics all the denunciations of image-worship which are found in Scripture, which will be dealt with in our last Treatise; the others would wish to make out that revelation has not done much for man, and they are troubled at whatever shows the depth of ignorance, folly, and wickedness, in which the race is plunged except so far as it is rescued by the influence of revealed religion.

The proof which we speak of is given in the Scriptures, where denunciations are found, not merely of idolatry in the wide sense, of worship offered to the creature in place of God (Romans i. 23), or of worship offered to the true God, but in an unauthorized mode (Exodus xxxii. 1—8), as seems to follow from Aaron having proclaimed a feast of Yahveh: but also of idolatry in its strictest and most proper meaning, where sense and life were attributed to inanimate objects. No reader can doubt the meaning of Isaias xliv. (cf. Baruch vi.) or of the writer of the Book of Wisdom (xii.—xv.); and there are other shorter passages to the same effect. (Isaias ii. 8; Daniel v. 4, xiv. 5; Jerem. x. 3—10, &c.) The like absurd belief prevailed in polished Rome, for Horace makes a god describe the doubt which there once was whether he would

ever come into existence, for the craftsman's first thought was to make a stool, but he changed his mind and made a god (*Satires*, 1, 8, 1—3), and we are told (Hor. Epist. 1, 16, 60) of a man who, wishing to wheedle the goddess Laverna to help him to play the sanctimonious knave, but desirous that his petition should not be overheard, thought it well to mount to her ear and whisper his desire. Many testimonies to the same effect are found in the Apologists; and it should be observed that these were mostly cultivated men who had not long time since been heathens, holding the views that they describe, and addressing men who would have been glad, if possible, to disclaim the absurdities charged upon them. We have already quoted Arnobius in this connection. (n. 70.) Athenagoras (*Leg. pro Christ.* 18; *P.G.* 6, 925) combats the idea that the images were supposed to be mere representations of the gods, and we may add some other references. (Minutius Felix, *Octavius*, c. 23; *P.L.* 3, 324; St. Justin, *Apol.* i. c. 9; *P.G.* 6, 340; Lactantius, *Divin. Instit.* 2, 2 and 4; *P.L.* 6, 258—276; Tertull. *Apol.* 13; *P.L.* 1, 344.) These may suffice.

Before leaving this subject, we may remark that the Church allows images of the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, under those forms for which we have Scripture warrant: the Eternal Father as an old man (Daniel vii. 9), the Son, in the prime of manhood (St. Luke iii. 23), and the Holy Spirit as a dove. (St. Matt. iii. 16.) But a caution is given by the Council of Trent (Sess. 25) that the people are to be taught that not thereby is the Divinity repre-

sented, as though it could be seen by the eyes of the body, or be portrayed by colours or figures: this instruction is effectually given in the words of the Catechism and in daily life; and no Catholic who kisses his crucifix is in the slightest danger of falling into the error of the client of Laverna, unless perhaps he is so grossly ignorant as to be a Catholic in name alone.

368. *God Immense* (n. 372).—Immensity is the attribute by which God is independent of all conditions of space, so that He is present in all space, and can be present in all possible space. This presence is not like that of a material body, which is extended in space, but the parts of which occupy different parts of space: such presence is called circumscriptive presence, because the space occupied by the body is circumscribed; nor is the Divine presence of the kind called definite, as where the soul of man is present in the body, not by extension, but wholly in each part; both these modes of presence imply limitation, such as has no place in God. Neither is God present only by His knowledge and His power, as is sometimes erroneously supposed, but He is present by His essence everywhere. These distinctions are explained and justified in Philosophy (see Boedder, pp. 249, seq.), and we shall meet them again in the Treatise on the Blessed Eucharist. For our purpose it is enough to remark that the Immensity of God follows as a corollary from His Infinity, which itself is best regarded as a direct consequence of His Aseity. (n. 361.)

In Holy Scripture, this Immensity is assumed rather than directly asserted. The Psalmist declares that the name of God is admirable, for His magnificence is elevated above the heavens (Psalm viii. 2); and the same idea is set forth more at large in the Book of Job. (xi. 7—9; see also 3 Kings viii. 27.) Among a multitude of passages of the Fathers, it may be enough to quote Theophilus of Antioch, who declares (*Ad Autolyc.* 2, 3; *P.G.* 6, 1,049) that it is a property of the true and real God, not merely to be everywhere, but to have sight and hearing in all places. This he says in opposition to the pagan idea which allowed to Jupiter and the rest of their deities no more than a circumscriptive presence: and St. Augustine will not allow it to be said that God is in one place and not in another, for by His incorporeal presence He is wholly everywhere. (St. Aug. Epist. 120 [222], *To Consentius; P.L.* 33, 460.) These clear utterances, which extend to the presence of God by His essence, and not merely by His power, must be our guide in interpreting certain expressions which looked at alone might be ambiguous, and raise a doubt whether the writers regarded God as being everywhere by His essence. It is not worth while to cite these passages, which may be read in Petavius (*De Deo*, 3, 8); the explanation of some is to be found in the need of combating the Stoics, who taught that God is in the universe, as the soul in the body, by definite presence; expressions used in confuting this error may easily seem to deny the Divine Immensity.

369. *Omnipresence.*—Omnipresence is not the same as Immensity, but is a result of it. Immensity is an attribute belonging to God from all eternity, and independently of any supposition; it is, therefore, called an absolute attribute, where it must be observed that the word *absolute* is not here used in opposition to *relative*, in the sense in which we shall speak of *relative* attributes in the next Treatise, on the Blessed Trinity. (n. 396, viii.) Omnipresence does not belong to God absolutely, but only on the supposition of the existence of creatures. He has not been omnipresent from eternity, and were He to please that all creation should fall into nothing, His omnipresence would cease. But since the beginning of time He has been present by essence, knowledge, and power, to every creature, for He is a God at hand, and not afar off (Jerem. xxiii. 23); present in Heaven and Hell and in the uttermost parts (Psalm cxxxviii. 8, 9); in whom we live and move and have our being. (Acts xvii. 27.) It is not worth while to quote the Fathers on so familiar a point.

It is true that God is, in some special sense, in Heaven (Psalm x. 5; St. Matt. vi. 9); that Heaven is His throne (Isaias lxvi. 1); and many similar phrases are used; but these are obviously mere anthropomorphic (n. 366) adaptations of human language to realities that are beyond human comprehension. Also, God is said to be in the soul of a just man (St. John xiv. 23), and in our common language is treated as being peculiarly present in a church, even if the Blessed Sacrament be not

reserved there; the meaning here is that He acts on that soul by a special exercise of His power, and that the building is appropriated exclusively to His worship; and if any other forms of expression call for explanation, it is found without difficulty.

It is the belief of the faithful that it is better to pray in consecrated buildings than elsewhere; and the Church encourages pilgrimages and other works of devotion to particular shrines, as to Loreto and Compostella, and most of all to the capital of the Catholic world, the city of Rome. It is sometimes ignorantly supposed that these practices are somehow in conflict with the doctrine of the Divine Immensity. In truth, there is no conflict at all; were the practice inconsistent with any Divine Attribute, it would have been so under the Old Law no less than under the New: but we learn from Holy Scripture that the practice of pilgrimage was approved by God (1 Kings i. 3), and that prayer had peculiar efficacy if made in certain places (3 Kings viii. 29, &c.); and although under the Christian dispensation the Sacrifice of the Mass is offered to God in every place (Malach. i. 11), and no longer in Jerusalem alone (St. John iv. 21), yet the Attributes of God remain unchanged, and if He pleases, the practice of pilgrimage may still be acceptable to Him; the whole matter depends upon His good pleasure, and each act of this kind is laudable if done with probably good reason, and under the guidance of the Church. (nn. 69, 314.) The truth is, the practice of pilgrimage is admirably adapted to human nature, and is in universal use:

it calls out in the highest degree all the qualities that give usefulness to our devotions and efficacy to our prayers.

It is scarcely worth while to notice the almost childish objection sometimes brought against our doctrine of Omnipresence, that it is unworthy of the Divinity to make Him present in filthy places, in the souls of the wicked, in the devils themselves. As to the last, St. Augustine tells us that God is in them to punish them; but the whole objection rests on forgetfulness of the truth that these things are not bad in themselves, but only in our way of thinking. As to filth, it has been well said that it is merely matter out of its place; and this matter, and all other creatures, were good as they came from the hand of their Creator, and remain good, although the sinful act of a free-will was bad, and its consequences remain; and no difficulty of this sort can be felt by one who remembers that the Word of God became Man, uniting Himself most closely with human nature; and the infinite distance between the Creator and the creature was bridged over, without any derogation to the dignity of the Creator; whence we see that there can be nothing derogatory to God in His being present in all His creatures. This is the teaching of St. Gregory Nyssen.

370. *God Unchanging* (n. 372).—That a Simple and Infinite Being must be unchanging, follows from the notion of these Attributes; and we have in Scripture repeated affirmations that God is not subject to change. He is not as man that He

should be changed (Numbers xxiii. 19); He is always the self-same and His years shall not fail (Psalm ci. 28); He is the Lord and changeth not (Malach. iii. 6); with Him there is no change nor shadow of alteration. (St. James i. 17.)

The doctrine then of the Immutability of God, is easy of statement and of proof both from reason and from Scripture; and the doctrine of the Fathers is seen in their replies to difficulties that have been brought against the doctrine. These difficulties are neither few nor slight, but their full discussion belongs to Philosophy: they are treated by St. Thomas (*Summa*, p. 1. q. 9.) and his commentators. These difficulties do not directly attack the proof of the doctrine, but they ask *how* He can be unchanged, seeing that having been alone from all eternity, in the beginning of time He became Creator; *how* He who from eternity had not been Lord and Master and Preserver, can without change come to have these titles: *how* He who at one time was not Incarnate, could without change become united to human nature. These difficulties are nothing new; they have been before the minds of thinkers for eighteen centuries, who have not found fully satisfactory answers to the questions, but whose belief in the doctrine has not been shaken; thus, St. Augustine himself confesses (*De Civit. Dei*, 12, 15, 3; *P.L.* 41, 365) that he prefers not to give a decided solution, and warns his readers that they must learn to avoid perilous questions and not suppose themselves capable of understanding everything. The difficulty founded on the Incarnation was raised by

Celsus, the Platonic philosopher, who sixteen hundred years ago anticipated so much of what has since been said against the Christian religion in the course of the following centuries. We learn his views from the reply made by Origen. (*Contr. Cels.* iv. 14; *P.G.* 11, 1044.) On the whole matter, we need not be ashamed to imitate the modesty of St. Augustine, and with him quote the words of the Book of Wisdom (ix. 13—15): "Who among men is he that can know the counsel of God? or who can think what the will of God is? . . . For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul." But it may be remarked that if we ask *how* things can be, we shall often find ourselves at a loss for an answer: we do not doubt that we can see, although no man knows *how* the impression upon the eye produces vision. Further, we may observe that occasions are not uncommon where a thing receives a new name without any change in the thing itself; the change is in the surroundings of the thing. Thus when a child is born, the name of father becomes applicable to a man to whom perhaps that name was previously not applicable; yet the birth works no change in the man himself; he is brought into new relations, involving new duties, but the change is not in him. This consideration mitigates the difficulty, but its full solution would require that we should comprehend the Infinite.

371. *God Eternal* (n. 372).—The word *eternal* is sometimes applied to that which will last long, as when perpetual, or as the Vulgate has it, eternal possession of the land of his sojournment is promised

to Abraham (Genesis xvii. 8; Levit. xxv. 46.); sometimes to that which had a beginning but will have no end, as the soul of man. But properly it signifies that which exists necessarily and has no beginning nor end nor change, and in this sense, God alone is Eternal, as He alone is Immense and Infinite. There is a famous definition of Eternity, adopted by St. Thomas (*Summa*, p. 1. q. 10. a. 1.) from Boethius (*De Consol.* 5 prosa 6; *P.L.* 63, 858): Eternity is a simultaneously full and perfect possession of interminable life. Eternity therefore is to time what Immensity is to space, and like Immensity it belongs to God because He is Infinite and Self-existing (n. 361): as all points of space are alike to Him and He is ever present at all, so also all points of time are alike to Him, and there is no succession.

That God is Eternal is indicated in many places of Holy Scripture, as when it is said (Psalm lxxxix. 2), "Before the mountains were made or the earth and the world were formed, from eternity to eternity, Thou art God;" also, God alone has Immortality (1 Timothy vi. 16), which place St. Augustine explains, as meaning that to be changeless and eternal belongs essentially to God. (Tract. 23, *In Joan.* n. 9; *P.L.* 35, 1538.) St. Gregory Nazianzen expresses the doctrine very neatly (Orat. 38, 7; *P.G.* 36, 318): God ever was, and is, and will be, or rather, He ever is, "for the *was* and *will be* of the time familiar to us are scraps belonging to a fleeting nature."

There are no difficulties of any account against

the doctrine that teaches the Eternity of God, for it will be readily understood that certain phrases are used anthropomorphically. (n. 366.)

372. *The Attributes defined.*—That God has the Attributes of which we have spoken in this chapter is the defined doctrine of the Church. We have not set forth the terms of the definition separately for each Attribute, for it seemed more convenient to wait till the list was nearly completed before transcribing the decree of the Vatican Council of 1870 upon the subject. This decree adds little to what had been already defined by the Fourth Lateran Council (Denz. 355) in 1215, in opposition to the Albigensian heretics. The more recent pronouncement runs as follows:

The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and professes that there is one (n. 363) living and true God, Creator and Lord of Heaven and earth (n. 427), omnipotent (n. 387), eternal (n. 371), immense (n. 368), incomprehensible (n. 351), infinite in intellect (n. 376), and will (n. 384), and in all perfection (n. 362); who being One (n. 363), singular, absolutely simple (n. 365), and unchangeable (n. 370), spiritual substance is to be regarded as distinct really and in essence, from the world (n. 428), most blessed in and from Himself, and unspeakably elevated above all things that exist, or can be conceived, except Himself. (Denz. 1631.)

Many of these Attributes are mentioned in the Athanasian Creed. (n. 401, iv.)

373. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have explained what is meant by the Attributes of God,

and shown how they are distinct from each other, although they are not really distinct from His essence; we have then dealt separately with these Attributes in which God is conceived, not as acting, but as simply being: He is Infinite, Simple, Immense, Omnipresent, Unchanging, Eternal: incidentally we have made some remarks on anthropomorphism and on idolatry: finally, we have quoted the dogmatic decrees of the Vatican Council upon the subject.

CHAPTER IV.

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

374. *Subject of the Chapter.*—The Attributes of God of which we have hitherto been speaking are such as do not necessarily involve the idea of activity; Eternity, Immensity, and the rest can be conceived apart from other Attributes, and then there is nothing in them to show that the eternal, immense Being is active, is alive, as we may say. It is true that these Attributes do not, and cannot exist distinct from the Divine Essence (n. 359); there is, therefore, no real distinction between them and the group of Attributes which we are to consider in this chapter and the next, which cannot be thought of except as belonging to an active, living Being; and this is why they are often grouped under the title "The Life of God." A living being that is not subject to the conditions of time and space under which matter ordinarily exists is what we call a spirit, and in a spirit we may distinguish the faculties of intellect and will, the exercise of which will constitutes his power. We have, therefore, to show that God is a Spirit, and that He has knowledge and will, with power to carry out His will. Some questions of no small difficulty will present

themselves to us in the course of this discussion. Although we have for convenience broken up the matter of this and the following chapter into different heads, it is most especially necessary to remember the real identity of all these Attributes with each other and with the Essence of God; no one of them can be treated fully apart from the others, and the order in which they are treated is a matter of indifference. In this chapter, we show that God is a Spirit, and that He has knowledge.

375. *God a Spirit* (n. 372).—That God is not subject to the conditions of time and space to which matter is ordinarily subjected follows from His Eternity (n. 371), and Immensity (n. 368); and that He is living follows from His having knowledge (nn. 376—381) and will (nn. 383—393), as we shall show directly. He is therefore a Spirit, having at least in an eminent manner (n. 362) all that is found in a created spirit. This deduction from what is elsewhere proved is confirmed by the testimony of God Himself in Holy Scripture.

We have first the express declaration of Christ to the Samaritan woman (St. John iv. 24), and in the seventh chapter of the Book of Wisdom, we have a grand description of the Wisdom of God, which is identified with Himself; and this description is certainly not verified of anything that is not a Spirit. The whole chapter should be read, but we may especially notice the twenty-second and following verses, where we read that in Wisdom there is the Spirit of understanding; holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, active, undefiled, sure, sweet,

loving that which is good, quick, which nothing hindereth, beneficent ; gentle, kind, steadfast, assured, secure, having all power, overseeing all things, and containing all spirits, intelligible, pure, subtle: For Wisdom is more active than all active things, and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. A full commentary upon this chapter would soon take us to the bounds that limit man's understanding, and show us glimpses of the infinite sea of Truth that lies beyond the limits of our knowledge.

The passage which we have quoted from St. John must be regarded as summing up in one word much of what we are taught concerning God in other places of Holy Scripture: in all those places, namely, where He is shown to be Infinite and to have the other Attributes of which we spoke in the last chapter, and those of which we shall speak in the following pages. We do not argue from the word, Spirit, but from the description given of the thing. For the doctrine of the Fathers it may be enough to quote St. Irenæus, who, writing against certain Gnostic heretics who held that the Attributes of God were emanations from Him, declares (*Contr. Hær.* 1, 12, 2; *P.G.* 5, 573) that God is wholly Will, wholly Mind, wholly Light, wholly Eye, wholly Thought, wholly hearing, wholly the Fount of all good things.

The difficulties that have been raised against this doctrine belong to Philosophy: they are in no sense theological. They are in fact at bottom either pantheistic or atheistic, though they are sometimes

raised by writers who do not see the inevitable result of their doctrines.

376. *The Divine Knowledge.*—That God knows all things is perhaps the most familiar to us of all the truths concerning Him: and the difficulty of reconciling this eternal Prescience with the freedom of man is one which occurs very early to the mind of every child, whether Christian or not, who is brought up to believe in God at all. It has been studied in all ages by the keenest intellects that have been found among men, and no full and satisfactory solution has been devised; but it is by all means to be observed that the difficulty is to see *how* coexistence is possible between two truths, each of which is thoroughly established by its own appropriate proofs; and the force of each of these proofs is so great that the truths themselves have rarely been disputed even by those who have studied the question most deeply and are most fully alive to the difficulty of explaining how they are to be reconciled. (See n. 370.)

The objects of the Divine Intellect may be classified as follows: (1) He understands Himself, as follows from His infinite perfection. (n. 362.) This is the knowledge referred to when the Incarnate Word of God declares that the Father knoweth Him and He knoweth the Father (St. John x. 15), and that no one knoweth the Son but the Father (St. Matt. xi. 27); and we read also that the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. (1 Cor. ii. 10.)

This knowledge that God has of Himself follows

the infinite perfection of His Being, and is therefore infinitely perfect, or such as may be called comprehension. But though God thus comprehends Himself, He does not put limits to Himself, in the way that that which comprehends seems to limit that which is comprehended. This difficulty arises from the imperfection of language: we have no word but comprehension to express a knowledge which extends to all that is in the object comprehended, and such is God's knowledge of Himself. It is no more against His Infinity that He is comprehended by Himself, than it is against His Immensity that He may be said to exist in Himself. In all these phrases we must consider whether the true meaning is affirmative or negative. It is in this way that St. Thomas reconciles two passages of St. Augustine: "Whatever comprehends itself is finite to itself" (*On* 83 *Questions*, q. 15), and "Whatever is so seen that nothing escapes the sight is comprehended." (Epist. 147 [112], *To Paulinus*, c. 9, n. 21; *P.L.* 40, 14, and 33, 606. See St. Thomas, *Summa*, 1. q. 14. a. 3.)

This knowledge that God has of Himself is immediate, nor can it be said to be also gathered from His contemplation of His creatures, for it is inconsistent with the Divine Infinity to be dependent on reasoning for His knowledge. No special name has been given to this knowledge.

377. *Simple Intelligence.*—(2) God knows all things that are possible: as St. Augustine expresses it (*De Civit. Dei*, 11, 10, 3; *P.L.* 41, 327): the knowledge of God is an immense and infinite store-house

of things intelligible, in which there reside, unseen and unchangeable, the ideas of things, even of those that are seen and subject to change, which are made by means of that knowledge, for God produces nothing in ignorance, for this were unworthy even of a human artificer. God has this knowledge, for all possible things are merely inadequate imitations of His infinite essence.

God's knowledge of things as merely possible is called the knowledge of Simple Intelligence. Like His knowledge of Himself, it is necessary, and does not depend upon any exercise of His Will.

378. *Knowledge of Vision.*—(3) Further, God knows all actual things, past, present, and future, seeing them from all eternity in the order in which they will come into existence, according to the determinations of His Will. This knowledge of Vision, as it is called, is not necessary but free, for God sees nothing outside Himself but what He has been pleased freely to call into being. There is no difficulty concerning the Divine Knowledge of things past and present, which have never been questioned by any who admit the existence of God: but the same cannot be said as to knowledge of things future, especially of such as depend upon the free-will of man. It has been maintained by some who profess to accept the Christian revelation, that God cannot know the future, at least the free future; and we must therefore prove from revelation that He has this knowledge. We reserve for another place (n. 381) what has to be said on the compatibility of

this knowledge with man's freedom and consequent responsibility.

It may be observed that of things that happen in the world there is nothing that in any way affects man but what is traceable to some act of free-will, though not necessarily to any free act of the person affected. Thus, nothing seems, or is, so entirely beyond human control as a tempest; yet, if a ship is wrecked and a man is drowned, his death is due to his having freely gone on board. If then God foreknows and can foretell that man's death by drowning, we have proof of His foreknowledge of free actions no less complete than if He foretold whether the man would pray or curse when made aware of his danger.

The all-embracing knowledge of God is declared in many places of Holy Scripture, as by St. Paul. (Hebrews iv. 13.) All things are naked and open to His eyes to whom our speech is. God from His habitation that He hath prepared hath looked on all that dwell on the earth; He hath made the hearts of every one of them, and understandeth all their works (Psalm xxxii. 14, 15); He has understood our thoughts afar. (Psalm cxxxviii. 3; see also Daniel xiii. 42; Proverbs xvi. 2; St. Matt. x. 29, &c.)

The Fathers who notice the doctrine of Scripture that God knows all things, past, present, and future, observe that in Him there is no distinction of time; with Him on account of His Eternity all things are ever present, although He knows them as having existence according to their true succession in time. Thus we read from time to time, in

the history of the creation, that God, having completed a part of the work, "saw that it was good" (Genesis i. 4, 10, 12, &c.); and St. Ambrose will have it that this commendation referred to the goodness that the newly created thing would have in the course of time, not merely to that which it had in the first instant (*Hexaemeron*, 2, 5, 21; *P.L.* 14, 155); and St. Augustine holds that to God past and future, as well as the present, are all present together: in one glance He has them all before Him. (St. Aug. *De Trinit.* 15, 7, 13; *P.L.* 43, 1066.)

It hardly needs remarking that all prophecy supposes a knowledge of the future actions of free agents, so that we may say with Tertullian (*Contr. Marcion.* 2, 5; *P.L.* 2, 290) that all the Prophets are witnesses to God's foreknowledge.

The Eternity of God's knowledge supplies us with the solution of a difficulty that is sometimes felt, as to cases where some action of God is caused, as we conceive the matter, by some subsequent occurrence. Thus, all the supernatural grace given to men before the coming of Christ, and without which they could not have attained salvation, was given to them in view of the merits of Christ their Saviour, as we shall see in our Thirteenth Treatise (vol. iii.): in particular, according to Catholic doctrine, the Blessed Virgin Mary owed her Immaculate Conception to the foreseen merits of her Son, as is declared in the Collect for the feast of this mystery. This inversion of cause and effect, were it more than apparent, would be impossible; but it is merely apparent, the truth being that the Death of Christ

and the decree to grant a singular privilege to His Mother were both before God from eternity, to be carried out in time; and if the limitation of our minds forces us to conceive the one before the other, we have here what is called a priority of sign or logical priority, no true priority in time.

Before going on to consider the difficulties that have been raised as to this Knowledge of Vision, we must say a few words as to a fourth distinction, which most Catholic theologians judge to be convenient, or even necessary.

379. *Scientia Media.*—(4) Besides things merely possible and things actual, there is a middle class of things which never have been nor will be, nor are, so that they are not actual; but which would have been, had some condition been fulfilled which in fact is not fulfilled, and so they are more than simply possible. These are spoken of chiefly when they would have been the result of the action of a free creature if he had been placed in such or such circumstances in which he in fact is never placed. Man can never have more than a conjectural knowledge of these matters: we can never know with certainty what John would have done with his money had he found a shilling in the road yesterday: we may guess, from our knowledge of his character, that he would be likely to save it, or to spend it, or to give it as an alms: but we can never be sure, for John was free and might have acted in a way which no one could have anticipated; but God knows all things, and knows with certainty what John would have done, as we shall prove directly: the knowledge

which God has of these *future conditionals*, as they are called, commonly goes by the name of *Scientia Media;* middle knowledge would be the English equivalent, but it is not in use.

It is to be observed that the Church has never defined that God possesses this knowledge, and in former times the point has been called in doubt by some theologians of repute. At the present day, there is general agreement that certain texts of Scripture cannot be understood in any sense which does not imply that God possesses the *Scientia Media*, and the doctrine of these texts must be accepted, however great may be the difficulty of explaining the *how* of this knowledge.

The first text that we quote shall be from the words of our Lord in the Gospel, and they seem perfectly clear (St. Matt. xi. 21; cf. St. Luke x. 13): "Wo to thee, Corozain, wo to thee, Bethsaida, for if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes." We have here an express declaration by our Divine Lord as to what would have been the conduct of the men of Tyre and Sidon in certain circumstances that never occurred, nor will any one suggest that such a declaration made by Him was merely conjectural: He must therefore have had certain knowledge as to the free acts which would have been performed, if a condition had been fulfilled: and these acts are precisely the object of *Scientia Media*.

In the First Book of Kings (xxiii. 10—13), we have a narrative which would be still more to our

purpose, were it free from certain difficulties as to the translation. We read, in the Vulgate, that God assured David that if he stayed in Ceila, the people of the city would deliver him to Saul, who was seeking his life; whereupon David left Ceila and escaped the fate intended for him. But those who in former times denied that God possesses the *Scientia Media*, maintained, on the faith of an old Chaldee paraphrase, that the warning received by David was no more than that the people of Ceila were at that time intending to deliver him: the Divine knowledge of this intention, an actual fact, would belong to the Knowledge of Vision. There are other texts where we find use made of the *Scientia Media*, but these may suffice. (Deut. vii. 4; Jerem. xxxiii. 17—23.)

The Fathers frequently appeal to the *Scientia Media*, especially when they comment on the words of Wisdom (iv. 11), spoken of one who dies young: "He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding or deceit beguile his soul." Thus St. Gregory of Nyssa says (*Orat. pro Infant.* near the end; *P.G.* 46, 184): It belongs to the perfection of Divine Providence, not merely to heal diseases, but also to prevent them. It is fitting that He, to whom the future is no less known than the past, should stay the child's advance to his full age: lest the evil which the prescient Intellect foresees should come about in him, should his life be prolonged. In the same sense, St. Augustine speaks (*De Corrept. et Gratia*, c. 8, n. 19; *P.L.* 44, 927): It is a favour from God, that the man's life comes to a close before he changes

from good to evil. Why the same favour is granted to one and not granted to another, we know not. The same St. Augustine, in another place (*De Anima et ejus Orig.* I, 12, n. 15; *P.L.* 44, 485), declares that there is an end of all Foreknowledge if that which is foreknown never happens; but this passage is not truly at variance with the former, for it refers to absolute Foreknowledge, such as might justify punishment. The mind of the holy Doctor will not be understood unless we keep in view the controversy in which he was engaged. He was combating the heresy of the Pelagians, who denied the doctrine of the Church that all men are born in original sin (n. 497); and they held that all men attained to the Beatific Vision after death, except those who had rendered themselves unworthy by actual sin. They acknowledged that infants who die without Baptism were not admitted to this Vision, so that they had to meet a difficulty, for these infants had not been guilty of actual sin. In order to escape from this difficulty, they invented a theory that God foresaw what sins these children would commit, if they lived. St. Augustine replies that this Divine Foresight cannot be absolute, for its object never comes into existence; and that conditional Foreknowledge will not serve the purpose of the Pelagians, for it would be unjust to punish for what has a merely hypothetical existence, as is the case with the objects of *Scientia Media*. The question of interest is that which concerns the existence of the knowledge of future contingents, not the name by which this knowledge is called. We see an illustration of

the wisdom of the Church in not allowing that the saying of even the greatest doctors should be accepted unreservedly. (n. 101.)

The belief that God has the *Scientia Media* is implied in the prayers which, under the guidance of the Church (n. 95), the faithful are accustomed to make: they ask for temporal favours under the condition, express or implied, that the attainment of their wish will not be prejudicial to their higher interests. And as a proof from reason, we may remark that it is absurd to suppose that Divine Knowledge receives an increase in the course of time, as would be the case if each free act done by a creature brought within the scope of God's Knowledge of Vision something which previously had been wholly unknown to Him.

380. *Difficulties.*—Certain difficulties have been urged against the doctrine which we have explained concerning the Divine Knowledge of Vision and *Scientia Media*, which we may notice shortly, although the chief among them belong more properly to Philosophy; and first, we will take some trifling objections founded on revelation. Several texts are quoted as showing that God is ignorant of some things, and requires to make experiments in order to ascertain how the matter stands; and after the experiment He avows that He has received such an increase of knowledge as we declare to be impossible. Thus God "tempted" Abraham (Genesis xxii. 1), that is, "proved" him (Judith viii. 22), or "tried" him (Hebrews xi. 17), as it is elsewhere expressed; and after seeing the result of the experiment, He

declared (Genesis xxii. 12), "*Now* I know that thou fearest God," speaking in the light of newly acquired knowledge. The explanation is found in the anthropomorphic (n. 366) character of the expressions used; they describe what would have been the action of a man under the circumstances; God wished that the faith of Abraham and his obedience should not remain hidden in his heart, but should be manifested outwardly, for the instruction of the faithful, and that he might earn the title of Father of all them that believe. (Romans iv. 11.) In this way the text is seen to be consistent with what we are taught elsewhere concerning the Infinite Knowledge of God, and no other mode of conciliation seems possible. There is still less difficulty with the passage (Genesis xviii. 21), where the language used might suggest that God had heard a report concerning the wickedness that was going on in Sodom, and that He went down to the city in order to see with His own eyes. If the anthropomorphic explanation be not admitted, it would follow that God does not even know the past and present, which will be questioned by none who believe in God at all.

Certain texts appear to ascribe doubt to God, the chief being that in St. John's Gospel (iv. 10), where Christ says to the Samaritan woman: "If thou didst know the gift of God, thou *perhaps* wouldst have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water." The anthropomorphic explanation is applicable in this and similar cases; but it is simpler to remark that no word expressing doubt is

to be found in the original; the Greek has a particle which is regularly found in all conditional sentences without implying the smallest uncertainty (*εἰ ἤδεις ἤτησας ἄν*). The *perhaps* which is found in the English, following the Vulgate, appears to be due to overgreat carefulness not to leave a single word of the original unrepresented (see n. 155), even when it cannot be represented without injury to the sense.

The death of Ezechias (Isaias xxxviii. 1) and the destruction of Ninive (Jonas iii. 4) are foretold, and did not come to pass; but there is no difficulty in seeing that the prediction is conditional, or rather that it is a threat and not a prediction; and that when the kings amended their ways, the threatened punishment was not inflicted.

Some Patristic difficulties have already been noticed. (n. 379.) Besides these, St. Jerome is quoted as saying that it is degrading to God to suppose that He knows from moment to moment, how many gnats are coming to the birth, and how many die. It may be enough to reply by quoting the distinct assurance of our Lord, that not one sparrow falls to the ground without the permission of God; and in fact St. Jerome is merely expressing in his fervent way what we read in the next verse but one to that which we have quoted: men are better in God's eyes than many sparrows. He has such care for those who have been redeemed by the Blood of His Son, that in comparison it may be said He has no care for His irrational creatures. (See St. Matt. x. 29–31, and St. Jerome on Habacuc i. 14; *P.L.* 25, 1086.) A similar

explanation may be given of the words of St. Chrysostom, who denies that God counts the number of the hairs of our heads. (Hom. 34 [35] *In S. Matt.* n. 2; *P.G.* 57, 401, and compare St. Matt. x. 30.)

381. *Free-will.*—One of the most famous questions in all Theology touches the mode of reconciling the Divine Foreknowledge of the free actions of angels and men with the freedom of will which angels and men enjoy, and which is their glory, making them more like to God and enabling them to offer to Him a higher service than the brute creation can offer, the service of servants not of slaves, at the same time that it renders them morally responsible. No Catholic denies to God the Knowledge of Vision (n. 378), which includes innumerable results of human action; at the same time, no Catholic denies that man is free in many of his actions. A difficulty arises as to the mode of reconciling these two truths, which are severally undeniable though seemingly incompatible; and it is discussed when Catholic philosophers and theologians consider what is the medium of the Divine Knowledge. It is agreed by all that God sees Himself immediately (n. 377), and sees all things possible in Himself; also, He sees all things that ever have actual existence in His own Essence as the pattern on which they are formed, and also immediately in themselves. (n. 378.) But there is no agreement as to the medium in which the results of free-will are seen, whether we speak of things that actually occur but which are considered precisely as being the result of a free act, or whether we consider those

which would freely occur were the creature put in such or such circumstances. (n. 379.)

The controversy is closely bound up with the much larger question of the efficacy of grace, and it will recur in our next volume. In the course of the sixteenth century, the attention of Catholic theologians was forcibly directed to the action of the human will under the action of grace, by the necessity of combating the heresies of Luther and Calvin upon the point; these teachers exaggerated the part taken by God in our free actions, and extenuated the share of man, and this in order to get a foundation for their doctrines that God positively predestines some men to eternal life, and positively predestines others to eternal misery. (n. 390, iv.) They freely branded all who failed to follow them as being Pelagians, heretics who in the fourth and fifth centuries denied the need of supernatural grace to enable us to do acts leading to our salvation. (n. 390, i.) Against these, all Catholics agreed that man is truly free, and that he truly merits reward or punishment by his conduct; and they repelled the accusation of Pelagianism, maintaining that there is no supernatural merit except in those acts which are done under the influence of supernatural grace. But two schools arose among them, each of which was again subdivided into two. It is to be borne in mind that as all parties were Catholics, they were all prepared beforehand to yield absolute, unquestioning, interior assent to any utterance of the Church upon the subject; but no such utterance has been heard, and

the matter is still freely discussed in the schools. (n. 220.)

The principal founder of the one school was a Spanish Dominican named Dominic Bañez, born in 1528, who, after a life spent in teaching at the famous University of Salamanca, died in 1604. Bañez laid great stress on the part taken by God, the First Cause, as influencing the action of all second causes, including those that are free; and he taught that these free acts were foreseen by God in the light of the decree by which He had from eternity resolved to *premove* the creature to such or such an act. In the same spirit, he taught that the grace given by God to man was efficacious of its own nature, and that men were predestined by God to eternal life by a decree which was prior to any foresight of their merits. The followers of Bañez took to themselves the name of Thomists, as though they were exponents of the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor; but their opponents were far from admitting this claim, maintaining that St. Thomas, properly understood, was far from being a Thomist; and a large part of the discussion has turned upon this personal question.

The school called Augustinian bore some resemblance to that founded by Bañez; the special doctrines do not call for notice in this place: their name will recur in the Treatise on Grace.

Against both of these schools were ranged the theologians of the Society of Jesus, under Molina (1535—1600), a Spaniard who taught theology at

Coimbra and Evora, and was the first Jesuit to interpret St. Thomas; his doctrine, especially as modified by the great Spaniard Suarez (1548—1617), has been widely accepted beyond the bounds of the Religious Order to which these writers belonged. Molina explained the Divine Foreknowledge of free acts as the result of the absolutely perfect Knowledge that God has of His free creature, as if a thorough knowledge of the character and circumstances of a man made it possible to judge with certainty, and not merely by way of conjecture, what his free action will be. Suarez preferred to say that these free actions had been foreseen in themselves from all eternity, precisely as being free, and he admitted no more premotion by God than is involved in God conserving His creature with its freedom and other powers in existence and concurring with it in the very act of making its free choice. The Molinist and the Suaresian explanations are alike applicable to those conditionally future actions, the condition of which will never be fulfilled, and which are the objects of *Scientia Mèdia*. The Thomists did not see the necessity of assigning these objects to a distinct division of the Divine Knowledge.

It is impossible for us to go into the details of this great controversy, especially as it is so closely concerned with matter which we have not yet treated. We must be content with a very few remarks. The Thomists have been accused of making God the Author of sin, but unjustly, for His premotion extends only to what is positively in the act of the creature, whereas the sinful

character is nothing positive, but is a mere privation of the rectitude that ought to be there. The Jesuit school, on the other hand, is accused of making God a mere machine, turning to do this or that at the will of the man; but this account also is unjust, for those theologians hold no more than that God who created the man with certain faculties, concurs with him in the use of those faculties. In the Thomist system it is difficult to see how freedom is secured, for the premotion is supposed to be prior to the act of choice, which follows of necessity, nor is it easy to grasp the meaning, when it is said that this necessity is not antecedent and that therefore liberty is saved. In the Jesuit system, there is no difficulty about liberty, for God is not represented as foreseeing the thing, which comes to pass accordingly, but its coming to pass is prior, with priority of sign (n. 378), to the foresight. That it will come to pass is the *cause* why God foresees it, if an anthropomorphic word may be allowed, which might seem opposed to the truth that God is the First Cause, Himself uncaused; so that it is true to say that our free conduct makes God to have foreseen from eternity what we do. The whole difficulty lies in the conception of eternity. (nn. 371, 378.)

The subject will be found explained in Father Boedder's *Natural Theology*. (pp. 279—289, and 370—380.) The difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge and free-will is mitigated, though not, of course, removed by observing that man can have a conjectural foresight of what will be the conduct of his fellow-men, without in the smallest degree interfering

with their freedom of will; there is simply no point of contact between the free choice which one makes and the conjecture which another forms as to what that choice will be, however nearly the conjecture approach to absolute certainty. The matter looked at in this way is well within our grasp and every day's experience; and if any one assert that Divine Foreknowledge constrains the will in a way of which we find no beginnings in human foreknowledge, the burden is on him to prove his assertion.

382. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter, after explaining that God is a Spirit, we have shown that He is possessed of infinite knowledge, extending to all things, without distinction of time, and including a knowledge of Himself, and of all things possible, as well those which actually occur as what would occur were free creatures placed in any given circumstances. A slight sketch is then given of the controversy which has arisen in the Catholic schools as to the medium of this knowledge.

CHAPTER V.

GOD'S WILL AND POWER.

383. *Subject of the Chapter.*—The remaining Attributes that make up the idea of the Life of God (n. 374), are His Will and His Power. It seems natural to group these together, as following on the Divine Knowledge; for man conceives a thing in his understanding, then wills to carry it out, and finally puts this will into execution by an exercise of his power; and it is convenient in breaking up the one indivisible act of the Divine Essence into parts to follow the sequence that is found in man. (*Summa*, p. I. q. 25. a. 5. ad. 1.) Having in the last chapter spoken of the Intellect of God, we proceed to the difficult questions touching His Will and His Power. These difficulties touch the liberty of God in creating, His permission of evil, and His will that men fulfil their end, which involves the whole question of predestination. The difficulty concerning God's liberty in the act of creation will be most conveniently dealt with in our Ninth Treatise on this subject. (n. 434.) The others will find their appropriate place in this chapter; but we must first explain some points which are of

great importance, but do not involve so much controversial matter.

384. *Objects of God's Will.*—By the will we understand a faculty which chooses among the objects presented to it by the intellect, embracing good and eschewing evil; it belongs to the will to aim at an end known as such, and consciously to select fit means for its attainment. It is this consciousness of working for an end that is wanting to the brutes, which, therefore, cannot be said to have a will, but are swayed blindly by some faculty which may be called an appetite.

That there is a Will in God follows from this, that we find a will in man and see that the possession of it is a simple perfection, not involving in its notion any imperfection. (n. 362.) In the Holy Scripture we find repeated mention of the Will of God, as when we are taught to pray that this Will may be done on earth as in Heaven (St. Matt. vi. 10); or when we are assured that the Will of God is our sanctification (1 Thess. iv. 3); in which passages, it will be observed, that the word Will signifies the exercise of the faculty whose existence it presupposes. But even when the word is not used, we have proof that God has a Will, as often as we read of His doing what cannot be done without an exercise of the Will, and passages to this effect are found in almost every page of the Bible. In the present chapter we shall cite a sufficient number of instances to place the point beyond doubt.

The primary object of the Divine Will is the

Divine Essence itself: creatures are the secondary object. That He is Himself the primary object of His Will follows from His infinite perfection (n. 362): He knows Himself perfectly (n. 376), and therefore knows that He is the highest good, and loves Himself as such. Were it otherwise, there would be a breach of right order, and it may be said that there would be in God a violation of justice towards Himself, were His Will to rest in any created good. This doctrine is illustrated by the declaration pronounced from Heaven that Christ is the well-beloved Son of God, in whom He is well pleased. (St. Matt. xvii. 5. See also St. Mark i. 11; 2 St. Peter i. 17; 1 St. John iv. 16.) The love of God for Himself is not a love of desire, but of satisfaction, and if we consider the mutual love of the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, it is the love of friendship; and in this we find a reply to the false inference which some attempt to draw from the oneness of God (n. 363), that existing alone from eternity He would feel lonely, and that therefore He must have called creatures into being from eternity: a false notion, which we shall speak of again when treating of Creation. (n. 439.)

The Divine love of creatures is a love of benevolence; and it is also a love of satisfaction, so far as He sees and loves in them the expression of some part of His own perfection. God's love for His rational creatures may be a love of friendship, so far as through His grace they have become His children. He has the love of desire for their

salvation. All this is illustrated when we read that God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good (Genesis i. 31): that God loves all things that are, and hateth none of those things that He hath made, for He did not appoint or make anything hating it: He spares all because they are His. (Wisdom xi. 25, 27.) The same thing is indicated by certain texts of the New Testament, which however are more immediately the expression of the human will in the Incarnate Son of God. Thus, it was said by Christ to the Apostles, and in them to all men: "You are My friends if you do the things that I command you" (St. John xv. 14); and yet more, after His Resurrection He called them His brethren (St. John xx. 17); and His exclamation upon the Cross, "I thirst" (St. John xix. 28), may have expressed among other things the intensity of His desire that men might profit by what He was doing for them: but this explanation, though given by Origen and others, can scarcely be regarded as literal.

God's love of Himself follows necessarily from the perfection of His Being: His freedom with regard to creatures, as already remarked (n. 383), will be more conveniently dealt with in the Treatise on Creation. (n. 434.)

385. *Divisions of God's Will.*—It will of course be understood that there are no real divisions in the Divine Will, for this faculty, like all the other Attributes of God, are really identical with His simple indivisible Essence. (nn. 359, 365.) But the imperfection of man's nature requires him to think

of this Will as if it admitted of certain divisions, and we proceed to explain some of these.

First, we distinguish the Antecedent and the Consequent Will of God, which some writers term His First and Second Wills. The Antecedent Will is exercised when God wills anything without regard to the circumstances, as when He wills that all men be saved. (1 Timothy ii. 4.) By the Consequent Will He wishes something under the circumstances which apart from the circumstances He would not have wished, as when it is His Will that such men as offend Him grievously and persevere till death in the state of enmity in which they have placed themselves should be punished eternally. (St. Matt. xxv. 41.) Even in regard to these, the First Will is that they should be saved: it is only the circumstance of their persevering malice that frustrates this First Will, and the Second Will has its course.

What God wills absolutely, without any condition, is always done, as when He willed to create the world: such Will is called efficacious. If He will something conditionally on some event which does not occur, the Will may be frustrated, as if He have the Will to give grace to His rational creature, but only on condition that He is asked to do so: in this case, if the creature fail to pray, the condition is not fulfilled and the Divine Will is inefficacious. It will be seen that the same act of the Will may, from different points of view, be called Consequent, Conditional, or Inefficacious. It is a true and serious Will when the event is willed

conditionally and it is wished that the condition should be fulfilled.

The good pleasure of God as signified to man is sometimes called His Will, but improperly; for the signification is an effect of the Will, and not the Will itself. There are various cases where the Will is thus signified. When the matter concerns the direct action of God Himself, it is fulfilled as a matter of course; as when God said, Be light made, and light was made. (Genesis i. 3.) But in other cases the signification is addressed to a rational creature, putting upon him a law to which it is his duty to conform his will; and this may be by way of command or of prohibition, as in the affirmative and negative precepts of the Decalogue: Honour thy father and thy mother, and, Thou shalt not kill. (Exodus xx. 12, 13.) There are occasions also where God signifies that a certain course of action on the part of a creature will be more pleasing to Him than the contrary, although He does not lay any absolute command, but merely advises, as when He gives the counsel of voluntary poverty: If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast and give to the poor. (St. Matt. xix. 21.) On other occasions, God merely signifies that it is not His pleasure to interfere with His creature's use of his natural powers, however displeasing this use may be: we have a clear instance of this when Satan received express permission to tempt Job (Job ii. 6), and there is the same permission given in act, though not in word, as often as a creature is conserved in the act of sinning: this permission by

no means implies that the sinful act is pleasing to God. As already remarked (n. 381), sin is a privation of due order, not anything real, and therefore it cannot be the object of will. Sin consists in the will fastening inordinately upon some finite, created good. See further in the paragraph on the permission of evil. (n. 388.)

386. *Moral Qualities.*—With the usual reserve as to using human language concerning God, we can ascribe to Him the possession of certain moral qualities, and it follows from the perfection of His Being that He has all these so far as they do not involve any imperfection. And first He has (1) Wisdom, which belongs partly to the Intellect, causing it to see the means which are suitable for carrying out a given end; but also, and chiefly to the Will, which employs those means which the Intellect proposes as useful. The Psalmist tells us (Psalm cxlvi. 5), that of the Wisdom of God there is no number: and the Apostle speaks of God as the Only Wise (Romans xvi. 27), indicating that all human wisdom is a mere shadow and imitation of the Divine Wisdom, which alone is truly entitled to the name; while throughout a whole Book of Scripture, God is pleased to speak of Himself by the name of Wisdom, which is described as reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly. (Wisdom viii. 1.) (2) God is holy, for His Will is in perfect harmony with the infinite perfection of His Being, which furnishes the motive for all His activity outside Himself (n. 377 [2]), so that He loves His creatures for the good that He sees in

them, while He abhors all evil. He is not a God that willeth iniquity (Psalm v. 5); His perfection is the pattern of the perfection to which we must aspire (St. Matt. v. 48); He tempts no man to evil (St. James i. 17); and the exhortation to men to be holy, for God is holy, addressed first to the Israelites through Moses (Deut. xxxii. 4), is repeated by St. Peter. (1 St. Peter i. 15, 16.) (3) God is just, not with commutative justice, which would imply that the creature had rights against the Creator; but His justice is seen in His legislation, when He provides His creatures with good laws, as by the Decalogue (Exodus xx.) and the Sermon on the Mount (St. Matt. v.—vii.): He is the Source of all human authority, for by Him kings reign and law-givers decree just things (Prov. viii. 15), a doctrine on which St. Paul bases the conscientious duty of obedience to civil governors. (Romans xiii. 1—5.) We must all be manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil (2 Cor. v. 10), so that God is just in dealing out rewards and punishment; and the Divine law finds its sanction in the peace or uneasiness of each man's conscience (n. 349); and perhaps whatever comes under the idea of justice may be reduced to legislation, judgment upon actions, and the sanction of the law.

(4) To pass to another group of moral characters, the holiness and justice of God, considered along with His Knowledge, assure us of His veracity, that He can neither deceive nor be deceived. God is

not a man that He should lie (Numbers xxiii. 19; see, too, St. John viii. 26; Romans iii. 4), and from this veracity we get an assurance of the truth of all our knowledge, both natural and supernatural: God cannot lead us into error. This Attribute, however, does not involve that He should never allow us to fall into error, just as His Holiness is not inconsistent with His allowing us to fall into sin; and here we have the explanation of such passages as those where we are told that God deceiveth them that walk in vain where there is no way (Job xii. 24), and that He gave a lying spirit in the mouths of all the prophets who promised success to Achab (3 Kings xxii. 23); but no one was deceived who walked wisely, and had the King hearkened to the voice of Micheas he would not have perished at Ramoth-Gilead: but he preferred to listen to them that prophesied smooth things, and he put the truthful counsellor in prison and fed him with bread of affliction and water of distress: by this conduct he gave clear proof of his headstrong determination not to believe what was disagreeable to him, and thus the error into which he fell was imputable to himself, and God permitted him to go his way. (See n. 381, and compare St. Matt. xix. 7 with St. Mark x. 3, where "permit" and "command" are used indifferently.) Further, (5) God is faithful to His promises, and this because He is holy, just, truthful, and unchanging; but care is necessary to ascertain whether His promises and threatenings are the expressions of His absolute Will, or whether they may not depend upon some condition. The des-

truction threatened to Ninive was conditional, and there is no contradiction in what we read, that God did not the evil that He had said He would do (Jonas iii. 4, 10): the threat of the Prophet had worked its effect: but we may have absolute trust in the promise (1 St. John i. 9) that, if we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins. This follows not only from the foregoing considerations, but also from (6) the Bountifulness of God, the last of this group of Attributes. This is seen in the provisions for the welfare of His creatures of which the world is full; and especially in the pity, mercifulness, gentleness, long-suffering, and patience shown in His dealings with sinners: all of which are summed up in the Incarnation and Death of the Son of God. This character is seen in all the pleadings of the prophets, and in countless texts in all parts of Scripture: as one specimen, we may refer to the pathetic lament of Christ over Jerusalem (St. Matt. xxiii. 27), when He deplores the obstinacy of the stubborn city in rejecting the most moving advances of His love.

(7) Finally, that God is infinitely happy follows from His possessing all good within Himself. We have already seen in what sense it is that regret, repentance, and the like feelings are attributed to Him (n. 366); and it will be shown in the Treatise on Creation that this essential happiness is no way affected by the existence of creatures or by their conduct. (n. 433.)

387. *The Power of God.*—The Power of God is not one of His moral Attributes, but like them it is

conceived as being in close connection with His Will, and therefore it finds a suitable place in the present chapter. No one who acknowledges the existence of God at all will doubt that He is possessed of Power: in the words of St. Augustine (Serm. 240, c. 2, n. 2; *P.L.* 38, 1131), "I do not ask you to show me a Christian who denies that God is all-powerful, nor a Jew who denies it: show me if you can an idolater, that worships devils, who does not admit it." By virtue of this power, God can do all things, whatsoever He pleases (Psalm cxxxiv. 6), for with Him shall no word, that is, thing, be impossible. (St. Luke i. 37.) But it is a remark of the utmost importance that sometimes that which is no thing is called by a name as if it were a thing: and it is no limitation of omnipotence to say that nonentities of this kind cannot be done. Thus, a name is sometimes used as if there were a thing which possessed contradictory attributes, whereas it is the nature of contradictories that they exclude each other: there is therefore no such thing possible, and it follows that the name is meaningless, senseless, nonsense. A trivial example is found if mention is made of a three-sided quadrilateral, where the characters of possessing three sides only and more than three are ascribed to the same figure, although these characters are mutually exclusive: no such figure, therefore, can exist, and it is quite consistent to say that such a one cannot be made, although God is omnipotent. If this example is understood, there will be no difficulty in applying the same considerations to the case of God sinning or dying:

a sinning God is as impossible as a square circle; so with an event which did occur and also did not occur in the past; or, in other words, God though Almighty, does not make past events not to have happened. Another case is a creature that is so good that no better is possible: did such exist it would be at once a creature and God; for whatever is not the Infinite God might be made better by receiving a larger share of likeness to Him.

We shall see in the Treatise on the Creation that, according to the defined doctrine of the Church (n. 434), God was omnipotent and free in the act of creating the world. He might, therefore, have made it different from what it actually is, and the precise measure and character of what He called into being was fixed by His free-will alone; it is therefore untrue to say that God, being infinite in Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, *must* have created the best of all possible worlds: this phrase, "best of all possible creatures," involves a contradiction, or the doctrine of optimism is nonsense. (See n. 434.)

There is a famous distinction between the Absolute and the Ordinary Power of God. When we ascribe to Him Absolute Power, we do not mean that nonentities are produced by Him, as we have just explained: nor that He does anything other than what He has decreed from all eternity to do, for this would be inconsistent with His unchangingness (n. 370): nor that He does anything by His Power which is inconsistent with His other Attributes, His Justice, for example. Some Jansenist heretics have ascribed Absolute Power to God in

this last sense, but wrongly and absurdly: for the Will of God is not really distinct from His Essence and His other Attributes, such as His Justice (n. 359), and therefore it is self-contradictory to speak of His Will pointing to what is inconsistent with His Justice. But there is a true sense in which we may distinguish between the Ordinary Power of God and His Absolute Power. According to the free and eternal decrees of His Will He commonly governs the world in accordance with a certain order; thus, He maintains matter in existence and in the exercise of certain powers, and one result is that a piece of iron which falls into water ordinarily falls to the bottom, in virtue of the attraction of the earth; and in His supernatural Providence there is in like manner an ordinary course followed, as when men are guided in the service of God by the ministry of the Church. But deviations from these ordinary courses occasionally occur, as when the axe-head floated in the days of Eliseus (4 Kings vi. 6), and when Saul heard the voice from heaven, which led to his conversion. (Acts ix. 4.) These extraordinary deviations from the usual course of things sometimes attract notice and are called miracles. (n. 24); we are altogether ignorant whether other such deviations occur which do not attract notice. But besides what God does, either ordinarily or on exceptional occasions, there are other things, which neither involve contradiction in themselves nor are in conflict with any of His Attributes, and these may be said to be within His Absolute Power, for they would be done were it

but His will to do them. We never can be sure that any act belongs to this class, for it may involve contradictions of which we have no suspicion; but there is perhaps no improbability in supposing that there would be no contradiction in continued acts of the creation of matter, or in the production of a living being from merely dead material, which acts, however, we believe not to occur (n. 440); and in the supernatural order, among many more abstruse questions, theologians dispute whether God could of His Absolute Power, pardon venial sin apart from some act of the sinner. Suarez holds that this is possible to the Absolute Power of God, although it is not within His ordinary Providence. (Suarez, lib. vii. *De Sanctificatione*, c. 24, nn. 4, 9, 14.)

388. *Permission of Evil.*—We now come to say something on a subject to which we have already referred more than once. (nn. 385–387.) We have shown that according to the Catholic faith, God is infinite (n. 362) in Knowledge (n. 376), Wisdom (n. 386, 1), Goodness (n. 386, 6), and Power. (n. 387.) It might have been expected that no evil would be found in the world which He made and which He governs. Yet, we find that the world is full of evil. There is evil that is physical, namely, pain, whether of body or mind; and evil that is moral, namely, sin; and the Catholic faith teaches that moral evil sometimes involves as its consequence physical evil of eternal duration.

The difficulty of reconciling the undoubted existence of evil in the world with the Providence of God has been felt in all ages, and it is the main

theme of the Book of Job, perhaps the oldest of extant writings. The system of two co-ordinate principles was devised to account for the coexistence of evil with no less plain marks of goodness in the Governor of the world; this system had long great vogue in the East, and under the name of Manicheism it made its way among Christians, and gave much trouble to St. Augustine and other Fathers, by whom it was combated (see St. Aug. *Contra Manich.; P.L.* 32, 1345; Tert. *C. Marcion, P.L.* 2, 239; and *C. Hermogenem; P.L.* 2, 195; also Theodoret, *On Providence; P.G.* 83, 956), while as late as 1252 the dagger of a Manichean gave the crown of martyrdom to St. Peter of Verona. (See n. 366.) We no longer hear anything of this system as an explanation of the difficulty, for there is a plain absurdity in supposing that two independent infinite beings can exist side by side, as well as in supposing that any being at all can exist in whom there is no good: His existence is itself a good, which He has either of Himself, and then He is God; or of another, and then he is a creature, wholly under the dominion of his Creator, as the Catholic faith teaches concerning Satan and his angels.

A sense of difficulty in reconciling the Christian system with the existence of sin and its consequences, has led some persons to reject the Christian revelation and embrace a form of Deism, which makes the world to be ruled by a God of pure benevolence. These apparently persuade themselves that the evil is not in sin, but in the punishment of

sin. Others are more consistent with a bad sort of consistency, and urge that the existence of pain is irreconcilable with the Deist theory; it may be allowed that these Atheists have the better of the Deists in the argument on this one point, but they themselves have no answer to give when a Christian or a Deist calls on them to explain the origin of the world. The existence of the world if there be no God, is a vastly greater difficulty than the existence of evil in the world, according to Christian teaching.

It will be observed that we say nothing as to the amount of evil in the world. It is impossible to measure this amount; and the warm discussions which have gone on whether men and brutes have more happiness or misery in life are perfectly futile; we have no measure either of happiness or of misery, nor any means of applying such a measure, did it exist. The difficulty before us is raised in substance by the existence of the smallest evil, and any enumeration of the details of what goes on around us merely excites the imagination and disturbs the reason. As it has been pointedly expressed, some men would have God dethroned if a fly suffers a passing pang.

The Christian does not pretend to be able to give a full explanation of the difficulty, but he remarks that it is merely a difficulty, not a demonstration. He is content to hold that both the Attributes of God and the existence of evil, are undoubted truths, and he is confident that they cannot be proved to be contradictory; so he is

content to acknowledge that he is without the powers of mind which would enable him to prove that they are really parts of one harmonious whole. At the same time, he can put forward some considerations which go far towards diminishing the urgency of the difficulty. First, he observes that his system must be taken as a whole, so as to include the Fall of Man (n. 497) and its effects; and account must be taken of the whole life of man, here and hereafter, not of his life on earth alone; he may well make the words of St. Paul his own: "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable" (1 Cor. xv. 19); he tries to live soberly and justly and godly in this world, looking for the blessed hope and coming of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ (Titus ii. 13), knowing that tribulation worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory. (2 Cor. iv. 17.) These are his hopes, and he is ready to give an account of the grounds on which he entertains them; and in view of them he defies every one to prove that the existence of physical evil is inconsistent with the Attributes of God.

As to moral evil, he observes that the possibility of sin is connected by an absolutely necessary tie with the possession of free-will; and that this possibility is reduced into act only by the malice of man, so that God is not the author of this evil; so far as He wills to conserve the creature in the act of sinning, and to punish him as is his due, this is not His antecedent Will (n. 385), but merely consequent on the free determination of the creature

To possess freedom, even with the terrible possibility of sin attaching to it, is a good, for it makes us more like to God, and enables us to do Him an altogether higher service than that of which the brutes are capable. The special difficulties that arise concerning eternal punishment will be considered in the last Treatise of this work.

The whole difficulty that is felt upon the subject of the permission of evil, is founded on a tacit assumption that God is bound to do to all His creatures all the good He can. But no one can show that there is any law of His Being binding Him to this, and certainly He is under no bond external to Himself; and in fact were He bound by any such law, creation would have been impossible. Whatever is created is finite, for a creature of infinite perfection is a nonentity, such as cannot be the object of the Divine power (n. 387): every possible creature is therefore imperfect, and suffers from what is called metaphysical evil; and the physical and moral evil that we have been speaking of are in truth nothing but phases of this metaphysical evil, under which every possible creature must labour to a greater or less extent. The complaint against God must therefore be, not why He has allowed evil to be in the world, but why He has not given to each creature a larger share of good than that creature has in fact received at His hands. To this question we may reply by another, asking why God should have given to each more than He has given; it is His pure bounty that He has given existence, and to men who are able to serve Him

He has added the further bounty that they have the prospect of eternal happiness, as the reward of their service. He might, had He pleased, have made men less liable to pain, but He was no way bound to do so; and whatever condition they were in, as regards this and other points, it would have been possible to suggest something that would be an improvement in their condition. In the same way, He might if He pleased, give to each man such a measure of grace as would ensure his always willing what is good, and this without any interference with liberty, as we shall see when we treat of grace; or He might withhold the offer of grace when He foresees that it will be abused; but the same remark recurs, that even if the proposed distribution of grace would be better for man than the actual economy, still God is not bound to give us anything better than we have; what we have is good, and when we have received a gratuitous benefit, we should be thankful and not complain that it is not better; especially when it lies with ourselves to choose how far we will profit by what is offered. The distribution of grace is at present a mystery to us, which God seems jealously to keep from our knowledge, for He tells us (Romans ix. 20, 21) that the potter has power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour, and the thing formed must not say to him that formed it: Why has thou made me thus? We believe that the mystery will one day be cleared up, and the way of God be justified in the sight of men; meanwhile we are content to

wait, convinced that the evil around us cannot be proved to be inconsistent with the Attributes of God.

We may notice shortly some forms in which the difficulty is sometimes presented. It is said that God by giving us free-will behaves like a mother who allows her child to have access to alluring poison, which no good mother would do; the answer is, that the mother is not good, unless she does for her child all the good she can, whereas a creature to whom God gave all the good He could cannot exist; its characters are mutually contradictory. (n. 387.) Again, if God has predetermined the free-will of man, He is responsible if the man sins: we leave the reply to those who uphold this doctrine of predetermination, which we reject. (n. 381.) And if it be urged that there is an unaccountable inequality in the distribution of good things, both material and spiritual, natural and supernatural, we answer that we are not concerned to account for the inequality, for God is at liberty to do as He will, according to the teaching of the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard. (St. Matt. xx. 15.) Our business is to make the best of what we have got, and not to concern ourselves with our neighbour; the judgment which God will form concerning each man, will be just and merciful, and will be passed with full knowledge, not of the man's acts alone, but also of his circumstances, internal and external. God will render to every man according to his works (St. Matt. xvi. 27), apprised truly and not according to any impossible standard.

389. *The Will to Save.*—We now approach the thorny subject of Predestination, which is to many minds the greatest difficulty in all Theology; the difficulty is undoubtedly great, but perhaps it will be found that it has been anticipated, and that it does not add much to the difficulty which we have already discussed (n. 381), when we pointed out that the Divine Foreknowledge of our acts is in fact consistent with our freedom in action, although we are forced to confess that the manner *how* these two truths stand together is an unfathomed mystery. Whenever we consider what depends upon the Infinity of God and His Eternity, we are at the very verge of our intellectual capacity, and are only dimly aware that there exists a vast and boundless ocean of truth of which we must be content to remain ignorant. But it is only the most gifted minds that are fully alive to their own ignorance, and have the humility to acknowledge it, and to say plainly that there are things that they do not know. It is the shallow and arrogant who pretend to universal knowledge, and profess to have an answer to every question, and among the rest they will give their views on the subject of Predestination, sometimes explaining it in a way that destroys human freedom and responsibility, at other times making it the occasion for denying the Being of the Infinite God. The interests concerned in the question of Predestination are so tremendous that the imaginations of men are apt to be excited when they consider it, and the calm exercise of reason is hindered; and this is another reason

why it is not advisable to dwell needlessly upon the subject.

We have already had occasion to explain the meaning of Predestination in the language of Theology. (n. 184, iii.) As we there said, we hold that God will have all men to be saved, or, in other words, that He has destined each man for a place in the ranks of the Blessed (n. 184, i.), and that in the case of the lost, this Divine destination has been frustrated. In the present paragraph we shall give the grounds on which this belief rests, and indicate the replies to such objections as may be raised against it: the following paragraph will contain a statement of the errors that are prevalent upon the subject.

It is of faith that God seriously and sincerely wills the salvation of some who are not of the number of the Predestined (Conc. Trid. Sess. 6, can. 17; Denz. 709), and that Christ did not die for the salvation of the Predestined only (Prop. 5, Jansenii; Denz. 970; see n. 390, vi.), for the contradictories of these statements are declared to be heretical. The truth is plainly declared in Scripture, as we proceed to show, taking first that part of our assertion for which we have the explicit declaration of the Church, as just quoted, and then the wider proposition that the class of men for whom Christ died is not only wider than the Predestined, but includes absolutely all mankind.

For the first part, it will be enough to show that there is a man among the lost concerning whom it

was the will of God that he should not be lost. This man is Judas. We have the express word of Christ: "This is the will of the Father who sent Me, that of all that He hath given Me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up at the last day." (St. John vi. 39.) Judas was among those whom the Father gave to Christ, who gives thanks to His Father that of those that He had given none were lost but the son of perdition, where this solitary exception undoubtedly refers to Judas; and Judas is among the lost, for were he already enjoying the Vision of God, or destined hereafter to enjoy it, these words would not be fulfilled, that it were better for him if that man had not been born. (St. Matt. xxvi. 24.) This argument seems to be absolutely conclusive, and it might stand alone; but we may notice the declaration that God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting (St. John iii. 16); but those believers (2 St. Peter i. 1) to whom St. Peter addressed his Second Epistle were "called" and "elect," and yet they had need to labour that by good works they should make sure their calling and election (2 St. Peter i. 10); it follows that it was not already sure, but might be lost if the warning were neglected. Further, Christ desired the salvation of the children of Jerusalem (St. Matt. xxiii. 27); but the desire was frustrated by the want of will on the part of the guilty city. Thus the doctrine defined at Trent, and in the condemnation of the Jansenian Five Propositions, remains established: the will of

God to save is wider than the class of the Predestined.

That this will in fact embraces all mankind is asserted in Scripture with no less plainness. Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1 St. John ii. 2); Christ died for all (2 Cor. v. 15); He takes away the sins of the world (St. John i. 29); and certainly God wishes the salvation of those for whom Christ died. These texts might be sufficient, but there is a passage in the First Epistle of St. Paul to Timothy which might well put an end to all controversy. It forms the opening of the second chapter, and runs as follows:

(1) I desire therefore first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made by men,

(2) for kings and for all that are in high stations, that we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all piety and chastity.

(3) For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour,

(4) who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

(5) For there is one God, and one Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus:

(6) who gave Himself a redemption for all, a testimony in due times.

This passage may seem too clear to need comment, but we may observe that we are here exhorted to prayer for kings and other men of influence, in order that they may not hinder their subjects in the service of God: in other places, we are told to pray

for all men. (St. Matt. v. 44.) Also, no plausible reason can be alleged for cutting down the meaning of the word "all" in the fourth verse, especially as the passage by no means stands alone, but has many parallels in other parts of Scripture. (See St. Matt. xviii. 11—14; 1 Timothy i. 15, iv. 10; 2 St. Peter iii. 9; Ezechiel xviii. 23, xxxiii. 11.) In these places God earnestly inculcates that His desire is to save all, even those who at the time when they are addressed are living in sin. The fifth verse shows that the will to save extends to all to whom the One God is God: to all for whom the One Mediator is Mediator, that is, to all who partake in the nature which God assumed that He might become our Mediator, that is, to the whole race of man.

It is to be observed, however, that some theologians of first-rate authority, while agreeing with all that is here said, have doubt whether it is proved that the will of God to save extends to more than the race as a whole, without necessarily embracing each individual. We shall not attempt to enter on this controversy.

There is one single passage of Scripture that might seem at first glance to be opposed to our doctrine, but the opposition is apparent only. Christ, shortly before His Passion, made a prayer to His Father on behalf of some limited class of persons, described as having been given to Him, and He expressly excludes from His prayer another class, spoken of as "the world:" "I pray not for the world, but for them that Thou hast given Me."

(St. John xvii. 9.) It does not concern us to inquire precisely how these two classes are distinguished; it is enough to remark that the scope of the passage is obscure, whereas those quoted in proof of our doctrine are clear: that we nowhere read that Christ never prayed for those who are excluded from His intercession on this occasion: that He prayed for those who were given to Him, in order that the world might believe (verse 21), so that His intercession redounded to the benefit of those for whom it was not directly made: and lastly, He begs the favour of His Heavenly Father for those for whom He prays, on the ground of their faith and love, which virtues were not found in the world.

It would be easy to quote largely from the Fathers to show that our doctrine was the common teaching of the Church in the early centuries, but we omit to do so, for our opponents make little account of Patristic authority; but a few words must be said about St. Augustine, in whom they think to find support. We have already seen (n. 101) that they maintained the irrefragable authority of this Doctor, in comparison with which they made little account of the decisions of the living Church; a view which it was found necessary to condemn. (Denz. 1187.) But St. Augustine is not really opposed to the doctrine which we maintain, for he clearly teaches that the Divine will to save is universal (*De Catechiz. Rudibus*, c. 26, n. 52; *P.L.* 40, 344), and he quotes the words of St. Paul (1 Timothy ii. 1—6) to this effect (*De Spir. et Lit.* c. 33, n. 57; *P.L.* 44, 237): "The will of God is

that all men should be saved, but not in such sort as to take from them their free-will, according to their good or evil use of which they will be judged with absolute justice." It is in the light of these clear passages that we must look for the meaning of certain places of St. Augustine, writing against the Pelagians, who maintained that man could gain salvation by his own efforts, without the supernatural help of God: against them St. Augustine assigns certain partial meanings to the words of St. Paul, to the effect that no man can be saved unless God so will: or that God causes men to wish for the salvation of all: or that He wills to save some out of all classes of men. This last, of course, is a true meaning if we understand the Saint to be speaking of the consequent will of God (n. 385), which follows upon His knowledge of the free acts of the creature; the will to save which we ascribe to God is, of course, an antecedent will. It is impossible for us to enter into the question as to the true mind of St. Augustine, concerning which volumes have been written: it is enough to say that we by no means admit that his authority is against us, as is often assumed by popular writers on this deep subject.

We have said that the will to save which we uphold is not absolute, but conditional (n. 385); antecedent, not consequent, and here we have the answer to the difficulty that some men are lost, and yet no one resists the will of God. (Roman ix. 19.) God's will is that all men be saved by means of their free co-operation with His grace, but only on

condition that they choose to co-operate. He has granted them a favour by leaving the matter in their hands, for this is essentially involved in the power to serve Him freely (n. 388); and that this antecedent and conditional will is a true will may be understood by considering the example of a judge, on whom is thrown the duty of pronouncing on the guilt or innocence of one very dear to him, who is accused of a crime. The judge will truly and sincerely wish to acquit his friend, but only on condition that the evidence leaves a doubt as to the prisoner's guilt: should there be no reasonable doubt left, then the consequent will of the judge will be to condemn.

Loss of souls then occurs through the failure of some condition, and this condition is for adults the will of the person to do his duty. It is always within the power of every one possessed of the use of reason to fulfil this condition, as will be seen in the Treatise on Grace; but sometimes it seems as if failures occur which are attributable to the free-will of other persons, or to physical causes. The ordinary instrument of the conversion of a sinner is the ministry of the Church, and it is easy to conceive a case of a sinner dying in his sin, who would have become reconciled to God had only a priest been at hand and done his office. But the priest may have neglected his duty through sloth; or he may have been hastening on his errand of charity and been hindered by a flood from arriving in time; in such a case, the condition on which God willed to save has not been fulfilled; the antecedent

Will has been frustrated, and the consequent Will to condemn the unrepenting will prevail; and we must remember that God is just (n. 386), and that therefore the above combination will not occur in any case where it would work injustice. In the same way, an infant who dies in the spiritual state in which he enters this world is not saved, as will be seen when we speak of Original Sin (n. 497); and in such a case the antecedent Will is frustrated through failure of the condition on which it depends, and the consequent Will takes effect. In this case, no injustice is done, for as we shall see (n. 501), the Vision of God is a gratuitous favour, no way due to the nature of man.

390. *Various Views.*—We shall close this chapter by shortly setting forth the chief among the various views which have been held on the difficult matter of which we are treating.

I. *The Pelagians.*—The Pelagian heresy derives its name from a Welshman, who is said, on no good authority, to have discarded his native name, Morgan, in favour of a Greek name having the same meaning. The time of his greatest activity was about the year 405. The heresy to which he gave prominence had always existed and still exists among persons who call themselves Christian but who do not know and follow the teaching of the Church. The principal point in the heresy is to deny the necessity of internal, supernatural grace, without which no salutary act can be done; this will be proved in the Treatise on Grace, where we shall have more to say about the Pelagians. They

are mentioned here because their doctrine is exactly opposed to all forms of predestinarianism, the one making too much of the part taken by man in the work of his salvation, the other too little. Plainly, in a system where no grace at all is recognized, no question arises as to any decree of God destining some to receive the grace which will lead to their salvation, and refusing the same grace to others.

II. *The Semi-Pelagians.*—The efforts of St. Augustine and other Doctors were successful in demonstrating the heretical character of the doctrine of Pelagius, which was finally condemned by Pope Zosimus, in the year 418. (Denz. nn. 64—72.)

But another school arose which fully accepted this condemnation, at the same time that they went further in the Pelagian direction than is consistent with the Catholic faith. These acknowledged the necessity of grace for salutary acts, but they held that original sin had not so thoroughly destroyed in man the power to do good as to prevent his making the first step towards salvation by his natural powers; and that when this first step had been taken, the grace that God gave, enabling the man to persevere, was not purely gratuitous, but was in some sense due. This doctrine originated with Cassian, a native of Gaul, who died in 432. After spending some time in the East, conversing with the solitaries who peopled the deserts of Egypt and Syria, he returned to the West, and became a monk of the Monastery of Lerins. (n. 114.) His error spread, especially in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, and his followers received the name of Massilians.

There was a lively controversy between them and St. Augustine, and many years elapsed before they were condemned at the Second Council of Orange in 529. (Denz. 144—171.) This was not an Ecumenical Council, but its teaching has been received by the Church at large. (See n. 296.) The error of Cassian, and of his fellow-monk Vincent, did not stand in the way of their writings on other subjects being held in esteem, for they did not obstinately oppose themselves to the living voice of authority, and they were supposed to draw their doctrine from the writings of no less a Doctor than St. John Chrysostom: and so, Cassian's records of his conversation with the Eastern masters of the spiritual life (*P.L.* vol. 49), became the great repository from which the ascetic writers of the middle ages drew their doctrine: while the *Commonitorium* of Vincent is to this day a most valuable treatise on the Christian rule of faith. (*P.L.* vol. 50, and see n. 114.)

We shall discuss the Semi-Pelagian tenets in the Treatise on Grace.

III. *Early Predestinarians.*—While St. Augustine was busied in proving the insufficiency of the unassisted free-will of man to secure salvation, it is not unnatural that he used some expressions which admitted of being so construed as to seem to exclude all action of free-will, and even to deny the existence of such a faculty. These expressions were caught hold of by some of the stoutest opponents of all forms of Pelagianism, and were formed by them into a body of doctrine which erred in the opposite direction Their leader was one Lucidus, of whom

little is known, except that he seems to have been a native of the same district as produced the Massilians. He is said to have held that free-will is totally extinct in man, and that the Divine Foreknowledge is equivalent to a Divine decree, forcing man to destruction; with many kindred tenets. This teaching was condemned by a Synod at Arles in 475; Lucidus accepted the condemnation, and his party disappeared. (See Hefele's *Councils*, vol. 3, for an account of this affair.)

The predestinarian teaching was revived in the middle of the ninth century, by a monk of Fulda named Godeschalc, whose eventful career fills a large place in the Church history of the time. He is reported to have taught that no one redeemed by the Blood of Christ can perish, and that if any baptized person is lost, he never had truly become a member of the Church: also that God predestines some to evil in the same sense in which He predestines some to good, that God forces some to evil, and that these have no power to withdraw from sin. Some Catholic divines of the time maintained that all that Godeschalc said admitted of an orthodox interpretation, and was in fact nothing but the teaching of St. Augustine; and a lively controversy ensued, in which the theological question was obscured by being mixed up with political considerations, arising out of the division of the Empire of Charlemagne into those portions which were in after-times represented by France and Germany. The personal question as to the orthodoxy of Godeschalc is of little interest: his history is a

curious picture of the manners of the age, which we must leave to the historians to develope. Later controversies have cleared up what is the true doctrine of the Church on the matter.

IV. *Calvin.*—Godeschalc is said to have been led to take up the views that we have described by observing what he considered to be great corruption of morals in some Bishops. The great revolt against authority which is termed the Reformation followed upon a time of great relaxation of Church discipline: widespread corruption, which sometimes extended to persons in high places, followed upon the renaissance in literature, together with the exile of the Popes to Avignon, the Great Schism, the Black Death, and the political events of central Italy: it required all the efforts of the Council of Trent and the glorious cluster of Saints who were contemporaries of the Council to restore a better state of things in the Church. It is, therefore, perhaps more than a coincidence that the new religion, on its positive side, renewed the teaching which Godeschalc falsely ascribed to St. Augustine, and pushed it boldly to all its consequences.

The man who put this doctrine into shape, and who has given his own name to it, was John Calvin, a French priest. We are not concerned with the details of his life, but will proceed at once to give the heads of his doctrine, as found in his Institutes. They are summarized as follows by Cardinal Franzelin (*De Deo Uno*, thesis 54):

"Of men, some are created for eternal life, others for eternal damnation: and so we say that a

man is predestined to life or death according as he is created for one or the other end. To be ordained to death does not follow on sin, but the sin of Adam and the ruin this sin entailed on the race, is itself the effect resulting from this antecedent Divine predestination of many to eternal death. This decree of God is put in execution when He grants to those whom He has antecedently chosen, the call to faith and the external declaration that they are just: while to those who are antecedently reprobated He refuses all grace, and hardens them in iniquity. Faith and other gifts in the elect have no character of merit, but are symbols and testimonies of the antecedent election: similarly in the reprobate, their infidelity and sins are indication of their reprobation which has gone before."

Such, then, is Calvinism in its original, uncompromising form. The doctrine is intelligible enough, and it will be seen that it is directly in conflict with the doctrine of the Council of Trent that God sincerely wills to save some who are not of the number of the predestined. (n. 389.) Seeing that in the view of Calvin all the lost suffer eternal torment, however personally blameless, and even if they died in the womb, we do not wonder that many of those who have been brought up to take this view of God have rejected it and taken refuge in deism or atheism.

V. *Forms of Calvinism.*—The Calvinistic doctrine was adopted by all the more thoroughgoing among the sects that sprang from the Reformation, especially in France, Switzerland, and Scotland. In

England, the formularies of the Established Church have a convenient vagueness and elasticity, so that they have been accepted by many who held the highest Calvinism and by many who abhor it in all its forms. The former are the Puritans, now represented by the Low Church party, and by the Congregationalists and Baptists, who broke away from the Establishment in 1662 on grounds connected with the form of Church government, and not on the ground of predestination. These sects exist in great strength in the United States of America.

As might be expected, the doctrine of Calvin proved too strong for many stomachs, and many controversies arose, and were carried on, especially in Holland. At length, a modification of the master's doctrine was very widely adopted, according to which the Divine decree of reprobation was conceived as being subsequent to the Foreknowledge of the sin of Adam. This was called the Sublapsarian view, in opposition to the old Supralapsarianism. Early in the seventeenth century, a Dutch divine called Arminius combated Calvinism in all its varieties, and upheld the all-embracing will of God to save: Arminianism prevails in the High and Broad sections of the Established Church, and among all other Protestant bodies who are not Calvinistic: the Arminian doctrine on predestination, so far as it is formulated, scarcely differs from that of the Catholic Church.

VI. *Jansenism.*—Certain doctrines having more or less in common with those of Calvin, made their way into the Catholic University of Louvain, and

one of the professors, Baius, has obtained an unenviable notoriety, for in 1567 no less than seventy-six errors taught by him were solemnly condemned by Pope St. Pius V. (Denz. 881—959.) These furnish the theologian with a large part of his material when treating of Grace, Original Sin, and other matters, and we shall find occasion to use them. Baius himself accepted the condemnation, but there is a doubt how far he was sincere: however that may be, his views were still held by some doctors of the University, and were adopted, perhaps with some modifications, by Cornelius Jansen, a Dutchman, who began his studies in 1602. Jansen devoted himself to the study of St. Augustine, and, finding what he sought, constructed a system of theology which he professed to found upon the doctrine of the great Doctor of Hippo, and he gave the name of *Augustinus* to the book which he compiled. This book was published in 1640, two years after the death of the author.

The *Augustinus* was promptly prohibited in 1641 by the Constitution *In Eminenti* of Urban VIII.; and Innocent X. in 1653 affixed the note of heresy to five propositions, which he declared to express the doctrine of the book (*Cum occasione;* Denz. 966—970); and the controversy that ensued brought out clearly the lawfulness of such an exercise of the infallibility of the Church. (See n. 211.)

After this condemnation, Jansenism was no longer a theological school within the Church: it was a mere heresy, as truly as the heresies of Arius and Luther. But its adherents did not recognize

this truth, but pretended to be dutiful sons of the Church, while they upheld the doctrine which she condemned; as the Church of the present disclaimed them, they professed to look for support to the Church of the past, or of the future: to St. Augustine or to a future General Council. (n. 189.) The five fundamental errors of the *Augustinus* branched off into a multitude of subordinate errors, and a large collection of these was condemned by Pope Clement XI. in 1713. (*Unigenitus;* Denz. 1216—1316.) The hearty acceptance of this last Bull was long the badge of a faithful son of the Church: and at the present day, after the Vatican decree on Papal Infallibility, no one can fail to receive it without obviously forfeiting the name of Catholic. (n. 290.)

There is no need to set forth the famous Five Propositions in this place. Four of them concern Grace, and will come before us again; the fifth has been already cited, when we spoke of the Death of Christ for some who are not of the number of the elect. (n. 389.) But Jansenism is far more than a particular theological system concerning grace and predestination: it is a subtle and insidious spirit which coloured all the thoughts of those who admitted it into their minds, and which has produced most disastrous results. It led men to think that the private study of Holy Scripture was the divinely appointed mode of learning the Christian faith: to appeal, as we have said, to the past and to the future, in order to escape from the unpleasing duty of obedience to a fellow-man: and it set up an impossible standard of morality, and strove only too

effectually to induce men not to seek the aid of the Sacraments, terrifying them by insisting on most rigorous conditions before they would allow any one to approach these means of grace; and it strove to hinder the spread of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, which is so powerful an instrument to lead men to serve God through love and not through fear alone. Jansenism derived powerful support from the statesmen and lawyers of France, who saw in it a help in the work on which they were engaged of resisting the Pope, and setting up their favourite Gallican liberties (n. 269); and, in fact, the spirit of Jansenism is nationalistic and not Catholic.

There is a curious story contained in a book published in 1654, according to which a meeting was held in 1621 at the village of Bourg-Fontaine, where seven men were present, including Jansen and John du Vergier, Abbot of St. Cyr, the chief promoter of Jansenism in France. The author professes to have derived his information from one of the party, and according to him a formal resolution was taken to abolish the Catholic religion and replace it by deism; the means to be employed were to be the propagation of ideas and practices such as we have just enumerated, and which in time came to be called Jansenistic. There is much difference of opinion among historians as to the reality of this project of Bourg-Fontaine, as it is called; but if it be false, the inventor must at any rate be credited with singularly keen insight into the tendencies of the movement which was going on around him. It will be observed that he wrote

within a year of the condemnation of the Five Propositions, and long before deism had shown itself openly in France or elsewhere. A hundred years passed, and the classes who had been the supporters of Jansenism are found to be deeply tainted with the irreligious spirit: and in another half century the Revolution came, and for a time swept away all religion.

391. *The Book of Life.*—Hitherto we have been chiefly engaged in exposing and combating errors as to predestination; we will now proceed to state some points of the Catholic doctrine. There is frequent mention in Scripture of the Book of Life, the Book of God, and the like. It is a favour to be written in the Book (Daniel xii. 1), and a curse to be struck out of it. (Psalm lxviii. 29.) St. Paul speaks of his fellow-labourers, whose names are in the Book of Life (Philipp. iv. 3), and similar phrases are frequent in the Apocalypse (xiii. 8, xvii. 8, xx. 12, &c.); a name which is written in the Book may be taken away. (Apoc. xxii. 19.) By this Book is to be understood God's knowledge of the eternal decree whereby He has predestined some to glory, or to the grace which they have, and which would secure them glory, unless they choose to throw it away by sin. (St. Thomas, *Summa*, p. 1. q. 24.) But there is no decree of reprobation, and we do not read of the Book of Death; with the Second Council of Orange (can. 25, Denz. 168) we detest those, if such there be, who hold that any man is by the power of God predestined to evil. This Divine decree is Eternal and Unchangeable, even

as God Himself (nn. 370, 371); but it is formed in the light of the Divine Foreknowledge of what the conduct of the man will be, so that the conduct of the man is prior to the decree. (n. 381.) Some Catholic theologians, as the great Jesuit, Suarez, held that the Divine election of certain men was made before the foresight of their merits, and that the lost were simply passed over. The question is open, for the Church has not spoken on it (n. 220), but we may say that it is hard to see that God had a serious will to save those whom He passed over. We do not propose to enter further into the controversy.

As to the number of the predestined we have no revelation, and it is impossible to speak with certainty, or even to conjecture with confidence. Plenty of writers, imbued with something of the Jansenistic spirit, or indulging in those exaggerations by which some preachers think to recommend the truth of God, represent that the predestined form but a small proportion even of those who belong to the body of the Church (n. 186) and have access to the sacraments; others think they see reason for believing that the number of the predestined bears no very small proportion even to the whole number of men. (See Hurter, *Compendium*, vol. ii. n. 145.) The one party quote the words of our Lord, that "many are called but few are chosen" (St. Matt. xx. 16); the others may refer to the passage in the prophecy of Isaias (xlix. 14–21), where God declares His love for the Church, whom He represents as a woman who mourns her

barrenness, saying: The Lord hath forsaken me, forgotten me. But she is bid to lift up her eyes around about, and see all those that are gathered together, and the desolate places are too narrow by reason of the inhabitants; and she expostulates and marvels whence these have sprung, these children that she knew not of, and yet they were hers. All this is thought by some to point to the presence of a large number of the predestined in the soul of the Church, who are not in the body. There is no likelihood of our having any assurance upon the point, until the last day.

The Council of Trent teaches (Sess. vi. can. 16; Denz. 708) that no one can be certain that he is of the number of the predestined, unless a private revelation has been granted, such as we sometimes read of in the Lives of the Saints. This point is defined in opposition to some of the Reformers, who, as we shall see, made justification to consist in certain assurance of predestination. The doctrine of the Council is based on the Scripture, for St. Paul warns him that thinketh he standeth to take heed lest he fall (1 Cor. x. 12), and we are with fear and trembling to work out our salvation (Philipp. ii. 12); the theological reason is that the decree of predestination is an act of God's will, which cannot be known to us unless He please to make it known. A few passages of Scripture which look the other way, merely mean that those who have been called to the faith may look forward to the future with great but not absolute assurance. So, one may have great but not absolute confidence that he is in

the state of grace, but even if this be assured, he cannot foresee how he will behave in the future; he may fall into sin and be lost, so that his present business is to practise the virtue of hope, relying on prayer and watchfulness.

Cardinal Franzelin, on the last page of his elaborate treatise, *On the One God*, asks himself the question whether there are any signs from which the predestination of a man may be conjectured, and he quotes St. Bernard as saying that there are these, care to avoid sin, fruits of penance, and good works. He himself adds, as more special signs, esteem for the eight Beatitudes, zeal for perfection in each one's state, love of God and one's neighbour, contempt of the world, diligence in prayer and the use of the Sacraments, devotion to the Blessed Mother of God and to St. Joseph, the patron of a happy death. By these means he that is not predestined can make himself to be predestined. (n. 184, iii.)

392. *Recapitulation.*—In the course of this long chapter we have pointed out what are the objects of God's will, and what is the meaning of certain terms which theologians use in speaking of it. The moral Attributes of God are then asserted and vindicated, and then His Power is described. In this way, we are prepared to understand the explanation which theology affords of the permission of evil; and then it is proved that God wishes all men to be saved, and has excluded none from this decree; various false views on predestination are enumerated, and the doctrine of the Church on the subject is stated and established.

393. *Close of Treatise.*—In this Treatise we have gone through the matter contained in questions 2—26 of the First Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. After a discussion of the possibility and means of knowing God, His existence is established, and His Attributes. After this, we were long occupied with questions as to His Knowledge and His Will, where we found plenty of difficult and controverted matter; and we gave what it was found possible to say on the mysterious subject of predestination, and so brought to a close the Treatise on God as One in Substance.

Treatise the Eighth.

The Blessed Trinity.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

394. *Plan of the Treatise.*—We now enter on the consideration of a mystery which is "the work of the Gospel and substance of the New Testament," as Tertullian expresses it (*Adv. Praxeam*, c. 31; *P.L.* 2, 196), that in One God there are three Persons; the belief in which, along with the kindred mystery of the Incarnation, characterize the Christian religion, distinguishing it sharply from all other religions. It will be shown (n. 401) that the mystery is one of those which may be called absolute (n. 16), as to which the unassisted reason of man could not have discovered the truth nor even the possibility; it is probably among the chief of those deep things of God, of which St. Paul speaks. (1 Cor. ii. 10.) In the Treatise on the One God, we found much that was taught us by Philosophy, which establishes the existence of the Infinite, Uncaused Being, and shows what are His Attri-

butes; and here there was no absolute need for Revelation, however necessary it may be in order that these natural truths should be known "by all men, readily, and with absolute certainty without admixture of error," as the Vatican Council teaches (Sess. 3, cap. 2, *De Revelat.;* Denz. 1135); but Philosophy is wholly silent as to the existence of the mystery with which we are now concerned: we depend wholly on revelation; all that it can do is to lend its aid to clear away the difficulties which are raised by the devices of unbelievers who endeavour to show that the mystery involves a contradiction. Notwithstanding that this mystery is so deep, it seems to be received with ease by all who, being in other respects prepared, come to see what is the authority on which it is proposed to them; it presents far less difficulty than is found in some other teachings of our faith; perhaps it is felt that no mere man could ever have conceived such a doctrine.

After some preliminary matter, we shall devote separate chapters to showing from the records of revelation, the Divinity and the distinctness of each of the Three Persons; we shall show that they are One God; and a part of the closing chapter will be devoted to such explanation as we seem authorized to give concerning the internal constitution of the Blessed Trinity.

395. *Subject of the Chapter.*—We propose to begin by explaining the meaning of some words which we shall find frequent occasion to use, and will then give a brief statement of the Christian doctrine and

of the errors which have prevailed upon the subject; after which it will be shown that no knowledge of the mystery could possibly be attained by natural reason, and that the public revelation of it came to us through Christ, even though the holy men of the Old Testament may have had glimpses of the truth. We read in the Gospel (St. Matt. xi. 27) that no one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him. Christians are they to whom this revelation has been granted.

396. *Terms explained.*—We shall have frequent occasion to make use of certain technical terms of Philosophy, and much depends upon a clear understanding of these terms. It will be convenient to collect them in this place. We shall make much use of the work of Father John Rickaby on *General Metaphysics*, in the Stonyhurst Series of Manuals of Catholic Philosophy, to which we refer for fuller particulars.

I. *Essence.*—We have already employed the word Essence, when we discussed what it is that constitutes the Metaphysical Essence of God. (n. 361.) The Essence is that which makes the thing to be what it is, and is in some sense, therefore, equivalent to Being, which word, however, is also used in other senses, and is, therefore, to be avoided. It is the possession of wisdom that makes a man to be wise, and it is the possession of Essence that makes the thing to be what it is. This becomes clearer if we consider the forms taken by the words in Latin: *essentia* gives *esse*, just as

sapientia gives *sapere*. Whatever difficulty there may be in apprehending the meaning of the term Essence, arises from its highly abstract and far-reaching character. We may notice the popular use of the word Essential for that of which the presence or absence determines what the thing is: in this sense, certain forms are *essential* in legal documents which in their absence are mere worthless pieces of paper; and the *essential* oil determines the character of the spice in which it is found.

II. *Nature.*—The Nature of a thing is its Essence considered as operative. As it is only by the activities of an object that we can know it at all, the variety in these activities leads us to a knowledge of the varieties of Essences, and this makes it convenient to have a word to denote this special aspect of the Essence.

III. *Substance.*—Substance is opposed to Accident: it is that which is conceived capable of existing by itself, without needing the support of anything else, though created substance always needs the Divine conservation, which is a continuation of the act of creation to which it owes its existence. (n. 438.) Accident is what is conceived incapable of existing by itself. In the words of Father Rickaby, "the contrast between substance and accidents is shown indisputably between an organism and its sensations, a projectile and its velocity, a carriage and its motion." We can think of a man without thinking of him as experiencing the sensations of hot or cold, but we cannot think of these sensations without thinking of some one

who experiences them; and so of the other examples. St. Thomas (*De Potentia*, a. 8.), quoted by Father Rickaby, puts it: "Substance is Being, inasmuch as this Being is by itself; accident is that whose Being is to be in something else." We shall meet with this distinction in the Treatise on the Blessed Eucharist, as well as in the course of that on which we are engaged.

IV. *Suppositum.*—There is no English equivalent for the word Suppositum, which is, therefore, used in the Latin form, here given, or often in the Greek form *Hypostasis*, to which the adjective *Hypostatical* belongs. A Suppositum is a substance which is complete in itself, independent, and capable by itself of acting and suffering. Every Suppositum is therefore a substance, but the converse is not true, for there are cases of two substances being so united as to form but one Suppositum, as in the case of a man, who is one Suppositum, arising from the union of the two incomplete substances, soul and body. The soul can exist apart from the body, and does so exist from the day of death until the general resurrection, when the two will be reunited, and during this period of separation it is capable of action and passion; but during the period of union, the man acts and suffers as a whole, and is, therefore, one Suppositum. Phrases are sometimes met with which sound opposed to this doctrine, as if it be said that a man's soul is full of joy in the midst of bodily suffering; but a moment's reflection will show that it is not meant that the body really suffers apart from the man; the true meaning is that the indi-

visible man suffers two affections, one of which is painful and originates in the body, while the other is pleasant and has a spiritual origin.

V. *Person.*—A Suppositum which is rational receives the special name of Person, which is defined by Boethius as the individual substance of a rational nature (*De Persona*, c. 3; *P.L.* 64, 1343), and this definition is generally adopted.

Revelation has taught us certain truths concerning Substance, Accident, Person, and Nature; and those truths instruct us on points which belong to natural knowledge, but which would probably never have entered into the mind of man to suspect, had he not received the light of Revelation. When we know a fact its possibility follows: and we know, by the light of faith, that there are Three Persons in One God; that our Lord Jesus Christ has the Nature of God and the Nature of Man, in one Person; and that in the Blessed Eucharist, the Body and Blood of our Lord subsist under the accidents of Bread and Wine. In all the cases that come ordinarily under our notice, each complete substance is one suppositum or person, and no more; each person has one nature and no more; and sameness or difference in accidents goes along with sameness or difference in substance. Unassisted reason would never have suspected that what is ordinarily seen is not necessary, or that there may be exceptions to the ordinary rule; Revelation teaches that there are such exceptions, and then reason, reconsidering the matter, discovers that there is not any basis for the opinion that no exceptions are possible.

VI. *Procession.*—Procession in its general sense means the origination of one thing from another. This may be by way of local motion, as when a "procession" starts from the sanctuary of a church, if so very popular an illustration may be admitted; or by way of cause and effect, as when sickness has its origin in exposure to infection; or by way of change of character, as when an actor plays a new part; but these examples do not exhaust the possible modes of origination. In every origination we may distinguish, first, the principle which contains in itself the source of another, or which yields to the other its being; then, the act of origination; and thirdly, the thing originated. This thing is often something distinct from the principle; but there are cases where it is not really distinct, as when an act of intelligence has its origin in an intelligent being; procession of this sort is called immanent. (See n. 421, i.)

VII. *Generation.*—In many cases of procession, the thing originated is of a different nature from the principle, which then is called the cause: the warmth of the sun causes the plants to grow, and produces an abundant harvest; but the nature of the grain is totally different from the nature of the sun. When the thing that proceeds is of the same nature as the principle, we have the particular form of procession which is called Generation. In this sense, a child proceeds from his parents. He receives from them human nature which is specifically the same as what they have; but in the ordinary case it is not numerically one; the son is

a distinct man from his father. But we shall see that this restriction is not necessarily included in the idea of Generation. (See n. 421, i.) A clear account of what is meant by Generation, and what is not meant, will be found in the *Summa* of St. Thomas. (p. 1. q. 27. a. 2.)

VIII. *Relation.*—It often happens that a being can be contemplated under a particular aspect, if only we at the same time contemplate another being which is in some respect distinct from the first; but that it cannot be contemplated under that aspect if it be considered alone. In this case, there is said to be a Relation between the two, or one is said to be related to the other. The first is called the *subject* of the relation, the other is the *term;* that whereby the relation is constituted is the *foundation.* The subject and the term may exchange their places, and then a distinction must be made between those relations in which the same name is retained in spite of this change, and those where a new name must be employed: the relation between two brothers, founded on their common parentage, is an example of the one sort; that between a father and his sons, equally founded on parentage, belongs to the other sort.

Relation is a matter of great importance and of the widest reach in Metaphysics; but what we have said may be sufficient for our purpose.

397. *The doctrine stated.*—It will be convenient to give a summary statement of the Catholic doctrine concerning the Blessed Trinity, with references to the occasions when such of the points were defined

as are not contained in the Nicene Creed, in the form in which it is now in use in the Church (Denz. 233), in the Athanasian Creed (Denz. 136), and in the declaration of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which begins, *Firmiter*. (Denz. 355.) This summary of Christian doctrine was directed against the Albigenses. Some account of the Creeds of the Church will be given hereafter. (n. 401.)

In God there are Three Persons in one Divine Essence, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, really distinct, equal, and of one substance. The Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten of the Father, the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son. (Second Council of Lyons in 1274; Denz. 382.) All things in God are common to the Three Persons, and are one and the same, except where there is the opposition of relation. (Eugen. IV. Decr. *Pro Jacobitis;* Denz. 598.) The Three Persons are distinct from the Divine Substance with a distinction that is not real but virtual. (The Council of Rheims of 1148, under Eugen. III.; Denz. 329.) And, finally, we must recognize in the Divine Persons Processions, Relations, Missions. (Eleventh Council of Toledo in 675; Denz. 222—229.)

398. *Scripture Teaching.*—It is scarcely possible for any who acknowledge the supreme authority of the Scriptures as our instructors in the things of God, to avoid agreeing that the number Three is in some way closely connected with Him: Three entities are spoken of in connection with Him,

whether they be Attributes, or modes of existence, or forms under which He communicates with men, or whether, as the Catholic faith teaches, they be Persons, each of whom is the One God. We will call attention to four passages, which abundantly prove what we have asserted. In the account of the Incarnation given by St. Luke (i. 32, 35), we have mention of the Lord God, of the Son of the Most High, and of the Holy Ghost, and these names plainly denote something that is God or stands in close relation to Him. In the Baptism of Christ (St. Matt. iii. 16, 17), we are told that the Spirit of God descended, and a voice from Heaven made the declaration, This is My beloved Son. In the discourse delivered by Christ at the Last Supper, He declared that He was in the Father and the Father in Him, and that He would ask the Father, who would give to the Apostles the Spirit of Truth. (St. John xiv. 11, 16.) And, lastly, the Apostles received the commission to teach all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. (St. Matt. xxviii. 19.) The Apostles obeyed the command, and no doubt the words of this solemn, initiatory rite had much to do with keeping alive among the faithful the belief in the Three in One.

There is yet another passage read in the Vulgate version of the First Epistle of St. John (v. 7) which speaks yet more explicitly of the Three in One. "There are Three who give testimony in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these Three are One." Since these words occur in

the Vulgate, they afford a sound basis for argument on any point of faith or morals, according to the declaration of the Council of Trent (n. 158); but this use of the text must rest on the authority of the Council and not on that of the Apostle, for there is grave doubt as to the genuineness of the verse. It is true that the Council by its decree declares that the Books which it enumerates must be received "in their entirety with all their parts as they have usually been read in the Catholic Church and are contained in the old Vulgate Latin edition" (Denz. 666); and it is known that the Fathers of the Council had before their minds certain doubts which had been raised as to the genuineness of three passages of the New Testament, namely, the account of the woman taken in adultery (St. John vii. 53, viii. 11), the Sweat of Blood (St. Luke xxii. 43, 44), and the close of the Gospel of St. Mark. (xvi. 9—20.) As to these three passages, therefore, the question is closed, and critical research has the advantage of having full assurance on one point. There are critical arguments against the claim of these three passages to be considered part of the inspired text which are plausible, though we believe that they can be shown on critical grounds to be no more than plausible; and however this may be, the decree of the Council proves that they are valueless, and thus gives a useful lesson in critical science. But the case is very different with the text of the Three Witnesses. The argument against its right to have a place in the Sacred Text is very weighty, for it is not found in a single Greek manuscript of

the slightest value, and it is also wanting in the Eastern versions, and in many good Latin manuscripts: its claim rests wholly upon its presence in the Latin version, and the Greek which appears in ordinary editions is known to be an editor's translation from this Latin. The result has been that the question has been debated with no little warmth on both sides, and there is no doubt that the view taken among Protestant writers has been influenced by their greater or less heartiness in accepting the doctrine so plainly declared in the text. The eminent Greek scholar, Porson, was a leader in the attack upon the text. We cannot go into the details of the controversy, which will be found in all the Introductions and Commentaries. The result is that though the genuineness of the text is upheld by many writers, it is abandoned by several Catholic authorities of great weight, among whom we may mention Scholz, the editor of a critical edition of the New Testament, with a full collection of various readings. Cardinal Franzelin (*De Deo Trino*, thesis iv.) argues at length that the question is not open among Catholics, for he holds that the passage is a "part" of the canonical Epistle, to which therefore the Tridentine decree extends; but this view of the eminent writer is not generally accepted, and it is to be remarked that the passage does not fulfil the condition required by the Council of having been usually read in the Catholic Church, for it was not read by Eastern Catholics. There is no reason to believe that the Fathers of the Council were alive to the existence

of grounds for disputing the authorship of the verse. (See Cornely, *Introduct. ad S. Script.* ad loc.)

399. *The Doxology*.—The Scripture teaching as to the Three in One sank deep into the hearts of the faithful, and from the beginning had a prominent place in their faith and their devotion. This truth finds expression in the formulæ, called doxologies, by which God is declared worthy of "glory" (δόξα), and which commonly make express mention of the Three with various terms of praise. The beginnings of the usage are found in the Holy Scripture (Romans xi. 36, xvi. 27; Apoc. v. 13; Jude 25, &c.), which places also suggest the addition of the words "for ever and ever," or "now and unto the day of eternity." (2 St. Peter iii. 18.) In the oldest Fathers we find the Three Names coupled by prepositions such as "through" and "in," or "with" and "together with;" but the form prescribed by Christ for Baptism gradually prevailed, and the conjunction "and" was adopted, and is still in use. The present form first appears distinctly in the course of the controversy with the Arians, to whom the equality among the Three was specially distasteful, and who found it difficult to win a way for their views among a people who were accustomed to hear in Mass and Office the ascription of "Glory to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost." The use of this form at the end of every Psalm is of Western origin (Cassian, *De Instit. Cœnob*, 2, 8; *P.L.* 49, 94); it is commonly said to have been ordered by Pope St. Damasus (about 378), and this may be true, although the letter in which St. Jerome was supposed

to have made the suggestion to his friend is spurious. The Doxology occurs also at the close of the hymns and responsories in the Breviary. For the East, Origen testifies that "all prayer should begin with the ascription of praise to God through Christ in the Holy Ghost." (*De Orat.* c. 33; *P.G.* 11, 557.) He would have thanksgiving, contrition, and petition to follow in order.

What we have been speaking of is called the Lesser Doxology, to distinguish it from the hymn beginning, Glory be to God on High, which is used in the Western Mass and in Lauds in the East. Its position, following the prayer for mercy, the *Kyrie*, is connected with the precept of the Wise Man (Ecclus. xv. 9), that praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner. Its use is of great antiquity, and some have thought that it is the hymn to Christ as God, which the Christians of Bithynia sang in the second century, as Pliny tells us (n. 41); but to trace its history would call us off from our subject.

400. *Errors classified.*—In all ages, men have been found who refused to accept the teaching of the Church, preferring to follow the guidance of their own reason, and when they did so in the matter of so profound a mystery as we are considering, it is no marvel that they fell into error and contradiction. During the third and fourth centuries of the Christian era, the defence of the traditional doctrine concerning the Blessed Trinity formed the chief work of theologians, for the doctrine was attacked on all sides; and in the providence of God, the prevalence of error resulted in the truth being

made more plain and firmly established. The writings on the Blessed Trinity of St. Athanasius, St. Basil, of the two Saints Gregory of Nazianzus and of Nyssa, in the East; of St. Hilary and St. Augustine in the West, are among the most valued treasures of the Church. The whole subject is admirably treated by Cardinal Newman, in his *Arians of the Fourth Century*.

The errors which arose in those early centuries have for the most part died out, being found to be untenable on grounds of Reason and Revelation alike. In our attempt to classify them we begin with one which differs from the others in not being philosophically absurd, but which departs most widely from Scripture and Tradition. This is the doctrine which in early times was called Monarchianism (*μόνος ἀρχή*), as teaching that the Godhead is in all senses one: more recently it has received the name of Unitarianism, which expresses the same meaning (*unitas*). These *Monarchians* then denied the distinction of Persons in God, holding that He whom the Scripture calls the Father was alone God, and that the Word of God and the Spirit were merely aspects or modes of action of the Father. There is a curious story in Eusebius (*H.E.* v. 28; *P.G.* 19, 513) which gives the financial details of the arrangement by which one Natalis agreed to become Bishop of the Monarchians in Rome, about the year 220. The income guaranteed to him was one hundred and fifty denarii a month, equivalent in purchasing power to about a thousand pounds a year of our present money. The Monarchian party

were divided into two camps, differing in the view which they took of Christ. The chief name on the one side is that of Paul of Samosata, who was deposed from the patriarchal throne of Antioch in 269. (n. 216.) In the view of this heretic, Christ was a mere man: He was not before Mary, but received from her the origin of His being. He was the last and highest in the series of the Prophets, in whom Wisdom dwelt after a higher manner than in other men; the deity of Christ, such as it was, grew by a gradual process out of His Humanity. The other section refrained from outraging Christian sentiment in so open a manner. They held to the unity of Person in God, but yielded so far to the teaching of Scripture as to say that the One God resided in Christ in some peculiar manner, making Him different from other men. God the Father, they said, gave the law to Moses in His own character: in so far as He was with Christ, He was called the Son or the Word; and He had the name of Holy Spirit when He came to the Apostles. This view became prominent when put forward by Sabellius, a Libyan Bishop, about the year 257, and his followers in the East were called by his name: in the West, they received the name of Patripassians (*pater, passio*), for it followed from their doctrine that the Father suffered on Calvary.

Monarchianism disappeared from view, but was revived along with most other forms of ancient error, in the sixteenth century. It met with strenuous opposition. Its followers did not coalesce into a sect except in Poland, where they had the

name of *Socinians*, from their leaders Laelius and Faustus Socinus: their teaching was condemned by Pope Paul IV. in 1555. (Denz. 880.) Scattered instances occur of men who called themselves Christians and avowed the same doctrines: the Spaniard, Michael Servetus, was burned alive at Geneva in 1553; the Sienese, Valentine Gentili, was beheaded at Berne in 1566; the Scots lad, Thomas Aikenhead, who, however, can scarcely be called a Christian, was hanged at Edinburgh in 1696; the executioners in each case wishing to control in others the exercise of that right of private judgment which they claimed for themselves.

Unitarianism in its modern form as a distinct sect sprang up towards the end of the eighteenth century, in the midst of that section of the English Puritans who preferred the Presbyterian form of Church government. (n. 201.) These, like the other Puritans (n. 390, v.), at first professed Calvinistic doctrine, but they insensibly abandoned it, in obedience to what seems to be a natural tendency, and openly adopted Unitarian tenets and the name. They are found both in England and the United States of America, where they often go by the name of Universalists, as believing in the universal salvation of the human race. These twin errors are probably widely spread, though not avowed, among the sects that profess Calvinism in different countries.

We have said that the Monarchian doctrine, though far from being Scriptural, is philosophically defensible; its leading doctrine is that revelation has added nothing to the teaching of natural religion

that God is One. (n. 363.) The *Arians* taught a doctrine which was absurd as well as un-Scriptural. It maintained that the Word was indeed God, as the Scriptures taught, but was a created God. This is a contradiction, for a creature is essentially caused and finite, whereas God is, no less essentially, uncaused and infinite. (n. 387.) The material world, they said, could not bear the touch of the Father, so He from eternity created His Son, the Word of God, through whom as an intermediary, He created all things. (Hebrews i. 2.) This doctrine took its rise with Arius, a Libyan (see n. 209), who came to Alexandria and propagated his views about the year 318. Arius was condemned at the Council of Nice in 325, when the word Consubstantial was adopted as suitable to express the true doctrine of the relation of the Divine Son to the Father; and this word, or its Greek equivalent, *homoüsian* (ὁμοούσιος) has ever been the badge of orthodoxy upon the subject. Arianism, however, continued to flourish greatly, having the favour of the Emperor Constantius, who succeeded his father, Constantine the Great, in 337, and proved himself the first of the long line of Imperial theologians who ruled in Constantinople and did much harm to the Church. The Arians split into many sections, which went by various names, and their struggle among themselves, and of the Catholics with them all, fill a great part of the ecclesiastical history of the fourth century. There is much difference of opinion as to the true interpretation of the records of antiquity concerning the details of the contest. (See Newman's *Arians*, and

Petavius, *De Trinitate*, i. 10.) We may mention the *Anomœans* (*ἀνόμοιοι*), whose leaders, Aetius and Eunomius, maintained that the Son was not "like" the Father. (See n. 350.) Others professed themselves Homœusians, saying that the Son was of *like* substance with the Father, but they declined to adopt the word Homoüsian, which expresses the *oneness* of substance. These last were called Semi-Arians, as going half way with the Arians. (Compare n. 390, ii.) Some among them professed, and perhaps sincerely, that they fully accepted the doctrine of Nice, but disliked the imposition of a word which was not Scriptural, and which had been condemned, when employed in a different sense, in the matter of Paul of Samosata. This part of the controversy brought out the authority of the Church to decide on the suitability of words to express doctrines. (See n. 211.) After being cast out of the Eastern Empire about the year 380, Arianism found a home among the barbarians who overran the West. The Vandals who held Africa were cruel persecutors of the Catholics, and were themselves swept away by the Mahommedan deluge. The Goths in Spain were reclaimed from their error after the death of the martyr St. Hermenegild in 586; and they were able to offer a stout and finally successful resistance to the Infidel when he invaded Western Europe. The Kings of Spain bear the title of "His Most Catholic Majesty," in remembrance of the good defence of the faith made by them: the Kings of Hungary, who were equally successful at the other end of Europe, are called "Apostolic." The Kings of

Portugal in 1748 received from Benedict XIV. the title "Most Faithful," which means true to the faith, not trusty: but the best known of these titles is that of "Most Christian King," conferred on the Kings of France by the Pope in 1450, in memory that they represented Clovis, who was baptized by St. Remy in 496, and was at the time the only Catholic King, all other chiefs of the barbarians being Arian. Hence, too, the title, "Eldest Son of the Church:" but there is no foundation for saying that Clovis himself bore these titles.

What it is necessary to say concerning the *Macedonians*, who denied the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost, will find its place in a future chapter. (n. 412.)

401. *Creeds.*—So large a part of the history of the Arian controversy consists of the account of the adoption of various forms of professions of faith, that this may be a convenient place to say something on the several Creeds which are in use in the Church. Petavius (*De Trinit.* i. 9) enumerates no less than fourteen which were put forward in the course of twenty years. So much confusion was caused by this liberty that private persons assumed to themselves of drawing up declarations of faith, and putting them out as authoritative, that the Council of Ephesus, in 431, forbade the practice, and the prohibition is still in force; particularly is this forbidden to Bishops in their diocesan Synods. (Bened. XIV. *De Synod.* 6, 3, 7.) But, as already pointed out (n. 226), the authority which made this disciplinary decree could repeal it, or in its discretion might

disregard it: the mischief arose when this most responsible work was done by persons who thrust themselves into the office. The Church, however, has not hesitated, from time to time, to make additions to the Creed in use in the fifth century, and these additions have no less authority than the earlier form, which itself was at one time a novelty in the Church: to hold otherwise is to say that the Church is dead, and no longer has any vital activity. (See n. 169, and the article of the *Auctorem Fidei* there quoted.)

We will speak of the principal Creeds under distinct heads.

I. *The Apostles' Creed.*—We have already spoken of this. (n. 245.) We may observe that the original idea of a Creed was that of a storehouse of Christian doctrine to which it was a privilege to be admitted. The Apostles' Creed was not used as a test, for it did not occur to any one that a person who professed the desire to be allowed communion with the Church should fail to accept whatever this Church proposed for his belief.

II. *The Nicene Creed.*—The Creed as adopted at the Nicene Council in 325 was in one respect less full than the Creed of the Apostles, for it closed with the profession of belief in the Holy Ghost; but it added a distinct protest against all those forms of Gnostic error which maintained the existence of .nvisible beings that were neither God, nor creatures of God. Its chief office, however, was to formulate the doctrine of the Church as to the Eternal Generation of the Son of God and His Birth in time of the

Blessed Virgin Mary, and to insist upon His consubstantiality with the Father. This Creed became the bulwark of the faith against all forms of Arianism.

III. *The Creed of Constantinople.*—In the year 381, the Second General Council of the Church was held at Constantinople, and among other things it made a further addition to the Creed of Nice, by declaring that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, with further developments of doctrine concerning Him, and supplying those Articles of the Apostles' Creed which had been omitted at Nice. Some other unimportant alterations were made, but the details are not clearly made out. The famous enlargement of this Creed by the declaration that the procession is not from the Father alone, but also from the Son, as one Principle, will be spoken of hereafter. (nn. 412, 413.) It brings the Creed to the shape now used in the Mass.

IV. *The Athanasian Creed.*—A formula containing an elaborate statement, in short detached propositions, of the Catholic faith on the Trinity and Incarnation is found in use in the West about the end of the seventh century, under the name of the Symbol of St. Athanasius, or from its initial words, *Quicunque vult.* It has been used in the public Office of the Church, in Prime, at least from the ninth century. Comparison of the Latin and Greek forms of this Symbol proves that the former is the original, and that the Greek is a translation, and this raises at first sight an objection against its having for its author an Eastern Doctor such as

St. Athanasius. This difficulty is, however, removed when it is remembered that the Saint paid two visits to the West; one when he was exiled to Treves, and the other when he attended a Synod at Rome in 340, during the Papacy of Julius I. He may possibly have caused this memorial of the faith for which he contended to be drawn up in Latin, and left it behind him on his return to the East. But this view of the authorship is now commonly rejected: it seems to have no support beyond what is implied in the name, the ascription of which is easily explained by the circumstance that much of the Creed is occupied with a declaration of the faith of which St. Athanasius was the champion; and it is hard to suppose that this Saint had a foresight of the Nestorian and Eutychian errors as to the Incarnation, which were scarcely heard of until after his death, but which are emphatically rejected in the Creed.

As to the emphatic declaration with which the Creed opens and closes, that to hold the Catholic faith is necessary for salvation, we need not repeat what we have already said on a kindred subject. (n. 181.)

V. *The Tridentine Creed.*—The Fathers of the Council of Ephesus in 430 did not see fit to modify the Creed of Constantinople by introducing into it the test-word, "Mother of God," by which they had secured the true doctrine of the Incarnation, and shown how our Blessed Lady is alone the destroyer of all heresies. Perhaps they were afraid of the consequences of opening the flood-gates to further

change. Their policy was imitated by other Councils, and, as we have said, the same Creed has been used in the public worship of the Church for fifteen centuries past. But a fuller form is in use on all occasions when a public profession of faith is required for any reason. This is called the Creed of Pope Pius IV., having been put forward by that Pope in 1563. It embodies the heads of doctrine adopted by the Council of Trent, in opposition to the Protestants. The same Pope in 1564 ordered that this profession should be publicly made by all persons who receive any promotion in the Church, and once a year by all teachers: it is also made by all converts when they are received into the Catholic Church. This Creed is for the most part explicit in its declarations, but on the obscure subjects of grace, justification, and the like, it is content to refer in general terms to the decrees of Trent.

VI. *The Vatican Creed.*—Three centuries and more passed before the Council of Trent was succeeded by another Ecumenical assembly. The Council of the Vatican, which met in 1869, defined certain points of doctrine, especially the Infallibility of the Pope speaking *ex cathedra* (n. 290), and in 1877 Pope Pius IX., following the example set by Pius IV., added to the Tridentine form a clause expressing acceptance of the Vatican definitions. This put the Creed into the shape in which it is at use at present, supporting the faith of Catholics who rejoice to be provided with a form of words which they can safely trust as expressing the truth which they hold. To make the profession in these

words is no burdensome test, but is an honoured privilege.

402. *The Trinity a Mystery.*—We have stated (n. 394) that the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is one of those mysteries which may be called absolute, which unassisted reason is powerless not merely to discover for itself, but even to recognize as possible. It is probable that, apart from revelation, it would never have occurred to man to ask whether there could by possibility be three *supposita* in one substance, or had the question occurred it would have been promptly answered in the negative: but when revelation has disclosed the truth that the case actually occurs, it is seen on consideration that this denial was hasty and groundless. We proceed to show that the mystery could not have been known except by the aid of revelation. The question is treated by St. Thomas, in the *Summa.* (p. 1. q. 32. a. 1.)

The proof of our assertion is found in the passages of Scripture which assure us that there are things in God beyond our capacity, such as that which warns us not to seek the things that are too high, nor search into things above our ability (Ecclus. iii. 22), for he that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory (Prov. xxv. 27); and the whole of the second chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians is to the same effect. There is no doctrine to which these warnings are more applicable than that of the Blessed Trinity; and we have the express declaration of Christ (St. Matt. xvi. 17) that St. Peter learned the truth of the

Divine Sonship, not from flesh and blood, but from the Father; and see another passage of St. Matthew (xi. 27), which we cited not long since. (n. 395.) As to the mind of the Fathers, we may cite, with St. Thomas, the declaration of St. Hilary, writing against the Sabellians, that man must not imagine that by his understanding he can reach the Sacrament of Generation (*De Trinit.* 1), by which expression he means the mystery of the Divine Sonship, as the context shows: and St. Ambrose (*De Fide*, lib. 2, *Ad Gratianum*, cap. 5) testifies that it is impossible to know the secret of Generation; the intelligence is at fault, language fails. The theological reason of the truth for which we contend is found in this, that in spite of the profound speculations of Plato, and other heathen philosophers on the nature of God, they never had a glimpse of the truth: the nearest approach made by them was the recognition that in God there is Knowledge and Love, but the essence of the mystery lies in the Personality of the Three, which the heathen never suspected. Also, all knowledge goes either from cause to effect, or from effect to cause: but the first has no place in God, who is uncaused; and all the effects of God are His creatures, the work of His Power, and this Power is an Attribute of the Divine Substance, having nothing to do with the Relations by which the Persons are distinguished. (nn. 387, 421, vi. vii.)

Attempts have been made by the ultra-rationalizing Abelard, and others, to show how the heathen philosophers might have demonstrated the existence

of the Trinity in God. One or two specimens of their reasonings may be given. First, they say that the Trinity of Persons is a perfection, which is undeniable; and that the heathen could have recognized that God had all perfection: but they could not have drawn the conclusion that God had *this* perfection unless they recognized that *this* perfection was possible; and it is denied that they could so recognize it. Again, it is the nature of goodness to communicate itself, and it is a perfection in a parent to communicate his own nature to offspring; but the difficulty remains that nothing suggested the possibility of that special mode of communication which we know to have place in God. Some have ventured to say that if, as is true, the Trinity cannot be demonstrated to be impossible, its possibility must be capable of demonstration. These forget the obvious consideration that perhaps neither of the contraries can be demonstrated.

Among the condemned propositions extracted from the posthumous writings of Rosmini (n. 343), we find the following (No. 25): "The mystery of the Blessed Trinity being revealed, its existence can be demonstrated by purely speculative arguments, which are, it is true, negative and indirect, but such as to bring that truth within the range of Philosophy, making it like other scientific propositions; for if it were denied, the purely rational doctrine concerning God would not merely be incomplete, but would be destroyed by the absurdities with which it would swarm in every part."

St. Thomas, in the body of the article just cited

(p. 1. q. 32. a. 1.), has a remark of very wide reach. He quotes St. Paul as teaching (Hebrews xi. 1) that some at least of the truths of faith cannot be known except by revelation; and he adds, that if any one profess to prove these truths by reasons which do not force conviction, he exposes himself and his cause to the ridicule of the infidel; for these imagine that the reasons adduced are the grounds of our belief, and despise us for our credulity. See the parallel passage of the *Summa* (p. 1. q. 46. a. 2. corp.) on the possibility of eternal creation. (n. 439.) Neglect of this warning has often led over-ardent controversialists unwittingly to do great harm to the cause they have at heart.

403. *The Old Testament.*—Although it is certain that the fulness of the Revelation of the Blessed Trinity came through Christ, yet it seems that some knowledge of it was imparted by God at least to a few among the holy men who lived under the Old Law. This seems to be implied in those words of Christ that Abraham saw His day (St. John viii. 56); and St. Ambrose (*De Cain et Abel*, i. c. 8, n. 30; *P.L.* 14, 332) understands the passage in this sense: St. Augustine ascribes the same knowledge to Abraham, when he comments on the account given in Genesis of the Lord (Yahveh, n. 354) appearing to the Patriarch in the form of three men, who, however, are addressed as one or more indifferently. (Genesis xviii. 1—5.) "He saw three," says St. Augustine, "and he adored one." (*Contra Maxim. Arian.* ii. n. 7; *P.L.* 42, 808.) St. Epiphanius holds that the Patriarchs and Prophets, including Adam,

had the same knowledge (*Hær.* 1—4, n. 5; *P.G.* 41, 181), and the general voice of the Fathers is with him.

We shall see in the next chapter (n. 406) that the Eternal Sonship of the Redeemer is indicated in various places of the Old Testament, but it does not follow that they were so understood by the general body of the Israelites, or even by the learned men among them. It may have been so, and there is satisfactory evidence that the common teaching ascribed some sort of pre-existence to the Messiah (see Edersheim, *Jesus the Messiah*, vol. i. ch. 5), but it is very doubtful whether this view was any substantial approach to the Christian doctrine. The affirmative has sometimes been maintained on a ground of theological reason which is worth notice. It is said by some, that explicit belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation has always been necessary to salvation, and that, as the Jews were not excluded from the hope of salvation, they must have received a public revelation of these doctrines. There are many flaws in this reasoning. Its basis is weak, as there is no proof that explicit belief in this was ever requisite, for it may have been enough to have a confused knowledge that God would make some provision for the forgiveness of sin: and, in fact, it seems to some high authorities to be morally certain that explicit belief in this is not necessary, even under the Christian dispensation. (Ballerini, *Opus Morale*, ii. 4.) And again, even if it were necessary, it does not follow that a public revelation had been given, for God might have

other means of providing for what was necessary, just as He does now in the possible case of a savage who does not violate his known duty, but whom the ordinary ministry of the Church fails to reach. God would send to such a one a teacher by some extraordinary means, as He did to Cornelius (Acts x.), or would grant a direct revelation, as to St. Paul. (Acts ix.) This doctrine is often inculcated by St. Thomas. (*De Veritat.* q. 14. art. 11. ad 1. and elsewhere.) The case which we suppose of a life free from actual sin is possible, but we may well fear that it is not of frequent occurrence.

Attempts have been made to show that certain heathen writers had a knowledge of the Blessed Trinity. If so, they must have borrowed it from Jews or Christians; but the indications are uncertain in the extreme.

The Fathers have seen in the natural world certain phenomena which they compare with the Blessed Trinity, which it will suffice to mention without references. They serve as partial illustrations, but of course they cannot be used as the basis of an argument. Light and heat proceed from the sun; root, trunk, and branches are found in a tree; three lamps in a chamber pour forth the same light; and the rational soul has the three powers, memory, understanding, and will. More recently, it has been observed that we have a kind of trinity in unity in the leaf of any kind of trefoil. These comparisons are more useful to man than suitable to God, as St. Hilary observes. (*De Trinit.* 1, 19; *P.L.* 10, 38.)

404. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have explained the meaning of some terms belonging to the science of Metaphysics which are employed by theologians in treating of the Blessed Trinity, and which by their precision aid much to the understanding of the mystery. We then give a statement of the doctrine, and show in general terms how it is indicated in the Scripture, and how it has entered into the minds of the faithful, and forms an integral part of their religion. We then sketch the history of the chief forms of error upon the subject, and finally show that the full knowledge of it is the privilege of Christians.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIVINE SON OR WORD.

405. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we shall justify from the Scripture the doctrine set forth in the Nicene Creed, where we declare that we believe in Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all worlds: God of God, Light of Light, True God of True God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made. The sequel of the Creed forms the subject of the Treatise on the Incarnation. There will be little need to quote Patristic authority on the subject; it must be enough to say that the texts we use and the arguments founded on them form the common stock of the Fathers who combated Arianism and finally expelled it.

406. *The Divine Sonship.*—We often read in the Gospels of the Son of God, and this in such a way as to imply that a true, natural sonship is spoken of, and to exclude the idea of a mere adoptive relation. We read that the Father loveth the Son (St. John iii. 35), and the Father is obviously God, who is spoken of in the preceding verse. He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting life (St. John

iii. 36); and the Son can make us free. (viii. 36.) This simple use of the word implies Sonship in its perfection, originating in generation (n. 396, v.), not a mere adoptive filiation, such as when found among men exists only by a fiction, in the contemplation of law; and the true Son has the privilege of admitting others to the position of adoptive brethren of Himself (St. John xx. 17), for to as many as received Him He gave power to be made the sons of God. (St. John i. 12.) We see then that men may in a true sense be sons of God by adoption, but this is something altogether different from natural sonship. One who is a son by nature is begotten not made; so that the Divine Son is Son in a sense which does not apply to men. The position of the Son in the household of God is contrasted with that held by a servant, however trusty. Moses was faithful in all the house of God (Numbers xii. 7), but Christ as the Son in His own house. (Hebrews iii. 46.) He was God's own Son (Romans viii. 32); He was the only-begotten Son of God (St. John i. 18, and elsewhere), which epithet proves Him to have held a unique position of true Sonship. The Gospels were written for the express purpose of persuading us of this truth (St. John xx. 31), the denial of which is the special badge of Antichrist. (1 St. John ii. 22.) The first chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews is devoted to setting forth the same truth, and there is scarcely a phrase in it which does not furnish a proof or illustration. It is to be observed that the Apostle here uses the words, "Thou art My Son, this day

have I begotten Thee" (Psalm ii. 7), to prove the Eternal Generation of the Son, while in other places he quotes the same text as applying to other truths, as to the Incarnation, or perhaps the Resurrection of Christ (Acts xiii. 33), or to His eternal priesthood (Hebrews v. 4); but the Divine Sonship includes these and other partial applications. That the word "this day" is not to be confined to what took place in time is seen from the phrase which ascribes glory to God, "both now and unto the day of eternity." (2 St. Peter iii. 18.) What is eternal is ever present to God who spoke these words to His Son.

That the generation of the Son is eternal follows from the passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews to which we have referred. For the Son is the brightness of the glory of the Father, and brightness is coeval with that from which it flows; and He was "in the beginning" (St. John i. 1), and He was Himself God, as will be shown presently. (n. 408.) Whatever is God, is eternal.

407. *Objections.*—The fundamental doctrine before us has in all ages been exposed to attack. The clearness with which it is set forth by St. John is probably at the root of the persistent attempts that are made to upset the authority of the fourth Gospel; attempts which, as usual, have served for nothing but to bring out the truth more clearly. (n. 51.) That generation in creatures betokens dependence does not prove that the Son of God is dependent upon the Father; for in God we have a necessary and complete imparting of the very same nature by

the Begetter and the Begotten, the like of which has no place in creatures; that the Father is Begetter and the Son Begotten follows in both cases equally from the necessity of the Divine Nature. Nor can it be said that the Father is prior to the Son in any one of the recognized senses of priority. There is no priority of nature, which is the same in both; nor of time, for both are eternal; nor of dignity, for they are equal with the dignity of God; nor can the Father be thought of without the Son, for this is the nature of a relation. (n. 396, viii.)

No objection can be raised to our doctrine from those passages of Scripture where the name of sons of God is given to creatures, for the texts that we have quoted show that the Only-Begotten One is Son in a way that is wholly unique and peculiar to Himself. God is the Father of men, as we learn from the opening words of the Lord's Prayer (St. Matt. vi. 9), and from many passages of the same and the following chapter; the word denotes the special care that the Creator has of His rational creatures. In a more peculiar sense, God is the Father of the nation which He chose as peculiarly His own (Exodus iv. 22; Romans ix. 9); and we have already shown (n. 406) that an adoptive sonship is open to all men who receive Christ; a point on which St. Paul often insists. (Romans viii. 17; Galat. iv. 5; and compare St. James i. 17.)

Some difficulty may be caused by a phrase used by St. Paul (Coloss. i. 15, seq.) which was made by the Arians the chief Scriptural support of their

doctrine. The Son is here spoken of as the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature, in whom were all things created, for all things were created by Him and in Him, and He is before all and by Him all things consist. These words seem to speak of the Son of God as a creature; but before they will avail the Arians, it must be shown that they refer to Him according to His Divine Nature, for if they are spoken of Him as taking flesh in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, they no more interfere with the doctrine of His Eternity, than do those other words of the same Epistle (Coloss. i. 18), where in view of His Resurrection He is called the first-born of the dead. Even if this be granted, we remark that the English "first-born" here represents a word which means literally "first-brought-forth" (πρωτότοκος); the verbal root is different from that which occurs in the word "only-begotten" (μονογενής), but it is also different from that which furnishes the word for "creature" (κτίσις), so that verbally, the text does not represent the Son as a creature. It could not do so without being self-contradictory, for it declares that all things were created by Him, whereas the characters of Creator and creature cannot coexist in the same subject. The passage therefore itself excludes the possibility of the Son being a creature, and furnishes proof that He is God.

We need not delay upon two obscure passages, where the Latin version represents Wisdom as declaring that the Lord possessed her in the beginning of His ways (Proverbs viii. 22), and that from

the beginning and before the world she was created. (Ecclus. xxiv. 14.) There can be no doubt that these passages are parallel, and that we must compare the two in order to arrive at the meaning. It will suffice for us to point out a linguistic difficulty in the way of the Arian interpretation, which depends on the use of the verb "create" in the passage from Ecclesiasticus. This Book exists in Greek only (n. 120), which probably represents a Hebrew original; the Book of Proverbs exists in Hebrew, so that we are able to check the Greek version. The Greek in both cases uses the word which commonly signifies "create," but the Hebrew of Proverbs does not mean "create," but "possess," as the Latin has it, departing herein from the Septuagint; in Ecclesiasticus, the Latin translator necessarily followed the Greek, for he had no other guide; but it is at least doubtful whether the original would not be fairly represented by "possess" in both cases. It is to be observed that the Greek word represented by the English "create" (ἔκτισεν) differs in spelling only by a single letter from that which corresponds to "possess" (ἔκτησεν); and in sound the two words were scarcely distinguishable. Greek critics are familiar with the confusion that often arises from the likeness of sound of these two letters, and have given to it the name Itacism. In the face of the clear testimonies to the contrary which we have collected (n. 406), we cannot treat these two passages as supporting the Arian contention that the Word of God is a creature, until it is proved that the word "create" correctly

represents the inspired original; and this proof is not forthcoming. The Fathers who defended the Nicene faith against the Arians, were not usually familiar with the Hebrew text, and some were inclined to regard the Septuagint Greek as inspired. (n. 152.) These were able by various arguments to show that the passages were not decisive, but it is needless to dwell longer on what was in its day one of the chief points of the controversy.

The Creed (n. 405) declares that the Son of God is "begotten, not made," yet the Scriptures sometimes speak of Christ as "made." But there is no contradiction. Some of the passages refer to the Human Nature of our Lord (Romans i. 3); in others, "made" is equivalent to "constituted" with a predicate, as in the decisive declaration that the Word was made Flesh. (St. John i. 14, see also the following verse, and Acts ii. 36, and Hebrews iii. 2.)

The Arians did good service to the cause of truth by securing that the whole Scripture should be scanned diligently, and all relevant passages brought forward.

408. *The Word is God.*—What we said when speaking of the Divine Sonship (n. 406), sufficiently proves that the Son of God is Himself God, for Father and Son have a common nature; but it will be convenient to point out a passage where this truth is taught more directly. It forms the opening of St. John's Gospel; but before discussing it, we will justify the assumption which we have already made tacitly, that the Word of God and the Son

of God are one and the same. This is hardly in doubt, for many of the testimonies to the Sonship refer directly to Christ, so that it was the Son who took Flesh; but we have just cited the express declaration of St. John (i. 14) that the Word was made Flesh; and the same Evangelist goes on to use the term Son as convertible with Word. There is probably no passage that can raise any difficulty on this point; and as the Son is a Person distinct from the Father, it follows that the Word is also a distinct Person. Such account as can be given of the suitableness of these two words to mark an inscrutable mystery will be found in a future chapter. (n. 421.)

We will copy the first four verses of the Gospel of St. John, and then, following Father Hurter, indicate very briefly and imperfectly, some of the depths of teaching to be found in them.

1. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

2. The same was in the beginning with God.

3. All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made.

4. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men.

The words of the first verse, "In the beginning," show the Eternity of the Word; and this, whether they be taken as in themselves denoting eternity, or whether they only mean that the Word existed before creation, for even so the Word is described by characters which distinguish Him from creatures, or show that He is God who is Eternal.

That the Word was "with God," shows that the Word is distinct from the Father, and yet that the duration of their existence and their action are the same. The phrase illustrates the declaration of the Apocalypse that there is one throne of God and the Lamb (xxii. 3), and one Kingdom. (xi. 15.) The Father and the Son are known together (St. Matt. xi. 27), are seen together (St. John xiv.7—11); and also much that is read in the seventeenth chapter of St. John's Gospel tends the same way.

At the close of the first verse, we have the express assertion that the Word was God. The context, as well as the presence of the article in the Greek, combine to show that our translation is correct, and we need no more; we may compare the declaration of St. Paul that Christ is over all, God blessed for ever (Romans ix. 5); the use made of this passage by the Fathers shows that this is the true reading, and that there is no ground for the doubt which has been raised in recent times on some very slender critical ground; and throughout this Scriptural argument, we must keep in mind that there is an overwhelming amount of Patristic authority for our interpretations. The particulars may be seen in Petavius. (*De Trinitate*, bks. ii. and iii.)

All things were made by the Word.—It follows that the Word Himself is not among things made, or that the Word is God. The same truth is conveyed in the words of Christ: "My Father worketh until now, and I work" (St. John v. 17), and we may note the declaration of St. Paul, that He that created all things is God. (Hebrews iii. 4.)

Lastly, we have the statement that in the Word was Life. He is the Source of Life (St. John iv. 14, v. 21, &c.), the Author of Life. (Acts iii. 15.) So too He is the Light (St. John i. 9), the Way, and the Truth. (xiv. 6.) The Concordance will supply many more references under each of these words, and if they be compared, the overwhelming force of the cumulative argument will be felt.

409. *Difficulties.*—There are certain passages of the Scripture which may seem at first sight to be opposed to our doctrine, and which were urged pertinaciously by the Arians. To understand them, the Catholic doctrine must be taken as a whole, according to which the Son of God came down from Heaven and became Man, as will be proved in the Treatise on the Incarnation; being rich, He became poor for our sakes. (2 Cor. viii. 9.) And He is not only God and Man, but He is the Head of the Church, His mystic Body; and this consideration is believed by some to explain the advance of Christ in wisdom and age (St. Luke ii. 52), and His ignorance of the Day of Judgment (St. Matt. xiii. 32), as if the Church continually grew to see more and more of what is contained in the revelation given to her (St. Jerome, *On Ephes.* i. 22; *P.L.* 26, 462; and see n. 113); but this revelation did not extend so far as to tell her how many centuries would elapse before the Second Coming of Christ. These passages admit of other explanations; but when it is said (1 Cor. xv. 27, 28) that the Son Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, it seems that the Son is reckoned as associated with

the Church in the hour of her triumph, when she has done her work and reduced all things to subjection to God.

The Arians naturally made much of the declaration of Christ, "The Father is greater than I" (St. John xiv. 28), which words, however, are best understood of the Human Nature of Christ, in which way they are taken by the author of the Athanasian Creed: "Equal to the Father, according to the Godhead: lesser than the Father, according to the Manhood." But even if they are thought to refer to the Divine Nature, they are quite consistent with our doctrine which teaches, in the words of the same Creed, that the Father is made by none, not created, nor begotten: the Son is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. This unity of Principle in God gives the key that removes some other difficulties. (*e.g.*, 1 Cor. viii. 6.) Some of the Greeks spoke of it as Monarchy, but not in the sense in which Monarchy was asserted by the Paulician and Sabellian heretics. (n. 400.) Christ prayed to His Father, asking that His disciples "might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." This English faithfully represents the Greek; the Latin, which language is destitute of the article, might be translated, "Know Thee alone, the true God," where the word "alone" might raise a difficulty. The Father is the only true God; but the Son has the same Nature with the Father, and He also is the same only true God. He is the true God and Life Eternal. (1 St. John v. 20.)

Lastly we will mention the explanations given by the Fathers of the words of Christ, reported more fully by St. Mark (xiii. 32) than by St. Matthew. (xxiv. 36.) Speaking of the Day of Judgment, He says, "Of that day and hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in Heaven nor the Son, but the Father." We have already seen that St. Jerome believes that Christ here speaks in the character of Head of the Church, to which no revelation is given concerning things which, however interesting, are not necessary for her work, and this explanation deserves mention, as having recommended itself to so great a Doctor. It is often said that Christ did not, *as Man*, know what was contained in the Eternal Counsels of God upon the subject; but we shall see in the Treatise on the Incarnation, that this cannot be asserted absolutely. It may indeed be said that the Human Nature had not this knowledge of itself, apart from its having been assumed by the Word: or that Christ, as Man, had no experimental knowledge on the matter, for there was nothing in the course of the world that suggested any answer to the question raised. In the Treatise on the Incarnation, we shall speak of this acquired knowledge of Christ, which is that in which He advanced, according to an interpretation which is commoner than that of which we spoke just now. St. Augustine supplies another explanation of the words used by Christ concerning the Day of Judgment: he says, It was useful for the disciples that Christ hid the matter from them, declaring that He knew it not, for by this concealment, He secured

that they remained ignorant. (*De Generi contra Manic.* 1, 22; n. 33; *P.L.* 34, 190.) Many others of the Fathers adopt this explanation, although it raises many difficulties which it is not our province to discuss.

410. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have established the Divinity of the Son as a Person having the same Nature as the Father, and yet distinct from Him. The argument has been directed chiefly against the Arians, and we have dealt with the difficulties raised by them; these include all that were put forward by the followers of Paul of Samosata and of Sabellius; the endeavours of modern Unitarians have not been successful in discovering new objections to the faith of Nice, which proclaims that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.

CHAPTER III.

THE HOLY SPIRIT.

411. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we show that the Holy Spirit of God is a Person distinct from the Father and the Son, and coequal with both. We then go on to show that this Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as one Principle, and we justify the Church in inserting this doctrine of the double Procession in the Creed. As in the last chapter, our arguments will be almost exclusively Scriptural, for the voice of tradition from the day when the question was first raised is too clear to need proof, and it is enough to repeat, what we said on another subject (n. 405), that there is ample Patristic authority for the use to which we put the texts adduced.

412. *The Spirit of God.*—The Creed of the Church (n. 401, iii.), as it now stands in the Roman Missal and is often said in the Mass, contains the following clauses, with which we are concerned in this chapter. "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spoke by the Prophets." The Divinity of the Holy Spirit was

naturally impugned by all those heretics whom we have mentioned as denying that the Word of God was eternal and true God (n. 400); and even some Bishops who professed to accept the Nicene definition concerning the Son made difficulty in admitting that the Holy Spirit was a distinct Divine Person. The history of this matter is confused in the extreme, and those who have gone most deeply into it are by no means in accord. The controversy was mixed up with questions about certain ecclesiastical rights claimed by the Bishops of Constantinople as following from the declaration of the Emperor that this city was the New Rome: which vital questions touched the very constitution of the Church as an independent society, having its rights to self-government unaffected by political changes. (n. 301.) These Bishops, who assumed the name and authority of Patriarchs, were for the most part heretics, and one of them, Macedonius, has given his name to the sect who refused to admit the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, and who were also called Pneumatomachi (*Πνεῦμα, μάχη*), a name expressive of their peculiar error. They were condemned by a local Council held at Alexandria in 362, and by Pope St. Damasus in 378 (Denz. 22—45); but on the political ground that has been mentioned, they refused submission.

At length, a Council held in 381, at Constantinople, and supported by the authority of the Emperor, prevailed with these slaves of the State. The Council was probably not Ecumenical, as wanting the Papal summons (n. 297), and on other

grounds; though its doctrinal decrees were confirmed by Rome and obtained universal authority; but it passed some disciplinary decrees which did not receive confirmation, and which indeed formulated (canon 3) the false principle that the civil pre-eminence of a city of itself gave that city an increase of ecclesiastical authority. An orthodox Patriarch was elected, in the person of St. Gregory of Nazianzus; but soon he despaired of doing any good, and he returned to the place of his birth.

The early adversaries of the Spirit did not deny His Personality, as is done by their successors, the Socinians and Unitarians: they held that the Spirit, like the Word, was a Person, but created by the Father, not consubstantial with Him. The Catholic doctrine is proved by the same texts against both classes of impugners. We will classify them, following Father Hurter's arrangement.

First, there are very many places of the New Testament where the Spirit of God is mentioned along with the Father, or the Son, or both, and is joined with them in opposition to creatures, but yet is distinguished from them by having a Name of His own, and by appropriation distinct operations. (n. 421, v. vii.) As specimens, we may refer to the scene at the Baptism of Christ (St. Matt. iii. 16, 17); the charge to the Apostles (St. Matt. xxviii. 19); St. Paul's account of the workings of the Spirit (1 Cor. xii.); and of the Sacrifice of Christ (Hebrews ix. 14), and others. (Romans xv. 30; 2 Cor. xiii. 13; 1 St. Peter i. 2, &c.) The fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth chapters of St. John's Gospel are full of

expressions to our purpose; especially we must notice the words (xv. 26) which speak of the Paraclete, or Comforter, whom Christ will send from the Father, the Spirit of Truth who proceedeth from the Father, and who will give testimony of Christ, just as the Apostles should do. And again (xiv. 16), Christ promises that He will ask the Father, and He shall give to the Apostles another Paraclete, that He may abide with them for ever, the Spirit of Truth. That these texts speak of Three Persons is clear: and the same is seen in the story of Ananias and Sapphira, who lied to the Holy Ghost, to God. (Acts v. 3.) Also, St. Paul speaks of our bodies as temples of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. iii. 16); but He that dwells in a temple is the God of the temple.

We cannot press an argument founded on those passages of the Old Testament which speak of the Spirit as having a share in the Divine work of creation, as when He is said to have moved over the waters (Genesis i. 2); or that the power of the heavens was established by the Spirit of the mouth of God (Psalm xxxii. 6, and see Psalm ciii. 30), because they are not conclusive in themselves, however plain they may be to one who has learned the truth from the New Testament. Many passages ascribe to the Spirit a special share in the work of the redemption and sanctification of men: the Spirit came upon the Blessed Virgin at the time of the Incarnation (St. Luke i. 35); from Him Christ received His anointing (St. Luke iv. 18, 21); He leads the Church into all truth (St. John xiv. 16);

He inspires the writers of the Scriptures (2 St. Peter i. 21), which nevertheless are the work of God. None can enter the Kingdom of God unless he be born again of water and the Holy Spirit (St. John iii. 5), and He is given when the Sacrament of Orders is conferred. (St. John xx. 22; and see Titus iii. 5; 1 Cor. xii.) We have already quoted for another purpose the text that exhibits the Spirit as knowing all the secrets of God (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11; n. 394), as well as the formula of Baptism (St. Matt. xxviii. 19; cf. n. 398), which of itself exhibits the Three Persons as bearing one Name, and so being One; and this may suffice.

413. *The Double Procession.*—It remains to show the Scriptural proof of the Catholic doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as one Principle: there will not be need to delay on the proof of the same doctrine from tradition, but a short and conclusive proof from theological reason shall be adduced. The Catholic doctrine was accepted by the Greek deputies who were present at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274 (Denz. 382), and at the Council of Florence in 1439 (Denz. 586), when the Creed was sung both in Greek and in Latin, with the word *Filioque*—and the Son—which proclaimed the double procession. On each occasion it was hoped that the Patriarch of Constantinople and his subjects had abandoned for ever the state of heresy and schism in which they had been living since the time of Photius, who about the year 870 found in this doctrine an excuse for throwing off all dependence upon Rome: but

such hopes were short-lived, for, whatever may be thought of the sincerity of the individual Bishops present, they failed to carry their people with them, and the breach between East and West continues to this day.

There is no difficulty as to the procession of the Spirit from the Father, for this is distinctly declared by Christ (St. John xv. 26), and is disputed by no one who accepts the Scriptures. That He proceeds also from the Son is proved by the texts where He is called the Spirit of the Son (Acts xvi. 16, 17; Galat. iv. 6), exactly as He is called the Spirit of God. (1 Cor. ii. 11.) Another proof is derived from the passages where it is said that the Spirit is sent by the Son. (St. John xv. 26, xvi. 7; St. Luke xxiv. 49.) Now, we are here arguing with those who admit that the Spirit is God, no less than the Father and the Son, for the Greeks made boast of their faithfulness to the Creed of Constantinople. (n. 401, iii.) We assume, therefore, as common ground that the "mission" or "sending" of one Divine Person by another does not mean merely that the Person said to be sent assumes a particular character, at the suggestion of Himself in the character of Sender, which absurd account of the matter was the best that the Sabellians (n. 400) could offer; nor does it imply any inferiority in the Person sent, as the Arians taught, for the sameness of nature implies equality. The only possible "sending" among the Divine Persons includes the idea of procession: for all "sending" involves some relation between the sender and him that is sent.

together with some new connection between him that is sent and the purpose for which he is sent (St. Thomas, p. 1. q. 43. a. 1.); and this idea is confirmed when it is observed that the Father is said to "send" both the Son (Romans viii. 3, &c.) and the Holy Spirit (St. John xiv. 26), and the Son also "sends" the Holy Spirit, as in the passages lately quoted; but this order is nowhere inverted, and we do not read of the Father being "sent," nor of the Holy Spirit "sending" the Son: it follows, therefore, that the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Father alone, but from the Son by whom He is "sent."

A last and easier argument arises from the words of Christ: "Whatsoever the Spirit shall hear He shall speak; . . . He shall receive of Mine and shall show it to you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine." (St. John xvi. 13—15.) Now, procession is the only way that we can conceive of receiving which does not imply dependence and inferiority; besides which, the Son is declared to have all that the Father hath, and this must include the being the Principle from whom the Holy Ghost proceeds.

We cannot go into the details of the argument which proves that the double procession is not merely the doctrine of the Latin Church, which is not in doubt, but that it also was held by the Greek Fathers, who lived before the dispute arose: the proof will be found in the third and following chapters of the seventh book of the great work of Petavius on the Trinity. We close with the theological reason given by St. Thomas. (*Summa*,

p. 1. q. 36. a. 2. corp.) The Divine Persons, having one and the same Nature, are distinguished one from another, by nothing but by relations, as will be explained. (n. 421, iii.) If, then, both the Son and the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father alone, there would be nothing to distinguish them, for there is no relation between them; and in this way the Trinity of Persons would be lost.

414. *Difficulties.*—The only Scriptural difficulty against our doctrine that we need consider is founded on the words of Christ (St. John xv. 26), that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, without mention being made of the Son. But those who urge this text as a difficulty ought to show that the omission amounts to a denial, and they have no plausible grounds for alleging this. And, in fact, if the procession from the Son were expressly mentioned in this place, it would be a mere repetition of what is implied in the earlier part of the verse, where the Son promises to "send" the Spirit. The Creed of Constantinople was directed against the Macedonian error (n. 412), and the declaration of the procession from the Father sufficed; and no doubt there was a desire not to raise needless questions by adding anything, however certain and important, tothe words of the Gospel.

As to ambiguous expressions in some early writers of authority, the principles will apply which we explain when we speak of the ante-Nicene Fathers. (n. 420.)

415 *The Filioque.*—We have said that popular feeling in the East interfered with the success

of the efforts of the members of certain Western Councils to bring about a reunion of the schismatics with the Holy See. The basis of this feeling was, no doubt, the desire that unreflecting men feel for anything like liberty, even though it be really a new form of slavery; and jealousy of the Old Rome took possession of the minds of men who looked to the New City of Constantine as the centre of all the life, both civil and ecclesiastical, of their race. The doctrine of the double procession was, as we have said, the occasion of the final schism under Photius; but so abstract a matter, reaching and going beyond the utmost bounds of human capacity, was but little calculated to appeal to the imagination of the multitude; some sensible object was needed to embody the national feeling, and it was found when it became known that the Westerns had made an addition to the Creed of Constantinople, by adding to the declaration that the Spirit proceeds from the Father the one word *Filioque*—and the Son—which expresses the double procession. This tampering with the Creed, as it was called, still excites strong feeling in the minds of many, even among those who accept the doctrine which the added word expresses; nor is this a matter of surprise, for such an act was forbidden by the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus in 431, and therefore could not be justified, unless it were done with the sanction of one who had authority equal to that of the Council. It was done with the sanction of the Holy See, and therefore Catholics have no difficulty about the matter; but the Creed.

with the addition, is used by all Protestant bodies who employ the English Book of Common Prayer, and it is hard to see how those among them who profess what are called Church principles can justify their conduct.

The *Filioque* seems to have been first used in Spain. It is known to have been in use as early as 589, and possibly a century earlier: there was much theological activity in the country about this time, for the strife of the Catholics and the Arians was still going on. (n. 400.) There is no clear record of the circumstances of the first introduction of the addition, but it certainly had no Papal sanction, and therefore was not justifiable: but it was tolerated and was adopted in Italy in 796, and in Germany in 809. Pope Leo III. wrote to the German Bishops expressing his disapproval of the course they had taken, but not requiring them to retrace their steps; and in time, Rome itself adopted the test-word, seemingly about 1015. From that time forward, the insertion became legalized, and it has been, ever since, in regular use in the West.

416. *Recapitulation.*—This chapter has sketched the history of the two chief errors concerning the Holy Spirit; one denied His true Divinity, and the other indirectly and by way of consequence attacked His distinct personality, by false teaching as to His procession. The Catholic doctrine on both points was established, and the sense of "mission" in God was explained. A natural place was then found for some remarks upon the word in the present Creed which embodies the Catholic doctrine.

CHAPTER IV.

THE THREE IN ONE.

417. *Subject of the Chapter.*—The preceding chapters of this Treatise have done what is necessary to establish the Catholic doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, as taught in the Scriptures. In the present chapter we shall endeavour to throw some more light upon this most mysterious subject, following in great measure the teaching of St. Thomas.

418. *God is One.*—The Essence, Substance, or Nature of God is one, as is distinctly declared in the canon *Firmiter*, of the Fourth Council of Lateran in 1215 (Denz. 355), and has been proved in our Treatise on the One God. (n. 363.) But care is necessary as to the way of speaking upon the subject, for there is danger of representing it in such a way as to make it difficult to repel the accusation of Tritheism, or holding that the Three Persons are Three Gods. In the beginning of the thirteenth century, the doctrine of Peter Lombard was misunderstood by the Abbot Joachim, whose name is well known in connection with some attempts to interpret the Apocalypse; and the Lateran Council put forth an explanation and defence of Peter (Denz. 258), not, however, condemning Joachim,

who submitted. We will indicate shortly the five considerations given by Petavius (*De Trinitate*, lib. iv. cap. 13, seq.), as showing that the Catholic doctrine is inconsistent with Tritheism. The author, as usual, illustrates his teaching by abundant quotations from the Fathers. We may notice that the Oneness which we assert in God, is not merely the moral oneness that there may be in a party of friends; nor merely the specific unity, by which, for example, all men share in one human nature, that is to say, one in kind but not numerically one: nor is it that God may be considered as One, if looked at from a certain point of view: the Oneness which we uphold is real, and independent of the mode in which He is regarded in Himself; nor is it inconsistent with plurality if regard be had to the Three Persons.

This principle of the Catholic doctrine furnishes the first proof that the Three Persons are not Three Gods. Three persons who have human nature are rightly called three men, because the human nature which each has is not numerically the same as that which another of them has: but, according to Catholic doctrine, the Divine Nature is numerically the same in each of the Three Persons. *How* this can be is unknown to us, but that it is so follows from the proof that we have given that each Person is God, and yet there is but one God: *how* it can be is a part of the inscrutable mystery of the Trinity, but as we have often seen, the difficulty as to the how is no reason for rejecting either of the proved truths. (See n. 396, v. and n. 370.)

The doctrine of the Church is also that all operations of God outside Himself are common to all the Three Persons, and this furnishes a second reason justifying us in disclaiming the charge of Tritheism. For persons act in so far as they have a nature, and a man acts as having his share in human nature: and since the operation of the Three Persons is the same, they have the same Divine Nature, and are not Three Gods. What may seem to be a difficulty in the way of this argument will be dealt with hereafter, when we speak of Appropriation. (n. 421, vii.)

Thirdly, the Catholic Church teaches that the Second Person proceeds from the First, and the Third from the First and Second, by way of communication of one and the same Nature. And this leads to the same conclusion that the Nature is not multiplied in the Persons. And fourthly, St. Paul teaches (Hebrews i. 3) that the Son is the brightness of the glory of the Father, and the figure of His substance. This expression has furnished the Arians with an argument against the perfect equality of the Father and the Son, but the reply is that the Apostle here refers to the procession of the Son, which does not necessarily imply inferiority; and his words certainly exclude the numerical multiplication of nature.

419. *Perichoresis.*—The last proof that we shall give that our doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is not tritheistic is founded on what is called by the Greeks the Perichoresis of the Three Divine Persons: the Latins translate the word by Circuminsession or Circumincession. Both words, according to their

derivation, signify the act of settling round about a place, (*περί, χῶρος*; *circum, insideo,* or *incedo*), but this etymology throws little light on their theological use. The doctrine expressed by these words is founded on the words of Christ (St. John xiv. 11), "I am in the Father and the Father in Me;" these express a truth concerning the First and Second Persons, and the truth is generally acknowledged to be no less applicable to the Third; each is in each of the others no less than in Himself, and they permeate and penetrate each other. To show the use that the Fathers make of the text just quoted, it will be enough to give the explanation of St. Hilary. (*De Trinit.* i. 22; *P.L.* 10, 39; and iii. 1; *P.L.* 10, 76.) After remarking that Christ had said in the preceding verse that the words He spoke, He spoke not of Himself, but the Father who abideth in Him, He doth the works, the holy Doctor proceeds: "Lest it should be supposed that the Father worked in Him and spoke, through the influence of some power and not through a property of the Nature which was His by generation, He goes on to declare, 'The Father is in Me and I in the Father.' This phrase explains the answer that St. Philip received, when he asked to be shown the Father: 'He that seeth Me seeth the Father also.'" (v. 9.) The whole passage proves the distinction of the Persons against the Sabellians, their equality against the Arians, and the Oneness of their Nature against the Tritheists.

The Scriptures sometimes speak of a moral unity among men. Thus the multitude of the early

believers had one heart and one soul (Acts iv. 32); and when there is no jealousy among Christian preachers, he that planteth and he that watereth are one (1 Cor. iii. 8); and Christ prays to His Father, that all who believe "may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee:" from which it has been argued that the Unity in the Trinity is merely moral unity. But this does not follow: the words must be taken according to their subject-matter: the unity of the Three Persons in one Nature is the highest conceivable unity, and it is set up as the perfection to which our Lord desired that His followers should approach, although it is impossible that they should ever attain it in its fulness. The nature of man is proved incapable of this union; no such proof can be given concerning the Divine Nature.

420. *The ante-Nicene Fathers.*—Cases are met with in the history of dogma, where some theological view is put forward, and is condemned as novel and erroneous by the general voice of Catholics. The records of tradition are searched, with the view of demonstrating the truth, and it is discovered that phrases occur in the writings of orthodox doctors which seem to favour the novelty. A doubt then arises as to what is the true doctrine on the point, and the matter is studied on all sides; and ultimately perhaps the Church pronounces, and all who are Catholics accept the decision. We may suppose that the final decision is adverse to the view the announcement of which gave occasion to the controversy; and then an interesting historical question remains as to what was the true mind of the

ancients; were they in unwitting error, or can any orthodox sense be given to the expressions that they have used. It is possible that some few writers may have erred if the point were of such a nature as does not frequently come under the notice of the faithful, and in fact it is hardly possible for a copious writer to avoid making some mistakes: St. Jerome seems to know no one but St. Hilary in whose works no blemish can be found. (Epist. 107, *Ad Laetam*, n. 12; *P.L.* 22, 876.) But it is hardly possible that any considerable number should agree in mistake as to the ordinary teaching of the Church; and if an apparent case of the sort occur, the inculpated writings must be scrutinized. The art of criticism must be exercised, to determine questions of date and authorship, and to detect possible interpolations in genuine books. The occasion of the writing must be considered, for words which would bear one meaning if addressed to one person, will often convey a very different sense to the mind of another. Care must be taken to distinguish between statements of doctrine and what is said by way of illustration or analogy: it is a true saying that no parallel is absolutely exact. Lastly, the words used must be scrutinized, to determine whether they bore the same sense in the days of the writer as they received afterwards: the progress of Theology (n. 113) may well have given a precise meaning to some word which had been at first used vaguely; and there is special value in comparisons between the ways in which an author uses a particular word in various places. It is only after all this labour

has been gone through that we should be justified in pronouncing a sweeping condemnation.

These remarks are placed here because what is perhaps the most famous question of the sort here contemplated concerns the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity as held by theologians who lived before the rise of the Arian controversy and the decree of the Council of Nice in 325 which determined the point. The question came into special prominence under the following circumstances. We have had frequent occasion to quote the great works on God and the Trinity written by the French Jesuit, Denys Petau, commonly called Petavius. This writer has no rival in familiarity with the Greek and Latin Fathers; he found, or thought he found, that many, if not all of those who lived before the Nicene definition, had been in error on some point; and he rightly deemed it his duty not to conceal his impression. He was far from thinking that all agreed in grave and substantial error, and he believes (Præf. cap. 3, 1) that he has succeeded in proving that the tradition of the Church can be traced back from the days of Nice up to the Apostles themselves. All the writers of those two and a half centuries, he says, not excepting even the heretics, agreed with the Church in some part of her doctrine, although on other points they parted from her; and where they differed from the Church they had no agreement among themselves. Their errors and the slips of their private opinions were in the mode of speaking, rather than in substance of the doctrine. Petavius, therefore, saw no reason to doubt that

had these writers lived after the time when the Arian error was distinctly proclaimed they would have been champions of the Catholic faith: and in his Preface he tones down considerably the statements made in the body of his work.

Nevertheless, what he said was taken up and exaggerated; in France, by the Jansenists and the supporters of Gallican liberties (nn. 269, 390, vi.), who found in the Society of which Petavius was an eminent member, a great obstacle to the realization of their hopes; and in England, by many men who were more or less avowed Socinians (n. 400), and who represented him as saying that the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity was long an open question in the Church; and one George Bull, afterwards the Anglican Bishop of St. David's, thought it necessary to clear himself of the charge of Socinian leanings by compiling an answer to Petavius, under the title *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ*. In this work, he used the materials which Petavius had gathered together before him, and from them he proved, as the Jesuit had also done before him, that the Council taught nothing but what had come down to it by the tradition of the Church. He had failed to see the real point raised by the author whom he attacked, and who was no longer living to defend himself; yet he was deemed to have gained a great triumph over a redoubtable adversary, and Anglicans still glory in his work as an unequalled display of learning. More than this, the book was brought under the notice of Bossuet, the Gallicanizing Bishop of Meaux; and in 1696, he procured from an assembly of French

Bishops an address of congratulation to the author, who was an official in an ecclesiastical establishment in full enjoyment of "liberties" like to those by which they were endeavouring to enslave the Catholic Church of France.

421. *The Processions.*—The Scholastics have proposed to themselves many questions concerning what we may call the internal constitution of the Blessed Trinity. They have endeavoured to see what answers appear most conformable to the expressions used in Holy Scripture and by the Fathers who knew the tradition of the Church. They are by no means in accord in the answers they give, and this is not wonderful, considering the mysterious character of the subject and that no express revelation has been given concerning it; and it must be kept in mind that these questions do not touch the dogma itself, which is revealed and beyond doubt; nor do those who entertain them profess to explain the mystery, still less to prove its existence. (n. 402.) We shall do no more than state some of the questions that are raised, and indicate the most approved answers, without attempting to enter upon controverted points.

I. We have seen (396, vi.) what is the general meaning of Procession; also that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity proceeds from the First is implied in the Names of Son and Word that are given to Him. The Name of "Word" indicates that the Second Person proceeds from the First in some way which is represented by the way in which the thought, which is the internal word of the mind.

proceeds from the intellect of man. The Word therefore proceeds from the Father inasmuch as the Father understands Himself. This is a case of immanent procession; it is a part of the mystery that in God that which proceeds in this way is a distinct Person. This case of procession is a Generation (n. 396, vi.), for that which proceeds is of the same nature as the principle of the procession.

II. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, inasmuch as the mutual love of the Two Persons has the Third Person for its term. He proceeds therefore by an act of the will. There is no ground for giving to the procession of the Holy Spirit any name suggested by what occurs in man. A son is generated by his father, but we have no peculiar name for the mutual love of a human father and son. Hence the general word *spiration* is used for the procession of the Holy Spirit, and we may distinguish *active spiration* in the Persons from whom He proceeds, and *passive spiration* in Him who proceeds. The act of loving does not produce any term which has a likeness to the thing loved, in the way in which the word of the mind is like the object it represents; and this may be the reason why the word Generation is not applicable to the procession of the Holy Spirit, so that the Son is truly the Only-begotten. (St. John i. 14, &c.) The Son and the Holy Spirit have both the numerically same Nature as the Father (n. 418); but the Son has it by force of His procession, the Holy Spirit not so.

III. Out of the Processions in God arise some of the relations of the Divine Persons. Some of these are common to all the Persons: they are identical in nature, coequal in dignity, alike in Godhead: but we are here concerned with those relations that are founded in the origin of the Persons.

Since the Nature of God is one, the Three Persons can be distinguished by nothing but their relations. Each procession gives rise to a relation between the Principle and Him that proceeds (n. 396, viii.): hence there are four relations, for in each Procession we may consider the relation of the Producer to the Produced, or of the Produced to the Producer. Thus between the Father and the Son we have the relations of Paternity and Filiation, or Sonship: the second Procession furnishes Spiration, Active and Passive. These relations are perfections, and yet there is not more perfection in one Person than in the others, or in the Essence from which all spring. For the Essence contains all these perfections *eminently:* they are also found in each Person, *eminently* (n. 362), inasmuch as the Person has the Essence: *equivalently*, for the personality of each is equivalent to the other personalities; and in some sense *formally*, in virtue of the Perichoresis. (n. 419.)

IV. That by which one of the Divine Persons is distinguished from another is called a *Notion*, as making the Person *known*. Thus it belongs to the First Person alone to be Unproduced and to be Father: the Second Person alone is Son, and

together with the First is Breather, if we may use the English verb *breathe* to correspond to the Latin substantive Spiration: the Third Person is Breathed. Thus there are five Notions: to be Unproduced, Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration, Active and Passive.

The memory will be helped if the arithmetical sequence is observed: One Nature, Two Processions, Three Persons, Four Relations, and Five Notions.

V. Among the Names given in Holy Scripture to the Three Persons, some are essential, having no regard to the other Persons; and some are called notional, as arising out of the Relations. The Name of God itself signifies the Divine Nature, with nothing to determine it as existing in this or that Person. The name of Father belongs to the First Person, both notionally, on account of His Relation to the Son, and essentially, for He is the source of all Being. This name was peculiarly distasteful to the Arians, for it implied not merely the Eternity but the Coeternity of the Son, the denial of which constituted their heresy. Hence they preferred the negative name of the Unbegotten, which may be explained so as to be unobjectionable; but which admits of receiving an Arian meaning, and which is not found in Holy Scripture. There are other names which will be understood: the First Person is the Principle (n. 396, vi.), the Cause, the Author, the Root, the Fount, and the Head. The Second Person is the Word of the Father, and the Son, concerning which names we have already

said something, when speaking of the First Procession: He is the Image of the Father, concerning which name a long discussion may be read in Petavius (vi. capp. 5—8); He is also the Wisdom of the Father. The Third Person should not be called simply the Spirit, for this name belongs to the Divine Nature, but He is the Spirit of God, or of the Father, or of the Son. The name of Holy Spirit, which might be used of God, is applied peculiarly to the Third Person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of Love, by which the will tends, or as it were is breathed forth, towards the beloved object: the Latin word Spirit corresponding to the English breath. He is also called Love, and the Bond; also, the Gift of God, and the Comforter, more especially in His relation to man.

VI. We have said that all the operation of God, except what is connected with the Processions, is common to all the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity (n. 402); these operations belong to the Divine Nature. Nor is this doctrine inconsistent with the commonly received axiom of Philosophy that to act belongs to supposita. The meaning of this axiom is negative rather than affirmative: the nature cannot act except so far as it is terminated by a suppositum: human nature can do nothing, except so far as it belongs to a particular man, a rational suppositum, a person. The Divine Nature exists in the Three Persons, and therefore is not excluded from acting, in the way that the axiom might at first sight seem to require. That the

Second Person alone became Man will be explained in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

VII. We find in the Holy Scripture and in the Fathers a mode of speaking by which certain operations appear to be *appropriated* to one alone of the Divine Persons. The work of redemption belongs to the Second Person in virtue of the Incarnation, and so does not concern us here; but the act of creation, and in general all exercise of power, is appropriated to the Father, who is said to exercise it through the Son (Hebrews i. 2), while God's communication of Himself to man and the work of sanctification belongs to the Holy Spirit. (2 Cor. xiii. 13.) Petavius went so far as to suggest, rather than maintain (*De Trin.* viii. c. 6, nn. 5—8), that the union of God with the just soul was something belonging so exclusively to the Third Person as not to be common to Him and the other Persons. He founds this view on some expressions used by the Fathers, but especially on the Holy Spirit being called the Gift of God; but this view has not been generally accepted by theologians, who find it hard to reconcile both with the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity and with the teaching of the Council of Trent as to the nature of justification. (See Franzelin, *De Deo Trino*, p. 577, thesis 45.)

We can understand something of the reasons of the Scriptural use of appropriation when we consider that the Son proceeds from the Father by an act of the Divine Understanding, and that we conceive that it is by the Understanding that the Father finds in the Divine Essence the patterns according

to which He calls His creatures into being (n. 378); also, the love of God for the creatures that He has made shows itself in His communication of Himself to them, and the Holy Spirit proceeds by an act of love. Those who wish to see what is to be said on the subject of appropriation can consult St. Thomas. (*Summa*, p. 1. q. 39. a. 8.)

422. *Rules of Language.*—In a matter so exalted above the intelligence of man as is the Trinity in Unity, the greatest caution is needed to guard against forms of speech, which whether they be or be not capable of an interpretation in accord with the faith, are at least liable to mislead the unwary. Theologians have given certain rules upon the subject, which all who have grasped the doctrine that we have tried to set forth will see to be necessary. And first, all phrases must be avoided which carry with them any suggestion opposed to the unity of Nature or to the distinction of the Persons. We may say that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one and the same Creator, or that they are one and the same thing: but not that they are one and the same as if there were no distinction. And of course we must not speak of the triple God, or every God, or a certain God, for these phrases deny the unity of Nature.

Neither must we speak as if there were in God three Natures, as by saying that there are three Individuals: nor must we say that the Father is something different from the Son, or that He is united with Him or separate from Him: but the

word *distinct* may be used, to indicate that each has His own Personality.

Words that belong to God essentially, and those that refer to His external activity may be spoken of each of the Persons, as we are taught in the Athanasian Creed: the Father Eternal, the Son Eternal, the Holy Spirit Eternal: and yet not three Eternals but one Eternal; and in the same way we may speak of each Person as Creator, but not of three Creators. The usage of Scripture as to appropriation should be adhered to. (n. 421, vii.)

Substantives that describe the Essence of God are used in the singular, adjectives in the plural: there is one only God, one only Divinity, but there are Three who are coeternal. In applying this rule we must determine whether a word is a substantive or an adjective by looking to the real meaning, according to the usage of the language, and not merely to the grammatical form. The English word "dead" is an adjective, yet we use "the dead" for a substantive; and this usage is exceeding common in many languages, especially in Greek and Latin.

Names that properly belong to the Essence may sometimes be used notionally (n. 421, iv.) if they are concrete, but not if they are abstract: we can say that God is begotten, but not that the Deity is begotten.

The one rule, including all the rest, is to adhere to the usage of the Church. Every novel phrase, in this matter, is certainly rash, and will usually be found to involve unexpected error.

423. *Recapitulation.*—In this somewhat miscellaneous chapter, we have put together some matter relating to the Blessed Trinity as a whole; together with two historical passages, on the faith of the ante-Nicene Fathers and on the *Filioque*.

424. *Close of the Treatise.*—The ground covered by this very imperfect sketch of a vast and most difficult subject corresponds to questions 27—43 of the First Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Much has been wholly omitted that might have been said with profit, did space allow, and much has been expressed with the utmost conciseness which would have borne large expansion and illustration. But the subject cannot be set forth adequately unless either the reader be presumed to be familiar with some of the deepest questions of Metaphysics, or such familiarity be imparted to him. Such matters would be out of place in these Outlines. The most that is hoped must be that enough has been given to prepare the mind for the perusal of ampler Treatises, especially by giving some idea of the nature of the questions to be considered.

Treatise the Ninth.

The Creation. The Angels.

CHAPTER I.

CREATION IN GENERAL.

425. *Plan of the Treatise.*—In our Seventh Treatise we showed that there exists a one, causeless, infinite Being, whom we term God; that His existence is eternal, and that He has the personal attributes of understanding and will. Further, there exist in the world a multitude of visible objects, as to which no one will assert that they are persons, or that the collection of them is a person (n. 396); they are, therefore, distinct from God. All the systems that are termed pantheistic hold that the whole universe is in some sense one substance, which they allege to have an existence that is necessary and eternal; but they do not allege that this one substance has intelligence and volition, and therefore they deny that there is any personal God, such as we have defined Him. We need say no more in this place upon pantheism, the various forms of which are dealt with by Father Boedder in his *Natural Theology*, and in many other books; still less are

we concerned here to go into the reasons for which we hold that things exist which in some way correspond to our sensations. (See the chapter on the Trustworthiness of the Senses, in Father John Rickaby's *First Principles*.) Our object in the present Treatise is to account for the existence of the world as distinct from God. Since God is causeless, and alone causeless, He must be in some way the Cause of all else that exists; and Creation is the act by virtue of which He is its Cause; and the world, and each part of it, considered as having the Cause of its existence in God, is said to be created, or to be a creature.

Among creatures, we recognize the visible, material universe, including plants and animals; these are the objects of sense. Besides these, we learn from revelation, that there exist creatures who are not objects of sense; these are not material, but are spirits, that is to say, persons who are not subject to those laws of space which govern matter; and thirdly, men exist, in whom a spiritual soul is united to a material body. In studying men as creatures, we are called upon to consider a number of important questions which do not arise in connection with the rest of creation; these must be reserved for a distinct Treatise. At present, we shall confine ourselves to the creation of the material world and of the Angels, the name given to the invisible created spirits, whose existence we learn from revelation. (nn. 444, 454.)

426. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this first chapter of the Treatise, we speak of Creation in general,

without reference to the nature of the created object; we shall show what is the teaching of faith upon the subject, and justify it, explaining the exact notion of creation, and proving that God was free in His work, so that it depended on His good pleasure whether or not He would call beings into existence that should be partial representations of His infinite Essence; and supposing that He did so resolve, whether they should be those beings that actually exist or any other. The teaching of the chapter is based upon revelation, but the conclusions of natural reason are brought in when necessary to illustrate the subject.

427. *Definitions of the Church.*—The doctrine of the Church on Creation has been set forth with gradually increasing fulness as time went on. In the Apostles' Creed, we declare that God is the Creator of heaven and earth. (Denz. 2—9.) By the time of the Nicene Council (325), various systems of doctrine had arisen, which made more or less sincere claim to be Christian, but which were inconsistent with the absolute supremacy of the one God: the founders of these Gnostic systems, as they were called, maintained the existence of certain beings, whom they represented as more or less independent of God, but concerning whose exact nature they spoke very vaguely. The details of the systems vary greatly, especially as regards the number of these beings, and, in fact, these schemes of the universe were mere works of fancy. In their day they were popular, and much time and labour was devoted by St. Irenæus, St. Epiphanius,

and others to the work of exposing the errors and contradictions that they involved. The Council of Nice made an addition to the Apostles' Creed, and declared that the one God is Maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. The beings whom the Gnostic fancy had created were pointed at by the word "invisible." The Angels, according to Catholic doctrine, are creatures of God no less truly and absolutely than the material world.

Many centuries elapsed before the Church judged it necessary to put forward any further definition on the subject. The Manichæan doctrine of two coequal, eternal Principles was held by many, who taught that the Angels and the spirits of men, which they distinguished from the souls of men, were the work of the Good Principle, while matter, including the human soul and body, owed its origin to the Bad Principle. (See n. 465.) These formed a distinct religious communion, not claiming to be Christian; but in the twelfth century some modifications of this doctrine began to get a hold upon some professing Christians, especially in the south of France, and it became necessary to emphasize distinctly the absolute supremacy of the one God, that Catholics might know that He was alone and had no rival. So the Fourth Council of the Lateran, held by Pope Innocent III. in 1215, declared (cap. *Firmiter;* Denz. 355), that there is one Principle of all, Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and material; who by His omnipotent power, at once from the beginning of time, framed of nothing the two kinds of creatures, spiritual and material,

the Angels and the world; and then man, who shares in both kinds, being made up of spirit and matter. After six more centuries, certain theories attracted attention, which, while seeming to preserve the supremacy of God, represented Him as acting through some necessity and having no option in the matter. God being thus deprived of free-will, was in truth no Person, and, therefore, no God in the Christian sense; and, little as some upholders of these views suspected it, they in fact taught what could not be distinguished from pantheism. The Vatican Council of 1870 thought well to mark that the freedom of God in creating is an integral part of the Christian faith; and with this view, the Lateran definition was amplified by a declaration that the One True God acted "of His bounty and by His omnipotent power, not in order to increase His own happiness, nor to acquire perfection, but to manifest it by the goods which He imparts to His creatures," and this "in accordance with His absolutely free decree." This is in the first chapter of the Third Session (Denz. 1632); and the first and fifth canons of the same Session (Denz. 1648, 1652) enforce the doctrine, adding that the world and all things in it were produced by God from nothing "as to the whole of their substance." This last phrase is directed against those forms of pantheism which profess to accept the doctrine of creation, but limit it to some sort of fashioning of a material which is pre-existent and not created by God, but like Him eternal. One of the ontologistic propositions condemned in 1861 (n. 343), finds a place here.

It is the seventh, and runs as follows: "Creation may be thus explained: God by the mere special act by which He understands and wills Himself as distinct from a determinate creature—man, for example—produces that creature." (Denz. 1522.)

428. *Creation.*—The Vatican Council, in the passage just quoted, explains the meaning of the word "create;" it signifies, "to produce out of nothing." It is usual, but perhaps hardly necessary, to remark that the words "out of nothing" must be understood negatively and not affirmatively: they do not mean that God took "nothing" and made the world out of it, but that He made the world without taking "anything;" in technical language, this act of production had no material cause. When a potter produces a cup, the lump of clay is the material cause of his work: in creation, there is nothing corresponding to the lump of clay.

What we have explained is the proper sense of the word "creation." This word came into the English language from the theologians, who adopted it from the Latin and gave it a new and precise sense. The Latin word was used of every known form of production, as of the birth of a child or the appointment of a magistrate; and no word was in use to express the act of production out of nothing, for the possibility of such production had not occurred to those who used the language. Christian writers learned from revelation that in fact the world had been produced out of nothing, and they saw the necessity of having a word to express such

an act; they chose the word "create," and their usage has passed into English. The meaning which we have explained is closely attached to the English word, which therefore should never be used in any other sense, except in cases where mistake is impossible; there is no harm in speaking of the creations of an artist's fancy, and we may without objection term a successful place-hunter the "creature" of the minister, just as the Italians say that a Cardinal is a "creature" of such a Pope; but it was not well for a popular writer on the origin of things to speak in his published writings of "creation," and explain in a private letter that all he meant was an act of production of which he did not know the cause. He gave no warning that he was using a familiar word in a sense totally different from that in which he knew it would be understood by his readers.

We have said that, before Christian times, the Latin language had no word to express creation, nor did the men who used the language feel the need of such a term; they had not the idea to which it corresponds. It is probable that the question of the possibility of creation never entered the mind of man apart from revelation. But creation is not a mystery in the full sense in which the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity is a mystery (n. 402); in fact, we may feel surprise that none of the heathen sages hit upon the truth. Some of them attained to a high idea of God, as Ruler of the world, and they saw that He was distinct from the world which He governed; and it would seem not to have been very

difficult to see that as God, and He alone, was uncaused, the world must have its entire cause in Him. But it seems that, in fact, this step was never taken, and the possibility of creation must be set down among the truths, which in themselves belong to natural knowledge, but of which the clear, explicit knowledge has not been attained without the aid of revelation.

Many philosophical difficulties are brought against our doctrine of the possibility of creation, in the sense in which we have explained the word, but they will, for the most part, be found to amount really to a denial of the existence either of a personal God, or of the external world. (n. 425.) Other objectors overlook the truth that the Agent to whom we attribute the act of creation is all-powerful (n. 387), and would set up arbitrary and inadmissible limits to His power. Some writers urge that we have no experience of any act of creation, which is perfectly true in the sense that in the ordinary course of nature no new matter comes into existence. We shall see in the next Treatise (n. 473) that creative virtue is constantly bringing a human soul into existence, as soon as there is a body fit to be informed by it; but we know nothing of any creation of matter going on at present, although we see no impossibility in it, should God please to put forth this power anew; and the much-vaunted assertion, or axiom, as it is sometimes called, that nothing can spring from nothing, is perfectly true, if it mean no more than to express the results of ordinary physical laws; but if it be extended, so as

to include all cases of production, then it is unproved, and is no more than an arbitrary assertion that creation is impossible.

Although the proper meaning of the word "create" is that which we have explained, yet Christian writers sometimes use it in a derived sense, for the action of God which is more properly called transformation, when a new substance is produced out of pre-existent material. When there is any risk of ambiguity this action is call a "second creation," the "first creation" being the production of matter from nothing. (nn. 429, 444.)

429. *The Doctrine of Scripture.*—That God created the world out of nothing is assumed rather than expressly stated in Holy Scripture; it is, however, so clearly implied that it is not seriously doubted by any who heartily recognize that the inspired books are the word of God. The doctrine of creation is implied in all the passages which assert that God is absolute Master of the universe, and ground this assertion on the fact that He made it; if He merely fashioned some material that existed independently of Him, these claims of mastership would be out of place. By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; He spoke the word and the earth was created (Psalm xxxii. 6, 9); it is He that makes all things, that alone stretches out the heavens, that establishes the earth, and there is none with Him. (Isaias xliv. 24.) The Lord maketh the earth by His power. (Jerem. x. 12.) When Esdras read to the Israelites the almost forgotten book of the Law of Moses, and the Levites interpreted it, they

recognized its teaching, and blessed the Lord who alone made the heaven and the heaven of heavens, and all the host thereof; the earth, and all things that are in it; the seas, and all that are therein. (2 Esdras ix. 6.) It will suffice if we add one passage from the New Testament: St. Paul assures the Colossians (i. 16), that in the Son of God were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible; he particularizes some of the choirs of Angels (n. 446), concerning whom, as it would appear, certain errors prevailed among the people whom he was addressing; and then he sums up emphatically, "all things were created in Him and by Him." (n. 429.) There are many other texts to the same effect. (Psalm cxlv. 6; Isaias xl. 26; Wisdom ix. 1; 2 Mach. vii. 28; Acts xiv. 14; Apoc. iv. 11.) In many of the places cited, the word "create" is used; and the mother of the Machabees declares that God made heaven and earth out of nothing (l.c.); but it cannot be proved that she was inspired in using these words, although of course the holy writer was inspired to record them (n. 145); nor can it be shown from any one of these texts that the word "create" was already appropriated to the special meaning which it now bears: the argument is that no hint is given of the existence of an uncreated basis of the process.

The principal passage, however, bearing on this subject, is the opening of the Book of Genesis: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and the earth was void and empty. This passage may be looked upon as containing the revelation of

the possibility and fact of production out of nothing, or creation properly so called. The word employed, which is translated "created," is never used in Scripture in any way that is inconsistent with this being its proper meaning. The action that it expresses is never ascribed to any one but God, and the word is never used with any mention of pre-existing matter, some apparent exceptions to which statement will be discussed directly; there are many places in the Mosaic account of the beginning of things, where formation and not creation properly so called, is described; but in these cases the word "create" is not employed. This is well seen if we compare the two accounts of the origin of man. We read that God "created" man to His own image (Genesis i. 27), and again, that He "formed" man of the slime of the earth (Genesis ii. 7); the earlier text speaks of the "creation" of man, inasmuch as the soul of man, the chief and characteristic element in him, originates in an act of creation, and can have no other origin (n. 473); the later gives a more particular account of the material from which the body of the first man was "formed;" the change in the word corresponding to the change in the action.

It is to be observed that the word "create" is sometimes employed for actions which are not "creation" properly so called, but to the peculiar character of which the sacred writer wishes to call attention as requiring an exercise of power comparable to that put forth in creation. Thus, the establishment of the Church was to be, as it were, a

new creation of the world (Isaias lxv. 17): fulfilments of prophecy come from God (Isaias xlviii. 6, 7); it is He that purifies the heart of man (Psalm li. 12), and who made Israel to be His peculiar people. (Isaias xliii. 1.)

In these cases the pre-existence of the material is implied, though not expressed, but the act described is peculiarly Divine. Somewhat different are certain cases where God is said to "create," but where the act does not seem to be such as to require any special exertion of power. The word "create" is not unsuitable, for in all the places the lordship of God over all the world is asserted emphatically; but perhaps the choice of the word was determined by the desire to express an idea a second time in varied phrase, in the manner that is characteristic of Hebrew poetry. This parallelism is nowhere better exemplified than in the opening verses of the Second Psalm, where it is clear that there is no intention to convey distinct meanings by the pairs of words "rage" and "devise vain things," "kings" and "princes." If this very frequent feature of Hebrew literature is kept in mind, it will be seen that no stress can be laid on the choice by the Prophet Amos (iv. 13) of the word "create" in the second member of the parallelism, as a change from the word "form" used in the first member. (See also Psalm lxxxviii. 13; Isaias xlv. 7; where "peace" and "evil" are alternatives for "light" and "darkness.")

Considerations such as we have set forth, at perhaps undue length, have induced pure Hebraists,

like Gesenius, to believe that the tradition of the Jews is correct, which ascribes to the word in question the proper sense of "produce out of nothing." (This tradition is implied in 2 Mach. vii. 28.) We speak here of the verb in its primitive form: a certain inflection of it is used not uncommonly in the sense of cutting or carving, the act of creatures, as when Josue bade the house of Joseph to cut down the wood, and clear the forest from the mountains (Josue xvii. 18); but the sense of this inflected form affords no argument as to the meaning of the primitive.

But our proof that the first verse of the first book of Moses reveals the fact of creation does not rest on the meaning of one word, nor on the tradition of the Church as to the force of that word: it rests on the consideration of the scope of the whole of the chapter of which this is the opening. For the writer plainly means to assert the universal dominion of God, which would not be absolute, if He were indebted for His materials to something independent of Him. The elaborate account given of the formation of various bodies would inevitably raise the question what they were formed of, and the account would be maimed and imperfect unless it afforded an answer to the question; but it is silent on the matter, unless it is understood to convey the idea of production from nothing; and the fact that in some instances mention is made of the source from which things were produced (Genesis ii. 9), would only render it more striking that in the chief matter of all, the heavens and the earth, nothing of

the sort is said. If it be not admitted that the first verse of Genesis teaches creation in the proper sense of production out of nothing, it is hard to give a meaning to the words, "In the beginning." An event occurred in the beginning, among the results of which was that the earth was void and empty, but afforded fit materials out of which various objects were formed or made: this event cannot have been anything but the "first creation," or creation proper, which was followed by the second creation, forming or making. (n. 428.) The object of the action was "heaven and earth," and it is easy to show that in the language of Scripture this phrase includes everything that exists, except God Himself. St. Paul used the phrase, evidently in this sense, even when addressing the Athenians. (Acts xvii. 24; see also Isaias lxvi. 1; Jerem. xxiii. 24.) When Christ says that His word shall endure, even when heaven and earth pass away (St. Matt. xxiv. 35), He plainly means to include all creatures. There is one passage only of Scripture which can be plausibly represented as raising a difficulty against our doctrine. It is found in the Book of Wisdom. (xi. 18.) The writer is pointing out the folly of animal-worship, such as prevailed in Egypt and elsewhere, and remarks that the pettiest living things, frogs and the like (Exodus viii.), were used as instruments of Divine justice, and that the power which sent these multitudes might have employed the agency of larger creatures; for, he says, addressing himself to God, "Thy Almighty Hand which made the world of matter without form was not

unable to send upon them a multitude of bears or fierce lions." There is a slight ambiguity in this English, for it might seem that "the world of matter" was equivalent to "the material world;" but this is not so, for in the original the words "of matter" depend upon the verb "made," and tell what the world was made of. Even so, the English version does not suggest any difficulty, but it represents the Latin "create," as if "creation" could be used of production from pre-existing matter. But we remark that as the Book was written originally in Greek, the passage before us cannot avail to show anything as to the use of the Hebrew word which is translated "create" in Genesis; and it is not asserted that the Greek word (κτίζω) is used exclusively for creative action. In truth, the action spoken of in Wisdom is plainly that which is called the second creation, when shape and order is given to matter which was previously formless.

This outline of the argument from Scripture may suffice.

430. *The Tradition of the Church.*—There is no serious doubt that the Fathers teach our doctrine that God produced the world from nothing. The Apologists continually insist upon this truth. For instance, Tatian says that while the world was as yet uncreated, the Lord of the Universe was alone. (*C. Græcos*, n. 5; *P.G.* 6, 813.) Certain ambiguous expressions occur in the works of Origen and Tertullian, so that it is worth while to quote passages which show clearly what they believed. Origen begins his work on Principles with a short

statement of the chief heads of Christian doctrine, and amongst the rest lays down that there is one God, who created and fashioned all things, and who, when nothing existed, caused all things to exist. (*Periarchon*, Præf. n. 4; *P.G.* 11, 117.) Tertullian wrote a whole book against Hermogenes, who maintained the independent existence of matter; and he teaches (*De Præscript.* c. 13; *P.L.* 2, 26), that there is one God alone who is no other than the Creator of the world, who by His word produced all things from nothing. St. Irenæus and others who were concerned with Gnostic and Arian fancies about secondary gods, had frequent occasion to insist that the one God created all things.

A grave difficulty would be raised if we could believe the account given by Photius (*Bibl. Cod.* 109; *P.G.* 103, 384) of the doctrine taught by Clement of Alexandria. Clement was believed by so good a judge as St. Jerome (*Epist.* 70 [84], *Ad Magnum*, n. 4; *P.L.* 22, 667), to be the most erudite among Christian writers; and in the same letter certain works of Clement, including the *Hypotyposes*, are declared to be learned and deeply philosophical. Yet Photius finds in this very work a curious assortment of absurdities, including the eternity of matter, along with the transmigration of souls, worlds before Adam, that Christ had a phantom Body, and much more. A large part of the work is extant, and its contents justify the account given by St. Jerome; we must therefore think that probably Photius was deceived by an interpolated copy. But the matter is far from certain; and the suspicion of false

doctrine, together with the absence of ancient testimony to personal holiness, are the grounds on which Pope Benedict XIV., in 1748, refused to insert the name of Clement in the new issue of the Roman Martyrology. The Pope's letter on the subject to King John V. of Portugal is printed in the sixth volume of his great work on Beatification and Canonization (see nn. 19—36 of the letter), and is a good specimen of the thoroughness with which all work of the kind is done at Rome.

431. *The Blessed Trinity in Creatures.*—We learn from Holy Scripture that the act of creation is to be ascribed to God the Father, to whom is addressed the prayer of the Church recorded in the Acts of the Apostles (iv. 24 and 27), where He is declared to be Creator of heaven and earth. The same act is to be ascribed to God the Son, through whom all things were made. (St. John i. 3; Coloss. i. 15.) Also, it is to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost, as we read in the Psalms. (xxxii. 6; ciii. 30.) Nevertheless, this exercise of the power of God depends upon His Knowledge and Will, which are common to all the Divine Persons. It follows that the ascriptions of which we have adduced instances are to be understood by way of appropriation. (n. 421, vii.) It is declared in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 that the One God in Three Persons is the one principle of the universe. (Denz. 355.)

But the act of creation is appropriated to the Three Persons under different aspects. It is an act of power, and is therefore appropriated to God the

Father, for power is conceived as the principle from which the act proceeds, and the First Person is the Principle from whom the other Persons proceed, but who Himself proceeds from none: and thus there is a likeness between an act of power and that which is proper to the First Person, distinguishing Him from the others. Similarly, there is a likeness between the wisdom shown in creation, and the Second Person, for it is proper to Him to proceed by way of Understanding. Lastly, the goodness of God is shown in creation, and here we have a likeness to the procession by Love, which is proper to the Holy Spirit. (See n. 421.) The whole matter is set forth very clearly by St. Thomas, in the *Summa* (p. 1. q. 45. a. 6.), where he teaches that creation is not the work of any one of the Divine Persons, except by way of appropriation. Our rules for speaking on the Blessed Trinity (n. 422) forbid us to say that there are three Creators; but we may say that there are Three who have the Divine power to create.

There seems to be a reference to the part taken in the act of creation by the Three Persons in the doxology with which St. Paul closes the dogmatic part of his Epistle to the Romans (xi. 36), where he says of God, "Of Him and by Him and in Him are all things;" but we cannot be certain of the exact force of each preposition.

In every effect there is something corresponding to the cause; something which may be said to represent that cause. This representation may be such that the existence of the effect merely indicates the

existence of the cause, and such an effect is said to show a vestige of the cause: the proper meaning of the word "vestige" is "footprint;" and a footprint which shows that a man has passed, but does not tell what manner of man he is, affords an instance of a vestige. When the representation affords some distinct knowledge of the nature of the cause, even if this knowledge be imperfect, the representation is called an image, such as is the work of a sculptor or painter. Many distinctions may be made as to the likeness of an image to its cause, but it is needless for us to go into them.

Now, in every created thing, we find indications that it is the work of One who is powerful, wise, and good; for power is exhibited in the creation of the object, wisdom in conceiving its design, and goodness in suiting it to its purpose. The thing therefore brings us to a knowledge of the Attributes by which the Divine Persons proceed, or in the thing we have a vestige of the Blessed Trinity. The matter is variously represented by various writers, but all the explanations come fundamentally to the same.

In irrational creatures, the representation goes no further; but such as are rational have a certain measure of power, intelligence, and will, so that in them we may recognize an image and not a mere vestige of the Blessed Trinity. Even apart from revelation, the study of man would have led, and did lead, to the knowledge that a God existed who was powerful, intelligent, and good: but as we saw (n. 402), the unassisted mind of man would never

have attained to the truth that in the One God there were Three Persons, corresponding to these three attributes.

432. *Can creatures create?*—It is clear that in Holy Scripture God claims to be alone in possession of creative power: thus, after pointing out the folly of the makers of idols, He says (Isaias xliv. 24), "I am the Lord that make all things, that alone stretch out the heavens, that establish the earth, and there is none with Me." And the Fathers who disputed with the Arians constantly used the argument that as the Word of God had a share in the work of Creation, He was Himself God, and not a creature. St. Basil, for example, urges against Eunomius (lib. 4, c. 3. 1; *P.G.* 29, 688), that the thing made has not the same power as its maker; the Father and the Son therefore have nothing in common, not even creative power, if the Son be made and not begotten. It is therefore certain that no creature has the natural power to create, and in fact it seems to many that infinite power must be necessary to pass what they regard as the infinite distance that separates Something from Nothing. Nor does it seem to be within the ordinary power of God (n. 387) to raise a creature and grant to it the power to create; for a faculty which has never been exercised cannot be supposed to exist, and that which has never been done cannot be said to be within the ordinary power. Further, it is certain that a creature who should have independent, unlimited, creative power is not within the object even of the absolute power of God, for the notes assigned

to it are contradictory. Whether by this absolute power a creature could be raised to be the instrument of God in creating is a question to which no certain answer can be given. The great body of theologians follow St. Thomas (p. 1. q. 45. a. 5. and the parallel passages) in holding the negative, but there are weighty names on the other side. The question is philosophical, not theological, and the reasons alleged are beyond our scope. (See Father Boedder, *Natural Theology*, pp. 127—130.)

433. *The End of Creation.*—There are two senses in which we may speak of the "end" of any action. That to which the action of its own nature tends may be called its end, and the same name may be given to that which the doer of the action had in view: thus, to make a pair of shoes may be regarded as an action having for its end either to keep the feet of the wearer dry, or to procure money for the maker. The first is called the end of the work, the second is the end of the worker. In the case of creation, the end of the work is to procure glory to God, especially through the good done to man. This doctrine is defined by the Vatican Council. (Sess. 3, can. 5; Denz. 1652.) "To be fully known and praised" is what is meant by "glory:" so that the end of the world is that the power, wisdom, and goodness of God should be fully known and avowed. We are taught this in Scripture, as when God declares (Isaias xliii. 7) that every one that calleth on His name, for His glory is He created: some are specially predestined unto the praise of the glory of the grace of God (Ephes. i. 6): in the

Apocalypse we are told of the four-and-twenty ancients, who declare that God is worthy to receive glory (Apoc. iv. 11); and the work of Christ Himself on earth was to glorify the Father (St. John xvii. 4); and the Lord saved the Israelites in the Red Sea, that He might make His power known. (Psalm cv. 8.)

As to the end of the worker in creation, none other can be assigned than the fulfilment of the will of the Creator. God certainly was not moved to the act by anything outside Himself, for nothing of the sort existed, and to look for the reason of His will is to attempt to assign the cause of the First Cause. God loved Himself, and willed that this love should extend to the partial representations of His own essence that are found in creatures. It cannot be said that God was selfish in thus acting exclusively with a view to Himself, in the way that a man would be selfish who made all things for himself (Prov. xvi. 4); for God seeks no more than is His due, nor does He seek it in an undue manner; and it is well for creatures that they should exist with the capacity of giving glory to One who deserves it. God does not love His creatures because they do Him honour, but it is a mark of His love that He allows them to do Him honour.

The whole of this doctrine is summed up excellently by Lactantius (*Instit.* 7, 6; *P.L.* 6, 757): The world was made that we might be born; we are born that we may recognize God, the Maker of the world and of us: we recognize Him that we may worship Him: we worship Him that we may receive immortality as the wages of our toil, for the

worship of God involves great toil: we receive the reward of immortality, that being made like to the Angels we may for ever serve our God and Father, and may be the Kingdom where God reigns for ever.

This writer here sets forth the doctrine that, to help man to serve God is at least a part of the end for which the world was made. It will be observed that this doctrine does not exclude there being other partial ends: and if any one think that the universe is too great a work to have been made merely with a view to man, he is free to indulge his speculations, so long as he does not trench upon revealed truth. He must, however, bear in mind that mere size goes for little in judging the dignity of a thing; that irrational creatures cannot give glory to God except by furnishing to rational creatures an occasion of fulfilling their end; that the nature of man was raised to an ineffable dignity when it was assumed by the Word of God; and that in the day of creation, the morning stars praised God together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody. (Job xxxviii. 7.) The reference here appears to be to the Angels, who know the works of God, and take the occasion to praise Him offered them by the new-made stars; and these blessed spirits are described as thousands of thousands, ten thousand times a hundred thousand. (Daniel vii. 10.) The world was made for man, but not for man alone. (See n. 444.)

434. *Creation free.*—It remains to show that God was free in creating; not merely as to whether He would put forth His creative power at all, but also

as to whether He would create the particular universe that exists, or some other, such as He preferred. To deny this is in fact to refuse to God that freedom of will which we find in ourselves, and in which we perceive no admixture of defect; which is therefore a simple perfection, found formally in the Divine Essence. Nevertheless, some writers have been found who have professed to exalt God while they refuse to Him that excellence which He has given to His creatures, the general basis being the notion that to create must be a good thing, or God would not have done it; and that when creating, having the choice of two worlds, He could not have chosen to create the less good. The first error is expressed in the eighteenth of the propositions of Rosmini, which were condemned in 1887 (n. 343): "The love by which God loves Himself also in His creatures, and which is the reason by which He determines Himself to create, constitutes a moral necessity, which in the all-perfect Being always induces an effect." The second is the doctrine of Optimism, which is commonly referred to Leibnitz as its author. Against both, we may refer to what we have said in general of the will of God, which is free (n. 385), and we shall directly give the special proof from Scripture that God is free in creating: meanwhile we may observe that both Rosmini and Leibnitz require God to do that which is impossible. The moral necessity arising from God's love of Himself must have operated as long as He has existed; that is to say, it would require that creatures should have been called into existence

from all eternity: now in the next chapter (n. 439), we shall show not only that the world was in fact created in time, but that an eternal world such as ours is intrinsically impossible: it is a nonentity, to which the Divine power does not extend. (n. 387.) In like manner, Leibnitz would require that God should not create, unless He produced the best possible creature: but a best possible creature is another nonentity, for it would involve the presence of contradictory notes in the same subject. (n. 388.)

In the Holy Scripture, God ascribes the act of creation to His own will, when He allows it to be said of Him that He created all things, and for His will they were and have been created. (Apoc. iv. 11): Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done (Psalm cxxxiv. 6): and these texts justify the doctrine of St. Irenæus, that God freely and of His own power disposed and perfected all things, and His will is the substance of all things. (Lib. 2, c. 20, n. 9; *P.G.* 7, 822.) These proofs extend not only to the act of creation, but also to the choice of the object which was to be produced.

The existing world, though not absolutely "best," for there is none such, is nevertheless entitled to be called "best" in some respects: no creature can have a better end than to give glory to God; production from nothing is the highest work of the most perfect Worker; and the world as created was in perfect accord with the pattern existing in the Divine Intellect. All these qualities are found in what we call the least of created objects: for, as St. Augustine says (*De Civit. Dei*, 11, 22; *P.L.* 41,

335), the greatness of an artist is seen in small things no less than in great, for it is to be measured not by the size of the object, but by the skill shown. It is a true saying that God is great in what is great, greatest in what is smallest.

435. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter, speaking of Creation in general, we have explained the meaning of the word, and have shown that God is truly Creator of all things, as the Church has defined. We then show that in all creatures there is a vestige of the Blessed Trinity, while in rational creatures an image of the same is found: and after a short notice of the question whether by God's absolute power a creature can be raised to a capacity to create, it is shown that God acted freely in creating, and that His sufficient end was His own glory.

CHAPTER II.

THE MATERIAL WORLD.

436. *Subject of the Chapter.*—Having spoken of the Creation in general, we now go on to consider the three principal classes of creatures, the material world, the Angels, and Man. The first of these will be the subject of the present chapter, which is chiefly concerned with such explanation of the records of revelation as may be considered to be established beyond question. Many deeply interesting questions suggest themselves, but we must not wander off among uncertainties.

437. *Creation and Ordering.*—In the preceding chapter we have shown that all things that exist outside God Himself are the creatures of God, being as to their substance produced by Him out of nothing; and there is no need to add anything to show that the material world is embraced in this doctrine. In the beginning, God created heaven and earth. This declaration of the first verse of Genesis is sufficient, for the word "earth" must mean the material world. It is best to understand "heaven" of the spiritual substances, the Angels, the invisible creation, while "earth" includes all that is visible. In this way, we have in the first

verse the declaration that all things owed their being to God, while in the second and following verses the writer gives some further particulars concerning that part of the world with which his readers were chiefly concerned. It is true that in the eighth verse the word "heaven" is used for the place occupied by what we call the heavenly bodies, so that the interpretation is not without difficulty. We must leave the question to the commentators.

In any view, the first verse describes the initial act of creation, and the rest of the chapter gives us particulars of the mode by which such things as now exist were formed out of the matter which was the first product of creation; and of the order in which this was done. It is to be observed that the word "create" occurs three times only in the course of the chapter, in the first, twenty-first, and twenty-seventh verses; elsewhere, the words "make," "form," and the like are employed. The first verse describes the original creation of all things, and the last of the verses cited speaks of the creation of man, whose spiritual soul owed its existence directly to the Creator, in the case of the first man no less than in that of his descendants. (n. 473.) The use of the word in verse twenty-one supports the opinion of those philosophers who believe that the brutes here spoken of have a soul which though dependent on matter for its existence, and therefore perishing with the body, is nevertheless simple, and originates in a distinct creative act. (See Palmieri, *De Deo Creante*, thesis 15.) It is very rash to rest a confident opinion as to the

meaning of Scripture upon the view we hold in respect of so very obscure a subject as the souls of brutes; but at any rate, it will hardly be maintained that the bodies of the "great whales" were created in a way which is not alleged concerning other animals; and so we hold that no creation of matter took place subsequently to that which is mentioned in the first verse. The matter thus created was, as it were, the raw material, the fashioning of which into bodies such as now exist is afterwards described.

438. *Conservation and Concurrence.*—There are one or two matters belonging to Philosophy, on which Theology throws little or no light, but to which a few lines may conveniently be devoted in this place. The creation of the substance of things must be regarded as taking place in an instant: "The Lord spoke and they were made; He commanded, and they were created" (Psalm xxxii. 9), and the reason is that there is no medium between non-existence and existence. But we must not consider that the substance, once created, is thenceforward in no need of the action of God to maintain it in being; on the contrary, it has need of a distinct exercise of Divine power to preserve it, for every creature is essentially dependent on God for all that it has; His free-will brought it into being, and the continued exercise of this same will is necessary if this being is to be preserved. If God ceased to act upon a created thing as the Cause of its being, it would cease to exist, and this Divine action which preserves it is called Conservation. This is true of all things outside God, whether substances or

accidents; they do not cease to be contingent, with no necessary existence, merely because they have been called into being; and therefore they depend for their continued existence on the permanence of the Cause that gave them that being. In the case of substances, this Cause is no other than God, the Creator, whose action therefore must endure. Accidents may owe their being to second causes, but no without the concurrence of the First Cause, both as conserving the subject of the accident and as maintaining the second cause in its action. The second cause having done its work may cease to exert influence, and yet the effect may remain, as when a body once set in motion continues to move until it is stopped by some new action; but it will not continue to move without the continued action of that First Cause to which, in the beginning, it owed its being and its motion. There is in fact no parity between second causes and the First Cause.

Faith teaches us that God will never withhold this conservation from any spiritual substance that is once created, and reason also would incline us to the same conclusion, as will be seen in our closing Treatise. As to material substance we have not equal certainty, and it would seem not to be beyond the absolute power of God to withhold the necessary conservation and so allow the matter to fall into nothing; and it is to be observed that we should not have any positive act of annihilation, but merely the negation of the positive act of conservation; but however this may be, there is no reason to

suppose that God has ever in fact ceased to conserve the matter which He created in the beginning; such an event would be a miracle comparable to the great miracle of creation, and such as there is no ground for supposing to have occurred. Some difficulties may be raised on this subject in connection with the doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist, but we do not at present consider this miracle. A clear discussion on this subject will be found in the *Summa* of St. Thomas. (p. 1. q. 104.)

Further, God not only conserves His creatures in existence, but conserves them in possession of those powers of affecting other creatures which He has given them. We have already had occasion to say something on this matter (n. 24), but a few more remarks may be made. We shall merely sketch the outline of the doctrine held by most Catholic writers on the subject, without going into proofs or discussing the subtle objections of adversaries. We must distinguish between three kindred ideas—Cause, Condition, and Occasion. A cause is that which determines a thing to exist. We have spoken of the material cause, the absence of which is the peculiar character of the act of creation (n. 428); we spoke also of the final cause, or purpose, of creation (n. 433); and of the formal cause, or pattern, which God found in contemplating His own infinite essence as being capable of partial imitation outside Himself. But the name of cause belongs properly to that which consists in action, physical or moral, and is distinguished as the efficient cause. We have seen that no

creature can be the efficient cause of creation (n. 432), but we hold that created substances have power to exert efficient causation upon each other, and that God conserving them, conserves them precisely in possession of this power, and when they are in the act of putting it forth: and Conservation, so considered, is called Concurrence. It might seem scarcely to need proof that a blow on a man's head exerts an action which determines him to fall, or is the efficient cause of his falling; or that our soul exercises some action on the body, causing contraction of certain muscles and consequent movement of the limbs; in which last example, of course, we assume the existence of the spiritual soul. Yet difficulties have been raised upon the subject, and it has been held that what we call the cause is really no more than a condition or an occasion of what we call the effect. A condition is that which does not act in any way, but without which the result would not follow; a condition may be such as is absolutely necessary, and is then called a condition *sine qua non;* or it may be such that the lack of it can be supplied by the presence of something else as an alternative, and then we have conditions simply so called. This distinction between cause and condition seems not difficult to grasp, when it is stated in general terms, though the application to particular cases is sometimes far from easy. Some writers explain the matter somewhat differently, and say that every condition is a partial cause. An occasion is that on the occurrence of which something else happens, which, however,

might have happened without the occurrence of this or of anything else to supply its place. Thus, if a message is to be sent, the occasion may be some ceremonial which has attracted public interest; a condition is that the telegraph apparatus be in good order, but this is not a condition *sine qua non*, for some other agency may be substituted; but it is a condition *sine qua non* that there should be some means of communicating with the destined recipient of the message. The efficient cause of the motion of the needles may be considered to be the electrical action, whatever may be its nature; or if we look on this as acting only under the direction of the operator, we may speak of it as the instrumental cause, or instrument, as distinguished from the principal efficient cause. The reporter who brings the message to the office is also in a sense the cause of its transmission; but inasmuch as his action influences the effect only by acting on the free-will of the operator, he is said to be the moral cause, while the operator causes the needles to move by physical causation, where no free-will intervenes. This distinction will be found to be of importance in the Treatise on the Sacraments in General. The analysis that we have given is merely intended to illustrate the meaning of the words, Cause, Condition, and Occasion.

We hold that substances as created and conserved by God have a power of acting which renders them true causes, and that God concurs with them when so acting. Against those who challenge us to prove that they are causes and not mere conditions,

we appeal to the universal consent of men, and decline to argue the point, just as we decline to argue with one who professes not to be convinced of the existence of the external world, or of the validity of the principle of contradiction. Such difficulties as can be raised are dealt with by writers on Philosophy. They also show, from the consideration of the Divine Wisdom and Veracity, that the events which occur in the world, for instance, the arrival of the message, in the example used above, are not due to the direct action of God, but only to Him so far as He concurs with His creatures; the contrary doctrine, that the acts of the operator are merely occasions, on the occurrence of which God by His direct action moves the needles, has been held by some Catholics, but finds few advocates at the present day. (See n. 451.)

439. *Creation in Time.*—We have seen (n. 427) that according to the definitions of the Lateran and Vatican Councils, the world was created "in time;" that is to say, that a certain finite number of days has elapsed since the instant when the Angels and the material world were brought into being. Before that instant there was no actual time, for time implies succession; but there was the possibility of time, for God could have put forth His creative power. This point of the Catholic faith does not merely declare that nothing outside God is eternal in such sense as to be independent of Him; it declares that the world is a creature and therefore dependent; and also that it is not created from eternity. We shall say something directly as to

the possibility of an eternal creature; our business here is to prove by the testimony of Scripture that the world is not in fact eternal.

We cannot rest an argument on the opening words of Genesis, "In the beginning." These words may refer to the beginning of time; but they may signify no more than the first step in the work of creation. St. Augustine (*Gen. ad Lit.* 1, 1; *P.L.* 34, 247) and St. Ambrose (*P.L.* 14, 124) and St. Basil (*P.G.* 29, 7), at the commencement of their discourses on the *Hexaemeron*, or, Work of Six Days, seem to wish to understand this "beginning" as applied to the Divine Word (n. 408); this interpretation, however, is put forward as it were tentatively, and is not commonly adopted. Our Scriptural argument is partly negative, founded on the absence of any indication that the world has existed from eternity; this silence is significant when we consider that eternity seems to be put forward as an attribute peculiar to God, as when it is said that He is the first and the last (Isaias xli. 4, &c.), or as St. John expresses it (Apoc. i. 8, &c.), the Alpha and the Omega; alpha and omega being the first and last letters of the Greek alphabet; whereas, we are told that the Lord was God before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed (Psalm lxxxix. 2); Christ had glory with God before the world was. (St. John xvii. 5, and Ephes. i. 4, &c.) These passages are hardly consistent with the idea that the world could have existed from eternity, even in its first rude and chaotic state.

Many of the Fathers argue that not only has the world not in fact existed from eternity, but that creation from eternity is intrinsically repugnant; thus, St. Irenæus says (4, 24; *P.G.* 7, 1002) that the Maker is always the same, but that which is made has a beginning and middle of its existence, and is always capable of increase. St. Athanasius argues against the figment of the Arians who set up the Word of God as eternal yet created (Orat. 1, 29, *Contr. Arian.*; *P.G.* 26, 71), and says that that which was not before it was made, could not coexist with God who always is. St. Augustine (*Confess.* 12, 15, 22; *P.L.* 32, 834), St. Anselm (*Monolog.* c. 27 [28]; *P.L.* 158, 182), and many others are quoted to the same effect.

The reasons adduced for this view did not satisfy St. Thomas (p. 1. q. 46. a. 2. corp.), who holds that faith alone assures us that the world has not existed from eternity; and this truth can, he thinks, no more be demonstrated, than can the mystery of the Blessed Trinity (n. 402); and he claims the attention of his reader to the matter, lest perchance one who undertook to demonstrate the truths of faith, but adduced inconclusive reasons, should lead those who have not the faith to deride, as though our belief rested on so unstable a foundation. The holy Doctor then proceeds to demolish the arguments by which Aristotle and others had striven to show that the world in fact never had a beginning; and in this proceeding he is faithful to his own principle as to the true method of theological discussion, set forth in the first question of the First

Part of the *Summa*. (art. 8. corp., and see *ante*, n. 5.)

Many Catholic philosophers and theologians are swayed by the arguments and authority of St. Thomas, and hold it to be impossible to demonstrate that the world is not eternal. Others, however, of no less weight, believe that they see a conclusive argument proving this impossibility, at least as regards any creature of a kind within our knowledge. In all existing creatures, they say, there is some sort of succession, whether of time, as with material objects, or something different as with Angels. (n. 451.) But if there has been succession from eternity, there is nothing to prevent God having created some object at each step of this succession, and conserved it; and in this way an infinite multitude of objects would coexist, which is impossible; for whatever number of objects coexist, that number can be increased, as by the creation of an additional object; but what is infinite is not susceptible of increase. The possibility of eternal creation therefore depends on the possible existence of a creature in whom there is no succession: and this is a controversy into which we need not enter. No such creature is in actual existence: and so we seem to have a proof from reason that at least the existing world cannot have existed from eternity.

We shall reserve for the Treatise on Man (n. 475) what we have to say on the question how long the world, as distinct from its Lord, has in fact endured; and we shall find that nothing is known on the subject.

440. *The Six Days.*—The business of a theologian is primarily with matters of faith, and, beyond the cases where the Written Word contains clear and distinct revelations, he is not concerned with the interpretation of Scripture, except so far as he derives from it his arguments, or deals with the objections of adversaries. But the question of the meaning of the first chapter of Genesis is so familiar and so warmly discussed that we are unwilling to pass it over; more especially, we may take the opportunity of laying down some principles of interpretation which will serve as guides in a most obscure region. They are mostly corollaries from the doctrine of the inspiration of Holy Scripture, which teaches us that Genesis and the other canonical books have God for their Author. (n. 136.)

The Church has given us no declaration on the meaning of the Mosaic account of the Six Days of Creation; we are therefore left to make out the meaning for ourselves, if we care to investigate the matter. This inquiry is the work of criticism, and at the outset we cannot but express our surprise at the rashness of those who think that they can see at a glance and with certainty the full meaning of a record of this kind written thousands of years ago for the use of a people, concerning whose habits of thought and familiar turns of language so little is known.

The history of Creation is perhaps the most familiar among the points of contact between revelation and natural knowledge. The Scripture is the written Word of God, the world around us is His

handiwork, and we have faculties which, rightly applied, tell us something about this work. In this way, the world may be regarded as a commentary upon the Book, and the more we study it the plainer will the meaning of the Book become. It may well happen, and in fact has happened, that what in one stage of natural knowledge would seem to be the meaning of the Book, turns out, as natural knowledge advances, not to be the meaning; that which was accepted unquestioningly so long as no reason for doubt appeared, turns out not to be the meaning when the matter is considered in the light gained by further application of reason. God has told us in His Book much that belongs to natural knowledge; but there is much more that He has not told, but which He encourages us to investigate for ourselves: "He hath made all things good in their time, and hath delivered the world to the consideration of man, so that man cannot find out the work which God hath made from the beginning to the end." (Eccles. iii. 11.) We shall never exhaust the wonders of Creation, and our study will give us constantly new ground for praising God, as He designed (n. 433); and when both the Book and the commentary are rightly interpreted, they will prove to be in perfect harmony. But caution is necessary: we must not readily be sure that either the Book or the commentary has been read by us aright; if the two readings seem to be at variance we have certainly blundered as to one, perhaps both; and in this case opinion must be suspended, until either the advance of criticism or

further light from the study of nature clear up the doubt; or possibly the Church will vouchsafe instruction, and put an end to the controversy. When the two readings agree, we must rest our faith upon the Book alone, and regard the commentary as containing useful illustrations and no more. On some parts of Scripture we have, in the definitions of the Church, an authentic commentary which cannot be set aside as a mere human result, liable to be disregarded as out of date. But for a large part of the first chapter of Genesis, this commentary is wanting. In dealing with the question of the Six Days, we must avoid overconfidence either as to the meaning of the Sacred Writer, or as to the results of geology and kindred sciences.

Some few points will probably be conceded as certain by all who admit that the first chapter of Genesis is the inspired Word of God, in the sense in which the Church has defined it. Such are that the main purpose of Moses was to insist on the supreme sovereignty of God as the Creator of all things, and on the folly of those men who paid Divine honour to the heavenly bodies and to the beasts, all of which had been created for the use of man. (Genesis i. 28—30.) Also that the Israelites might be led to hold in honour the law of the Sabbath rest, when they knew that it commemorated the rest of God Himself. (Exodus xxii., xxxi. 17.) This purpose was fulfilled, although we may not fully undertand what is meant by the rest of the Almighty; and although we know that the same

institution also kept up the memory of another rest. (Deut. v. 15.) These lessons were to be impressed upon the reader, and the writer abstained from adding what would not have been to his purpose; for instance, he does not tell us what ends besides the service of man are subserved by the heavenly bodies, the plants and animals. (n. 433.)

I. We will now mention some systems of interpretation that have been proposed, together with a few remarks on the reasons alleged in favour of each or against it. And first, some who call themselves Christians reject the whole narrative beyond the first verse, as being a mere fanciful amplification, of no authority. This method of dealing with the Scripture is clearly inconsistent with the hearty acceptance of the doctrine of the Church as to inspiration; it relieves its patrons from one difficulty, but only to land them in greater difficulty of explaining why they attribute any more authority to the first verse than to those that follow.

II. Another system makes the narrative to have allegorical but not historical truth. This system is supported by the high authority of St. Augustine, who holds, that both the original creation and the formation of the world were completed in a single instant (n. 437), instead of the creation being an instantaneous act, followed by an ordering which was completed in time. We will give a passage where the Saint explains his views as to what really is described in terms of the Six Days. (*Gen. ad Lit.* 4. 26; *P.L.* 34, 314.) "The day which God made by His works does not consist," he says, "of

a revolution of matter, but of spiritual knowledge, when the blessed company of angels first contemplated in the Word of God, that 'Be it made,' which God spoke. And so, it first comes to the knowledge of the angels, when we have the words, 'And it was so.' And afterwards they know the thing made in itself, and this is the meaning of evening; and when seeing the character of the thing itself they turn it to the praise of the Maker, this is the meaning of the morning."

The main point of this interpretation is the coincidence of the creation and the fashioning of the world. In various forms it has commended itself to a large number of theologians of high authority, including St. Thomas himself, who remarks that it is a convenient way of defending the Scripture against the scoffs of the infidel (*De Potent.* q. 2. a. 4.), which seems to be a dangerous canon of interpretation. The system is, however, now generally rejected, for it has no foundation in Scripture, and is, by confession of St. Thomas, less in harmony with the apparent meaning of the text; but the matter is not so plain as to exclude it from the list of lawful interpretations. An idea which has had some vogue of late, that the first chapter of Genesis is a hymn, and to be interpreted as such, may perhaps be defended on the ground that it is not further from the literal meaning of the text than the admissible Augustinian view.

III. It is only in recent times that any Catholic commentator has recognized the possibility of more than two interpretations being given to the Mosaic

narrative, the allegorical, and what we may call the strictly literal. According to this, the original creation of unordered matter is described in the first verse, and subsequently the present order was evolved by Divine power in the course of six successive natural days. This view is supported by an immense amount of ancient authority, and it is maintained at the present day by some few writers of no great weight; also, it is in accord with what at first sight seems to be the meaning of the narrative, which must not be parted from without reason. (n. 159.) But there need be no hesitation in departing from it if good reason can be shown for so doing, as is taught by Pope Leo XIII. in the Encyclical of November 18, 1893, to which we have already referred. (n. 145.) The great bulk of modern writers think that the progress of natural knowledge, especially geology and palæontology, has supplied reason which justifies, or even requires, this departure. They argue that, whatever differences there may be between schools of geologists as to the details, the deposition of the strata containing organic remains which are found in the earth, must have taken enormous periods of time, and yet this deposition is the very work which is described in Genesis as done in six days; hence they conclude that the Mosaic "days" are not natural days. In taking this view they act in perfect accord with theological principles; they believe they have deciphered portions of the Commentary which were illegible to their ancestors, and have been led to see that the book bears a meaning

which was previously unsuspected. They observe with St. Augustine (*De Civit. Dei*, 20, 1, 2; *P.L.* 41, 659), that "day" is often used in Holy Scripture for a period which is not a natural day, and that the word occurs in several senses in this very narrative: thus Day is distinguished from Night (verse 5); and it is employed for some lapse of time before the sun was made (verses 5, 8, 13), as to which days, St. Augustine says very truly (*De Civit. Dei*, 11, 6; *P.L.* 41, 321), that it is very hard, if not impossible, to conceive what these days were; and lastly that the whole period of the Six Days is called one day (Genesis ii. 4); we cannot therefore be certain what is the sense in which the word is used in other places.

It will be admitted by most champions of the strictly literal interpretation that they cannot claim absolute certainty for their view; they will allow that the question is open, even on the strictest theory of inspiration. But they will maintain their own right to uphold the old view, which is perfectly consistent with all the teachings of geology. This science merely says that, if the present disposition of strata and fossils was brought about by natural means, it must be the work of long series of years; but the process described in Genesis, is represented as the immediate work of God, whose power is adequate to do all that we read of, if He so please; and thus the supposition which lies at the basis of the geological argument is unproved. Nor can it be objected that such Divine action as the strictly literal interpretation requires, finds no

parallel in any other acts of God of which we read, or that it forces men to believe falsehood. The act of creation has no parallel elsewhere; and if men who contemplate a fossil are thought to be forced to believe that it is the relic of a once living animal, whereas it is really the immediate work of God, the same objection may be raised against every act of creation; for whatever we conceive to have been the condition of matter at the first instant after its creation, this condition must, by the principles of physics, be the result of a certain calculable condition in which it existed in the previous instant; and so we are compelled either to hold that matter is eternal, or to admit that men are not forced to regard all that they see as being the effect of natural causes. Similarly, if it be said that we do not see what end God could have had in creating the fossils as we see them, the same difficulty may be urged, and is urged, against all creation; we know in general terms what is the final cause of the world (n. 433), but if we attempt to apply this explanation in detail, we are met with difficulties at every turn; these are the difficulties which form the strength of the Manichean argument, for this strives to show that matter cannot be the work of the Good, Wise, and Powerful God.

It seems, therefore, that while the strictly literal interpretation is not proved to be alone tenable, it is not proved to be untenable. But in fact, the immense and growing weight of modern Catholic authority is against it, and its supporters do not give proof that they appreciate the force of what we may

call the geological argument. The subject before us is eminently one on which no one deserves a hearing who does not show that he is alive to all that constitutes the strength as well as the weakness of the position held by his adversaries.

IV. Some Catholics uphold what may be called a broadly literal interpretation, which maintains that the present state of the earth's surface was brought about in six natural days, but that the phenomena into which geology inquires, are the relics of events which occurred between the original creation described in the first verse, and the fashioning of which the second and following verses speak. That the earth was void and empty is supposed to be the result of some great and universal catastrophe, due, as some advocates of the theory hold, to the sin of the angels, who had previously inhabited the earth. This theory has nothing positive to recommend it, and so far as it ascribes bodies to the angels and local habitation, it is opposed to the ordinary doctrine of divines (n. 445); moreover, it entirely fails to remove the difficulties which arise from the study of geology, for this science teaches the continuity of the geological record.

This may be the place for noticing the diluvial theory, according to which all geological phenomena are to be ascribed to Noe's flood. Whatever may have been the geographical extension of the events recorded in the seventh chapter of Genesis, they are totally insufficient to explain the existing strata and fossils. When fossils first attracted attention in the eighteenth century, they were hailed by Christians

as being conclusive proof of the truth of the Mosaic narrative, and unbelievers were driven to amusingly extravagant hypotheses to account for their occurrence; but no one will now support either side in that controversy.

V. The periodic theory holds that the days of Genesis are indefinitely long periods of time, during which the geological phenomena had their origin. Some authors would make these periods successive, while others think it more likely that they overlapped each other, existing contemporaneously in different parts of the earth. What we have said when speaking of the strictly literal interpretation shows that we hold the periodic theory to be at least admissible, and many writers regard it as fully established; but the numerous attempts that have been made to apply it in detail do not appear to have been crowned with success. Such attempts are premature; our knowledge of the physics of the earth and of the succession of organisms is still very imperfect, and there would be nothing startling in the casual discovery of a fragment of bone that would upset the most plausible theories put forward by these too hasty champions.

VI. Another system, which with no very good right goes by the name of Revelation, considers that the "days" of Genesis i. are not periods of time, but so many visions successively granted by God to Moses, and recorded by him as he saw them; these visions representing so many stages in the formation of the earth, without reference to any intermediate events. The course of the formation of the world

cannot have been known except by revelation, and this revelation may have been made by way of vision, such as was granted to Ezechiel and St. John; and the proposed system is clear from all the difficulties of interpretation raised by the natural sciences. This system recommends itself to many modern writers, especially to the most recent commentator on Genesis, Father Francis von Hummelauer, who speaks of it as "alone true;" but it may be observed that when the prophets describe the visions granted to them they speak of having seen such or such a vision, as Moses himself does (Exodus iii.); whereas the frame of the narrative of creation is historical. Also, it is not clear what, in this system, can be meant by the "rest" of God on the seventh day. If the work of creation went on for six days, to say that God "rested" on the seventh day is an intelligible anthropomorphic expression; but we should hardly be prepared to read that God "rested" from granting visions, or that Moses had a vision of God "resting."

Such are the principal views that find supporters among Catholics. It is plain that the matter is involved in uncertainty, and that the mode of formation of the earth and the meaning of the Mosaic narrative, must be set down among the many things which for the present we must be content not to know. Meanwhile, all Catholics who have the oppportunity will do well to pursue and if possible advance the study of geology, and of whatever other sources of knowledge have a

bearing on the matter; they will come to know more of God's works, and will have new ground to praise Him (n. 433); they will be prepared to expose the futility of the efforts of unbelievers who endeavour to make natural knowledge a ground for attack upon the truths of faith, and they will help on the work which will one day be accomplished, of proving affirmatively that the Book and the Commentary are in perfect accord.

The difficulty in this matter, which many persons find so grievous, has its origin in the notion very prevalent among Protestants, which indeed sometimes infects unthinking Catholics, that the Holy Scripture can be interpreted by every man or woman who sets about the work with honesty of purpose. We saw in our Treatise on the subject (nn. 155, &c.), that this view is baseless: the Church is our teacher in Divine truth, and she teaches us that Genesis is the written Word of God, but does not see fit to instruct us as to the meaning of the first chapter, in respect of which we may conjecture that no revelation has been granted to her.

441. *Recapitulation.*—This chapter has been chiefly concerned with the formation and ordering of the world. We showed that the creation took place in time, and that no creature is eternal, nor probably is eternal creation possible: and we recounted some systems of interpretation of the Six Days of creation, and gave a caution against hastiness in speaking confidently on a subject as to which we are imperfectly informed.

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURE OF ANGELS.

442. *Subject of the Chapter.*—We have already more than once had occasion to speak of the Angels, by whom we understand a class of creatures distinct from the material world and from man. In the present chapter, we shall give the proof from revelation of the existence of such beings, and set forth what can be known concerning their nature and relations to God and to each other. They fall into two classes, for when all were submitted to a probation some remained faithful to their Creator while others fell away. In the next chapter we shall speak separately of the action of good Angels and bad Angels in the world.

Some writers think that reason can find grounds for suspecting that such beings as Angels exist; but at most these grounds go no further than to raise suspicion, and it is best to consider that all our knowledge of the subject is founded on revelation. (nn. 444, 454.)

443. *The Existence of Angels.*—No one who admits the authority of Holy Scripture can doubt that beings exist such as we have called Angels: distinct on the one hand from God, and on the

other from the visible world and from man. We have already seen that the point is defined by the Church. (n. 427.) The word "Angel" itself belongs to the Greek language, and is in common use to signify "Messenger:" it therefore expresses the office, and not the nature, of him to whom it is applied, and is used in Scripture even of men: thus Moses sent "Angels" to the King of Edom (Numbers xx. 14), where the English version has "messengers;" and in the sixteenth verse Moses himself is called an Angel, as being sent by God on a mission to the Egyptians. The original text speaks of human "Angels" in other places (Josue vi. 17; St. James ii. 25, &c.); and the context alone can determine what is the sense in any particular passage. There is a doubt whether the "Angels" of the Seven Churches spoken of in the Apocalypse (chapters i. ii. and iii.) were Guardian Spirits (n. 453), or, as is more probable, human officials; but there are many places where there can be no doubt that the word "Angel" is used for those who elsewhere are called the Sons of God (Job i. 6), Saints (Daniel viii. 13), Dwellers in Heaven (St. Matt. xviii. 10; Philipp. ii. 10), the Host of Heaven (2 Esdras ix. 6; St. Luke ii. 13), or simply Spirits. (Psalm cl. 6; Hebrews i. 14.) The word "Angel" is applied to a bad spirit (2 Cor. xii. 7), and to the whole heavenly host (Daniel iii. 58), as well as to him that was sent by God to protect the Three Children in the furnace (Daniel iii. 49), and very frequently of other spiritual messengers. (Genesis xxii. 11; St. John v. 4, &c.) However, the distinction

that "Angel" properly denotes the office of a messenger and not his nature, is clearly marked where the Psalmist declares that God makes His Angels Spirits (Psalm ciii. 4), if the passage be taken in the way that St. Augustine (*In Psalm.* ciii. Serm. i. c. 15; *P.L.* 37, 1348) and St. Gregory (Hom. 34, *In Evang.*; *P.L.* 76, 1250) took it, as meaning that God employed Spirits as His Angels or messengers: in the words of the first-named Doctor, "He is a Spirit on account of what he *is;* an Angel on account of what he *does.*"

We find in Scripture the proper names of three individual Angels. St. Michael is represented as the chief of all (Daniel x. 13; Apoc. 12, 7): his name signifies, Who is like to God? St. Gabriel, the Mighty Man of God, was the Messenger of the Incarnation. (Daniel viii. 16; St. Luke i. 19, 26.) St. Raphael, the Divine Healer, conducted the younger Tobias on his journey and healed the elder of his blindness. (Tobias iii. 25, v. 5, xii. 15.) We learn from this last verse that St. Raphael was one of seven Spirits who are admitted to special intimacy with God, but the nature of their privilege is altogether uncertain. They would seem to be the same as the seven Angels mentioned more than once in the Apocalypse (i. 4, xv. 1, &c.), and in these places the numeral seems to be used definitely; and so we must suppose that the word "seven" is not used in Tobias for an indefinitely large number, as is sometimes done (St. Matt. xviii. 21), but refers to some special seven: possibly they are the chiefs among those who are employed in the government

of the world and the care of men. Special honour is paid to the Seven Spirits in some places in Sicily, and in the Church of Santa Maria degli Angeli in Rome. No other proper names of Angels are mentioned in Scripture, and no others should be invoked by name by Christians, as was declared in a Synod held at Rome in 745, under Pope St. Zachary. The occasion was that one Adalbert, a German Bishop, among other freaks, had composed a prayer invoking seven Angels with uncouth names. Adalbert was probably insane. Some in the Council were for burning his prayer, in sign of disapproval, but it was thought better to preserve it in the archives of the Roman Church, for the instruction of posterity; and so it has come down to us, and may be found in Hefele's history of the Council. Jewish legend makes much of Uriel, the Light of God, and countless other names of Angels are to be found, but none of these have any claim to notice.

444. *Origin of the Angels.*—We need not repeat the proof that we have given that whatever exists outside God has been created by Him (n. 429); an express statement concerning the creation of Angels is made by St. Paul. (Coloss. i. 16.)

Further, God was free in the act of creating the Angels no less than in the rest of creation (n. 434); and this is the reason why we hold that the existence of Angels is known with certainty by revelation alone. Theologians, enlightened by revelation, see reason to judge it convenient that an order of purely spiritual creatures should exist, for were it otherwise

there would be no creatures that correspond to the Divine Intellect (St. Thomas, p. 1. q. 50. a. 1.); to create such beings seems to us an act in harmony with what we know of the nature of God. But while we are sure that there is nothing in God that is positively "inconvenient" and out of harmony, yet it is rash to attribute to Him everything that we judge to be "convenient;" and it would be at most a negative "inconvenience" if no Angels existed. The argument of St. Thomas, therefore, is not demonstrative, but at most suasive; raising a likelihood; and the freedom of God in this part of His creation is saved. We shall touch hereafter upon another reason which leads some to think that the existence of Angels can be known without revelation. (n. 454.)

The Lateran Council (n. 427) teaches that all creation took place in time; and this definition, with the reasons which justify it (n. 439), applies to the Angels no less than to the visible world. There is some difficulty as to the date of the creation of the Angels compared with the creation of man. Some of the earlier Fathers believed that the Angels had existed long before the material world, which, as a few taught, was brought into being to furnish a home for man, destined to be the means of supplying the place of those Angels who had fallen and left Heaven empty. The Lateran decree is not conclusive against this notion, which however is not commonly received. The phrase used by the Lateran Fathers, which we have rendered "at once," does not necessarily signify that the acts spoken of were absolutely contemporaneous, for it may mean "without

exception" (Psalm xiii. 3), or "without distinction." (Ecclus. xviii. 1.) We shall not be wrong in holding that the Angels are included in the "first creation" described in the first verse of Genesis; and that they were in existence, and were used by God as instruments, during the "second creation" which occupied the six days. (n. 440.) All speculation on the number of the Angels is vain. The number is very large, as is proved by texts which we have already had occasion to quote (n. 433), among which the passage from Job (xxxviii. 7) should be noted, as being in full accord with our doctrine that the creation of the Angels was prior to the fashioning of the world in the six days, though not necessarily prior to the original creation of matter. Many writers have indulged in speculations connecting the number of the Angels with the number of the predestined (n. 187), with the number of human souls that exist or will exist, with the number of families or other communities, or even of material bodies, to which a distinct Guardian can be assigned (n. 453); but these speculations find no support from any of our sources of knowledge, and, were it otherwise, would merely tell us what we already know, that the number is very large.

The end sought by God in the creation of the Angels, as in all other creation, was His own glory; they know more than man can know of the power, wisdom, and goodness exhibited by the world, and take occasion to praise the Creator. Our ignorance prevents our saying whether they promote the glory of God in any other way.

445. *The Nature of the Angels.*—That the Angels are spiritual substances, as the Church defines (n. 427), follows from the passages of Scripture in which they are exhibited as something more excellent than man. The Psalmist, exalting the dignity of man, declares him to be a little less than the Angels (Psalm viii. 6); and the preaching of an Angel would be more persuasive than that of a man (Galat. i. 8; see also Job iv. 18, 19; Hebrews i. 4), and the same follows from the acts of intelligence and will involved in what we read to have been said and done by St. Raphael and St. Gabriel. Concerning the extent of their knowledge, little is told us; it is commonly believed that this knowledge is intuitive, and not arrived at by a process of reasoning: it does not extend to the secret thoughts of men, for that knowledge is represented in Scripture as belonging to God alone (3 Kings viii. 39; St. John ii. 24, 25; Hebrews iv. 12); but it must be remembered that this doctrine can be applied only with certainty to such of our thoughts as are wholly confined to our mind, and not accompanied by any corresponding bodily change; the Spirits of whom we speak may have power to observe and interpret the slightest affection of matter. In like manner it would seem that the Angels can have none but a conjectural knowledge of the future actions of free agents, however shrewd may be their conjectures: certain knowledge on the matter belongs to God alone. (Isaias xli. 23; Daniel ii. 27, 28.) The Angels do not know how long the world shall last (St. Mark xiii. 32), nor

can they tell the number of the predestined (n. 187), and an Angel was ignorant of the duration of the captivity of the Jews in Babylon. (Zach. i. 12.) St. Augustine teaches that they cannot know the interior state of men, or Satan would not have wasted his strength in tempting one so firm in patience as Job (*De Gen. ad Lit.* 12, c. 17, 34; *P.L.* 34, 467); and it is certain that they have no natural knowledge of such mysteries as the Blessed Trinity (n. 402); and although, when raised to the supernatural state and admitted to the Heavenly Kingdom, they see God as He is, yet even then they know nothing of what depends upon His free-will, except so far as He pleases to reveal it to them; and it seems that this revelation has not been made to them with completeness, but that their knowledge grows, as they study the works of God, and especially as they see the working of the Church in the world. It is in this way that some of the Fathers have understood a difficult passage in the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians (iii. 8—11), where the Apostle speaks of himself as having the grace to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, "that the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers in the heavenly places, through the Church." Principalities and Powers are, as we shall see (n. 446), the names of different classes of Angels, and the words, "in the heavenly places," show that good Angels are here spoken of: it follows that the preaching of the Church in some way gives to the Blessed Angels an increase of

knowledge. Theodoret, commenting on this passage (*P.G.* 82, 529), remarks that if the heavenly Spirits learn more fully the wisdom of God by observing what is done in the Church, there is nothing to prevent our supposing that they may have seen a Man, Christ, and have failed to know that in this Man the Deity lay concealed. St. Chrysostom goes further, for he thinks that the Angels learn the mysteries of faith, not merely from observing the course of the history of the Church, but directly from the preaching of her ministers. Great, he says, is the honour done to human nature that, along with us and through our agency the heavenly Virtues learn the secrets of their King. (Orat. 4, *De Incompr. contra Anomœos; P.G.* 48, 729.)

There is good authority for believing that the evil Spirits are in some way restrained from knowing some of God's dealings with man, even such as they might otherwise have learned by their natural power. Thus, St. Paul preached a mystery "which none of the princes of this world knew, for if they had known it they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." (1 Cor. ii. 8.) No doubt, the Jewish authorities are included among the princes of this world here spoken of, but some commentators believe that the phrase also designates the evil spirits.

In this view Satan, who would by his natural power have recognized the fulfilment of prophecy in Christ, was hindered by Divine intervention from doing so; and thus himself frustrated his own hopes for the final ruin of man by the part he took in procuring the death of the Redeemer. St. Ignatius

the Martyr thought that the marriage of our Lady with St. Joseph blinded Satan to the fact of the virginal conception of her Son, whom therefore he did not regard as being the Child spoken of in the prophecy of Isaias (Isaias vii. 14; St. Jerome on St. Matt. ii.); and here we perhaps get an explanation of what some have felt as a difficulty concerning the Temptation of our Lord, for Satan would never have attempted the hopeless task of leading into sin one whom he knew to be the Son of God. Also, it has been suggested that the dream of Pilate's wife (St. Matt. xxvii. 19), was a last desperate effort of the Evil One to stay the work that he had set on foot, he having conceived a strong suspicion that he had made a mistake fatal to his cause. Father Knabenbauer, in his commentary on the place, leaves it undecided whether this is the true explanation of the dream, or whether it was divinely sent to check Pilate in his course of sin, or whether it was an ordinary dream, natural in a woman who had leanings to Judaism such as are reported by tradition in this case. There is a curious opinion ascribed to St. Justin by St. Irenæus (*Contr. Hær.* 5, 26; *P.G.* 7, 1194) and Eusebius (*H.E.* 4, 18; *P.G.* 20, 376), who approve of it. These Fathers believe that before the coming of Christ Satan did not know that his doom was final and eternal, and that he was more guarded in expression of his enmity to God than he became afterwards, when he had learned that his condition was hopeless: probably no theologian of authority has held this opinion for many centuries.

No one will doubt that the Angels, being Spirits, have a natural power of communicating their thoughts one to another; and this communication may be called speech, as St. Thomas teaches (p. 1. q. 107. a. 1.), founding his doctrine on the passage where St. Paul speaks of the "tongues" of Angels. (1 Cor. xiii. 1.) Local distance does not hinder the use of this "speech," as we see from the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (St. Luke xvi. 24), for what is true of disembodied spirits must be true of the Angels; and whatever may be the exact mode of communication, it can be made secretly, as we are told by the same St. Thomas. (art. 4.)

The Angels, because they are Spirits, are naturally immortal.

Older writers discuss at length the question whether the Angels are pure spirits, or whether they are united to material bodies. The former opinion is supported by the silence of Scripture and by the form of expression used in the Lateran definition (n. 427); and the censure of rashness would be incurred by any one who at the present day maintained the opposite view. Some earlier writers of good authority had a difficulty in conceiving the existence of any pure Spirit, except God; and in fact, as we have seen (n. 375), some would not make even this exception. The arguments on the subject depend on the views held by the writers as to the nature of matter, and can scarcely be understood by any but those who are familiar with the old physics: they have little interest except as illustrating the history of opinion.

446. *Distinctions among the Angels.*—The Angels being very numerous, as we have seen (n. 444), it will be interesting to inquire whether they form but one group, or whether they can be thrown into any kind of classes. There is a famous question concerning the distinction of one Angel from another, whether they are to be considered as so many individuals of one species, as is the case with men; or whether they differ specifically among themselves, and if so whether each species contains several individuals, or whether each individual is specifically different from all the rest. This last is the opinion of St. Thomas. (p. 1. q. 50. a. 4.) Every one of these questions might have three branches, for it might be discussed with reference to the fact, with reference to what was possible by the ordinary power of God, and what was within His absolute power. (n. 387.) This intricate discussion does not concern us, for the arguments adduced are almost exclusively philosophical and not theological, and, like the question which we just noticed concerning the supposed bodies of Angels, they are expressed in terms of the old physical ideas, and would be hard to translate into modern language. Probably most inquirers in recent times have come to the conclusion that no sufficient proof is forthcoming for the doctrine held by St. Thomas.

The Scriptures, speaking of the good Angels, plainly represent them as distributed into certain classes, among which there is some system of subordination of lower to higher; and it is commonly supposed that representatives of each of

these classes are to be found among the Fallen Spirits. Certainly Christ seems to countenance the opinion of the Jews that the devils who possess the bodies of men have a chief, called Beelzebub (St. Matt. xii. 24, 27), and he speaks expressly of the fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels (St. Matt. xxv. 41); but further than this we cannot go.

As to the good Angels, the doctrine that they are distributed into classes, or choirs as they are called, is so clearly set forth in the Scripture, that it may be regarded as being certainly revealed doctrine, forming part of the Catholic faith, although not defined by the Church. (n. 327.) Nine choirs are distinctly named, as is recognized by all the Fathers and theologians, and these shall be enumerated presently. It is quite uncertain whether this enumeration is complete, for there is no ground for an opinion whether or not there are other choirs of which we do not know even the names. A question is raised whether the souls of men who die in the grace of God, when admitted to the heavenly city, are associated to particular choirs of the Angels. Certainly the souls of the dead do not put on the angelic nature, for the union with the human body is connatural to every soul that is created to inform such a body, and the union, severed by death, will be restored in the day of the general resurrection. Nor is there reason to believe that the souls of the dead are employed in the ministries, in which God uses Angels as His instruments. But it is commonly, and with good reason, believed that holy

men are distributed among the choirs of Angels, according to the degree of grace and glory that they have attained, and that the highest place in the heavenly court belongs to a human being, the Blessed Mother of God. What is here said agrees with the doctrine of St. Paul, who speaks of the City of the Living God, the Heavenly Jerusalem, in terms implying that both men and Angels are found among its citizens (Hebrews xii. 22, 23); and it seems to help us to an explanation of another place in the same Epistle, where we are told that Jesus was made a little lower than the Angels. (Hebrews ii. 9.) The nature of Man, assumed by the Eternal Word of God, is lower than the angelic nature; although it is also true that His Name is above all names. (Philipp. ii. 9.)

As to the nature of the distinction among the various choirs of Angels, we may leave the explanation to those who know it, stipulating only that they say no more than they can prove, and in this way we shall be following the example of St. Augustine (*Enchir.* 58; *P.L.* 40, 250); with him again (*Ad Oros. contra Priscill.* c. 11; *P.L.* 42, 678) we may declare our unhesitating conviction that there are such distinctions, and at the same time avow our ignorance wherein they consist. But where certainty is not granted to us, we may be allowed humbly to speculate on the nature of the things whose names we know. (St. Bernard, *De Consid.* 5, 4; *P.L.* 182, 791.) While theologians avow that in this matter all is uncertain, they commonly think it worth while to present to their readers what is found in the

work on the Celestial Hierarchy which goes under the name of Dionysius, or Denys the Areopagite. We read in the Acts of the Apostles (xvii. 34) that St. Paul, by his discourse before the Areopagus at Athens, secured the conversion of one of the judges of the court, named Denys: and tradition of no great historical value represents him as preaching the Christian faith in Gaul, and dying the death of a martyr at the town near Paris afterwards called after his name, where stood the famous abbey that became the burial-place of the Kings of France. This identification originated with Hilduin, Abbot of St. Denys, no earlier than the ninth century, and the martyred first Bishop of Paris seems really to have suffered in the persecution of Septimus Severus, about the year 202. Four works on the Names of God, the Hierarchy of Heaven, the Hierarchy of the Church, and on Mystical Theology, are still extant under the name of the Areopagite, and were much studied in all parts of the Church down to recent times, being regarded as the genuine work of him whose name they bore, and as having almost canonical authority. Much certainly of the contents could not have become known except by revelation; and readers who believe that the author was the disciple of St. Paul, naturally receive his statements with absolute submission. But for the last three hundred years, the opinion has gradually gained ground that these writings are far more recent than the Apostolic age, and that they were probably composed between the years 360 and 400. This conclusion is drawn from the silence of other writers

concerning them, and from the references to the controversies of the fourth century that can be traced. The antiquity of the Dionysian writings, and the identity of the author with the Areopagite, and with the first Bishop who was given "by the Paris of the East to the Athens of the West," still finds zealous defenders, whose arguments, however, are sentimental rather than critical.

One passage in the writings ascribed to the Areopagite is so often referred to that it may be noticed here, although it has no connection with our immediate subject. It is not found in any of the four larger works which we have mentioned, but in a letter (*P.G.* 3, 1081) supposed to be written by Dionysius to St. Polycarp, the Bishop of Smyrna. The writer instructs his correspondent how to deal with a heathen philosopher, named Apollophanes, who seems to have lectured against Christianity; and among other sensible advice, suggests that the strength of the Christian argument should be set before the sophist, and that he should be reminded of an occurrence which he witnessed in company with Dionysius, when they were students together at Heliopolis, in Egypt. One afternoon they saw the full moon move round by the east from its place opposite to the sun, until it covered the solar disk, and after a time it returned to its natural position. Apollophanes, filled with awe at the sight, exclaimed to his friend: "We witness a change in God!" Dionysius afterwards learned that the year and day of this portent were the year and day of the Crucifixion of Christ, and he thought that

Apollophanes would confess the truth of the Gospel narrative.

The exclamation ascribed to the philosopher has had currency in various forms: "The Unknown God (Acts xvii. 23) is dying in the flesh!" or, "Either the God of Nature is dying, or the fabric of the world has an end!" It is clear that the authority for the story is too slender to be of avail to support the historical character of the Gospels.

What follows is mainly taken from this author, and must not be regarded as having more weight than is due to him.

The word Hierarchy, which is used for the governing body in the Church (n. 202), is also applicable to the Angels, and the Nine Choirs are regarded as distributed in three Hierarchies, but the nature of these, and the distinctions among them, are more obscure than even the distinctions among the choirs; but in both cases they are supposed to depend upon the functions in which the blessed Spirits are employed. The lowest choir in the lowest Hierarchy have the name of Angels in a special sense, which is extended from them to all the choirs. Their name occurs often in Scripture, and we have already cited some of the places. (n. 442.) Next come the Archangels, or chief Angels, mentioned by St. Paul (1 Thess. iv. 15) and St. Jude (verse 9), who tells us that St. Michael belonged to this choir: these seem to be sent on business of importance for the welfare of man. Highest in this lowest Hierarchy are the Principalities, mentioned by St. Paul (Ephes. i. 21); they have authority over

Angels and Archangels, and exercise care as to all sovereignty on earth. The Powers, Virtues, and Dominions, mentioned in the same verse, form the second Hierarchy. (See also Coloss. i. 16.) Authors are not altogether agreed as to the order in which these three should be arranged, nor as to the special functions indicated by their names. St. Denys, who in default of better authority, is commonly followed, places the Powers lowest. They are thought to receive their name from their steadfast constancy in the service of God, or perhaps as having peculiar power to restrain the endeavours of the evil spirits to tempt men to sin. The Virtues are judged to have a special power of influencing the lower choirs to fervent service of God, or it may be that they are the instruments employed in the working of miracles. The Dominions are said to have the charge of assigning their employments to the other choirs. The highest of the Hierarchies contains the Thrones, the Cherubim and the Seraphim. The Thrones are named in the Epistle to the Colossians (i. 16); an explanation suggested for their name is, that they execute the sentences pronounced by God when seated on His throne as Judge, but St. Denys makes it signify that they are far removed from earthly affections; it is not easy to see what connection he made between the two ideas.

What has been said concerning the Seven Choirs hitherto dealt with, may be enough to show that nothing is truly known concerning them beyond their names: nothing can be known except by revelation, and it seems that no revelation has been

given. St. Augustine, therefore, had no reason to be ashamed of the ignorance which he avowed in a passage which we quoted not long since. There is a little more to say concerning the two remaining choirs; the highest according to the accepted arrangement, for we read some particulars about them in the Holy Scripture. Considering the depth of our ignorance concerning the choirs whose names are known to us, we may be excused for not following certain writers who speculate on the possible existence of other unnamed choirs, in addition to the Nine whose names have been revealed.

447. *The Cherubim and Seraphim.*—In the antiphon at the *Magnificat* for the First Vespers of the feast of All Saints, the Church invokes the intercession of Angels, Archangels, Thrones and Dominations, Principalities and Powers, Heavenly Virtues, Cherubim and Seraphim; and on the principle that the law of prayer is the law of belief (n. 95), this passage affords an argument to show that these Nine Choirs have separate existence, and indicates that the Seraphim are the highest of all, the Cherubim being next in dignity: but it has been observed that there is some variety in the order of arranging the names. The Cherubim and Seraphim are named apart from the other choirs in the *Te Deum*, and their names occur also in the Preface of the Mass.

The word *cherubim* is the ordinary plural form of the Hebrew word cherub, and both numbers are of frequent occurrence in Scripture. The etymology is unknown: the Hebrew and cognate tongues have

been ransacked in vain, except that the word has some resemblance to the Assyrian name for the gigantic images of bulls, man-headed and lion-clawed, that are so conspicuous among the remains recovered from the buried palaces of Ninive. The suggestion that the word is connected with the Persian *griffin*, and the English *grip*, does not find favour; there is no ground for ascribing talons to the Cherubim. The earliest occurrence of the word is in Genesis (iii. 24), where we read that, after Adam's sin, God cast him out of the paradise of pleasures, and placed before it Cherubim and a flaming sword, to keep the way of the Tree of Life. This obstacle, whatever were its nature, barred the road against return, and seems to have remained permanently, so long as Paradise existed; that is to say, until the Flood of Noe, or some other catastrophe, altered the features of that locality.

The next time that we find the word, it seems to be used as the name of a familiar object; for among other ornaments which Moses, by Divine command (Exodus xxv. 18), proposed for the Ark of God in the Tabernacle, were two Cherubim of beaten gold; these were to stand on each side of the Ark, and between them was to be the Propitiatory, or Mercy Seat; the Cherubim were to cover both sides of the Propitiatory, spreading their wings, and covering the oracle; they were to look one towards the other, their faces being turned towards the Propitiatory, wherewith the Ark was to be covered. (vv. 19, 20.) All this was carried out (Exodus xxxvii. 7), and when all things were perfected, the glory of the

Lord filled the Tabernacle. When Solomon built his Temple at Jerusalem, to replace the Tabernacle, two Cherubim were placed on the two sides of the Ark; the height of each was fifteen feet, and the span of the wings was the same; the material was the wood of the olive-tree, covered with gold (3 Kings vi. 23—28), and the whole building was ornamented with figures of Cherubim and palm-trees, and the glory of the Lord filled the house of the Lord. (viii. 11.)

These passages contain the substance of what we learn from Scripture as to the figure designated a Cherub; nor do we derive much help from other sources; Josephus, for instance, who must have been familiar with the device, gives up the attempt to describe it, for he tells us merely that it was a winged living creature, having no likeness to any that man ever saw. (Joseph. *Antiq.* 3, 6, 5.) The arrangement would seem to have been that the Cherubim on each side of the Ark rose up above it, and between them was seen the luminous appearance called the Glory of the Lord, or Shekinah, resting on the cover of the Ark, called the Mercy Seat. It was from this Mercy Seat that God spoke to Moses (Numbers vii. 89), and on it the blood was sprinkled by the High Priest when, once in the year, he entered the Holy of Holies, not without blood, on the feast of Expiation. (Levit. xvi. 14; and see Hebrews ix. 5, 7.) The whole of the work of Solomon was destroyed by the Babylonians under Nabuchodonosor, and the treasures were carried off. (4 Kings xxv.) At this time the Ark was destroyed

with the Tables of the Law (Deut. x. 2), so that in the new Temple raised by Zorobabel (Aggeus i. 14), the Holy of Holies was empty, and the Glory of the Lord was not seen. It is probable, however, that the traditional figure of the Cherubim was employed for ornament. This account will explain the passages where God is spoken of as seated upon the Cherubim. (Psalm lxxix. 2; Isaias xxxvii. 16, &c.)

Besides these places where the figures called Cherubim are mentioned, there are others that disclose to us the existence of a choir of Angels who have the same name. The passage already quoted from Genesis concerning the Cherub that kept the way of the Tree of Life may be an instance, and we seem to have another where David describes God as coming from Heaven to aid him (2 Kings xxii. 11; Psalm xvii. 11); but the clearest places are found in the Book of Ezechiel. The Prophet repeatedly saw them in a vision, under symbolical forms, described especially in the tenth chapter. We shall not delay on the detail of this account, which has tested the acuteness of commentators on this most difficult book. (See Father Knabenbauer, in the *Cursus Scripturæ Sacræ*.) It need scarcely be said that neither the symbols mentioned nor any other form that can be presented to the eye has any real likeness to pure Spirits. It is usual to regard the Cherubim as possessing knowledge in a peculiarly high degree.

The remaining choir is formed by the Seraphim. These are mentioned in the sixth chapter of the Book of Isaias, who describes in his vision that his lips

seemed to be purified by the touch of a hot coal brought from the altar by one of the Seraphim. Isaias tells us that the Seraphim stood on the throne of God, which expression fully justifies the assignment to them of the highest place among the Nine Choirs. The name is of Hebrew origin, and comes from a root signifying to burn: this derivation may be the reason why ardent love is ascribed to these highest of the blessed Spirits. The name does not occur in any place of Holy Scripture except the chapter just quoted. It is famous in Church history, for the angelic appearance which brought the impression of the Five Wounds of our Lord to St. Francis of Assisi is described as a Seraph. Several contemporary accounts of the event may be read in the twenty-fourth section of the Bollandist Life of the Saint, but none of them throw any light on the reason for this name, beyond saying that the figure had six wings, in agreement with the text just quoted from Isaias. The name suits well with an apparition granted to a Saint whose burning love of God governed all his actions; the whole of the vast religious family who serve God in poverty, under the Rule of St. Francis, are called the Seraphic Order; and the name of Seraphic Doctor is given to the great Franciscan theologian, St. Bonaventure.

448. *The Probation of the Angels.*—It is certain that some of the Angels enjoy the Beatific Vision in Heaven (St. Matt. xviii. 10), while others are banished from the presence of God. (St. Matt. xxv. 41.) As to the reason of this difference, we

have a declaration of the Fourth Lateran Council (Denz. 355), in the chapter *Firmiter* already quoted. The Devil and the other evil spirits were created by God good, but by their own act became bad. This defined doctrine leaves little doubt that the spiritual history of the Angels is in the main the same as that of man, but with certain difference. We shall here give a sketch of what is commonly held on the subject, without attempting a full discussion, which it is better to reserve for our next Treatise, on Man: much the same considerations occur in both cases. (See nn. 481, 483.)

The Angels, as created, had at least natural goodness, as all the works of God must have; but this natural goodness bore no proportion to the supernatural sight of God which constitutes the happiness of man and is called the Beatific Vision. The Angels must therefore have been raised to the supernatural state by the infusion of grace. It is doubtful whether they were raised to this state in the first instant of their creation, or whether they were left for a while in the state of pure nature. The Jansenists (n. 390) held the first opinion, for they erroneously taught that the state of pure nature was impossible (n. 489); the Scotist school hold that the Angels, in the first instant of their creation, had no more than natural goodness; but afterwards they received the needful supply of actual grace, which some of them used well, and were raised to the state of habitual grace: others failed to use their opportunity and sinned. The ordinary opinion seems to be that God might have left them in the

state of pure nature had He pleased, but that in fact there was no such interval. The Angels, therefore, were in a state in which, through grace, they were capable of doing free service of supernatural value for God, and so working out their end; but along with this capacity of free service went the capacity of refusing it: some refused to serve, and sinned; others went faithfully through the allotted trial and were assumed into Heaven, to the presence of God, where sin has no place.

The reality of the sin of some of the Angels is proved by the declaration of Christ that He saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven (St. Luke x. 18); St. Peter speaks of the Angels that sinned (2 St. Peter ii. 4); and St. Jude mentions the Angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation (v. 6): moreover, we know by revelation that evil spirits exist (Deut. xxxii. 17; Job i. 6, &c.); but God did not create them evil, for all His works are good: it follows that they must be evil by their own malice. There is no trace of the grace of repentance being given to the Angels after their sin, such as is given to men during the time of their probation in this life: their sin appears to have been immediately followed by their final condemnation, and the punishment which they will never cease to endure. The eternal condition of Angels, good and bad, is in substance the same as that of men, good and bad, concerning which we shall speak in the Treatise on the Four Last Things.

What has been said so far in this section appears

to be certain: many interesting questions arise, concerning which we must be content with guesses. It is probable that the degrees of grace given to the Angels varied no less than they vary with men, and it is very commonly supposed that the chief of the rebel Angels was he who, had he been faithful, would have held the highest place among the blessed spirits in Heaven; some commentators think that this may be gathered from the passage where Isaias speaks of Lucifer, the son of the morning, falling from heaven. (Isaias xiv. 12.) Lucifer in this passage is not a proper name, but means "morning star." There is a common impression that one-third of the whole number of Angels fell, but it is destitute of solid foundation. As to the nature of the sin of the Angels, some early writers thought that it was a sin of the flesh, founding themselves on the account given in Genesis (vi. 2), that the sons of God seeing the daughters of men that they were fair, took to themselves wives of all which they chose; a transaction which involved the sin that gave immediate occasion to the Flood. But this opinion finds no supporters, for, as we have shown (n. 445), the Angels are pure spirits, and even in the view of those who ascribed to them bodies of some sort, they are far from having bodies of gross matter, such as those of men. In some copies of the Greek version the words "Angels of God" were read where we have "sons of God," and this false reading lent colour to a false interpretation: it is almost certain that the passage refers to intermarriages between the descendants of Seth, who

had preserved the worship of the true God, and the race of Cain, by whom it had been abandoned. Others think that the sin was envy of man that he was made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis i. 26); or vexation that a creature of a lower nature was destined to equality with the pure spirits in Heaven: and it is true that the hymn of the Church for the feast of the Guardian Angels describes Satan as burning with envy, but this cannot have been the first sin: the will must have been turned away from God to self before envy could arise. Also Satan was guilty of lying (Genesis iii. 4; St. John viii. 44), but this again was not the first sin. It seems certain that this sin was pride, which is the beginning of all sin (Ecclus. x. 15), and which is especially presupposed in a sin of envy (St. Aug. *De Genes. ad Lit.* 11, 14, 18; *P.L.* 34, 436), and from pride all perdition took its beginning. (Tobias iv. 14.) More specifically, the pride of the fallen Angels seems to have been a refusal to accept the position of creatures, subject in all things to their Creator: or it may have consisted in a complacency in their own natural excellence which refused to aspire to the supernatural vision of God, by use of the grace offered to them; some think that it lay in a prospective refusal to worship God, should He take on Himself a nature lower than their own: or that they were not content unless they had a degree of likeness to God that was not attainable. There is no need to relate more of these guesses: in our utter uncertainty, each reader may choose what best recommends itself to him.

449. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter, we have set forth and proved the little that may be considered certain concerning the Angels, good and bad, who are pure Spirits, created by God: to this is added a large quantity of other matter, which is commonly held by theologians, but on which the Church has not spoken distinctly; this chiefly concerns the nature of the division into Choirs, and the sin by which many fell from Heaven.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ANGELS IN THE WORLD.

450. *Subject of the Chapter.*—So far we have been considering the Angels as they are in themselves, without reference to the material world, or to mankind who form a part of that world. We have now to consider both the good and the bad Angels as being employed, or at least allowed, by God to act as His agents in the government of the world and in working out the designs of His providence.

451. *Action on Matter.*—That God does to some extent use the agency of Angels in His government of the world, appears to follow from the declaration of St. Paul (Hebrews i. 14), that they are all ministering spirits sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. There is some difference of opinion among the Fathers whether this word "all" is to be taken as absolutely universal, or whether some of the highest Angels are never employed on the things of earth; and the question is moved principally with regard to the Seven Spirits (n. 443) who stand by the throne: the interest of the discussion lies chiefly in the proof which it affords of the minute attention that was

bestowed by the holy Doctors upon every word of the Sacred Text.

We have little information as to how far this agency of ministering spirits is carried. We know that God can do all things by His own immediate action (n. 387); and that He can use the agency of His creature for any purpose within the power that He has given to that creature. Also we hold (n. 438) that creatures, especially material substances, act by their own power, and are not merely the occasions of the action of God or of other creatures; but it seems that we cannot go further than this, and it is impossible to distinguish in detail how far the action of Angels extends.

No one who admits the presence of a spiritual soul in man (n. 463), can doubt the possibility of spirit acting upon matter, and it is vain to raise the difficulty that we cannot tell *how* this can be. We cannot tell *how* matter acts on matter, yet no student of physics doubts that it does so act. As to the objection drawn from the law of conservation of energy, we have already remarked (n. 33) that by this objection the absolute truth of the law is assumed; whereas there is no ground whatever for asserting that the law holds with any greater degree of accuracy than that which corresponds to the necessarily imperfect instrumental appliances used in the experiments by which it is suggested, and in a physical sense "proved." For the fact that good Angels have moved matter, we have the testimony of St. Matthew (xxviii. 2), that an Angel rolled back

the stone from the sepulchre of Christ; and the Angel that delivered St. Peter (Acts xii. 7) must have acted upon matter; also, Satan was able to strike Job with a very serious ulcer (Job ii. 7), a material action. Angels ministered to Christ after His temptation (St. Matt. iv. 11), probably bringing Him food; and it is believed that the miraculous feeding of a multitude with a few loaves (St. Matt. xiv. 17—22, &c.) was effected by the ministry of Angels, and not by an act of creation; but commentators are not agreed on the point.

Angels must be present in the place where they move matter, or do any other act, for nothing can act where it is not in some way present. The relation of Angels to space seems to be the same as that of the soul of a living man in the body which it informs; the soul is present wholly in the whole body and in each part of it. Every portion of a man's body is of course extended, having parts that lie outside the other parts; but a pure spirit would seem not to need any extended space, although he is capable of occupying it. This doctrine ascribing to the Angels a definitive, not merely circumscriptive presence (n. 368), is held by all theologians, and the opinion that they are in no sense in space, is condemned by St. Thomas as heretical. Nor must it be thought that an Angel can be present everywhere, for this ubiquity belongs to God alone. An Angel has no necessary relation to any particular mass of matter which may be in the place where he is present; but there is nothing to prevent his framing matter into the semblance of a body, and thus

appearing in human shape, such as may possibly have suggested to Christian artists the representations that they are accustomed to give. It is plain that there was something material about such an apparition as that of St. Raphael to Tobias and his family; for they all supposed that they were dealing with a man, which implies that the figure was visible to all that met him, not to a few favoured persons only; and the same remark applies to many other apparitions of Angels which are recorded in history. It must not be supposed that this was a living body, informed by the Angel, as the soul informs the body of man. (Tobias xii. 19.) As to its nature, the old account represented it as framed of condensed air, which expression it would be difficult to translate into the language of modern physics; it is better to avow our ignorance on a matter of pure curiosity.

There is a difficult passage in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xi. 10), where, among other directions as to public worship, St. Paul gives the injunction that a woman ought to have a power on her head because of the angels. The word translated "a power" properly has this meaning, but there is little doubt that it here signifies a veil. The motive assigned for the injunction has been variously supposed to be reverence for the Angels of God present at the Holy Sacrifice, or respect for the clergy (Apoc. ii. 1), or concealment from spies sent by the heathen. But all this is guess-work.

Angels are capable of successive acts, as we see in the case of St. Raphael; but the general question

of the relation of pure spirits to time is beyond our scope.

452. *Action on Souls.*—It does not seem possible to suggest any ground for doubting that pure spirits are able to communicate both with each other and with the spiritual souls of men. We cannot perhaps go further, and in so obscure a subject it might be difficult, apart from experience, to give positive proof of the possibility of such communication; but this is no more than must be said of the communications that pass between living men, for nothing but experience shows us that certain impulses in the air falling on our ears admit us to the knowledge of the thoughts of our neighbours. We shall show immediately that both good and bad Angels are able, under some obscure conditions, to affect us in a way which, for want of a better word, we can describe only by calling it speaking to us. There is no reason to suppose that this power is necessarily supernatural in them; it may be that it requires no more than the ordinary concurrence of God in all the actions of His creatures, when they use the powers that He has given to them. (n. 438.) As to what we may call the mechanism of the process, we know nothing; it may be that the two spirits communicate directly, without any material action being concerned; or it may be that the Angel produces in the body a change identical with that which would be produced in the same body by the action of the causes that ordinarily excite our sensations and affect our consciousness. There, as in so many other cases, a difficulty as to how an

effect is produced, furnishes no ground for judging it to be impossible; the reasons for believing it to occur must be considered in themselves, without reference to explanations of the mode of its occurrence.

453. *The Guardian Angels.*—Among the works on which the blessed Angels are employed, is that of praising God, as we read of the Seraphim (Isaias vi. 3; and compare Psalm xcvi. 7; Daniel iii. 58), and of serving Him. (Daniel vii. 10; Psalm cii. 20.) Also, they offered a special worship to the Son of God made Man (Hebrews i. 6; Philipp. ii. 10), and especially in His Nativity (St. Luke ii. 13), His temptation (St. Matt. iv. 11), and His Bloody Sweat (St. Luke xxii. 43); and this work of praising the Lamb that was slain, is continued unceasingly in Heaven, as we learn from St. John. (Apoc. v. 11—14.)

But we are more immediately concerned with the office of the blessed Angels to act as Guardians of the human race. This doctrine, when expressed in these general terms, is a part of the Catholic faith, plainly revealed by St. Paul when he tells us (Hebrews i. 14) that the Angels are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. Origen sets it down among the doctrines as to which there is no controversy in the Church, that some of the good Angels are God's ministers in promoting the salvation of men (*Periarchon*, lib. 1, Præf. n. 10; *P.G.* 11, 120); St. Hilary calls it absolutely certain (*In St. Matt.* xviii. n. 5; *P.L.* 9. 1020); and St. Augustine uses

the truth of this guardianship to prove that the duty of mutual love extends to all the intellectual creatures of God. (*In Psalm.* cxxxvii.; *P.L.* 37, 1775.) There is no suggestion of doubt upon the subject among the Fathers, and the difficulties urged by some moderns are founded on their expectation that these Guardians should do more for us than they actually do, and especially that they should show themselves. The difficulty as to the amount of evil, moral and physical, which the Angels do not hinder, is no more than a branch of the general question of the permission of evil, as to which we have already spoken (n. 388); and as to apparitions, no one will ever give a reason for supposing that they ought to occur more frequently than is read in history; we know nothing as to the conditions of such manifestations, or why they occasionally take the place of the ordinary invisible ministrations.

To come more to particulars. It would be rash or worse to doubt the unanimous teaching of Fathers and Doctors that at least each member of the Church who is of the number of the predestined, is under the guardianship of an Angel, specially deputed for the work; and there are few or no writers of weight who do not believe that the same privilege extends to all men, from birth to death. The Fathers express this doctrine when commenting on the declaration of our Lord (St. Matt. xviii. 10) concerning little children, that "their Angels" in Heaven always see the face of the Father. This phrase does not perhaps afford absolute proof of the universality of special guardianship, but

it is clearly in perfect harmony with it, so that it leads St. Jerome (in loc.) to remark on the dignity of human souls for each of which an Angel is deputed to be Guardian. There was an Angel that delivered the Patriarch Jacob from all evils (Genesis xlviii. 16), and the Christians who prayed for St. Peter while in prison believed that they saw his Angel, when after his miraculous deliverance he came to them (Acts xii. 15); these passages are consistent with the narrower view which confines angelic guardianship to the elect, and which derives some support from the words of the Psalmist (xxxiii. 8): "The Angel of the Lord shall encamp round about them that fear Him;" but there is no text which is inconsistent with the wider doctrine. In the Seventy-second Psalm we read that God is good to Israel; but these texts do not imply that God is not good to all men, or that no Angel protects even those who are not in friendship with Him; they merely express that there are degrees of care. There is a feast of the Angel Guardians of men in the Roman Calendar for the 2nd of October; but there seems to be in the Offices for that day nothing decisive as to the extent of this guardianship.

There is a general impression among holy writers that not individual men alone, but Churches, nations, and other communities are under the guardianship of Angels, and this is thought to be indicated by the obscure passage (Daniel x. 13) which speaks of "the Prince of the kingdom of the Persians," and by one or two other still less conclusive texts. St. Augustine

goes so far as to say that "each visible thing in this world has an angelic power to preside over it" (lib. 83 qq. q. 79; *P.L.* 40, 90), a doctrine which he seems to have borrowed from Origen (Hom. 14, *In Num.* n. 2; *P.G.* 12, 680); but this writer is an unsafe guide on the subject of Angels, and even the authority of St. Augustine has not led to the general adoption of his very sweeping doctrine. Without going to this extreme, we may without rashness believe that part of the ordinary ministry of the Angels is to have care of families, congregations, and the like, and especially that St. Michael is the Guardian of the Catholic Church, as he was of old of the Synagogue. In the Sacred Liturgy, the priest prays God to bid that the Offering be carried by the hands of His Angel into His presence, from which it is concluded that there is an Angel attendant on each Mass that is said; and some writers think that a distinct Angel has been created for the express purpose of this ministration; but the whole subject is one on which there is need to guard against a tendency to extravagances.

As a specimen of the absurdities that have found their way into the works of writers of note, we may mention the heretical doctrine of Eusebius (*Demonstr. Evang.* 4; *P.G.* 22, 268), that the Guardian assigned to the Patriarch Jacob was no other than the Eternal Word of God. This writer, it may be noticed, was not altogether out of sympathy with the Arians, who regarded the Divine Word as a creature.

As to the mode in which the Guardian Angels

exercise their ministry, there is nothing to add to what has already been said. (nn. 451, 452.) With respect to the extent of their guardianship, we know nothing in detail. The Scriptures tell us of certain cases where Angels have busied themselves for the benefit of men, but there is nothing to show whether these may not have been cases of extraordinary action. We may believe that their ordinary work may involve some degree of protection for our bodies; that they suggest good and salutary thoughts, to help us in our service of God, and that for the same end they may sometimes inflict chastisement. Also, no doubt, they guard us against the assaults of evil spirits, of which we shall speak immediately; and lastly, they pray for us and offer our prayers to God. The whole subject of the worship and invocation of good Angels, and of their intercession for us will be discussed in our closing Treatise, when we speak of the state of the Saints in glory.

454. *The Evil Spirits.*—Theology has not much to tell as to the action of the Guardian Angels of men, but it has still less to say concerning the influence of the evil spirits. It seems certain that these are hindered in the use of their natural powers, but we are left in ignorance of the conditions of this "binding." However this may be, it is certain that they habitually exert much influence upon men, an influence which is more clearly traceable at some times than at others. Some writers consider that clear proof can be found of the occasional occurrence of events which are not the direct

work of God nor the effect of the action of any material being; and if this be so, we have a proof from Philosophy of the existence of created spirits (n. 442): and since these events are such as are inconsistent with what we know of God, the spirits to whom they are due must be bad: but probably this argument will convince no one who has not already learned the truth from revelation.

As to the particular molestations to which man is exposed from the devils, it is commonly supposed that they sometimes take the form of material injury, on which subject, however, most extravagant ideas have been entertained. Internal molestation in the form of temptation to sin is of ordinary occurrence. Some writers, indeed, have held that no sin is committed except by the instigation of an evil spirit, and this may possibly be true, if it be understood of his remote instigation; but it is false, if it be explained so as to cast a shade over the native corruptness of man's heart, of which we read that it is prone to evil (Genesis viii. 21); and St. James tells us (i. 14) that every man is tempted by his own concupiscence. The reality of diabolic temptation is plain in Scripture: our First Parents were tempted and sinned (Genesis iii. n. 492), and the same is true of Judas (St. John xiii. 2, 27), of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts v. 3), and others. We have exhortations to be on our guard against our spiritual enemy (1 St. Peter v. 8; Ephes. vi. 11), and we have the assurance that God will not suffer us to be tempted above that we are able, but He will make also with the temptation issue that we may be able

to bear it (1 Cor. x. 13); and that temptation is a blessing if we use it aright. (St. James i. 12.) In the Lord's Prayer, we pray to be delivered "from evil," as it is usually translated; but it is noticeable that both the Greek and the Latin will equally admit the translation "from the Evil One" (*ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ*), which is adopted in the recent English Revised Version, following some of the Greek Fathers. The difference is of no great importance, for the chief of evils from which we need deliverance is sin, and to this we are urged by the Evil One: but it is remarkable that, besides this case of doubtful gender, the text of this short prayer as given by St. Matthew contains a word (*ἐπιούσιος*) the true meaning of which is as obscure as is that of "supersubstantial" which represents it in English; the ordinary "daily" being found in St. Luke's Gospel (xi. 2): also there is room for doubt whether the "doxology" (n. 399) beginning, "For Thine is the Kingdom," is a genuine part of the text. It might have been thought that if the Written Word of God were intended for popular instruction, no obscurity would have been allowed to gather over the text and meaning of this simple, familiar prayer.

We are forced to be very brief upon the interesting subject of those demonic molestations which are not temptations to sin. That such things are possible cannot be questioned unless the authority of Holy Scripture as the Word of God is rejected. Thus, Satan tormented Job (ii. 7), the Egyptians (Psalm lxxvii. 49), and the High Priest Jesus (Zach. iii. 1): and the Scriptural doctrine has guided the

Church in her rites, especially in the form of blessing Holy Water, and in her prayers, such as the Collect said daily in Complin. (n. 95.)

The reality of those mysterious forms of infestation which are called diabolic possession is also taught with the utmost clearness in Scripture. In these cases the body of a living man comes to be under the control of a spirit distinct from the soul that continues to inform it; and this spirit compels the utterance of its own words by the organs of speech of the man, and the performance of other actions. As in so many other instances (n. 451), we avow that we do not know how the effect is produced, but this ignorance does not hinder our acceptance of the testimony on which it comes to us. Mention is repeatedly made of devils being cast out of the bodies of possessed persons by our Lord (St. Mark i. 34; St. Luke xi. 14, viii. 30), and by His disciples (St. Luke x. 17; Acts viii. 7), and a share of this power is solemnly promised to the Apostles, who were to found the Church. (St. Mark xvi. 17.) We must leave to commentators on Scripture and to writers on the special subject the easy task of showing that the language employed is such as proves the truth of the diabolic possession in these cases, as distinct from natural disease and from popular superstition. In connection with this matter, particular attention should be given to the history of the devils that were allowed to enter into a herd of swine: this account is given by all the three Synoptics (St. Matt. viii., St. Mark v., St. Luke vii.) and there seems to be no choice but to admit

that we have either a story of diabolic possession or an absolute fiction. The story defies other explanation. If any one allege that he sees an impossibility in devils obtaining power over the bodies of brutes, he ought to disclose the source from which he derives his knowledge of the spirit world and of the interior nature of irrational animals. Also it belongs to writers on mystic theology (n. 4) to give the rules for discriminating between cases of possession that occur at the present day and such diseases as they may resemble. These rules are in themselves sufficiently simple, although the utmost care is required in their application. No fair opinion as to the value of the results obtained can be formed by persons who think that they see reason to deny the possibility of diabolic possession, a denial for which no reason can be given: or who make the equally gratuitous assumption that although cases of possession occurred in the time of our Lord, they do not occur now.

It is by all means to be borne in mind that although a possessed person may be suffering temporal punishment for sin, the guilt of which may have been forgiven, yet we must not assume that this is always the case; still less that he is responsible for the acts done by him, such as blasphemies uttered by his mouth. His will remains free, and probably does not go along with these acts, or it is so weakened and overpowered as to be incapable of deliberation. We may apply to this matter the lesson taught us

by our Lord in the case of a man born blind. (St. John ix. 1—7.)

Possessed persons are often employed as intermediaries in that voluntary intercourse with evil spirits which is called Magic. (Acts xvi. 16.)

455. *Magic.*—The Magi, from whose name the word Magic is derived, were a sect or caste of soothsayers who enjoyed great dignity and influence in the Median Empire, on account of the more than natural powers with the possession of which they were credited. (See Rawlinson, *Ancient Monarchies*, iii. 125.) Similar castes have always existed and still exist under the name of Shamans among the nations of northern and central Asia, and have given their name to a peculiar type of religion. The Druids, who are so much talked of and so little known, were probably a caste of the same nature. The Magi in their original form disappear from history, but their name became in the East the common designation of all persons who gained a reputation for knowledge and the power that accompanies it, especially when this knowledge and power had an unlawful origin. In this sense, the Roman Empire swarmed with Magian adepts, who professed to be able to give to charms the power of curing disease, and who were also skilled in the arts of the poisoner: and Pliny tells us (*Hist. Nat.* 30, 1) that beyond doubt, magic was born of medicine: but we must not delay on the immense and deeply interesting subject of ancient magic: we will only remark that it is impossible to tell who those Magi or Wise Men were, who were led from the East by a star

and visited our Lord at Bethlehem. (St. Matt. ii. 1.) Strange as it may seem, some of the earliest of the Fathers assumed as a matter of course, that they were practitioners of what is now called the black art.

By Magic, then, we understand all means of producing effects of whatever nature by the aid of evil spirits. That magic in this sense has been used is plainly attested in Scripture (see Exodus vii. viii.; 1 Kings xxviii.; Acts viii., &c.), and by an unbroken series of writers from the earliest times: and Suarez holds that its existence is a part of the Catholic faith. There has been the greatest variety in the forms that it has taken and the names by which it has gone, and it seems that Satan has at times striven to conceal his handiwork, and in fact even his existence, while at other times he parades his power: his cunning and experience teach him what is the best way of enslaving individual men or whole communities, and he varies his mode of dealing with those who are willing to become his votaries, according to their dispositions. No critical history of the whole subject exists, nor indeed has it been attempted, such works as there are on the subject being little more than materials for isolated chapters. Immense difficulties stand in the way of the composition of such a history, for a great part of the matter is buried in impenetrable secrecy: probably, far the greater part of the magical practices that go on pass away without leaving any record. Also, the difficulty of dealing with what seems to be the material of the work will be so much the greater because the material has to be sifted: account must

be taken of the possibility of mistake or falsehood in the reporter; of self-deception or conscious fraud in the operator; of coincidence; of true Divine miracle. Not until all these possibilities, and perhaps others, are exhausted, have we reason to believe that an alleged extraordinary occurrence is diabolic: but the true existence of such a residuum will be questioned by few persons who have paid attention to the subject and who believe the records of revelation. The supposed art of magic, which is a collection of ceremonies and forms of words, the use of which constrains the evil spirits to do the will of a man, has probably no real existence. No man can do more than invite their aid.

The objects which Satan has in view, when offering his assistance to those who are ready to accept it, appear to be to gain worship for himself; to wreak his spite on God by mimicry of the sacred rites of the Church, and by outrages on the Blessed Eucharist; and to bring souls to sin and Hell. In Christian countries at the present day he appears to be specially bent on persuading men that there is no such thing as dogmatic religion; that no eternal punishment awaits sinners; that one religion is as good as another, provided it is not the Catholic religion. This character runs through all the teaching which professes to come from spirits, and of which we hear so much; and they that listen to it very commonly find themselves exposed to violent temptation to foul sin, besides yielding to inordinate pride almost before they are aware. No one is justified in exposing himself to these risks for the

sake of amusement or the pleasurable excitement felt by those who play with danger: the interests at stake are too great to be risked. The same warning applies to various forms of surrendering one's own will to that of another: it may be that in some of these Satan has no special part, just as the great bulk of so-called spiritual manifestations are mere fraud of the most vulgar character; but it is impossible to distinguish what is simply silly from what is foully wicked, so inextricably are they mixed together; and the only prudent course is to refrain from everything to which the smallest suspicion can attach.

456. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have spoken of the action of Angels with regard to the rest of creation, and especially to the bodies and souls of men; and we apply this general doctrine to the good and bad Angels separately. The action of evil spirits that is called Magic is shortly described and characterized in a special section. The chapter throughout is based on revelation, but in parts we call in the aid of history, to tell us what has gone on in the world and is still going on. The evidence is abundant, but is scattered through a multitude of publications, and perhaps has not been collected in any English work.

It has seemed needless to multiply quotations from the Fathers on the subjects treated in this and the preceding chapters. They will be found in considerable abundance in the great work of Petavius.

457. *Close of Treatise.*—This Treatise on Creation may be regarded as introductory to that which

follows, on Man, who is composed of body and spirit, and is destined to go through a probation on this earth which is to lead him to join the company of the blessed Angels in Heaven.

The matter dealt with in this Treatise corresponds to qq. 44—74 and 105—115 of the First Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St.Thomas. This prince of theologians is supposed by some to owe his title of Angelic Doctor to the peculiar clearness and excellence of his writings on the Angels: but it is more probable that the name was given him in memory of his angelic chastity (St. Matt. xxii. 30), which gift he won as a reward for an act of heroic virtue in his youth. The story will be found in every Life of the Saint.

Treatise the Tenth.

Man Created and Fallen.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE OF MAN.

458. *Plan of the Treatise.*—Man is the noblest among the visible works of God, and it is this human nature that God has condescended to take upon Himself. Natural knowledge, as is obvious, tells us far more about man than about any other creature, and also the revelation made by God to us is chiefly concerned with man. The Treatise on Man must therefore occupy a leading place in every system of Theology, where his greatness and his littleness alike are seen. We shall divide the Treatise into four chapters, speaking of the Nature of Man, his Origin, his Elevation, and his Fall. The following Treatise, on the Incarnation, will describe the admirable work of the Divine Wisdom and Love, by which the restoration of fallen man was effected.

459. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In the present chapter, we shall show what is the doctrine of

Scripture and the Fathers as to the pre-eminence of man among the visible works of Creation; and we shall justify this doctrine by considering what man is, in his body and in his soul.

460. *The Excellence of Man.*—An account of the origin of man is given in the first chapter of Genesis, and the discussion of it will form the subject of our second chapter. Without anticipating what will be there said on the matter, we quote the passage here to prove that, according to revealed doctrine, man is of a nature superior to the brutes, and of course raised still higher above the rest of the world. We are told (verses 25—28) that God made man to His own image, to the image of God He created him; man was bidden to fill the earth and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea and fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth. Again, in the same book (ix. 1—3), we learn that after the Flood, "God blessed Noe and his sons; and He said to them, Increase and multiply and fill the earth; and let the fear and dread of you be upon all the beasts of the earth, and upon all the fowls of the air, and all that move upon the earth. All the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand, and everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I delivered them all to you." We learn the same doctrine from the Psalmist (viii. 4—9), who, contemplating the greatness of the heavens, marvels at the special favour with which man is treated by God; made a little less than the Angels, he is crowned with glory and honour, and set over the works of God's

hands. God has subjected all things under the feet of man, all sheep and oxen, moreover the beasts also of the fields, the birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.

These texts teach unmistakably that man has a nature which approaches the nature of God more closely than do the beasts, which are not made to the Divine image and likeness: and that it is the place of man to have dominion over the earth and all that is in it. The Fathers find the foundation of this excellence in the double nature of man, whose body has much in common with the beasts, while his spiritual soul raises him far above them. (St. Peter Chrysolog. Serm. 148; *P.L.* 52, 596.) Also they see it in the power which man alone possesses of understanding the works of God, and receiving from them material to praise Him: thus carrying out the end for which they were created. (n. 433.) This argument is set forth at length by Lactantius. (*Divin. Instit.* 7, 5; *P.L.* 6, 749.) They enlarge on the circumstances of the creation of man as described in the passage which we have lately quoted from Genesis, and especially on what, for want of a better word, we must call the appearance of deliberation with which the work was done, which was not begun till after consultation. (St. Greg. the Great, *Moral.* 9, 49; *P.L.* 75, 930.) Lastly, they observe that as a palace is made ready before the arrival of the king, so the earth was prepared and supplied with all that was necessary to fit it to receive its lord and master. (St. Greg. Nyss. *De*

Hominum Opificio, 2; *P.G.* 44, 132.) Passages to this effect might be gathered in great abundance.

461. *The Body of Man.*—The revealed doctrine of the essential superiority of man to the brute creation has been attacked of late years violently and with persistence; and writers who arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to be called men of science, have thought to overthrow the Christian religion by explaining away the differences and exaggerating the points of resemblance between the two orders of being. This is a line of attack upon religion which must be fairly met, even though much unfairness is often shown in the mode of conducting it; and Catholics who have the opportunity to go into the matter will do well to meet their opponents on their own ground. Perhaps they will be surprised to discover how great is the power of anti-dogmatic bias in warping the judgment and damaging the moral sense of men who are intelligent and intend to be honest.

We can do no more than indicate some points in the bodily structure of man in which he differs from all brutes, and especially from those apes which are thought to approach him most nearly.

I. *Upright Posture.*—Man alone is capable of holding himself erect in standing and walking. This one circumstance alone necessitates many peculiarities of arrangement in the hips and the base of the spine, which, however, would be useless, were it not that the foot of man differs utterly in its firmness and breadth from the hands which terminate the hind limbs of the ape; and along with

these differences in the bony structure goes a totally different disposition of the muscles, especially of the calf.

II. *The Hand.*—It is plain to all that the hand of man is an incomparably more versatile and efficient organ than the corresponding part in an ape or in others of the brutes. This superiority depends partly upon the length, strength, and flexibility of the fingers, but still more upon the great and various powers of motion belonging to the whole limb and to each of its parts, especially to the thumb. These qualities result from a multitude of peculiarities of detail in the structure of the shoulder, elbow, and wrist, and of the bones of the hand itself; but all this would be useless, were the limb not furnished with suitable muscles which carry into effect those movements that the bony structure renders possible. It may freely be admitted that for the one purpose of climbing among trees, the hand of the ape is more suitable than that with which we are provided; but we have abundant compensation for this inferiority in the firmness of grasp of which we are capable, when we fold the thumb over the closed fist, an action which is beyond the power of the ape. Much also depends on the freedom of motion which enables man, while he holds the arm straight, to turn the palm of the hand through three-quarters of a circle; much also on the considerable power of independent action possessed by the fingers.

III. *The Head.*—It is in the bony and muscular structure of the skull that the difference between

men and apes is most obvious. The size of the brain-chamber corresponds to the weight of the important organ which it is destined to accommodate; while the great prominence of the jaws in the ape puts him among the other brutes, at an immeasurable distance from man. The usual weight of a normal human brain is not less than thirty-two ounces, while the brain of a gorilla, a far bulkier animal, does not exceed twenty ounces. The prominence of the jaws is measured by the "facial angle," or the angle contained by two lines drawn from the insertion of the upper front teeth, one to the most prominent part of the forehead, the other to the opening of the ear; in man, this angle exceeds 70°, and often reaches 80°; in no ape is it more than 30°.

IV. *The Face.*—Another marked distinction is found in the face of man, to which a multitude of muscles, acting for the most part reflexly, give a mobility and power of expression altogether wanting in the brutes, which at most have only a limited capacity for grimace. The mobility of the eye of man, the range of sight, and the scarcely perceptible movements by which the expression is changed, render it an organ plainly more perfect than the eye of any brute.

It will be observed that we have here done no more than point out differences between man and brutes which are obvious to all whose attention is called to the subject, and we have not insisted on any disputable point. So far, it might be that man differs for the worse. It is enough to have proved

that there is a wide difference in the bodily frames, and the heads of proof might be greatly multiplied. We proceed to show by facts that these bodily differences secure for man a control over nature far beyond that which the brute creation have secured.

462. *The Achievements of Man.*—We can do no more than indicate a few of the many ways in which man has fulfilled the Divine command to fill the earth and subdue it, and rule over all living creatures. The points which we shall here consider are perfectly unambiguous; even if it be mere self-love that leads us to prefer the upright march of man to the crawling of a serpent, yet the capacity to control nature which we are about to illustrate cannot possibly be represented as anything but an excellence.

I. *Climate.*—There is perhaps no exception to the rule that the natural range of each species of terrestrial beasts is very small, and this is notably the case with those apes which are thought to approach most nearly to man; the chimpanzee and the gorilla are confined to a narrow strip of land along the western coast of tropical Africa; the orang is found nowhere but in Borneo and Sumatra, while the gibbon has a slightly wider range in the same neighbourhood. Man, on the contrary, knows no such limitation; of the fifty-one million square miles of dry land found on the surface of the globe, not more than three or four millions, in the immediate neighbourhood of the poles, are destitute of inhabitants. Man has adapted himself to great

extremes of heat and cold, dryness, and moisture, the rarified air of the mountains or the high barometer of the valleys. Man exists in some countries, such as parts of Australia, where no indigenous quadrupeds have established themselves. It is true that the dog and the rat have practically the same range as man, but this is merely because they have accompanied him in his wanderings; they are not found apart from him.

The reason for the power of acclimatization which man shows is found in his capacity to use a variety of food. Multitudes of men live and flourish on an exclusively vegetable diet, the food of others is mainly animal, while in most countries both classes of nourishment are employed. There is probably no animal which in its natural state is capable of enjoying the same variety, whatever may be the case when new habits have been engendered by domestication.

II. *The Mastery of Nature.*—It is most noticeable that man shows himself the master of the whole of the earth, subduing every part of it to his service. Each kind of beast derives its food from some one product of nature, and finds shelter in some other: we do not find beasts make more than one use of each thing that they master, and the greater part of the earth and its products is useless to them. The fox shelters himself in a hole, and feeds on the flesh of birds that he surprises, sleeping; but he does not employ the feathers to make his home warmer and more comfortable. Man, on the contrary, finds uses for every part of each natural

production: the wood, the bark, the fruit, the sap of a tree, furnish him with valuable materials; so do the flesh, the skin, the hair, the bones, the nails, of each beast that he kills. Nor is it only the dead beast that he uses; he finds his advantage in compelling all to render him service while they live. The elephant is forced to lend him its strength, the horse its swiftness: no beast is found to do the like. Some beasts are found to be harmful to man, who steadily wars against them, and always with success: there is no region of the earth which the beasts hold permanently as their own possession, to the exclusion of man. The noxious beasts are ever disappearing before him. Inanimate nature also is forced to serve man, who knows how to procure metals from the earth, and who finds a use for each out of countless sorts of minerals. Especially we notice that man alone digs the rock-salt and evaporates brine, and thus secures an abundant supply of a condiment which is absolutely necessary for all animals, but which the beasts can procure only in scanty quantity where it chances that a "salt-lick" is found on the surface of the soil.

III. *The Arts.*—There is one art which is familiar to all men, wherever found; which is most highly useful; the use of which is often appreciated by beasts when its results are presented to them, but to which no beast has ever attained. This is the art of making and maintaining a fire. When a fire has been made by man, the beasts will gather round it, if they have the opportunity, and enjoy the warmth; but no beast ever was known to throw

a morsel of fuel on to the expiring embers. It will be observed that the use of fire is the necessary condition for all use of the metals; and, what is still more important, fire is the main instrument employed in the art of cooking, and there is no need to enlarge on the power of this art as improving the value of nutriment. Some beasts, it is true, hnd use in allowing the natural process of decay to go on in their food before they consume it, and others take advantage of the effects of the no less natural process of germination in living seeds: but nothing is found among them that can fairly be called cooking. Still less is the artificial preparation of drink known among them.

The art of making clothes may be mentioned in this place.

IV. *Tools.*—The use of tools is peculiar to man. The beaver is able, by the use of its teeth, to fell trees on the bark of which it feeds; but this process differs essentially from what a woodsman does with his axe. Without tools it would be impossible to clear the forests, drain the morasses, irrigate the dry places and render the surface of the earth habitable: and the plough and the spade are the tools needed for agricultural labour, just as the pitcher and basket are used by pastoral peoples, and the bow, the blow-pipe, and the boomerang in yet earlier stages of society. No brute is known to use a tool in any sense that can be compared with what is found among the rudest tribes of men.

In what is here said, there is no intention to deny that stray instances occur where one or another

brute does things which have a certain resemblance to what is here set down as characteristic of man: but the comparison between the recorded instances and what is true of man will only serve to bring out more clearly the immense difference between the two cases. The parade with which certain reports of travellers are put forth and repeated in every popular book written for the purpose of upsetting the doctrine of revelation, sufficiently proves how sorely our opponents feel the cogency of our argument.

It should be observed that we have instituted a comparison between men as they are and beasts as they are, and have found enormous differences between them. Writers will frequently draw a fancy picture of what they imagine men to have once been, and make out that they differed little from brutes: or perhaps, the picture represents what it is supposed that beasts will be, at some indefinite time hereafter, and the reader is asked to suppose that the tiny beginnings which are now found will have developed so that the beast has risen to equality with man. We have nothing to do with these works of the imagination: at no time that history tells us of is there any trace of the state of affairs being materially different from what it now is, and for reasons that will appear hereafter (n. 464) we believe that the distinction now seen between men and brutes is founded in their nature, and can never be modified.

463. *The Soul of Man.*—The bodily superiority of man over the beasts indicates that there is an

essential difference of nature, but does not constitute this difference between the two classes of being: the difference is that besides having a body, man has a spiritual soul. There is in him a substance (n. 396) endowed with powers of intellect and free-will and of its own nature independent of the conditions of space to which matter is subject; and this is what is meant by its being a spiritual substance. Being a substance, it is capable of existing apart from the body, and will so exist between the day of the death of the man and his resurrection at the Last Day: it remains united to the body during life in such manner that it is present wholly in the body and wholly in each part of the body, according to the mode of presence in space which is proper to created spirits (n. 451), and which is called definitive.

This doctrine of the double nature of man is part of the defined doctrine of the Church. We have already quoted the chapter *Firmiter* of the Fourth Council of the Lateran, held in 1215, which defines (n. 427; Denz. 355) that God created the Angels and the World; "and then man, who shares in both kinds, being made up of spirit and of matter." In view of this double nature, man is often called the *compositum*, the compound being. The existence of the two elements is assumed rather than asserted throughout the records of revelation, as where, in Ecclesiastes (xii. 7), the time of death is spoken of as that when the dust shall return into its earth from whence it was, and the spirit return to God who gave it. There is no need to say more

on the proof from revelation in this place, for we should only anticipate what will be said presently upon the unity of the soul of man (n. 465), its immortality (n. 467), the mode of its union with the body (n. 466), and its origin. (n. 473.)

The proof from reason of the existence of a spiritual soul in man, independent of the body, belongs to the branch of Philosophy which is called Psychology. (ψυχή.) This is treated by Father Maher in the Stonyhurst Series of Philosophy. We will merely indicate some lines of proof that there is something in man that is independent of the conditions under which matter exists. And first, man is capable of thought, and this is not confined to what is material, but extends to what cannot have any material existence, such as universal ideas. Also, thought is essentially simple and indivisible, whereas matter and what depends upon it is, by the necessity of its being, extended and divisible. What is here pointed out concerning the operation of thought must be no less true of the principle from which the thought proceeds. This principle therefore must be independent of matter, and is spiritual.

The same arguments are derived from the existence of free-will in man, which by a simple act reaches after goods that are not the objects of sense, and must therefore proceed from a principle which is immaterial.

Consciousness teaches the same. Man feels that he is a one and indivisible something, which is distinct from his body, and also distinct from the

impressions of which he is aware and the acts that proceed from him. This something is his soul.

464. *Activity of the Soul.*—Putting aside for a while certain effects of the presence of the soul in the body which will come under consideration shortly, when we speak of the unity of the soul (n. 465), we will here consider some features of man's life which seem to be directly referable to the presence of the spiritual component. And in the first place, man is capable of religion; he can recognize, honour, and worship God, as the Supreme, Infinite, Invisible Being. It is sometimes said that man is himself God to a dog; but the attitude of the brute towards his master seems more like the feeling of a child towards his parents than that of a Christian worshipper. Next, we may notice the moral sense of men, the feeling of the distinction between right and wrong, which exists quite apart from the prospect of reward or punishment. No feeling of the kind can possibly be ascribed to matter, and no beast gives indications of having any such affection. No beast can be shown to possess this moral sense.

In these matters we have a difficulty in asserting positively that brutes are strangers to the mental activities of which we are conscious in ourselves: we are unable to communicate with them, and consequently are in absolute and hopeless ignorance concerning their minds. Negatives are notoriously difficult to prove, and it might be hard to find a basis for a positive demonstration that a particular

beast is not familiar with the multiplication table, and in other respects an accomplished mathematician. All we can say is that we never observe in a beast any indications of his possessing even the beginnings of any such abstract knowledge, and this negative proof is sufficient for our purpose. We are proving that man has a spiritual soul, and that we have no ground for attributing the same prerogative to any beast.

This may be a fitting place to insert a caution against readiness in accepting without reserve the anecdotes that are current regarding the conduct of beasts. It is necessary first to be assured of the good faith and means of knowledge of the narrator: then, of his capacity to observe and report all the material facts with accuracy, a work which is far more difficult than might be supposed; all witnesses are apt to be swayed by prepossessions and to imagine that they see what they expect to see. Care is peculiarly needed before we can be assured that the conduct described is not the fruit of some form of training by man. But the chief difficulty is in fixing on the interpretation to be given to the observed action: there is a constant liability to regard the action as indicative of a mental process like to that which would have led up to a similar action in a man. We are very much in the dark as to the influences which may be exerted on the bodies of animals: and it is not unlikely that they may in some cases feel sensations of which we know no more than one who is blind from birth knows of sight. The negative proof that we have indicated

shows conclusively that brutes have no intellect nor moral sense; further than this, in what concerns the mind of animals, avowal of ignorance is the only prudent course.

But there are two characters of man as to which we can say with full assurance that they are not possessed by the brutes. Brutes do not use language, and brutes do not advance in the arts. It is true that cases are common where animals utter sounds which are significant, in so far as they attend the presence of certain sensations in the utterer, and often influence the conduct of other animals; but these sounds are analogous to the wailings of an infant, and have nothing in common with human speech. The essential difference is not to be placed in the articulate character found in all true language, for the work might perhaps be achieved, however clumsily, by the use of inarticulate sounds. The true difference is found in this, that language distinguishes the subject and predicate: he that says, I am hungry, or uses the equivalent single Latin word, *Esurio*, does not merely make known the presence of a hungry man, but distinguishes between himself as subject of the sensation and the sensation that he feels: and he has no difficulty in saying of another person, He is not hungry: the cry of the beast and the wail of the infant are alike incapable of expressing this distinction. These merely express the presence of a hungry being, and they may or may not influence the conduct of other beings: men will often endeavour to relieve the pain whose presence is made known to them, but it may be

doubted whether any beast will do so, except in the case of the parental instinct prompting them to feed their young. The beast will be assiduous to supply food if it hears the cry of its young reproduced by a phonograph; a mistake which no human mother would make.

A further remark on the use of speech is that great variety of language is found among men, while nothing of the sort is found among beasts. This difference again points to an essential difference between conventional language and natural cries.

The last point that we shall mention as showing the presence of the soul in man is his capacity for progressive improvement. New arts are constantly being invented, and the cases are rare in which a valuable art has been lost. Illustrations will occur to every reader, and it will be enough to mention one. The art of making lucifer matches was invented within the memory of many persons still living: the use of this little instrument is now rapidly spreading even in the most remote parts of the world, and there is little likelihood that mankind will ever go back to the primitive methods of getting fire by the flint and steel or the friction of dry wood, which had served the race for thousands of years. No progress of this sort is observed among irrational animals, so that here again we have proof that man possesses some principle of activity that is wholly wanting to them.

465. *The Soul One.*—"Man has being in common with the stones; life in common with the plants; sensation in common with the brutes." Man has

therefore in him a principle of life and sensation, which does for him all that is done, for plants and animals by the principle of their being; and he has further a principle which does for him all that in which he is distinguished from the brutes, and constituted in an altogether higher order of being. (nn. 463, 464.) Philosophy teaches us much as to the nature of this principle which we call the Soul: but there are certain points in which Theology is able to throw more light upon the subject, and in the first place it assures us that in man the principle of his vegetable, sensitive, and rational life is one and the same: that in the human compound there are two elements only, body and soul. This doctrine goes by the name of Dichotomy (*δίχα, τέμνω*), or two-fold separation, as opposed to Trichotomy (*τρίχα*) or three-fold division. The characteristic doctrine of Trichotomy is that there is in man a principle of vegetative and sensitive being, like that which is supposed to give life to beasts; and in addition to this, a principle of rational being, so that the compound is formed of three elements, the body, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul.

Trichotomistic opinions were held by Plato, and in various forms they have at all times had attractions for some persons; for they are thought to furnish an explanation of that mysterious struggle of which every man is conscious within himself, and which St. Paul describes as the law in his members fighting against the law of his mind. (Romans vii. 23.) The doctrine of the Church as to this struggle will be given when we speak of original sin. (n. 485.)

Some of the fanciful systems of the Gnostics were trichotomist (St. Iren. *Adv. Hær.* 1. 5, 1; *P.G.* 7, 492); and the Manicheans adopted the same theory when they taught that not merely the body of man was evil, but also the sensitive soul which gave him the life that he has in common with the brutes; and that nothing but the rational soul was good. These sects were scarcely to be called Christian; but the unity of the soul of man became a doctrine of vital importance to the Church, when the heretic Apollinaris began, about the year 349, to teach that Christ was not perfect Man: it was allowed that He had the body and sensitive soul of man, but it was maintained that He had no rational soul, the place of which was supplied by the Divine Word. This doctrine destroyed the truth of the Incarnation, as will be shown in the next Treatise (n. 520), and a controversy arose, in the course of which it was established that Dichotomy is the doctrine of the Church. In modern times, some form of Trichotomy was taught by the Swedish dreamer, Emmanuel Swedenborg, as disclosed to him in revelations first received in London in 1744. The followers of this seer, who take the name of the Church of the New Jerusalem, are sedulous in endeavouring to propagate the ideas put forward by their founder, and boast much of their success, of which, however, little is visible. The German Catholics, Günther and Baltzer, taught a doctrine on the nature of personality which is fundamentally trichomistic, and was accordingly condemned in 1857 by Pope Pius IX.

Trichotomy is in the main a philosophical system, but there are certain passages of Scripture which at first sight seem to lend it some support. Thus St. Paul prays for the Christians of Thessalonica (1 Thess. v. 23) that their whole spirit (*πνεῦμα*) and soul (*ψυχή*) and body (*σῶμα*) may be preserved blameless in the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ: and in another place (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15), the same Apostle distinguishes between the sensual man (*ψυχικός*) and the spiritual man (*πνευματικός*); referring, as it seems, not to two individuals, but to two aspects of the nature of every man. But these and similar texts admit of being understood as distinguishing those activities of the one rational soul by which it gives life to the body of man, and those in which it is wholly independent of matter; and it is to be remarked that in other passages of Scripture, this distinction of soul and spirit is not observed: thus spirit is used for the principle of life (Genesis vi. 17, where it is Englished by breath), and the immortal intellectual principle is spoken of as soul. (Wisdom i. 4; St. Matt. x. 18.) The Scripture therefore affords but a frail foundation for the doctrine of Trichotomy, while the dichotomist texts are clear. In the creation of man, God formed him of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul (Genesis ii. 7), where nothing is said of any third constituent. To the same effect is the passage which we have already quoted from Ecclesiastes (xii. 7; n. 463), where the whole man is spoken of as made up of dust and spirit: and at the word of

Christ addressed to the dead daughter of Jairus, her spirit returned and she rose immediately. (St. Luke viii. 55.) The doctrine of the Fathers will be seen when we speak of the heresy of Apollinaris. (n. 507.)

The Fourth General Council of Constantinople, held in 869, was therefore justified in defining that man has one rational and intellectual soul (Denz. 274); and Pope Pius IX. merely upheld the traditional doctrine when he condemned the covertly insinuated Trichotomy of Günther and his followers.

466. *Mode of Union.*—There is some difference of opinion among Catholic philosophers as to the best mode of explaining the union of soul and body in man, but all agree that the union is such that the man is one complete substance. We do not propose to enter upon the question further than to explain what is meant by this unity of man. The General Council held at Vienne, in France, in 1312, had to deal with a question concerning the Incarnation, and took occasion to define that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is truly and immediately the form of the body of man (Denz. 409); and the same doctrine is insisted on by the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513 (Denz. 622), and by Pius IX. in his condemnation of Günther in 1860.

We learn therefore that, in man, the body has the place of the matter, which is in itself indifferent to one or another mode of existence, and is determined to a particular mode by the form which is united to it; and this form is the rational soul. The union is substantial, resulting in one person; it is not an accidental connection of two substances:

it is a false idea therefore to think of the soul as being clothed by the body, in the same way as a statue may be clothed with garments. The actions of the man belong to him as a whole, and are not to be spoken of as exclusively the actions of the soul or of the body, although such language is allowable when there is no danger of misunderstanding, and it is wished to emphasize the part taken by one of the two elements. Both soul and body share in the rewards and punishments which are to be awarded in the next life on account of the good or evil works of the man; this will be shown in our closing Treatise, and it implies the unity of the being by whom these works were done.

467. *The Soul Immortal.*—The Fifth Lateran Council, in the passage to which we referred just now (n. 466), condemns those who say that the rational soul of man is mortal; and when we speak of the Four Last Things we shall show, from the records of revelation, that neither body nor soul will ever perish. Probably, the future resurrection and unending existence of the body of man is among those truths which could never have been ever suspected, had they not been made known by revelation (n. 16): but it is otherwise with the soul; natural reason is capable of detecting, and in fact has detected many reasons for believing in the capacity of the soul for independent existence after death. We will briefly indicate some of these.

There are three ways in which a being may be imperishable. Life may belong to him by the necessity of his nature, as is the case with God

alone: or the nature of the being may be such as to have no inherent tendency to death, so that it will not die nor cease to exist, unless God withdraws His conservation (n. 438): or there may be an inherent tendency to death, which, however, is hindered from ever taking effect by an effect of God's providence not required by the nature of the thing. Man's body is in the position last described: the soul of man, like other created spirits, belongs to that order of being that can cease to exist only if the Divine conservation is withdrawn. We have to show then that the soul does not naturally tend to dissolution, and that God will never withdraw His concurrence from it.

The first point follows from the simplicity of the soul, which has no parts, and therefore does not admit of dissolution: the soul is unextended, and independent of extended matter. (n. 463.) As to the other point, we need not inquire whether the withdrawal of concurrence is within the absolute power of God (n. 387): it is enough to know that it is not in accord with His ordinary power to frustrate the nature which He has created by allowing it to come to a violent end, especially when the being is of so excellent a nature as to be able to know, praise, and serve its Creator. This capacity does not depend upon the union with the body. Moreover, it is plain that in this life, wickedness is not seldom prosperous to the end, and virtue oppressed: it seems therefore that the justice of God requires at least some continuance of life after death; nor does it seem to be in accordance with what we

know of God that He should implant in us the desire that all men feel to exist and enjoy happiness, if He were about to withdraw that concurrence without which this desire cannot be gratified. These and the like considerations explain why the persuasion that man is immortal should have prevailed so widely even among nations who have not the light of revelation. There are countries where pantheistic forms of philosophy prevail, which teach that on death the soul of man ceases to have a distinct personal existence, being absorbed into the universe which in these systems holds the place of God: but even in these countries the mass of men believe in the personal immortality of the soul, as they believe in a personal God (n. 338), and so are wiser than the philosophers among them. Cicero was right in saying (*Tusc. Disp.* I, 16) that as the belief in the existence of the gods is natural to us, so do all nations agree that the soul survives the death of the body. This book gives an excellent presentation of the argument from reason for the immortality of the soul. It is to be observed that trichotomists (n. 465) of all classes confine the prospect of immortality to the rational soul.

468. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have vindicated the teaching of revelation concerning the essential difference between man and brutes, and shown that man belongs to an order of being which is superior to irrational animals, not in degree alone, but in kind. This superiority is seen in the structure of the bodv; and the differences receive their interpretation when we consider the works

which man has been able to perform, and compare them with all that beasts have done. It is seen still more clearly when we consider the proofs that come before us of the presence in man of a spiritual and intelligent soul, in virtue of which presence he is capable of many actions which are altogether beyond the capacities of brutes; among which actions, a notable place is held by human speech and man's progress in the arts. After this, it is shown that the soul in man is one, and that it is united to the body by a substantial union, so that the soul and body constitute one being; and lastly, we have given reasons derived from the light of nature for believing that the soul of man survives that severance from the body which constitutes death.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

469. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we shall explain and justify the teaching of Holy Scripture as to the origin of the first man, and as to the manner in which the race is propagated; we shall endeavour to show precisely what must be held with certainty as the revealed doctrine, and what is the certain teaching of natural science, and vindicate the declaration of the Vatican Council (Const. i. c. 4; Denz. 1649) that between the two no contradiction is possible.

470. *The Account in Scripture.*—The Book of Genesis contains two accounts of the origin of man. One occurs in the first chapter, the other in the second. They run as follows:

Chapter i. verse 26: And He said: Let us make man to our image and likeness; and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth.

27. And God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him: male and female He created them.

Chapter ii. verse 7: And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: and breathed into

his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.

18. And the Lord God said: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like unto himself.

21. Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam; and when he was fast asleep, He took one of his ribs, and filled up flesh for it.

22. And the Lord God built the rib which He took from Adam into a woman, and brought her to Adam.

23. And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man.

The relation that we find in the first chapter emphasizes the truth that the world was created for the service of man: and for this purpose it was not requisite to detail the circumstances of the creation of the first woman. In the seventh verse of the second chapter, we enter on the narrative of all that led up to the fall of man, and it is natural that accounts should be inserted, showing more particularly than had been previously necessary the distinct acts of creation which gave being to him that was the destined head of the human race, and to her by whose voice he was led to ruin.

Nothing is found in the Sacred Scriptures to add anything to the accounts here given. The passages do not present any textual difficulties; there is no doubt of the reading, nor of the translation. It may be observed that there are three

common words in Hebrew which are translated "man," but there is a marked distinction of use among them. One denotes a male as opposed to one of the weaker sex, and is commonly employed of a man in his vigour, or of a hero. (1 Kings iv. 9; 3 Kings ii. 2.) Another signifies a man considered as frail, and liable to suffering and death (Job vii. 17; Psalm lxxii. 5), and its feminine form is believed by some grammarians to give the word "woman," which the first man applied to his companion. The ordinary word for a human being is *adam*, which is also used as the proper name of the first father of the race. In the original text, the presence or absence of the article guides the translator in his judgment whether the word is a proper or a common noun. We have already said what is necessary on the use of the plural form, "Let us make" (n. 364), where we saw that the phrase indicates the deliberation of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Also we have pointed out (n. 431) the sense in which it is said that the image of God is found in man, while irrational creatures present a vestige only of their Creator.

471. *The Interpretation.*—The Church has not given us any express interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation of man. We are left, therefore, to gather for ourselves the meaning which the sacred writer conveyed to his readers. In deciding upon this meaning we should give great weight to the authority of the Fathers, as witnesses to the prevailing teaching of the Church of their time; also, we must give great weight to the commentary

upon the written account which is afforded to us by the world of nature, the study of which will help us to learn the mind of the true Author of Genesis, who is also the Creator of all things. On this subject we need not repeat what we said in reference to the work of the six days. (n. 460.)

At first sight, the passages that have been set forth certainly appear to convey that the body of the first man and of the first woman were formed by the immediate action of God Himself, exerted upon pre-existing matter. The action is not creation properly so called, for it is not production out of nothing: the action was a fashioning of the slime of the earth, and of the rib taken from the side of Adam. The Fathers and early commentators appear to have had no doubt upon the subject, but they speak as critics, not as expressing any tradition, and therefore their voice is not conclusive. (n. 159.) At the present day, it appears to some writers of weight that the meaning of the Sacred Text is too clear to admit of doubt, and these hold that the immediate formation of man is a matter of Divine faith. (n. 326.) Others think it possible that close study of the visible world, which we have called a divinely composed commentary upon the Written Word (n. 440), may possibly give good ground for believing that the apparent meaning of the Mosaic narrative is not the true meaning, and that the body of the first man was prepared by the operation of natural causes, without any extraordinary action of God. These therefore suspend their judgment, and await further light upon the subject, whether it

come to them by a pronouncement of the Church, or by the progress of natural science.

On this controversy we observe, first, that it concerns the body only of the first human pair, for, as we shall show presently, the spiritual soul must have had its origin in a creative act, properly so called. (n. 473.) Again, no theory on the subject deserves attention, unless it takes account of the origin of the first woman, as well as of the first man, for no reason can be given for rejecting one narrative more than the other; the same principles of interpretation must apply to both. And, moreover, the power, wisdom, and goodness of God are exhibited, not only by the immediate formation of a human body, but no less by the creation of matter of such nature, and in such circumstances, that under the action of ordinary laws it assumed the shape of such a body. To some minds it may appear that the theory of evolution gives a higher idea of the Divine attributes than is obtained on the other view; and we need not be moved by any suggestion that the dignity of man should lead us to incline to any particular view of his origin. This dignity is assuredly saved by that, whatever it be, which God has done; and therefore we may be free from bias in our inquiry as to what this is.

472. *Evolution.*—The theory which teaches that the first man's body came into existence through the operation of natural laws, without any immediate action of God, is a branch of the system which, under the name of Evolution, seeks to explain the whole course of the world without any reference

to Divine control. A vast amount of labour has been expended in the last few years upon the development of this theory, and its application to every branch of human knowledge in succession. It cannot be gainsaid that the great intellectual activity which this task evokes has led to a large measure of solid advance in knowledge. At the same time, it is obvious that many who have taken a leading part in the movement have been under the influence of a hope that it will lead to results at variance with the doctrine of the Christian Church; and the mass of unfounded assertion, false reasoning, and unfair insinuation, to which men of undoubted ability commit themselves in the cause, is enough to astound all who are not aware that blindness is often the portion of the tools employed by Satan in his work.

It is no part of our task to attempt to discriminate between what is true and what is false in the system called Evolution. We can do no more than very briefly sketch the mode in which evolutionists suppose the body of the first man to have come into existence, and then indicate some reasons for regarding this theory as far too uncertain to furnish ground for questioning whether the obvious meaning of the Mosaic narrative is the true meaning.

It is supposed by evolutionists that the body of the first being that deserved to be called a man was born in the ordinary course from a beast, and that the body of the child differed from that of the parent by some small difference, such as is always

found between parents and children, which difference, however, was sufficient to found the difference of man and beast: the beast parent may have had other children who chanced to vary in some other direction, and so were not men, and was itself the offspring of a parent which was removed from the likeness to man by two small stages, and also may have become the progenitors of beasts of various kinds. If the pedigree of man be traced backwards in this way, the theory represents that we come, sooner or later, to one or more living things which themselves did not spring from any parent that had life, but the origin of which is outside the theory. Authorities differ as to the number of these primæval organisms. In this explanation we have spoken of one parent only in each step: this is done merely to avoid the complication of language that would be unavoidable if we spoke of two.

There is the utmost variety among evolutionist authorities as to the way in which they would fill up the details of the process that we have described, but the general outlines never differ much from what we have given. It is hard to attack so very plastic a system, for the defender can always introduce a modification, and thus strengthen the weak point that has been detected; but the genuine advances in natural science have not been plastic in this way, but have taken the form of the enunciation of a principle which is found capable of solving all the problems to which it is applicable. We have examples in Newton's theory of universal gravitation, and Harvey's discovery of the circulation of

the blood, which have stood in no need of modification, but furnish a solid basis for further inquiries in the sciences to which they belong.

The advocates of Evolution are by no means agreed as to the pedigree to be assigned to man, that is to say, on the question what existing species of animals are the best representatives of the hypothetical ancestors of man. Also, they are not agreed as to the influences which have secured that the small variations between parents and children on which the system is founded should accumulate, so as to produce great results. It is undoubtedly true that children do on the whole resemble their parents, but vary from them in small particulars. There is such a thing as family likeness, yet even in the case of a twin-birth, the two brothers can always be distinguished. Also, it is true that the art of a cattle-breeder, or pigeon-fancier, can secure that considerable accumulated change is seen in the objects of his care, but there is absolutely no evidence that this accumulation does go on in nature, and arguments or suggestions tending to show that it *must*, or *may* go on, are insufficient. The original suggestion that the struggle for existence was a complete account of the matter, is now generally abandoned. Sundry supplementary laws, such as sexual selection, variability of some species, permanence of others, correlation of co-ordinate growths, and the like, are found on examination to be nothing but arbitrary statements which ought to be true, if the theory of Evolution is well founded, but which are valueless in the absence of inde-

pendent proof; and this is not forthcoming. The fact is, the whole theory is a mere guess, for which no verification is found in the quarter where it might have been expected. It gets no assistance from palæontology, the science which studies the fossil relics of the animal and vegetable life of past times. As far as this science goes, it seems that plants and animals have always been as sharply divided into species as we see to be the case now: there may be considerable variety within the same species, as we see in the case of dogs, for example, where, however, the varieties are mainly owing to human care, and are far more widely separated than those found in a state of nature. But it remains true that the varieties of dog shade off into one another by scarcely perceptible differences, while there is a broad line of distinction between the whole group of dogs and such species as approach most nearly to them: a zoologist is never in any doubt whether the animal before him is, or is not, a dog. Species, thus understood, can be arranged for convenience in larger groups, such as genera, orders, and so on; but the divisions between these groups are usually not sharp, as are the divisions between species; and thus we read of "aberrant" species, the characters of which raise a doubt as to the genus to which they are to be referred; but, as we just now said, no such doubt arises as to the species to which an individual is to be referred. If species originated in a series of minute differences which gradually accumulated, the intermediate forms ought to be found preserved in the earth, even if

they were not now living on the surface: but nothing of the sort has been found, and evolutionists are driven to remark upon the imperfection of the geological record, and to speculate as to what may perhaps be discovered hereafter.

Evolutionists must admit that the length of time required for the development of species in their system is very large. Men used to be startled by the great demands for time that were made by the geologists; but the longest geological period is a mere trifle compared with what Evolution requires. History and archæology tell us that the lapse of some six thousand years, for which we have written or sculptured records, has made no visible difference in the forms of plants, or animals, or men; no mind can conjecture what number of millennia would be required for the development of cat and dog from their common ancestor; yet such development would be small indeed compared with the work of bringing all back-boned animals from the sea-worm, which is alleged by many to be their common parent. The mere demand for time might be allowed to pass, were we at liberty to assume that the earth has lasted throughout in its present state; but the science of physics teaches, by sure demonstration, that this is not so, but that at no distant period, as evolutionists reckon time, the heat of the earth was such that neither organic life nor water could have existed on it. This difficulty has not been met by the advocates of the system, except by expressing distrust of the accuracy of the physical calculations; but even if the calculation of years

were uncertain, it remains true that there was a time when the earth was not capable of supporting living creatures, whence it follows that life began on the earth where there was no life before. But it is agreed on all hands that all life now originates in pre-existing life; there is no such thing as what used to be called spontaneous generation. It follows that life came upon earth from some extraneous cause, and the claim of Evolution to explain all things must fail. Some power interposed to bring about that which would otherwise never have come about. We believe that a similar interposition would have been needed to give sensation to living matter, and reason to the sensitive brute; but we need not dwell upon this point.

Lastly, we may notice the argument that evolutionists deduce from the study of embryos. They say that each human body, in the first beginning of its existence, is a small mass of jelly, and that in its growth it takes the likeness of a fish and of successive classes of brutes, until at length it takes the characteristic form of man. They assume, without an atom of proof, that the history of the race has been the same as that seen in the individual, and then parade their demonstration that man is descended from a fish. Now, besides all other observations which may be made upon this course of reasoning, we may remark that it proves no more than the imperfection of the means of investigation that the embryologist has at his command. No one supposes that the jelly-like mass which had its origin from a human being can ever

live with any life but that of a man. It may die prematurely. But if it live to grow to maturity, it must take the human form; it will never live with the life of a fish. If, then, at a certain stage of its growth the embryologist cannot detect any difference between its structure and the structure of a fish, the only conclusion is that the observer is unable to gain a perfect knowledge of the object before him; there is something in the object that determines it to be a man, and nothing else, and more perfect observation would detect the presence of this something. To say, "I see no difference, therefore there is no difference," is to adopt an altogether unsafe mode of reasoning.

It seems, therefore, that, for the present at all events, the study of the works of creation has not yielded any sufficient reason to lead us to discard what, at first sight, seems to be the meaning of the Mosaic account of the origin of the body of man.

473. *Origin of the Soul.*—Various opinions have been put forward from time to time as to the origin of the Soul of man. Some of these have always been obviously heretical, but there are others which were for a time held by orthodox doctors, but are now abandoned; and the controversy furnishes an illustration of the three stages of implicit belief, doubt, and explicit statement which we have met with already. (n. 113.) The pantheistic notion that the soul is an emanation from God, to whom it returns on death, and is absorbed, has never been held by Catholics, and is inconsistent with the

doctrine of the Church as to the nature of God and the immortality of men (n. 467); no reward or punishment awaits one who is absorbed in God. Nor could any Catholic who believes in the spiritual character of the soul, hold that it is generated from the bodies of the parents. (n. 463.) This opinion, to which the name Traducianism is given, was perhaps held by Tertullian; so, at least, St. Augustine believed (Epist. 190, *Ad Optat.* c. 4, n. 14; *P.L.* 33, 861); but we must remember (n. 222) the peculiar sense in which Tertullian used the word "body." (Cf. *De Anima*, cc. 19, 27; *P.L.* 2, 680, 694.) We have seen that the soul is a spiritual substance (n. 463), and it is impossible that what is simple should be generated from extended matter.

Generationism is the somewhat awkward name given to a theory that the souls of children are in some manner the product of the souls of the parents. It is, therefore, essentially different from the Traducianism of Tertullian, although this name is sometimes employed widely, to embrace both views. Some form of this doctrine had for a time a recognized place in Christian Theology, as an allowable opinion, but St. Jerome seems to have gone much too far in declaring that it was held by almost all the Westerns. (Epist. 126, n. 1; *P.L.* 22, 1085.) It obtained currency because it was thought to be supported by the high authority of St. Augustine; but, in truth, this great Doctor goes no further than to express doubt whether it may not be true, in which case it would be useful as furnishing an explanation of the great mystery of original

sin: "A man's wishes," he says, "do not make that to be true which is not true; nevertheless, I could wish that, if possible, this opinion were true" (Epist. 166, to St. Jerome; *P.L.* 33, 720), and for some centuries, respect for this writer withheld theologians from condemning what he did not condemn; but the scholastics detected the difficulty of conceiving this process of production, and especially of accounting for the share of each parent in the act of production; and St. Thomas was able to declare that in his time the view was generally abandoned. (*De Potent.* q. 3. a. 9.)

It remains that human souls owe their existence to an act of creation. Some modern writers have indulged in speculations on the subject which go near to making them originate in a creative act of the soul of the parent, which view would be inconsistent with what we have already proved, that to create is an act proper to God alone. (n. 432.) As taught by Froschammer it is condemned by Pius IX. in a Brief addressed to the Archbishop of Munich. (*Gravissimas inter;* Denz. 1524.) We need not delay upon the point, for the practically universal teaching of Catholic Doctors has long been that each soul is created immediately by God. This consent constitutes that ordinary teaching of the Church which is no less decisive than her express definitions. To deny the doctrine is perhaps not actually heretical, but this denial is not consistent with the condemnation or rejection of all the rival views. (n. 103.)

In fact, no view on the origin of spiritual

substance is philosophically defensible, except that which ascribes it to immediate creation by God. The tradition of the Church on the subject is gathered from the works of the orthodox Fathers. These are unanimous upon the question, except so far as they were influenced by the hesitating expressions used by St. Augustine; it is not worth while to quote passages from their works to prove what is not questioned, but we may remark that they refer to the subject chiefly when they are combating certain false notions as to the pre-existence of souls. These notions were derived from Plato, and were current among Christians under two forms. These agreed in representing that the souls of all men were created together, but were united with bodies successively as these were fit to receive them; but the one form, which is associated with the name of Origen, supposed that the souls of men had sinned during their unembodied existence, and were united to matter in punishment of their offence. This idea, that the soul of a living man was detained in a body as in a prison, must be rejected, not only as being wholly destitute of foundation, but also because it destroys the substantial unity of man (n. 466); the other form, held by the Priscillianists and some other heretics, gave no account of the premundane occupations of souls, but let it be supposed that they slept, like dormice (St. Jerome, *Contra Ruf.* 3, 30; *P.L.* 23, 480), until the time came for their probation on earth. The old commentators consider the doctrine of the pre-existence to be inconsistent with

the Mosaic account (Genesis ii. 7) that God breathed into the face of man the breath of life, which they understand of the creation and infusion of the soul; and they find in this work of creation of souls, constantly going on, a partial explanation of the words of our Lord, "My Father worketh until now, and I work." (St. John v. 17; St. Jerome, Epist. 126, n. 1; *P.L.* 22, 1085.)

Hence, we look upon it as part of the course of nature that a human soul is created and infused into each body at the first instant that there is a body fit to receive it. It seems that Theology has nothing to teach as to the stage of growth when the body becomes ready.

474. *The one Parent.*—There is no room for doubt among Catholics that all men who have lived or will live upon the earth are descended from the single pair concerning whom we read in the Book of Genesis. The matter is in a totally different position from the question of the Six Days of Creation (n. 440), and the immediate formation by God of the body of the first man. (nn. 471, 472.) As to these matters, we have no authentic interpretation of the text of Scripture, and so we cannot be absolutely sure that we understand it aright; we are free to reject the *prima facie* meaning if we see reason to believe that this meaning is not what the writer intended to convey. These matters stand alone, and are not connected with other doctrines of the faith; but, as we shall see, the doctrine of Original Sin (n. 493) and of the Atonement (n. 542) are inseparably bound up with the descent of all

men from Adam. We are sure, therefore, that no reason will ever be found for departing from what is clearly the teaching of Scripture on the subject. The point is defined by the Council of Trent, where Adam is called the first man, and all the human race are spoken of as his offspring. (Sess. 5, *On Original Sin;* Denz. 670.) This definition is justified, not only by the plain history in Genesis, but also by the declaration (Wisdom x. 1) that Wisdom preserved him that was first formed, the father of the world, when he was created alone; and the doctrine is implied in many other places.

The doctrine has been impugned by some who profess to admit the authority of Scripture, but who think that the man whose creation is described in the first chapter of Genesis (verse 27) is a different person from him who is mentioned in the second chapter. (verse 7.) They say that the former is the ancestor of all mankind, except the Jews and kindred nations who are the children of the latter. In this way they think to account for certain passages in the history of Cain, which imply the existence of men of whom no other mention is made. All this assumes gratuitously that no children were born to Adam and Eve beyond those that are named; and it will never be shown that in the infancy of the human race no brother could take his sister to wife. (See St. Aug. *De Civit. Dei*, 15, 16; *P.L.* 41, 45; St. John Chrysost.; *P.G.* 53, 167.) This professedly Scriptural doctrine of Preadamites has perhaps received more attention than it deserves. Its author was a French Calvinist, Isaac Pereyre,

who retained his opinion although he renounced his heresies, and died a Catholic in 1676. (See n. 498.)

The unity of the human family is, however, denied by many who make no account of the teaching of Scripture, and we must consider very shortly the grounds alleged for their opinion. It is obvious that large differences are found among the inhabitants of different countries, and the question is whether these differences are so great as to preclude the possibility of all having a common ancestry. Not long since, the affirmative was held by the great body of those students who did not profess respect for the authority of Scripture, but of late years the tide has changed, and the prevailing doctrine teaches that not men alone but all brutes have descended from the same living thing. (n. 472.) Though we are far from agreeing with this last view, we may at least take its prevalence as affording clear proof that biological science fails to afford conclusive reason for denying the unity of mankind.

We might leave the matter there, and wait till our opponents were agreed among themselves as to the basis of their attack; but it may be worth while shortly to remark that the denial of the unity of descent was rested chiefly on the differences of bodily structure among different races, on the differences of colour, and on the difficulty of seeing how men starting from a common centre could have spread over the world. On the last point it is enough to say that no one doubts the common descent of the inhabitants of many islands in the

Pacific Ocean, though these are separated by vast tracts of sea; and if the transportation was possible in this case, whether by the casual passage of canoes or otherwise, much more possible would it be for men to pass from one of the great continents to the other. In the same way, great differences of complexion are found among members of races of acknowledged common descent; for instance, the fair German, the brown Brahmin, and the black Abyssinian, all come of the same Aryan stock. There are black and white Jews in Cochin, black and white Chinese; and even within the negro race, great variety of colour is found. As to bodily structure, it is true that great differences are seen when extreme cases are compared; but intermediate forms can always be found connecting these together by trifling differences, whereas men are marked off from brutes by broad and unmistakable boundaries. No naturalist will ever be able to doubt whether the being before him is, or is not, a man.

A positive proof of the unity of man is found in the perfect fertility of unions between members of different races; distinct permanent varieties of men have arisen where Europeans have been in contact with the natives of other countries; this is abundantly illustrated in Canada, the United States, and India. Brutes belonging to different species will sometimes produce young; but either these are sterile, as mules; or if fertile, as sometimes is the case of hares and rabbits, the peculiarities of one ancestor soon disappear, and in a few generations,

all the characters are those of one species alone. Most of what we have said as to the achievements of man (n. 462), and as to the activity of his soul (n. 464), applies without change to all races, although it is true that some show more capacity for advance than others; but all, even the lowest, are obviously the superiors of the brutes in these respects.

For these reasons, the Christian doctrines which essentially stand or fall with the unity of the human race, have nothing to fear from the results of the study of ethnology, the further progress of which clears away the difficulties that it seemed at first to raise.

475. *The Age of Man.*—The question of the date of the creation of man is one that belongs to the interpretation of Scripture, and not properly to Theology; nevertheless, a few words concerning it will not be out of place. It seems that the Church has not given us any teaching upon the subject, except by her declaration of the inspiration of Scripture (n. 145), and so we are left to our own study of the text, to determine the meaning conveyed by the words of the sacred writer. It happens that this work is involved in great difficulty, on account of differences in manuscripts and versions, and of room for variety of opinion as to the meaning of certain phrases, and the true way to reconcile seeming discrepancies. These difficulties are of no theological importance, for the merely historical question stands quite apart from the truths of faith.

Also, the question concerns the age of man on the earth, and is dependent on the view taken as to the interpretation of the Six Days (n. 440); the earth itself may be far older than man. The usual way to consider the subject is to reckon the years that elapsed from the creation of Adam to the Birth of Christ. Two widely different reckonings find a certain support from the Church, which, however, is far from intending to speak decisively on the matter. One is found in the Vulgate Latin version (n. 158), which is commonly understood to give 4,004 years; the other is in the Roman Martyrology for Christmas Day, which lengthens the period to 5,119 years. Other views, both within and beyond these limits, have found favour with different Catholic authorities, the extremes being the 3,941 of St. Jerome and 6,621 of Clement of Alexandria. The reason of these discrepancies will be understood when it is remembered that the question depends upon numerical statements, which would appear to have been systematically tampered with by copyists, who wished to introduce into the genealogies a symmetry not found in the document before them.

There are two lines of consideration which have led some writers to assert that the presence of man upon earth has lasted for an immensely longer space of time than those here mentioned; they would have it reckoned by hundreds of thousands of years. They draw their arguments from two sources: history and archæology. In many nations, there is a traditional history reaching back indefinitely far; but this history is full of mythological details,

is unsupported by contemporary documents, and is obviously a fiction due to national vanity. These traditions probably find no sober defenders. The attempt has sometimes been made to support them by the evidence of astronomical sculptures, such as the famous planisphere of Tentyra in Egypt, which was interpreted as representing the heavens as they were seen some ten thousand years before Christ. If the engraver of this stone was depicting what he had seen, the argument for the great antiquity of man would deserve attention; but in truth the sculpture is subsequent to the Christian era, as was proved when the hieroglyphic inscription accompanying it was deciphered; which also records that the state of the heavens as represented was the result, not of observation, but of calculation; for which the astronomical science of the time was perfectly sufficient. In truth, trustworthy history of the most ancient nations, such as those of Egypt, Babylonia, and China, indicates that they had their beginning not far from the year 4000 before Christ, a date which may be reconciled with the history given in Genesis.

The argument from archæology rests upon the discovery of the works of man, tools, drawings, and the like, in places which indicate on the principles of geology that the date of their deposition is very remote. But all this is very uncertain. We must remember the possibility of mistake, or of fraud by workmen, who often have little difficulty in "finding" whatever they think they are expected to find; but besides this, the whole argument depends on calcu-

lations of geological time, concerning which it is always rash to be confident. Such calculations invariably depend upon some assumption as to the average rate of the deposition of strata, which assumption does not admit of verification; also, they often require it to be believed that strata of the same character and bearing the same fossils have been deposited contemporaneously; an idea implied in such phrases as "the tertiary period," as if it were something common to all the earth. In truth, these various "periods" are found side by side at the present day, and the tendency of geologists is to abandon the word. The same remark applies to the stages of civilization marked by the words "the stone age," and the like; stone implements are in use at the present day in parts of Europe, and will survive long after the iron employed elsewhere has perished in rust. It also happens that the leaders of geological science are far from being in agreement as to the interpretation which on their principles ought to be given to a discovery of each work of ancient man.

476. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have set forth the account given in Scripture of the origin of man, and have discussed how far it allows us to doubt whether the first human body was formed by the immediate action of God; we then discuss the theory of evolution, and show that this guess remains unsupported by any arguments that could lead us to adopt any but the surface-meaning of the text. We next speak of the origin of the soul, showing that it is created by God, and has no

existence before the time of its infusion into a body. It is proved that Scripture teaches that the whole human race come from one parent, and that natural science raises no serious difficulty against this doctrine; and lastly, it is shown that there is no reason to suppose that the human race has greater antiquity than is consistent with the apparent meaning of the Book of Genesis, so far as the state of the text enables us to judge.

CHAPTER III.

THE ELEVATION OF MAN.

477. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In the two preceding chapters we have spoken of the nature and origin of man without reference to his relations to God, and especially without mention of his having been created for any special end, beyond that work of giving glory to the Creator, which is the end of all creation. (n. 433.) In the present chapter we shall consider more particularly the end for which man was created, which we shall find to have been the supernatural and eternal possession of God, to be earned by faithfulness during a time of probation: and we shall see that our first parents were provided with many gifts beyond what their nature required, which were either necessary to them, or at least helpful, for the performance of the work assigned them. The following chapter will show how these gifts were lost to Adam and all his posterity in consequence of his sin, and how they were partially restored and are now enjoyed by us, in virtue of the Redemption which we owe to our Lord Jesus Christ.

The questions discussed in this chapter will be found to lie at the root of most of the religious

differences that have prevailed among Christians, and there are some which are still freely discussed in Catholic schools. (nn. 113, 220.) They depend in great measure upon the accurate understanding of the words "natural," "preternatural," and "supernatural," which we have already allowed ourselves to use occasionally, where no mistake seemed likely to arise. We must now devote some space to their explanation: but first, it will be convenient to sketch in outline the various views that have prevailed as to the state of our first parents.

478. *Various Errors.*—The errors that have been maintained on these subjects fall into classes which are almost parallel to those which we described when speaking of predestination (n. 390); and like them, they fall under one or other of two great heads; for some ascribe too much power to the will of man, and others deny to it what ought to be allowed. We shall not need to repeat what has been already stated as to the history of the sects which we have had occasion to mention.

I. *The Pelagians.*—The Pelagians taught that "Adam was mortal and would have died, whether he had sinned or had abstained from sin: that his sin did harm to himself alone and not to his posterity; that children are now born in the state in which Adam was before his sin, so that death among men is not due to the death nor to the sin of Adam; and that the future resurrection of men is not due to the Resurrection of Christ." This summary of their doctrine is taken from Marius Mercator (*Commonit. super nom. Cœlest.* n. 1; *P.L.* 48, 67), an historian

and controversialist who lived in the first half of the fifth century, and assisted St. Augustine and St. Cyril in combating the heresies of Pelagius and Nestorius. Pelagian views are current among many of the subdivisions of Protestants. These in effect deny the reality of what we may call the preternatural and supernatural providence of God; and although they would not willingly discard these words, they attach to them a sense of their own.

In our Treatise on Grace we shall describe the views of the Pelagians, and of their successors, the Semi-Pelagians, as to the need in which man stands of the supernatural assistance of God before he can do anything towards attaining salvation.

II. *The Lutherans.*—The Lutherans, on the other hand, admit that Adam in Paradise enjoyed many peculiar gifts, which his posterity are without, and that these were received by him from the Holy Spirit; but they represent them as natural to him, inasmuch as he was capable of tending to God, so that without them he would not have had the perfection of his nature. Among these they reckon the freedom of the will, which was lost with the rest, so that man is now intrinsically corrupt, and incapable of doing any act which is in any sense good. This doctrine should be considered in connection with the Lutheran view of Justification, to be explained in our Fourteenth Treatise on the subject. The early Lutherans spoke quite plainly to the effect we have mentioned: many of their modern representatives shrink from definite statement of their views.

III. *Baius.*—The doctrine taught by Baius is summed up in the seventy-nine propositions which were condemned by St. Pius V. (Denz. 881—959) in 1567, and afterwards by Gregory XIII. and Urban VIII. These repeated condemnations, with some variation of phrase, were rendered necessary by the cunning shown by some professing Catholics in their endeavours to find excuse for still maintaining the errors. Especially a doubt was suggested whether the condemnation fell upon the doctrine expressed by the propositions, or whether it might not in some instances attach only to some excess of vehemence in the mode of expression. This doubt partly depended upon the punctuation of the Bull of St. Pius, and a fierce controversy arose concerning a certain comma, called Comma Pianum. The utterances of Gregory and Urban showed that the suggested doubt was groundless.

The doctrine condemned in Baius, so far as it concerns us at present, was as follows: The special gifts which Adam enjoyed before his fall were not natural, for his nature would have been complete without them, but they could not be withheld by God, who, having created a rational being, was bound to supply him with the means of attaining his end, and no other end could be proposed to him except the attainment of that vision of God, of which no creature is capable by its own powers. (n. 350.) It follows that man could not have been created in the state in which he is now born, destitute of the paradisiacal gifts, without which he will never attain the supernatural end. The fundamental

error of Baius was that he did not recognize the distinction of the natural and the supernatural end of man: he did not see that God might, had He pleased, in creating man have destined him for a lower end than that which was actually proposed to him, and fitted him for this and for no more.

IV. *Jansenius.*—The errors of Jansenism on the subject now before us were substantially the same as those of Baius, and the Jansenists were pertinacious in trying to explain away the condemnation of the precursor of their Master.

479. *The Catholic Doctrine.*—A short statement of the Catholic doctrine on these matters may be found convenient in this place: it will be further explained and justified in the following pages, where the text will be found of the decrees of Councils in which it is defined. (nn. 484—493.) The condition of our first parents before their sin was better and happier than that which followed their fall. The advantage consisted in the possession of sanctifying grace, which raised them to the rank of partakers of the Divine nature (2 St. Peter i. 4) and of adoptive sons of God: moreover, they were free from concupiscence, and from pain and death, and had a high measure of knowledge: but these privileges were not natural to man, but above or beyond his nature, and therefore man might have been created without them. The change wrought by the sin of Adam and transmitted to his descendants will be described in the next chapter. (n. 493.)

480. *Natural.*—The substantive "Nature" has many senses, to which the uses of the adjective

"Natural" correspond. According to the etymology (*nascor*), "Natural" means that with which an animal is born, as opposed to what is acquired: thus, a taste for certain kinds of food is "natural," when they are relished when first offered: and men are by nature children of wrath (Ephes. ii. 3), inasmuch as this is true of all men at their birth, in a sense which will be explained (n. 497.) But "nature" is used also in another sense, which may be wider or narrower than the former, and it then embraces that, and that only, which the being has precisely because he has been produced as an individual of a certain species. In this way it is "natural" to man to have a material body and a rational soul, for it is the presence of these two elements in combination that constitutes a man. The "Nature" in this sense is the same as the "Essence," but is commonly employed rather when the being is viewed as acting, and not merely as existing. Actions which indicate the presence of the essence are termed natural.

Further than this, those things are natural without which the race of beings would be unable to exercise their faculties and do the work for which the Creator destined them. Thus, the supply of food which the earth offers to man is natural to him, although accidentally a particular man may starve, just as a particular man may be born destitute of limbs and senses, although the whole race could not subsist in that condition: and the same remark may be made concerning the intellectual powers. It is to be observed that it is impossible

to fix any particular amount of these supplies and faculties as being "natural:" a race of rational animals, or men, could not exert their powers of body and soul and so give glory to God, which is the end of every creature, unless they live for some space of time: but we cannot say that a life of five years, or fifty, or even five hundred, is necessary for the purpose, and therefore natural. We may think that with a longer life, or with wings like those of a bird, the end might be attained more perfectly; but it lies with the Creator to determine the degree in which He would have it to be attained in each case.

When an individual is wanting in some of those gifts which are accorded to the race at large as helping it to the attainment of its essential end, this privation is said to be unnatural: in this way the epithet is applied to such a state as idiotcy.

481. *Supernatural.*—The meaning of the word "Supernatural" follows that of the word "Natural:" it is something added over and above nature. It cannot be said, therefore, that whatever is not an object of sense is supernatural to man, for amongst other invisible things, the guardianship of the blessed Angels (n. 453) might be among the helps given to man, even if he had no end beyond that of a rational animal: in which case it would be no more supernatural than his food. Nor is every act done immediately by God to be called supernatural, for the word is not applicable to the creation of souls. (n. 473.) Some falsely give the name of supernatural

to whatever is done freely; for to act freely is most natural to a spiritual substance (n. 463), and the special end of such a being is to offer free service to God, of which irrational creatures are incapable. (n. 433.)

The literal meaning of "supernatural" might then be something superadded to a being, not merely beyond the essential constituents of that being, but also beyond what is suitable, and in a manner due to it, to enable it to attain its end; but the use of the word in Theology is somewhat different. In the sense just mentioned, the idea of what is "supernatural" would be relative, so that what is natural to one being might be supernatural to another of a lower order; and to determine whether or not a certain gift was supernatural, we should need to know the particular end for which the nature was created. But the idea to be attached to the word in Theology is absolute: it means that which is above the essence and exigency of every created nature. Thus, we have seen that no creature can have power to create, merely in virtue of its existence, nor is any such power due to it (n. 432): in this case, it is even uncertain whether a creature can be raised, even by the absolute power of God (n. 387), so as to be enabled to bring things out of nothing: but if those who hold it to be possible are right, and it were actually done, then this power would be strictly supernatural. We shall see as we go on that many other conceivable gifts are supernatural; especially the clear vision of God, for which we are destined in the other life, and the

supernatural grace without the supply of which we should be unable to reach this our destination.

482. *Preternatural.* — What has been said is perhaps sufficient to show the theological meaning of the word "supernatural;" but the matter may be further illustrated by considering what is meant by "Preternatural." This word denotes what is beyond nature, but not above nature. The means which a man would have for attaining his end, were this merely the necessary end of a rational animal, would be natural to him, and among these we must reckon existence under the ordinary conditions of space; but these conditions are not necessary, and a man may, by Divine power, be exempted from them, and such exemption is preternatural: it is not strictly supernatural, for it has no necessary connection with any higher end than every creature must have. This matter is explained in Philosophy. (See Haan, *Philosophia Naturalis*, n. 51.) Recovery from disease is natural to man, in certain circumstances, time being allowed for the process: if, by an exertion of Divine power, the recovery is instantaneous, this cure is preternatural: and the same Divine power may exempt a particular man from the ordinary law of death, and the exemption would be preternatural. The same word is also applied to all occurrences which we trace to the action of evil spirits (n. 454): these cannot, of course, do anything that is strictly supernatural, for they themselves are creatures, and cannot transcend the capabilities of all creatures: but their traceable action is so far beyond the ordinary round

of events that the word "preternatural" may fairly be applied to it. The same word may also be used of action which we trace to the Blessed Angels (nn. 451, 452), but this usage is not common: practically, there is no need to distinguish between what God Himself does, and what is done by the agents who execute His will.

483. *States of Man.*—There are certain conditions in which man has existed, or might have existed had God so pleased, on the right understanding of which the doctrine of this chapter depends. These concern the end proposed to man and the means for its attainment put at his disposal; and they are called states of man. In this place we merely explain them, and indicate our doctrine as to how far they are actual or merely possible, supernatural or merely natural. The proof and further illustration will occupy the rest of the chapter.

First then we have the *State of Pure Nature*, in which man might exist, did God so please, but in which he has never existed. (n. 487.) In this state, man would have had no destiny beyond that possession of God by knowledge and love which is within the natural capacity of a creature, and which therefore bears no proportion to what is expressed by seeing Him face to face. (1 Cor. xiii. 12.) This destiny would have been happy, as fulfilling all the legitimate aspirations of the creature: it would have been attained by faithfulness in doing all duty and avoiding sin, and whatever helps were necessary for making it possible to do this would have been

supplied by God, as part of the natural course of His providence.

In the *State of Integral Nature*, which like the foregoing is merely possible and not actual, the destiny of man would have been the same as in the State of Pure Nature: but he would have enjoyed some preternatural (n. 482) gifts, making the attainment of his end more easy, and among the rest his reason would have had that perfect control over his lower passions and appetites which constitutes what is called freedom from concupiscence. Many questions arise as to these merely possible states, which cannot be answered except by guesses.

Our first parents, before their sin, were in the *State of Original Justice and Sanctity*. (n. 484.) They had a strictly supernatural destiny (n. 481), the clear vision of God which is natural to no creature. (n. 350.) They were free from sin and from all that follows from sin: they had sanctifying grace, that supernatural gift of God, permanently inhering in the soul, by which immediately and formally a man is made holy, just, pleasing to God, the adoptive son of God, capable of doing works which merit eternal life, and heir thereto. The nature of this great gift will come before us in the Treatises on Grace and Justification. Along with this went freedom from concupiscence (n. 486) and from liability to pain and death, together with a high degree of knowledge. (n. 487.) Had Adam been faithful, his posterity would have lived in the same state, with the same destiny, but capable of individual sin which would have stripped the sinner of

all these supernatural and preternatural gifts. We know a little more concerning this state than concerning those that never were realized: but as the state was not permanent, there are many points of interest as to which we must be content to be ignorant.

Adam sinned, and had not God at once intervened, he would have passed into the state which is properly called the *State of Fallen Nature*, in the stricter sense of the term: but the race was at once rescued from this state, which therefore was never actual, and we are ignorant as to what would have been the condition of man in that state.

The *State of Repaired Nature* is that in which man now is, and to which the name "Fallen Nature" is sometimes loosely applied. Immediately on the sin of Adam the eternal decree took effect that in virtue of the Redemption to be wrought by the Divine Word made Man, the race should be restored to the supernatural destiny that it had lost. But the preternatural gifts enjoyed by Adam and Eve were not restored: nor was sanctifying grace restored to the race as a whole, but is given to individuals, on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The differences for the worse which the State of Repaired Nature presents, when compared with the State of Original Justice, are due to the sin of Adam, and constitute or follow from original sin. (n. 500.)

We now proceed to prove, step by step, the doctrine which we have been stating.

484. *The Grace of Paradise.*—The doctrine that Adam, before his fall, possessed that gift of God which is called sanctifying grace is defined by the Council of Trent (Denz. 670, 671) in the following terms, taken from the first and second canons of the Fifth Session.

Canon 1. If any one do not avow that the first man, Adam (n. 474), when in Paradise he transgressed the command of God, at once lost the holiness and justice which was his condition, and by this act of evil incurred the anger and indignation of God, and that death with which God had threatened him, and along with death subjection beneath the power of him who is the lord of death, that is, the Devil; and that the whole Adam, through that evil-doing, was changed for the worse both in body and soul, let him be Anathema.

2. If any one assert that the sin of Adam hurt himself alone, and not his offspring, and that the holiness and justice which he has received from God was lost to himself alone and not also to us, or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience (n. 482), has only transfused death and pains of the body into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the death of the soul, let him be Anathema.

Other declarations of the Church to the same effect, both of earlier and of later date, might be quoted, but there is no present need.

The doctrine here set forth lies at the root of the religion founded by Christ, the whole purpose of whose coming was to restore to the race of man

what it had lost through the sin of Adam. We shall show in the Treatise on Justification that this restoration is effected through the infusion of sanctifying grace; it follows therefore that Adam before his sin possessed this grace. As it is expressed by St. Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. 38, n. 16; *P.G.* 36, 329), "The head and aim of all the Christian mysteries is my perfection and restoration and return to the first Adam." The teaching of St. Paul upon the point is clear, for he speaks of God the Father as having delivered us from the power of darkness and translated us into the Kingdom of the Son of His love, in whom we have redemption through His Blood, the remission of sins (Coloss. i. 13, 14), and he exhorts us to be renewed in the spirit of our mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth. This new man seems to be Adam, who was in a special sense created to the image and likeness of God (Genesis i. 26), and of whom we read (Eccles. vii. 30) that God made man right; but even if this be not so, to be created according to God certainly includes that union with God which is called sanctifying grace. The testimonies of the Fathers to the same effect are clear, which St. John Damascene sums up in these words: The Creator imparted grace to that first man, and through grace communicated to him Himself (*De Fide Orthod.* 2, 30; *P.G.* 94, 976); and St. Irenæus represents Adam as lamenting: I have lost that robe of sanctity which I received from the Holy Spirit. (*De Hæres.* 3, 23, 5; *P.G.* 7, 963.)

The question was at one time much debated whether the first man was adorned with sanctifying grace in the first instant of his creation, or whether he was created without it, and after the lapse of some time raised to the supernatural order. The Church has not spoken upon the subject, and the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from deciding it; the Council made it their business to assert the faith against heretics, not to decide points that were in controversy in the Catholic schools. At the present day, the universal teaching is that Adam was created in grace, and it is a common opinion that he merited this grace from the first *de congruo*, by the good use of actual grace, according to the interpretation given by the Fathers to the account so often quoted from Genesis, that God made man in His own image: but the contrary opinion was most common from the first rise of scholastic theology down to the end of the fifteenth century; it was grounded on certain passages of St. Augustine, and on a difficulty felt in conceiving that so great a gift as sanctifying grace could have been bestowed on one who had done nothing to merit it. St. Thomas held what in his time was the less common doctrine (p. 1. q. 95. a. 1.), and his authority at length prevailed, and the more readily as it came to be more clearly perceived that the gift in question was wholly gratuitous. It is to be observed that the older opinion asserted a state of man beyond those which we have enumerated (n. 483), which might be called the state of innocence, between creation and the receipt of sanctifying grace. Perhaps this state, s

long as it lasted, would not have differed from the state of pure nature.

485. *Concupiscence.*—The nature of that Integrity which our first parents enjoyed cannot be understood unless a clear idea be formed of the meaning attached to the word Concupiscence. In its most general sense, Concupiscence is the same as Desire, and signifies the yearning of the soul for some good, or fancied good, which it has not got. The English word Lust had formerly the same wide meaning, although it is now seldom used except with reference to a particular sensual gratification; a distinction which must be remembered when we read the older writers. In the same way "to covet" is now commonly used of undue desire of that which is another's, but formerly stood for any yearning. All these words are used in the English version of the Scriptures to represent what the Latin calls Concupiscence in the wide sense just explained; as when the Decalogue forbids us to covet (Exodus xx. 17), while the writer of one of the Psalms (cxviii. 7) declares that his soul has coveted to long for the justifications of God: the beginning of Wisdom is the most true desire of discipline (Wisdom vi. 18); and St. Paul tells us that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. These passages sufficiently show that the word Concupiscence, as used in Scripture, does not necessarily indicate whether the object of the yearning is good or bad, nor whether it originates in the soul or in the body—a distinction which must not be confounded with that which immediately precedes it.

The desire of food is bodily and is generally good: the desire of honour is spiritual and yet is often bad.

The desires that a man forms, whether good or bad, may originate in an act of his free-will, and have their whole being in it. He may calmly and without bias fix his desire upon some good, or fancied good, be it good for the body only, gratifying the bodily appetites and desires, or such as is good for the spiritual soul, and this again may be of a lower or higher order of goodness. But although this origination is possible, it is not usual to find that the act of desire is so purely spiritual; it ordinarily happens that the suggestion to form the desire comes from the part of the man's nature to which the desired good is suitable, whether this be the body, or the soul considered as capable of finding gratification in good which is not its highest Good, and which to a greater or less extent excludes the desire of that highest Good. These suggestions have the name of first motions, in which phrase the word motion includes affections of the soul and does not refer to bodily movements alone; they are not under the control of the will, which is the highest faculty of the rational soul, and which is able to resist them as soon as they are fully perceived. When first motions of a particular character, whether good or bad, are habitually crushed at their first appearance, they tend to cease to show themselves.

But further, every man finds that not only do first motions arise within him, but that they are not easy to control. His will may be to reject them,

when perceived, but he finds himself unable to do so; they persist, and a state of disturbance is set up within him which is fairly described as a conflict, a warfare; not, of course, that there are really two antagonistic wills contending for the mastery, but that the one will is drawn this way and that by the partial goods found in objects which are here and now inconsistent. The free-will is always mistress, and can assert itself; for, were it otherwise, the being considered would not be a normal man, one of whose essential characters is that freedom of the will, which is impaired or lost in lunacy, and possibly in diabolic possession (n. 454); but this self-assertion involves a struggle which may be long and painful.

We have described this struggle in general terms, which are applicable, whether the object which the lower nature suggests be good or bad; nor have we said anything as to whether these suggestions originate with the man, or whether they come from God Himself, or from a created spirit. The struggle of the will of which we have spoken may arise from a deliberate determination not to listen to the promptings of Divine grace, when a man is bent upon wickedness. But it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the other case, where the importunate suggestions point to that which is recognized as being morally wrong. When this is so, the struggle constitutes the state of temptation to sin; and that feature in our nature by which we are liable to be tempted in the manner described, is what is peculiarly known as Con-

cupiscence. The body considered as apt to start suggestions to evil is called "the flesh." It must by all means be observed that sin is the act of the will which consents to a forbidden object, whether this object be purely internal, as a thought, or external, as a word or deed. By this consent the struggle ends in the victory of one of the parties; wherefore so long as temptation lasts there is no sin.

After a sinful consent has been yielded, a new temptation may arise, and this may be followed by another fall into sin; and this process may continue, so that it is hard to tell how many sins have been committed. This state of things may be spoken of indifferently as a series of temptations each closed by a sin, or as one temptation resulting in many sins. Even where the higher will has triumphed and the temptation to evil has been successfully resisted, the mere horror at the thought of having been tempted will often leave the soul in a state of turmoil, which the inexperienced may confound with a continuance of the crushed temptation, and of which Satan often takes advantage as affording him the opportunity of doing further mischief. But we must leave this matter to the Moralists, to whom also it belongs to discuss the differences in the character of the forbidden object and in the mode of yielding to its enticements, which constitute the distinction between mortal and venial sin.

486. *Integrity.*—The reader will now be in a position to understand what is meant by the gift of

Integrity which our first parents possessed before their sin. It means freedom from Concupiscence. The whole of their nature was under the control of their rational will, which had no trouble in disposing of all suggestions that came to it, either accepting or rejecting, and the suggestion at once came to an end. They were not exempt from temptation, as we know; but their temptation consists merely in a forbidden good being presented to their minds; there was no struggle in them such as we commonly understand by temptation.

The distinction between the states of Adam and Eve before and after their fall, in regard to this matter, is sometimes expressed by saying that, before sin, the will was a despotic sovereign, whose behests none thought of disputing; but, after sin, the will remained sovereign, it is true, but so that the sovereign was forced to win his way by humouring his subjects, who were well inclined to give trouble by the resistance they offered.

We have said above that concupiscence is not sin, for sin essentially requires the consent of the will to evil. Nevertheless, the word "sin" is used many times in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans in the sense of concupiscence; the Council of Trent explains that it is so called, not because it truly and properly is sin in the regenerate, but because it springs from sin and inclines to sin. (Sess. 5, can. 5; Denz. 674.)

Among the propositions taught by Baius (n. 478) and condemned by St. Pius V., the twenty-sixth ran as follows: The Integrity of the first Creation was

the natural condition of man, not a gratuitous exaltation of him. (Denz. 906.) This condemnation falls upon the assertion that Integrity was natural to man, as to which we shall speak before long (n. 488); but it assumes the fact that our first parents possessed the gift of Integrity, and this has never been doubted in Catholic schools.

The proof of the doctrine is found in certain passages of the Book of Genesis. (ii. 25; iii. 7, 10, 11, 21.) From these passages it is clear that Adam and Eve, after their sin, and as a consequence of it, began to feel themselves affected by their nakedness in a way of which they had not been conscious before; and they sought a remedy in the use of clothing, the wisdom of which course was countenanced by a direct favour of God. This, put into technical language, is nothing else than saying that they had enjoyed the gift of Integrity, but by their sin they lost it, and became subject to concupiscence.

The same conclusion follows from the doctrine of St. Paul that concupiscence may be called sin (Romans vii. 7), and that sin entered the world by one man (Romans v. 12), with clear reference to the sin of Adam, which therefore made him for the first time subject to concupiscence.

The Fathers who combated the Pelagians, and especially St. Augustine, continually insist upon this doctrine. It will be remembered that, according to Pelagius, the sin of Adam did harm to himself only, and not to his posterity (n. 478), a view which was in direct opposition to our doctrine that in

consequence of that sin we are exposed to concupiscence, having lost that integrity which would otherwise have been ours. The assertion, therefore, that Adam enjoyed an integrity which we are without, was a convenient way of resisting the spread of an erroneous system which has at all times been very prevalent. A short statement of the Catholic doctrine on the point may be quoted from the Deacon Peter, a Greek who was sent to Rome to witness to the faith of the East: "Our belief is that Adam came from the hands of his Creator good and free from assaults of the flesh." (Lib. *De Incarn.* c. 6; *P.L.* 62, 88.)

Some of the Eastern Fathers, as St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St. John Damascene, inclined to think that, had Adam not sinned, no children would have been born of parents, which is now the way in which the race of man multiplies, but this end would have been secured in some other way. Even St. Augustine was at one time doubtful upon the point (*De Bono Conjug.* cap. 2; *P.L.* 40, 374); but afterwards he became convinced (*Contra Julian.* 4, 4, n. 34; *P.L.* 44, 756) that there was no ground for the doubt, and theologians have long been in agreement in holding the view that we described when explaining the State of Integral Nature. (n. 483.) The Scripture tells us that God created man, male and female, and gave the command that they should increase and multiply (Genesis i. 27); and it is altogether arbitrary to suggest that this was done on account of the Divine prevision of the impending fall of man from grace. The contrary

opinion rested on some idea that generation is impossible without concupiscence; but this idea is false, for that which may be done unconsciously does not necessarily involve unregulated desire. There may be concupiscence about food, yet food may be taken by a person who is unconscious, and may nourish his body.

487. *Other Gifts.*—We learn from Holy Scripture that our first parents received certain other gifts along with sanctifying grace and integrity, and first we may mention the large degree of knowledge that they possessed. This sense has always been ascribed in the Church to a passage of the Book of Ecclesiasticus, from which we learn that the Creator furnished man with all that was necessary to enable him to do the work for which he had been called into being, and this is to praise God. (n. 433.) The words are: "He gave them counsel, and a tongue, and eyes, and ears, and a heart to desire; and He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit, He filled their heart with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil; He set His eye upon their hearts to show them the greatness of His works, that they might praise the Name that He hath sanctified, and glory in His wonderful acts; that they might declare the glorious things of His works." (Ecclus. xvii. 5—8.) In the light given by this passage, we can appreciate the greatness of the knowledge implied by the fact that Adam gave names to every beast and bird (Genesis ii. 19); which names, doubtless, were not merely arbitrary

and devoid of suitability, but expressed in some manner which it is hard to understand, the essential nature of the beings to which they were applied. Such at least is the sense ascribed to the passage by the Fathers; a discussion of the matter would require us to enter on the mysterious question of the origin of language, which is beyond our province.

We have already quoted (n. 484) the canon of the Council of Trent, which declares that had Adam not sinned, he would not have been subject to death, as had been more than once declared by the Church during the controversy with the Pelagians. (Denz. 65, 145.) That death would be the result of transgression of the command is the warning given by God (Genesis ii. 17): "In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death." If this text stood alone, it might possibly be understood of the spiritual death of the soul which results from the loss of sanctifying grace, and of course this death is included in the threatened punishment. But that it extends also to the death of the body becomes clear when we compare the words of the sentence that followed on the sin: "Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return" (Genesis iii. 19), which is true of the body after death, but not of the soul. It is true that the death of Adam's body did not occur on the day of his sin; but this phrase is in accord with an Hebrew idiom, by which that which is certain to come to pass is spoken of as having already happened. St. Paul addressing living men tells them that the body indeed is dead (Romans

viii. 10), where he means no more than that it is surely destined to die.

But if there be any difficulty as to this text, the doctrine is clearly stated in other places of Holy Scripture. God created man incorruptible, but by the envy of the devil death came into the world (Wisdom ii. 23, 24); from the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die (Ecclus. xxv. 33), where the reference is to the part played by Eve in leading Adam into the sin which brought ruin on the race; by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death (Romans v. 12, and see n. 495); and still clearer is that other passage of the same Epistle (viii. 10) which we quoted just now for another purpose.

It is commonly understood that the freedom from liability to death was accompanied by exemption from pain of body or mind. Food, in all probability, would have been obtained without labour. (Genesis iii. 19.) It would seem that the State of Original Justice lasted for but a short time; in other words, the first sin followed speedily on the creation. At all events, no children were born in that state. A question has been raised whether children, had any been born, would at once have had the high degree of knowledge which was the portion of their parents, and the probable answer must be in the negative; the knowledge would have been acquired gradually, with their growth. It is impossible to fix the degree of knowledge which Adam and Eve possessed, but it is clear that it had its limits; for they were finite creatures, and more-

over Eve was mistaken as to the character of the tempter who assailed her. There is another question connected with the foregoing, whether they could have sinned venially; the Scotist school maintained that they could not have done so, for in their state the slightest violation of the law of God must have involved what is called formal disobedience, or renunciation of the principle of submission, and this must have necessarily amounted to grievous sin. St. Thomas, on the other hand, does not recognize the impossibility, and his view is commonly adopted by theologians.

It would be interesting to know how life would have been preserved, had sin and death never entered the world. As to this, it should be remarked that we have no information how long each individual would have remained in a state of probation before being translated without death to the sight of God and eternal life, the corruptible body putting on incorruption. (1 Cor. xv. 53.) But so long as the probation lasted, it is likely that the body was corruptible, and tended to decay; and that some means must be taken to check this tendency. We may be content with the conjecture put forward by St. Thomas on the subject. (p. 1. q. 97. a. 4.) The daily decay would, he thinks, have been checked by the use of food afforded by the ordinary trees of Paradise; but the decay due to the lapse of years required some more potent check, and this was found in the "tree of life" (Genesis ii. 9, iii. 22, 24), the fruit of which had the property of maintaining or restoring perpetual

youth. It is believed that this preternatural virtue belonged to an individual tree, and not to all of the same species. Nothing is known as to what this species was, and the guesses of Jewish and other writers are not worth recording.

The "tree of the knowledge of good and evil," the eating of which was forbidden, is also believed to have been an individual tree and not a species. It seems to have got its name, either from the promise made by the serpent as to the effects of eating it, or more probably, because God had ordained that the precept concerning it should instruct Adam as to the difference between moral good and evil.

And so we leave a subject on which endless speculation is possible.

488. *The Gifts not Natural.*—So far we have been maintaining certain statements of fact concerning the condition of our first parents; and our adversaries have been the Pelagians, Arminians (n. 390), and others, whose tendency is to make too little account of the effects of the sin of Adam, denying that it deprived mankind of any gifts above and beyond nature. We have now to assert the true doctrine against another class of adversaries who ascribe too much to that sin, and represent it as depriving man of much that was natural to him. These are the followers of Luther, Baius, and Jansenius, all of whom agree in substance, although they sometimes make use of different phrases. They assert that sanctifying grace, integrity, knowledge, and immortality are part of the essence of man's

nature, or are required by it by way of exigency or of fitness; we maintain, on the other hand, that the first is supernatural in the strict sense, and the other preternatural. (nn. 481, 482.) Our doctrine has not been formally defined by the Church, so that it may be denied without heresy; the Bull *Auctorem Fidei* (n. 189) censures one form of the opposing statement as false, already condemned in the cases of Baius and Quesnel, erroneous, and favouring the heresy of Pelagius.

It would be too long to cite all the propositions on the subject that are condemned by the Bulls of St. Pius V. against Baius, of Clement XI. against Quesnel, and of Pius VI. against the Synod of Pistoia. We must be content with quoting the fifty-fifth of Baius, which, in fact, expresses compendiously the whole matter: God could not have originally created man such as he is now born. Our opponents will agree that God could have created man with all that belongs to his nature, but think that the gifts which we now are born without were part of that nature; the condemnation therefore establishes our doctrine that these gifts are not natural.

The proof is simple. Man is a rational animal consisting of body and soul. But the body naturally tends to corruption and yearns for sensible pleasures; while the soul's natural yearning for happiness can be fully gratified by a natural knowledge which is something short of the sight of God face to face, provided the possibility of such a vision be not disclosed; and this is equivalent to saying that the

possession of sanctifying grace, integrity, and immortality is not the natural state of man.

What we have just said may sound more like reassertion than proof of our position: but in truth, when a limitation to the Divine power is alleged, it belongs to those who assert it to show the impossibility. We will therefore proceed to consider very shortly some of the heads of argument on which our opponents rely. And first, they urge the saying of St. Augustine: "Thyself, Lord, stirrest us to take delight in praising Thee; for Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart has no ease until it rest in Thee." (*Conf.* 1, 1; *P.L.* 32, 661.) They explain this as meaning that the Creator could not have put this longing in our hearts without at the same time giving us the means of securing its gratification; or in other words, that the perfect possession of God must be within the power of our nature to attain; and as this is not attainable without sanctifying grace, which the soul lacks at birth, it follows that St. Augustine teaches the doctrine of the fifty-fifth condemned proposition of Baius.

We have drawn out this objection at some length, because it is a type of a large class of arguments urged by the Jansenists, who extol the authority of St. Augustine, as often as it can be represented as supporting their cause, but make little account of the same authority when it goes against them. (n. 101.) The general answer is that there is great danger of error in trusting to isolated passages of the works of this great Doctor. In

the course of his long and busy life he was engaged from time to time in combat with adversaries of various descriptions, and he wrote for the practical purpose of checking the spread, sometimes of one error, sometimes of another. It happened, therefore, that, when he wrote, he sometimes used phrases which were perfectly correct, if understood as bearing on the matter then in hand, but which might be liable to mislead, if taken in connection with a different subject. It is therefore most necessary to study each passage as part of a whole work, or series of works, and with due regard to the teaching of the author on kindred subjects: and this, as we have remarked already, is the work of a life-time. The passage just quoted is taken from the *Confessions*, in which the Saint gives to the world the communings of his own heart with God: it is perfectly natural, then, that he should speak of himself, and of that human race to which he belonged, according to that state of repaired nature, in which we actually are (n. 483): in this state, the clear vision of God is within our reach, for the supernatural gift which Adam lost has been restored to us in a modified form. In the state of pure nature, the heart would have found rest in a knowledge of God which would be true, but of inferior clearness.

The same explanation applies to passages where St. Augustine, following St. Paul (Romans vii. 20, 23), calls concupiscence by the name of sin and the penalty of sin: and of course God could not create sin. We reply that in the existing state of things,

its presence in us is part of the penalty of the sin of Adam, as will be explained (n. 497); and it may metaphorically be called sin for the reasons given by the Council of Trent. (n. 486.) It is by a kindred metaphor that Christ, who died to redeem us from sin, is said to have been made sin. (2 Cor. v. 21.) There is no sin, properly so called, except where there is a free act of the will in violation of the known law of God. God could not create sin in this sense, for He is holy (n. 386), but by creating man subject to concupiscence, He would do no more than create the possibility of sin, which possibility follows by absolute necessity from the creation of a free-will. Every free creature is in ordinary circumstances liable to sin, whether subject to concupiscence or not; and hence the difficulty is reduced to that raised concerning the permission of evil, on which we have already spoken. (n. 388.)

The condition of the human race is described in the parable which speaks of the man who fell among thieves on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, while Christ is the Good Samaritan who relieved him. (St. Luke x. 30—35.) The thieves stripped their victim and wounded him, and it is explained that by the sin of Adam, man was wounded in what was natural to him and stripped of what was gratuitous. This accepted axiom is thought to show that man has lost something that belonged to his nature, besides being deprived of something that is above his nature: that is to say, that while sanctifying grace is supernatural, integrity and the other gifts are natural. And it is urged

that the Council of Trent countenances the same doctrine, when it declares (Sess. 5, can. 1) that by sin, the whole man, both body and soul, was changed for the worse. We reply that integrity and the rest are not strictly supernatural (n. 481), but merely preternatural, such as might be called natural to the state of integral nature. (n. 483.) Our opponents ought to show that the poor traveller was deprived not merely of the integrity of his body by wounds, but of that actual union of soul and body which constitutes the essence of man; in other words, that he was slain: and this is untrue.

What we have said appears sufficient to present to the reader the chief classes of objection alleged against our doctrine. The controversy is of immense extent, and we have to be content with the merest sketch. The whole matter will be better understood when the next chapter, on Original Sin, and the Treatises on Grace and Justification have been read.

489. *Pure Nature.*—The controversy of which we have just spoken was sometimes made to turn upon the possibility of the state of pure nature (n. 483), as to which there is now no question among Catholics, if absolute possibility is meant. (n. 385.) But certain theologians belonging to the Augustinian and Thomist schools maintain that God could not, by His ordinary power (*Ibid.*), create man as he now is, and that the proposition of Baius spoke of His absolute power, and so was rightly condemned. But these writers seem to make too much of the difference between the absolute and the ordinary power. It is absolutely impossible for God to do

anything that is positively opposed to any of His attributes; but the difficulties raised as to the possibility of the state of pure nature, are founded on its seeming to be opposed to the justice and mercy of God; if this be so, the opposition is positive, and the impossibility absolute. If negative opposition to the Divine attributes is meant, the doctrine in effect denies the possibility of the creation of any being that is not absolutely best; but since no absolutely best being can possibly exist (n. 388), this amounts to a denial of the possibility of creation.

490. *Recapitulation.*—This very important chapter has defined several terms used in discussing the position of man as a creature of God, and has indicated the errors that have prevailed on the subject. The condition of man in Paradise is described, and it is shown that he enjoyed certain privileges which were not his natural portion, but were superadded gratuitously to his nature; some of which were above the exigency of every possible created nature, and so were supernatural in the strictest sense of the word; others were of a far lower character than these, and were merely preternatural. One of these was Integrity, or absence of concupiscence, which is shown to be no more due to the nature of man, as such, than the other gifts; so that God might have created man in the state of pure nature, subject to concupiscence, and this would have been possible not to His absolute power alone, but also to His ordinary power, which in this matter cannot be distinguished from the other.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL OF MAN.

491. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we shall deal fully with a leading part of the revealed doctrine regarding man, some points of which we have already assumed as common knowledge. We shall show that Adam sinned, and by his sin lost the supernatural and preternatural gifts with which his nature was adorned in Paradise; and not only so, but involved the whole of his posterity in the consequences of his sin, so that all who come from him by way of human generation are conceived in the state which is called original sin, except so far as a special exemption may be granted by God to an individual. We shall show hereafter that the Blessed Virgin Mother of God received this favour, through the merits of her Son (nn. 520—543); but the rest of the present chapter will be occupied with explanations of the nature and effects of original sin, and the mode of its propagation.

The whole matter is known to us by revelation alone, and is tolerably plain; the difficulties raised against the doctrine of the Church are taken from reason, which fails to understand why God acted as

He has pleased to do. It may be hard, or even impossible to solve these difficulties, all of which, however, may be left on one side when we are dealing with the positive question what God has done. In truth they are not much urged by persons who frankly admit revelation to be their guide to the highest truth.

Attempts have been made to prove the Fall of Man from reason and history, and certainly the doctrine explains much of what goes on around us. But no such proof is conclusive, and we have reason to remember the warning we have quoted from St. Thomas about the danger found in using inconclusive arguments in support of the truths of faith. (nn. 402, 439.)

492. *The Sin of Adam.*—We read in Genesis a plain statement that God gave a command to Adam not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (n. 487); and the command was enforced by a revelation of the punishment that would ensue on disobedience: "In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death." (Genesis ii. 17.) Further, there is an equally plain statement that Adam disobeyed, for Eve gave to her husband, who did eat. (iii. 6.) It is unnecessary to transcribe the well-known history of the temptation that led up to this result. (iii. 1—6.)

This history, like other narratives found in Scripture, must be taken in its obvious sense, unless that sense be inconsistent with certain knowledge derived from other sources. If this were so, it would be necessary to consider whether the text

fairly admitted of some other sense, differing from the obvious sense, and not open to objection on other grounds; should this prove to be the case, the less obvious sense may be admissible. (nn. 159, 440.) But in the case before us, there is nothing known to us with certainty which requires us to search for any meaning but that which lies on the surface, and we need make no account of arbitrary conjectures, such as that of Philo, who thinks that the sin was not of the nature described, but another which is more rife among men now; or of the equally arbitrary assertions of others, that the whole describes what Eve saw in a dream, or that it is in some other way not a true and literal history of what happened. Not the smallest scrap of authority is forthcoming for any explanations of the sort, involving as they do the overthrow of the whole Christian revelation, which in numberless ways assumes the truth of the history.

The Tempter is spoken of by St. Paul indifferently as the serpent and as Satan. (2 Cor. xi. 3, 14; and so too in the Apocalypse xii. 9, xx. 2.) It would seem, therefore, that the chief of the fallen angels (n. 446) gained control over the organs of a serpent (see n. 454), and in this manner conversed with Eve; but it need scarcely be said that this is uncertain and a matter of mere curiosity. That the sin of Adam was grievous and not only venial follows from the penalty attached to it. This penalty was not death of the body alone, which would leave the point doubtful; for it is not certain that temporal death inflicted by the judgment of God is always

accompanied by the spiritual death of the soul which is the characteristic effect of grievous sin. But this sin of Adam had the result that all his posterity lost that sanctifying grace which would have been theirs, as we shall show; and Adam himself lost those gifts of integrity and immortality which had accompanied sanctifying grace in his soul (Genesis iii. 7, 19), so that it is not open to doubt that he himself by his sin lost the spiritual life which he had enjoyed, and became the enemy of God.

Some writers exercise their ingenuity in reckoning up all the forms of sin that were involved in this one act of Adam: they regard it as involving gluttony, and theft, and avarice, and much more; this seems to be far-fetched; we may say that there was pride, as there is in all sin (n. 448); but the special sin was certainly disobedience, as we learn from the express testimony of St. Paul (Romans v. 19; and see Conc. Trid. Sess. 5, c. 2, n. 484); and this knowledge guides us to the solution of a difficulty that occurs to many minds. To eat an apple seems to be too petty a matter to amount to mortal sin, and this may be so, if justice or temperance be the virtue concerned. But the principle of obedience is tested by small things no less than by great, for the Superior may make the smallest matter the test of willingness to submit; and the refusal of the principle of submission, by whatever act it is shown, may well amount to weighty matter, not in itself, but on account of the end of the act and its circumstances.

493. *Original Sin.*—We have already (n. 484) quoted the first and second canons of the Fifth Session of the Council of Trent upon Original Sin, and these were all that we had need of at the time. In the same Session, certain other canons were adopted, which we must proceed to give. (Denz. 673, sqq.)

3. If any one assert that this sin of Adam—which in its origin is one, and being transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own—is taken away either by the powers of human nature, or by any other remedy than the merit of the one Mediator our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath reconciled us to God in His own Blood, made unto us justice, sanctification, and redemption; or if he deny that the said merit of Jesus Christ is applied, both in adults and to infants by the Sacrament of Baptism rightly administered in the form of the Church; let him be Anathema.

4. If any one deny that infants, newly born from their mothers' wombs, even though they be sprung from baptized parents, are to be baptized; or say that they are baptized indeed for the remission of sins, but that they derive nothing of original sin from Adam, that has need of being expiated by the laver of regeneration for obtaining life everlasting—whence it follows as a consequence that in them the form of Baptism for the remission of sins is understood to be not true, but false; let him be Anathema.

5. If any one deny that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the

guilt of Original Sin is remitted; or even assert that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but say that it is only cancelled, or not imputed; let him be Anathema.

The conclusion of this canon concerning concupiscence is given already. (n. 486.) The Session closes with an important declaration:

This same holy Synod doth nevertheless declare that it is not its intention to include in this decree, where Original Sin is treated of, the Blessed and Immaculate Virgin Mary, the Mother of God.

In making this declaration, which we adopt and make our own, the Council followed in the footsteps of St. Augustine, where he makes a similar exception as to our Blessed Lady: "Except the Holy Virgin Mary, as to whom, for the honour of the Lord, I will have no question mooted, when sin is treated of." (*De Nat. et Grat.* c. 36, n. 42; *P.L.* 44, 267.) The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, which was not defined as a part of the Catholic faith till 1854, will be dealt with in our Treatise on the Blessed Virgin. (nn. 520—543.)

494. *Anathema.*—This may be a convenient place to explain the true meaning of the phrase, "Let him be Anathema," with which these and so many other definitions of doctrine close. The word is of Greek origin, and exists in that language in two forms, distinguished by a very trifling difference of spelling, but very distinct in use. Both are derived from a verb meaning "to set aside," and in one form (*ἀνάθημα*) the word is used of something

precious, set aside for the service of God, such as the gifts with which the Temple in Jerusalem was adorned. (St. Luke xxi. 5; see also 2 Mach. ix. 16.) But the word occurs also in another form (*ἀνάθεμα*), and with this spelling it is employed to signify a penal setting aside, whether of a thing which has been used as the instrument of wickedness, or of a person who has lost his social rights by crime. It occurs in both senses, in a verse of Deuteronomy. (vii. 26.) St. Paul uses the word more than once, to signify that a person is not worthy to be admitted into the society of Christians. (1 Cor. xvi. 22; Galat. i. 8, 9.)

In the language of the Church, the phrase, "Let him be Anathema," is used in the same manner as by St. Paul, and is a form of assigning the penalty of excommunication (n. 196) for an offence; when used, as it often is, to enforce definitions of faith, it means no more than this; but sometimes an Anathema seems to mean an excommunication pronounced against an offender with solemn and impressive ceremonies, which, however, do not alter the nature of the punishment. As we remarked in the place cited from our first volume, no anathema or other act of a human judge can take away the grace of God from the soul, if by any error the judgment has been pronounced against an innocent man.

In one place (1 Cor. xvi. 22) St. Paul adds to the word Anathema "Maranatha;" and the same is sometimes done by Councils of particular Churches, but the usage has not passed into the general

Canon Law. It has been supposed, but wrongly, that the addition of this word signifies that the censure will never be relaxed. (Benedict XIV. *De Synod.* 10, i. 7.) Maranatha is in truth an Aramaic word, belonging to a language familiar to St. Paul and most of his readers. It means "The Lord is at hand," and has the same force as when this expression is used in its Greek form. (Philipp. iv. 5.) The phrase enhances the force of that to which it it appended, by solemnly reminding the reader that Christ will come again, to judge the world.

495. *Anglican Doctrine.*—It may be convenient to here copy the authoritative statement of doctrine on the subject of Original Sin found in the ninth of the Articles of the Established Church.

Of Original or Birth Sin.—Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault or corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby every man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit, and therefore in every person born into the world it deserveth God's wrath and damnation; and this infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh (called in Greek *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh) is not subject to the law of God. And though there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess,

that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

496. *Erroneous Views.*—Most of the sects of Protestants would probably profess that they held the doctrine set forth in the Article just quoted, the earlier part of which is in substantial agreement with the Catholic teaching, as declared by the Council of Trent. In the latter part, where concupiscence is spoken of, there is a direct contradiction, and it will be our business to vindicate the teaching of the Council. (n. 499.) There is much in the decrees of the Fifth Session of Trent that we shall not deal with until we reach the Treatise on Baptism.

But though most of the prominent Protestant sects profess agreement with the Catholic Church on the subject of Original Sin, there is room for doubt whether the ministers of these sects are always diligent in preaching it; this is done where Calvinistic or Lutheran tenets (n. 390) prevail, but in many cases the views are insensibly disappearing. The Unitarians (n. 400) do not hold Original Sin in any form, nor do the Remonstrants. This sect exists in Holland, and has a history which deserves to be shortly noticed. We have mentioned the Arminians (n. 390, v.), the followers of the Dutch divine Arminius, who early in the seventeenth century raised his voice in protest against the extravagances of the fashionable predestinarian doctrine, upheld by a party who received the name of Gomarist, from a prominent leader. This theological feud came to be mixed up with the political strife between the

lovers of the purely aristocratic form of government and the adherents of the House of Orange, who wished to establish a veiled monarchy. These latter found it convenient to embrace the Gomarist side in the controversy, for by so doing they secured the sympathy of King James I. of England. In 1610, the Arminians had put forth a profession of faith which they called a Remonstrance, and received from that circumstance a name which has remained by them to the present day. The Gomarists prevailed, and in 1618 procured the condemnation of the Remonstrance by a Synod held at Dort; after which, following the fashion of the time, they endeavoured to crush their opponents by force. Many of the Remonstrant leaders, including Grotius, were imprisoned, and Bameveldt perished on the scaffold.

The earlier Remonstrants seem to have held the common creed of Christians on the subject of Original Sin; but the party never loved definite declarations of theological doctrine, and in consequence soon abandoned beliefs which were elsewhere regarded as fundamental. The sect has produced many men of learning and literary power, and their views and principles have had wide influence beyond the bounds of their communion. It may be said that the very prevalent form of religion called by its friends "liberal" and "undogmatic," originated with Arminius.

All theological systems that deny Original Sin are spoken of as Pelagian. We have already mentioned Pelagius in another connection (n. 478, i.),

and his name will come before us again in the Treatise on Grace. In the place referred to, we have quoted the summary of the Pelagian view given by Marius Mercator, which is clear and needs no explanation. It will be observed that it is in direct contradiction with the canons of Trent that we have quoted (nn. 484, 493), and, in fact, these canons are adopted, with scarcely the alteration of a word, from the decrees passed by Councils about the time when the heresy first arose. The history of this controversy, which is too complicated for these pages, illustrates remarkably the right of the Roman Pontiff to receive appeals from all the Christian world, and the care he exercised to secure a fair hearing to the accused. The final condemnation was issued in the year 418 by Pope Zosimus.

It seems that the true author of the Pelagian error was Theodore, Bishop of Mopsuestia in Cilicia. This man possessed great intellectual power, but was too much under the influence of the rationalizing spirit of the theological school of Antioch. His name will recur in the next Treatise, in connection with the heresy of Nestorius. His Pelagian views are recorded by Marius Mercator (*In verba Juliani*, Præf. n. 1; *P.L.* 48, 109), and seem to have been almost identical with those which the same writer ascribes to Pelagius.

497. *The Doctrine proved.*—That some evil consequences of the sin of Adam passed on to his posterity follows from what we have proved (nn. 484—487) as to the state of man in Paradise. It is clear that men are now subject to concupiscence

and death, being therefore deprived of gifts which Adam had before his sin, and lost in consequence of it (n. 492); this sin therefore has hurt us. The same follows from what we know of the work which the Incarnate Word of God came on earth to do: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." (1 Cor. xv. 22.)

These considerations, however, may be explained as referring to no more than the preternatural gifts lost by Adam, and something more is needed to show that men are actually in the state of sin, as soon as they come into this world. There is a passage in a well-known Psalm (l. 7.) which is more to the purpose, for the penitent David declares, "I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." These words might be hard to explain, except in the light of the Catholic doctrine, but they are scarcely sufficiently clear to be used as proof of that doctrine, especially as we can quote in its support the formal statement of an inspired Apostle.

This statement is found in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. Its full force cannot be exhibited except in the course of a complete commentary upon this difficult Epistle, and we can do no more than make a few remarks which may help to remove some of the more obvious difficulties that may be brought against our interpretation. The twelfth verse runs as follows: "As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned."

The second member of the comparison introduced by "as" is not given expressly, but it seems to be contained in the closing words of the fourteenth verse, "Adam, who is a figure of Him who was to come." Such changes in the form of a sentence, indicating the rapidity of the writer's thought, are characteristic of the style of St. Paul, and often cause much difficulty to the interpreter. The one man (12) is plainly Adam, and He that was to come (14) is Christ; the scope of the whole passage being to institute a comparison between what was done by Adam and what by Christ for the race of man. The twelfth verse, therefore, tells us that the sin of Adam introduced sin into the world, and death as the accompaniment of sin, and we have already (n. 487) used the passage to show that, before sin, Adam was not subject to death of the body; but what is important for our present purpose is to observe that sin and death are represented as going together, and that the universal prevalence of death is explained by the universal prevalence of sin as the result of the sin of Adam; which is the doctrine for which we contend.

The words translated "in whom" (ἐφ' ᾧ) admit also of the rendering "inasmuch as." The difference is immaterial for our purpose.

If the whole passage (12—19) be read, it will be observed that the word "sin," "offence," and "transgression" occur. These words are not synonymous, but represent well-marked differences of the original. "Sin" is a general word; "transgression" is the act of Adam in violating the

injunction laid upon him; "offence" is the same act considered as exciting the wrath of God, until this wrath was appeased, and grace or favour won for us by Christ. (15.) We read, "By the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation" (18); and in the following verse we have that "by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners" (19); these passages express the same idea, and putting them together we see that by the one sin of Adam, all men were made sinners, or contracted the stain of sin. Sin, therefore, one in its origin, being transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own, as the Council of Trent teaches. (n. 493.)

When the word "many" is used in this passage, it is opposed to "one," not to "all," to which it is equivalent. This is clear from a comparison of the places, especially of the eighteenth and nineteenth verses; and the Greek original marks the meaning. (*οἱ πολλοί*, not simply *πολλοί*.) Throughout, the opposition is between Christ on the one hand, and Adam with all his posterity on the other.

498. *Other Proofs.*—This must suffice as an indication of points to be attended to whenever a discussion is raised touching the interpretation of this passage, concerning which volumes have been written. Another proof is derived from a comparison of the declaration of St. John the Baptist that Christ is the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world (St. John i. 29), with the teaching of St. Paul that Christ died for all. (2 Cor. v. 15.) Christ took away sin from those

for whom He died, and He died for all; it follows that all were in sin. These references cannot be to actual sins, for these are many, and the plural number would have been used by St. John. There have been some who deny that Christ died for all men, and we shall deal with the matter in the next Treatise. (n. 543.) It is enough now to observe that they who question the universality of salvation are strenuous in upholding Original Sin.

A third proof is supplied by the practice of the Church in the use of the Sacrament of Baptism. We assume, what will be proved in the Treatise on the subject, that infants are capable of receiving Baptism, and that this Sacrament is necessary to them, so that without it they cannot enter the Kingdom: yet nothing but sin can exclude them, so that they must be under sin, from which this Sacrament cleanses them. They have no actual sins, for infants have not committed any; they must therefore have Original Sin. It is in this sense that the Church professes in the Creed her belief in one Baptism for the remission of sins, and the effect of cleansing from a stain is indicated by the use of the water, which is the matter of the Sacrament. The exorcisms used imply that the person receiving Baptism is a servant of the Devil, as being under sin.

It is scarcely necessary to notice, in addition, the proof drawn from prescription (n. 83), to which St. Augustine constantly makes a triumphant appeal, in his controversies with the Pelagians. Thus he addresses the Pelagian Bishop Julian: Original Sin

is not of my inventing; the Catholic Church has held it from of old; you who deny it are unquestionably the preacher of novelties, the heretic. (*Adv. Jul. de Nupt. et Concupis.* 2, 12, 25; *P.L.* 44, 456.) In another place, the same Saint, addressing the same Julian, enumerates eleven eminent writers of former generations who taught the doctrine, and he challenges his learned adversary to contradict him. (*Contra Jul.* 2, 10, 33; *P.L.* 44, 697.) He also explains certain ambiguous phrases which occur in some writings of the Doctors of the East by the remark that they had no reason to doubt that what they said would receive an interpretation in harmony with the Catholic faith, as to which no question was moved: "Before you raised a dispute they were less careful in their choice of language." (*Adv. Jul. de Nupt. et Concupis.* 1, 6, 22; *P.L.* 44, 450.) The method adopted in this controversy deserves attentive consideration, for it is applicable at the present day to many subjects. (See n. 113.)

The belief of the Church in the oneness of the race of man (n. 474) and in the universality of Original Sin is illustrated by a passage in a letter written about the year 750 by Pope St. Zachary to St. Boniface, the Apostle of Germany. Some charges had been brought against a certain priest named Virgil, and the Pope says (Epist. 11; *P.L.* 89, 946), "If he be proved to teach that there is another world and other men beneath the earth, and sun and moon, excommunicate him." This passage has been strangely represented as an *ex cathedra* declaration

(n. 290), that there are no men inhabiting the antipodes, and it is used as an argument against the infallibility of the Pope. Besides all else that may be remarked on the subject, the Pontiff said nothing that was not true, in the sense in which his contemporaries would understand his words: it was the universal belief that the fires of the tropic zone effectually cut off all possibility of intercourse between the northern and southern hemispheres: the teaching ascribed to Virgil therefore amounted to an assertion that there were men on the earth who were not sprung from Adam, and therefore not under Original Sin; and this would be against the doctrine of St. Paul, that in Adam all die. (1 Cor. xv. 22.)

So far we have proved the existence of Original Sin. We must now consider its nature; and first we will reject some false notions concerning it.

499. *False Notions.*—Certain undoubtedly false notions concerning the nature of Original Sin have been held by many of those who admitted the existence of this sin. According to some, the effect of the sin was to render the soul substantially bad. But this cannot be; the soul that God creates must be good, for He is not the Author of evil. (n. 473); Baptism, which, it is agreed, cleanses from Original Sin, does not work a substantial change in the soul, for this is impossible except by a process of annihilation and new creation; besides which, it is certain that the Divine Word took on Himself a nature substantially the same as ours (n. 520), but assuredly He assumed nothing that was substantially bad.

The same truth that Baptism removes Original Sin, together with the fact that it does not relieve the liability to pain, sufficiently disproves what is attributed to Abelard, that the pains of this life are Original Sin, and are so called because they are the consequence of the sin of Adam. This notion was a favourite with some of the more thorough-going among the early Protestants, and furnished them with a pretext for retaining the Catholic doctrine in word, while in truth they rejected it. Certainly, Christ did not die to relieve us from temporal pain.

A more important error is that which makes Original Sin consist in concupiscence. (n. 485.) This was taught by Luther and Jansenius, and is still a common view among Protestants: the English Establishment is pledged to it (n. 495), but many members of that community who comment upon the Article show little disposition to explain and defend it.

Against these adversaries we cannot use the argument that Baptism takes away Original Sin but leaves us subject to Concupiscence, for they do not admit that Baptism has the effect which we attribute to it, and which St. Augustine and his contemporaries made so much use of in their controversy with the Pelagians. We acknowledge that in our present state, our liability to concupiscence is an effect of the sin of Adam, as we have already shown (488), and for this reason and because it leads to sin, it is called sin by the Apostle. (n. 486.) But to lead to sin does not give it the proper nature of sin, for St. James tells us,

Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then, when concupiscence has conceived, it bringeth forth sin, but sin when it is completed begetteth death. (St. James i. 14, 15.) That which conceives and brings forth is not the same as that which is brought forth. Nor is it enough that it is the result of sin, for this is true of death (nn. 487, 498), which none call sin. Nor lastly can the presence of concupiscence in us be said to be properly sin, for sin essentially involves an element of consent. It was altogether a perversion of language when Baius gave the name of sin to evil desires which a man suffers against his will, as though they were forbidden by the commandment against coveting. (Denz. 930.) Punishment is the attendant on sin; but we revolt from the notion of positive punishment for that which we cannot help. (n. 500.)

500. *The Nature of Original Sin.*—These notions being rejected, we proceed to set forth one view of the nature of Original Sin which is admissible in Catholic schools: but we by no means say that it alone is admissible. We have seen that Adam and Eve enjoyed certain gifts (nn. 484—487) which were not due to their nature, but which nevertheless would have passed to their posterity, but for the sin of Adam. (nn. 488, 497.) But Adam sinned (n. 492), and by his sin forfeited these gifts for himself and for his posterity. (n. 497.) Men therefore are now born without that sanctifying grace with which they would have been clothed at birth, had not the Divine design been frustrated by the

transgression of the common father: the actual state at birth is a state of privation, or of the absence of something that ought to have been there. This privation had its origin in an actual sin: also, it is identical with the state to which one is reduced who, having in virtue of the redemption wrought by Christ regained sanctifying grace, commits actual mortal sin and so is stripped of that grace. On these accounts it is rightly called a state of sin: it is called Original Sin, to distinguish it from the state of actual sin, from which it differs totally in origin and in effects.

Besides being born without the supernatural gift (n. 484) of sanctifying grace, man is also born without the preternatural gifts (nn. 486, 487) of integrity and the rest, the absence of which constitutes a privation, no less than the absence of grace. This privation, however, is something different from the privation of grace, and is a punishment of Original Sin, rather than itself Original Sin. This punishment falls upon each one of us, although his will had no part in the originating transgression: but the punishment involves no injustice, for it is of the negative kind, which consists in withholding that which is no way due, but which would have been granted, as a gratuitous favour, had some condition been fulfilled. The Divine decree which bound up the fortunes of the race with the faithfulness of Adam may seem to us strange, for we fail to see its wisdom; but nothing can be seen in it which is opposed to the known attributes of God, and for the present we must be content to wait till we are

admitted to the vision of God, when all things will become plain.

Had God so pleased, He might have created us in the State of Pure Nature (n. 489), without interfering with any of His Attributes. The state in which we actually are born does not differ from the state of Pure Nature, except in the train of circumstances that led up to it, and in the prospect of restoration to the supernatural state which each man has, in virtue of the Death of the Divine Saviour—an immense exception.

This view of the nature of Original Sin is in harmony with the teaching of the Council of Trent (nn. 484, 493) as to the effect of Baptism, which is the Sacrament ordained for giving sanctifying grace to the child of Adam who has been born without it, and thus for removing the stain of Original Sin. It recommended itself to the great St. Anselm, who declares that he cannot understand Original Sin to be anything but the absence, due to the disobedience of Adam, of that robe of justice which ought to have been ours (*De Concep. Virg. et Pecc. Orig.* c. 27 [26]; *P.L.* 158, 461), and we may observe the analogy that just as the actual sin of any man produces in him individually a state of sin, so the sin of Adam produces a state of sin in the race as a whole.

The propagation of Original Sin is explained if we remark that the body comes into existence in exactly the same way, by the same natural operation, as if the parents were in the state of pure nature or of original justice: the soul is created by

God (n. 473), when the body is fit to be informed by it; but God, in view of the sin of Adam, abstains from conferring upon that soul the gifts above and beyond nature which He would otherwise have conferred in the act of creating: and this soul is infused into the body with the result that a man comes into existence, stained with Original Sin, in the sense explained. He has the nature of the race to which he belongs, neither more nor less: and this, quite irrespective of any question as to the spiritual condition of his parents. They are the parents of the body, and this body is generated in exactly the same way, whether the parents are in the state of grace or in the state of sin; the soul comes direct from the hand of the Creator, and its condition is unaffected by the parents.

501. *Some Further Points.*—A few miscellaneous remarks may be added, bearing on the subject that we have been discussing. The mystery of Original Sin consists in the Divine disposition whereby the fortunes of the race were placed in the hands of Adam. This must have been a positive disposition, for otherwise there would have been no more reason for the sin of Adam damaging his posterity than for the sin of any other man extending beyond himself. Some have suggested that there must have been some kind of an agreement between God and Adam, as basis for the result that happened; but this suggestion seems to be arbitrary and needless, for the mere will of God accounts for all.

As to the mode of transmission, concupiscence is so regular an attendant on the conception of a

new body, that some writers use expressions which might be understood to mean that the transmission of sin is a consequence of this concupiscence. But it is not a necessary accompaniment, for conception can be accomplished under circumstances that absolutely exclude all irregular appetite; so that these writers can be defended only if we understand them to mean that the ordinary presence of concupiscence is a mark of the fallen state of the nature of parent and child alike. Its presence is a sign of this state as truly as the spoken or written word is a sign of the interior thought; and in both cases, the name of the sign is often given to the thing signified.

According to the view that we have taken of Original Sin, it has not injured man in anything that is natural to him; and this is of faith so far as regards the freedom of the will, as we shall see in the Treatise on Grace. This point is one of the chief differences between the doctrine of the Catholic Church and that of the Lutherans and Jansenists. Catholic divines hold that the Fall weakened the free-will of man and rendered each individual more liable to sin than he would have been in the state of pure nature: this increased liability arises from a lessened supply of actual grace or from an increased liberty allowed to Satan to practise his arts of temptation. This view finds support in the truth that Original Sin has made us captive to the Devil (Conc. Trid. Sess. 5, can. 1, n. 484), from which captivity we needed to be redeemed: which word, it will be remembered, properly means the act of buying a slave for the purpose of restoring him to

freedom; and the life of our Blessed Lord was the ransom given to redeem us. (St. Matt. xx. 28.) But there seems to be no sufficient reason to suppose that the nature of man has suffered any intrinsic change for the worse: the loss of the preternatural gifts fully satisfies the decree of Trent upon the subject.

It would seem that some change in inanimate nature must be included among the effects of the sin of Adam. Part of the judgment pronounced on Adam was that the earth should bring forth thorns and thistles to him (Genesis iii. 18), and this has sometimes been understood as importing some change in the soil of the earth. But this interpretation is not necessary, for there may be special force in the words "for thee:" as if in the state of original justice (n. 483) food would have been obtained without labour (n. 487), while fallen man is forced to clear the soil from weeds by painful toil. But St. Paul declares (Romans viii. 22) that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain even till now, where the context seems to show that the phrase is not confined to rational creatures. This whole matter, however, is wrapped in great obscurity.

502. *Adamite Heresies.*—There is a considerable list of heresies that have received a name from Adam. The earliest of these is perhaps that held by those who are also called Encratite, or The Continent, because they professed a special abhorrence of marriage. (See St. Iren. 3, 23; *P.G.* 7, 960—965.) Their views were Manichean, founded on

the doctrine of the essentially evil character of matter. The founder of this sect was Tatian, who lived in the latter part of the second century. He was an Assyrian by birth, who was led by his insatiable thirst for knowledge to travel to the West, and he resided for some time in Rome. The multitude of idols with which the city was crowded forced upon him the conviction of the absurdity of the pagan worship, and under the influence of St. Justin Martyr he became a Christian. His activity now showed itself in the production of literary works, two of which we have already had occasion to quote: his *Diatessaron*, or Harmony of the Four Gospels (n. 51), and his *Apology for Christianity*. (n. 430.) After a time, however, he returned to the East, and adopted that doctrine of Two Principles (n. 427) which was always at home in his native country. He maintained the absolute unlawfulness of marriage, which he held to be that Tree of Life which Adam was hindered from approaching (Genesis iii. 24, and n. 487), and he taught that by introducing marriage into the world, Adam sinned beyond forgiveness, and was eternally lost. This severe judgment as to the fate of the common father excited the indignation of Christian writers, such as Tertullian (*Præscript.* 52: *P.L.* 2, 72); all of whom believed in his salvation, which indeed is expressly taught in the Book of Wisdom. (x. 1, 2; see n. 474.)

Another curious sect of Adamites was that which showed itself in Bohemia, during the religious turmoil which is connected with the name of Huss.

These thought that they could restore the paradisiacal state of man by dispensing with the use of clothing, which was introduced after the Fall. (n. 486.) They were accused of frightful excesses, and we are almost justified in accepting the charge without much scrutiny into the evidence, so great is its inherent probability. However this may be, the leaders were put to death in 1421 by *Ziska*, and the sect disappeared from public view. But it was not destroyed, and when in 1781, the Emperor Joseph II. saw fit to proclaim religious toleration, a considerable number of persons avowed themselves Adamites, and claimed the protection of the new law. They were, however, disappointed, for special legislation was adopted excluding them from toleration. Again they disappeared; but during the frenzy for universal liberty that marked the year 1848 they again revived, and on this occasion they announced the approaching destruction of the Catholics by the Moors, after which the true imitators of Adam should possess the land. Military force being brought to bear upon them, they again disappeared from sight, and are probably now biding their time, bringing up their children in principles which they are unable to act upon. (*Kirchen-Lexicon* of Wetzer and Welte, s.v. Adamiten.) The same atrocious form of fanaticism has sometimes appeared in England and other Protestant countries.

503. *Recapitulation.*—This chapter has presented to the reader the account given in Scripture of the sin of Adam, together with the doctrine of the

Church on the abiding effects of that sin in opposition to the views maintained by various opposing sects of heretics. Many questions arise, as to some of which it is impossible to speak with certainty, but indications are given of possible answers. Lastly, we have the curious history of heretics who profess to be followers of Adam.

504. *Close of the Treatise.*—It is to be feared that the reader of this Treatise must often have felt disappointed at finding that he fails to obtain satisfaction for his reasonable curiosity. The truth is that the Treatise on Man raises many questions to which we think that answers ought to be forthcoming: the subject seems to be so near to us, yet in truth is so far off. What is here said applies alike to the knowledge of man that we get from natural means and to that which revelation supplies. In both cases we must try to make the most of such means of inquiry as are within our reach; and to be content even if we find that much remains obscure. Revelation was given for a purpose far different from that of satisfying curiosity, and it is well that faith supplies us with some few truths, as firm bases on which to rest while striving to learn ever more and more.

The matter of the Treatise is discussed by St. Thomas, in the First Part of his *Summa*. (qq. 44—76 and 90—99.

Treatise the Eleventh.

The Incarnation.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

505. *Plan of the Treatise.*—The Incarnation is the central Mystery of the Christian religion, which may be described as the worship of the Son of God who was made Man, and by His Death redeemed mankind. It is the central Mystery which gives unity to all other parts of Christian teaching, and links into a consistent whole the several branches of this teaching, and of all our natural knowledge of the position held by man before his Creator. The great act of condescension which we are about to consider throws light on much which Natural Theology leaves obscure.

The teaching of revelation upon the matter is, in short, this: The Divine Word, the only-begotten Son of God, the true and eternal God (nn. 406, 408), took to Himself a true human nature, with a body and natural soul and all else that belongs essentially to man, and in this human nature, He was born of a

Virgin Mother, without having any man for His father. The union of the two Natures was such that each remained distinct from the other, having its own will and operation; but so that in the God-Man there is but one Person, the Person of God the Son. The Son of God, thus made Man, came to shed His Blood and die upon the Cross; and this Blood-shedding was accepted by God as an Atonement for the original sin of mankind and for all actual sins; so that through the merits of Christ the race of man was raised from the state of Fallen Nature, and being placed in the state of Repaired Nature (n. 483), was made capable of being admitted after death to the enjoyment of the supernatural vision of God.

The doctrine of the Incarnation, when thus stated in broad outline, is in itself sufficiently simple, although it is easy to fall into errors regarding it if once we venture to go beyond what is taught in the Creeds. This danger is made greater by the fact that the Death of the Son of God on the Cross is the great object of the thought and devotion of Christians, who are sometimes tempted to indulge in speculations beyond what is revealed, and then are apt to neglect certain rules of language and sufficiently subtle distinctions, inherent in the mystery of One Person in two Natures. In the present Treatise we shall endeavour to explain some of these distinctions. After a little preliminary matter, we shall in successive chapters, prove that Christ was God and Man, and show the mode of the Union with some of its consequences: after

which, we shall give an account of what is held concerning the Atonement, and close with a chapter containing remarks on some of the incidents of the Life of our Lord upon earth. It is obvious that the whole matter of this Treatise is known to us by revelation alone. The greater part is the defined faith of the Church.

506. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this preliminary chapter, we shall give a brief account of the chief errors concerning the Incarnation which have been current at various times; and then show that the Catholic doctrine involves nothing which is self-contradictory or unbecoming in God, but that it is eminently in harmony with His attributes: and some other miscellaneous points will follow.

507. *Errors.*—The Mystery of the Incarnation is the union of two Natures, Divine and Human, in one Person, in Christ. The history of the Church shows us that all possible errors in regard to this Mystery have from time to time found patrons. The earliest error of which we read denied the reality of the Human Nature in Christ; then came those which denied His Divinity. The oneness of Person in Him was next attacked; and afterwards it was taught that the Human Nature was absorbed and lost in the Divinity, at least so far that it had no separate will; and thus in Christ there was but one will. We will give a few particulars concerning each of these classes of error.

I. *The Docetæ.*—The first error is that of those who denied that the Christ of whom we read in the Gospels was truly Man: it was said that He was

phantom, having the semblance of a human body, but no true flesh and blood. This fancy will secure few advocates at the present day, and we find it hard to conceive how it could have gained a place in the mind of any person who accepted the Gospel history; nevertheless, it is certain that the error made its appearance very early among Christians, so that the Apostles were forced to protest against it. St. Paul had this error in mind when he taught (Coloss. ii. 9) that in Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally, where the last word is emphatic: and St. John, more fully, declares that his eyes had seen Christ and his hands had handled Him. (1 St. John i. 1.) When the Apostles' Creed declares that Christ was born "of" or "out of" the Virgin Mary, and that He was crucified, dead, and buried, it protests against the views of those who held that He had no true human Mother, but that He was some kind of Angel who assumed the appearance of a body, coming "through" the Blessed Virgin like water through a pipe. This Angel was held to be incapable of suffering or death, and various modes were invented of explaining away the history of the Sacred Passion: such, for instance, as that Christ betook Himself back to Heaven while on the road to Calvary, leaving Simon the Cyrenian to be crucified in His place. (St. Iren. 1, 24, 4; *P.G.* 7, 677.) This absurdity only showed the straits to which its inventor, Basilides, was reduced in his endeavour to reconcile his Gnostic dreams with his pretension to be considered a Christian: yet the attempt continued to be made, not in the East only,

the land of mysticism, but in the matter-of-fact West also; and the African Tertullian found it necessary as late as the year 210 to write a tract on the flesh of Christ. These heretics received the name of Docetæ, from a Greek root (δοκεῖν) signifying "to have a semblance."

II. *Apollinaris.*—The true humanity of Christ was denied also by the followers of Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea, who, about the year 375, began to teach that the Body born of the Virgin Mary was not informed by any soul, or at least that it had no rational soul, the place of this being supplied by the Divine Word: this last form of the error being trichomistic. (n. 465.) The controversy on this subject brought out the true doctrine of the Church on the subject of the Incarnation, but it is not of much historical importance.

III. *The Monarchians.*—The true doctrine of the Incarnation is impugned by all forms of Monarchian teaching (n. 400); whether it be said by Sabellius that God being one in Person took flesh: or whether it be denied that Christ was God, as by Paul of Samosata, and his modern representatives; or that the Incarnate Word is consubstantial with the Father, as by the Arians. We need not repeat what we have said in the place referred to, as to the history of these sects. Probably, no one who held the doctrine of the Trinity of Persons in God has denied the presence of one of these Persons in Christ.

IV. *The Nestorians.*—Nestorius, the able and eloquent Patriarch of Constantinople, began, about

the year 427, to preach a doctrine which destroyed the unity of Person in Christ, and by consequence the reality of the Incarnation. He had imbibed the idea of this doctrine from his teacher, Theodore of Mopsuestia, under whom he studied at Antioch, who by denying the existence of original sin (n. 493) did away with the necessity of God's taking human nature, to redeem the race. Nestorius taught that Christ was conceived and born exactly as other men, but that, at some undefined period of His Life, the Word of God became united with Him by a moral union, like that by which God is united to the souls of all the just (n. 184, ii.), only far closer than is ordinary. This union ceased and the Divine Word withdrew Himself, at some time before the Death of Christ, who accordingly was a mere man when He suffered on the Cross; and in this way the whole fabric of Christian doctrine fell together. The error was promptly detected and condemned in an Ecumenical Council held at Ephesus in 431, when the doctrine of the Church was declared to be that the union of the two Natures in Christ was such that there was in Him one Person only, and this was the Person of the Divine Word; also that this union began from the first instant of His existence as a Man; all of which is summed up in the one title, Mother of God, ascribed to the Blessed Virgin, who thus became the Destroyer of Heresies.

Unlike Arianism, the heresy of Nestorius failed to find favour at the Court of Constantinople, and being condemned by Church and State alike, it soon ceased to be visible within the bounds of the

Roman Empire. But for this very reason, it was acceptable to the heathen rulers of the Parthian Empire beyond the Euphrates, who recognized in it a means of securing the allegiance of their Christian subjects. The followers of the heresy developed a missionary spirit, and seem to have spread some knowledge of Christ throughout Central Asia, and even as far as China. They made large numbers of individual converts, but it is noticeable that they failed to effect the conversion of any nation (n. 256), and their success was very short-lived. The Christianity of those regions was swept away by the Mohammedan invasion, and is now represented by a few thousands, in Eastern Kurdistan. Many of these have accepted the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, and are in communion with Rome, but have a Patriarch of their own, and still use their ancient Syriac liturgy. There are others who seem to refuse to receive the doctrine defined at Ephesus, but their ignorance is such that it is hard to ascertain what is really their belief on the points in controversy.

V. *The Eutychians.*—Foremost among those who combated Nestorianism in Constantinople was one Eutyches, the head of a monastery in that city. Unfortunately, he had more zeal in opposing heresy than acuteness to appreciate the subtleties of the controversy; and the result was that he misunderstood some expressions used by St. Cyril of Alexandria, the guiding spirit of the Council of Ephesus. Eutyches maintained that he had the authority of this great Doctor for a view which in truth

destroyed the reality of the Incarnation as thoroughly as did that to which it was opposed, for it represented the Human Nature as being so completely absorbed in the Divine Nature that it ceased to have a distinct existence. This heresy was condemned by the Fourth Ecumenical Council, held at Chalcedon in 451, but the sect maintained itself under the name of the Monophysites, which signifies that according to their teaching there is one Nature alone in Christ. (*μόνος, φύσις.*) The struggle of these heretics against the Church was kept up for a long time, and was carried on, not by theological argument, but by political intrigue, much of which depended on the jealousies of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria. The latter See fell finally into the hands of the heretics, with the result that the flourishing Church of Egypt perished, having no strength to withstand the Mohammedan invaders: and Abyssinia also embraced the Monophysite teaching. At the present day, at least three varieties exist among the Christians of Egypt. Some not only preserve communion with Rome, but also follow the Latin rite: others have communion with the Holy See, but use a Coptic liturgy. Others again cling to the heretical Patriarch as successor to Dioscorus, and these uphold the belief that his deposition by the Council of Chalcedon was unjust. Their course is dictated by personal and national considerations, and the theological question is lost sight of.

VI. *The Monothelites.*—Early in the seventh century, a party arose at Constantinople who

endeavoured to put forward an explanation of the doctrine of Chalcedon which would render it less distasteful to the Monophysites. These represented that in Christ there were two distinct Natures in the one Person of the Word: but that the Human Nature was without initiative, so that all will and action came from the Divine Nature, the Human Nature yielding a merely passive concurrence; so that the acts of Christ were in no true sense the acts of a man. This attempt to win over heretics by a compromise which in fact abandoned the cause of truth, was a failure, as all such attempts must be; and the only result was that a new sect of Monothelites arose, whose name signified that they recognized only a single will in Christ. (*μόνος*, *θέλω*.) Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, fell into the Monothelite error, and wrote a cunningly worded letter to the Pope, Honorius, explaining his position. In the year 633, the Pope replied by a letter which dealt with the matter as Sergius represented it, and not as it really was, with the result that he could be plausibly represented as favouring the heresy; when, therefore, Sergius was condemned in 680 by the Fourth General Council of Constantinople, the condemnation extended to Pope Honorius, whose want of prudence and vigour had caused much mischief to the faith. We have already pointed out (n. 292, iv.) that this condemnation does not affect the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, speaking *ex cathedra;* for Honorius did not address the Universal Church, nor was he condemned for

teaching false doctrine. The heresy disappeared after the Council.

VII. *Adoptianism.*—In the course of the eighth century we meet with a kind of revival of Nestorianism in Spain, where two Bishops, Felix of Urgel and Elipandus of Toledo, taught that in Christ there were two sonships: that Christ, as God, was the natural Son of God, but that, as Man, He was merely an adoptive son, as are all other men. This error destroyed the unity of person in Christ, and was accordingly condemned by a Council at Frankfort, and the condemnation was approved by the Holy See.

VIII. *Protestants.*—The Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation is probably accepted, as far as words go, by all the sects of Protestants that admit the Trinity of Persons in God: by all the "orthodox" sects as they are called, to distinguish them from impugners of the Trinity, who are termed "heterodox." But the theological studies of the ministers even of the "orthodox" sects are seldom directed towards the attainment of distinct ideas as to the mode of union between the natures; and the result is that Nestorian views would probably be found on investigation to be largely prevalent among clergy and laity alike. Among Catholics, the knowledge of the true doctrine is kept alive among all classes by the frequent use of prayers where the Blessed Virgin is invoked as Mother of God; and there is no feeling of incongruity in paying Divine worship to the Sacred Humanity, and to whatever the Word of God has once assumed. The disuse

of these practices among Protestants of all shades soon led to a looseness of hold upon the doctrine which some now deplore.

508. *Possibility.*—The Incarnation is a mystery in the strictest sense (n. 16), for it is probable that without revelation the reason of man would never have detected the possibility of one Person having two Natures; and even in the light of revelation, the possibility cannot be demonstrated. The fact that the doctrine has been revealed can be established with certainty, and the inconclusive character of all attempts to prove it impossible can be exhibited; in truth, the proof of the possibility of the union thus attained is as complete as is attainable in other cases. Apart from our knowledge of the fact, no man could prove the possibility of guiding ships in mid-ocean by the use of an iron needle. We will shortly notice some objections that are made to the possibility.

First, it is said that to become incarnate is a change in God, whereas He has been shown to be unchanging. (n. 370.) To this it is enough to reply that the same difficulty may be urged in some measure against the possibility of creation, and in fact is urged as one of the main supports of the system of pantheism. When we are discussing the Incarnation we may assume that the doctrine of creation is admitted. The explanation of the difficulty is the same in both cases. It is no change when that which was possessed "eminently" comes to be also possessed "formally" (n. 362), for nothing more is possessed in the second case than

in the first, the novelty being in the mode of possession only. To be actually Creator or actually Incarnate adds nothing to the power to create or to take a human nature, both of which powers are eternally possessed by God.

That one Person of the Blessed Trinity should become incarnate, seems opposed to the axiom that all the works of God outside His own Being are common to all the Divine Persons. (n. 418.) The answer to this objection is that the creation of the Human Nature of Christ was common to all the Persons, like other acts of creation, but that it is appropriated (n. 421, vii.) to the Holy Spirit, because it is in a special manner an act of love by which God communicates Himself to the race of man. That this nature became united with the Divine Nature as existing in the Second Person and not otherwise, is not an act of God to which the axiom applies.

Other difficulties against the possibility of the Incarnation resolve themselves into the question how a human nature can exist without being a human person. This point will be considered hereafter, when we discuss the mode of the union of the two natures. (n. 528, and see n. 370.)

509. *Congruity.* — The theological use of the words "congruous" or "convenient" is not the same as the popular use. The "convenience" of the works of God is seen when we are able to trace in them the manifestations of power, wisdom, and goodness that they contain. We may be sure that, in all that God does, these attributes are exercised

in a far fuller sense than we can detect, and that nothing can have place in His works that is positively "incongruous" or "inconvenient," even in the least degree. (n. 387.) Also, the more the matter is studied, more numerous points of "convenience" will be detected; and to search these out is a principal part of the work of Theology. We will point out some of the conveniences that are observable in the Incarnation; but first, we must reply to these persons who think that it involves positive inconvenience.

The Manicheans, who maintained the doctrine of the essentially evil character of matter, consistently held that it was unworthy of God to become united with anything so low as human nature, and especially to be born of a woman. The fundamental answer is, of course, found in the doctrine of creation, according to which whatever exists outside God owes its existence to Him, for He is the Creator of all, of matter no less than of spirit; and the propagation of mankind by birth from woman is the Divine institution in which there can be nothing evil. (n. 428.) But the Fathers find other replies to the particular form of the objection before us; thus they admit with Tertullian (*Contra Marcion.* 3, 10; *P.L.* 2, 335), that no creature can of itself be worthy to furnish a vesture for God, yet whatever He chose for His clothing He makes to be worthy. They remark also (Rufin. *In Symb. Apost.* 12; *P.L.* 21, 351), that if a child is drowning in a filthy pool, there is nothing degrading in the act of a nobleman who steps in and rescues the helpless

victim. The more foul the abyss, the stronger is the evidence of love.

Respecting the conveniences found in the Incarnation, we may mention that it contains greater proof of Divine Power than is found even in the Creation of the world out of nothing; for this "nothing" certainly offered no resistance to the act, whereas it might seem that human nature with its inherent liability to suffering and death, does offer resistance to union with the Divinity. By the Incarnation, the Charity or Goodness of God appeared towards us, because God has sent His only-begotten Son into the world that we may live by Him. (1 St. John iv. 9.) Lastly, the Divine Wisdom showed itself in devising a means by which due satisfaction could be offered for the sins of man by a Person who was free from sin, at the same time that He had the sin-infected Nature. Other conveniences of the same kind will present themselves as we proceed. These concern God. On the side of mankind we notice that even if the redemption of the race were otherwise provided for, in no way could God have made Himself known so well to His creatures as by the Incarnation, and when He is known as being Himself a Man, He can the more easily be loved and imitated; and each man who knows the dignity to which his nature has been raised will be stirred to endeavour to live a life worthy of his position.

510. *Which Person?*—Theologians endeavour to illustrate the mystery of the Incarnation by considering certain questions as to the possibility of a created nature being assumed by God in other ways

than that in which we know Him to have assumed the nature of man. In these subtle inquiries, the teaching of St. Thomas has generally prevailed, although he is opposed by one or another high authority upon almost every point. We can do no more than very briefly indicate some of the results arrived at. (See *Summa*, p. 3. q. 3.)

In the first place, it does not seem impossible that the First or Third Person of the Blessed Trinity should have become incarnate. The power that effected the Incarnation of the Second Person would seem to have sufficed for one of the other Persons, and no positive incongruity (n. 509) can be detected in the assumption of human nature by the Father or the Holy Spirit. At the same time, there is a positive convenience in the Incarnation of the Word of God, for He is the Image of the Father, by whom all things were made. (n. 421, i.)

Next, St. Thomas also holds that all the three Divine Persons could have assumed one and the same human nature; but the possibility is denied, not only by Scotus, but by St. Anselm, the weight of whose authority on a point of this kind is very great; and Suarez, as well as Scotus, is against the Angelic Doctor, who holds that the Divine Nature, considered as common to the Three Persons, could not assume a created nature.

Could the Divine Word, who became Man in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, go on to assume other human natures? No impossibility can be detected, for the one act does not exhaust the Divine power; but though we do not see that many Incarnations

were impossible, yet it seems clear that in fact there neither has been nor will be more than one; for not only is there no hint of a second Incarnation to be found in the records of revelation, but the existence of a second seems to be excluded by the doctrine of St. Paul (Ephes. iv. 10), that Christ has ascended above all heavens that He might fill all things; and no one can suggest any end which has not been provided for by what Christ has done.

511. *What Nature?*—The nature, in fact, assumed by the Word of God was a human nature; the question may be considered whether any other nature could possibly have been assumed. As to irrational natures, animate or inanimate, St. Thomas sees no contradiction, so that the assumption would be within the absolute power of God. (n. 387.) But it is hard to see how such an assumption could be consistent with the Divine Wisdom, and therefore it would seem not to be within the ordinary power.

As to the angelic nature there is less difficulty; and, in fact, the Scripture seems to indicate that mankind were favoured above the Angels, in that God was pleased to assume the nature of man and not of an Angel; and this seems to imply that either assumption was possible; a text of St. Paul (Hebrews ii. 16) is sometimes referred to as indicating the possibility, as distinct from the fact, of hypostatic union with an Angel. At any rate, God spared not the Angels that sinned (2 St. Peter ii. 4), which text implies that He might have pardoned them; and although this pardon might have been

extended to them without satisfaction being made by a Person having the sinful nature (n. 512), yet such a course would be out of harmony with what we know of God's dealings.

At the same time, we may see a special suitableness in human nature for the honour conferred upon it, for this honour extended in a manner to the whole world. Man is the microcosm (n. 349), combining in himself all other natures, for he has corporal being in common with the stones, and life in common with the plants, while he shares sensation with the brutes; and the spiritual nature, intellect and will, belongs to him in common with the Angels.

512. *The Incarnation Free.*—The Incarnation, like all other works of God outside His own Being, was absolutely free. God was free in creating man, in raising him to the supernatural state, and in restoring him after his Fall. The Divine decree to work the redemption of man by means of the Incarnation was therefore an absolutely free act of the love of God for His sinful creature; and when expressions occur in Scripture which seem to point to some necessity, these must be understood of the necessity arising from the eternal decree; it was in this sense, for instance, that Christ "ought" to have suffered. (St. Luke xxiv. 26.) When God decreed that man should not be restored unless a perfect satisfaction were offered for sin, the Incarnation of a Divine Person became necessary, for in no other way could one who had the nature make the satisfaction required; but the restoration could

have been effected, had God so pleased, in other modes. We see "convenience," in the mode of perfect satisfaction which was actually adopted, but God is in no way necessitated to do all that is "convenient" (n. 509); to hold otherwise is to destroy the Divine liberty (nn. 387, 484), and under pretence of exalting God, to deprive Him of a grand Attribute. Particularly, it is a false view which represents God as bound to secure to Himself infinite honour from the homage of a creature, and holds that this could not be, unless that creature were also the Infinite God; for God is free in fixing what external honour He will have.

The Incarnation must be held to have been a free act on every hypothesis short of a Divine decree that it should take place; and, in fact, this decree was made, as a step towards the redemption of mankind from the state of sin. But there is a famous question agitated among theologians, whether the Son of God would have assumed a human nature, even if Adam had been faithful in observance of the command laid upon him; in other words, could God have had any end in becoming Man, beyond that of making Atonement for sin. The negative is maintained by St. Thomas (p. 3. q. 1. a. 3.), on the ground that he sees no trace in the monuments of revelation of any other end being answered by the Incarnation; and some of the Fathers represent this as the only end (St. Iren. 5, 14, 1; *P.G.* 7, 1161; St. Leo, *Serm.* 77 [75], 2; *P.L.* 54, 412): this view is adopted by many writers of the highest authority belonging to all schools of

theology: *e.g.*, St. Bonaventure, Cajetan, Petavius, Thomassinus, Berti, Billuart, Witasse. But great names are also found on the other side: *e.g.*, Scotus, Suarez, Catharinus, St. Bernard, St. Francis of Sales. These think it unseemly that the greatest work of God should be represented as done in virtue of a decree that was subsequent to the foresight of the sin of a creature; and they think they find indications in Scripture that the honour of the God-Man is the end of all creation (Proverbs viii. 22; Coloss. i. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 7), and that the predestination of Christ is the basis of our predestination. (Ephes. i. 4, 5; 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23.) They think that the passages quoted from the Fathers must be understood as referring to the fact of what was done to atone for the sin of Adam, and not as indicating what might have been done, had no sin been committed. No decisive utterance of the Church can be quoted on either side, so that the question is open; but the general current of opinion is against the Scotists.

513. *Recapitulation.*—This introductory chapter has dealt with a variety of points which might have been distributed in other parts of the Treatise, but which it seemed more convenient to put together, before beginning the proofs of doctrine. One section gave a rough classification of the errors which have prevailed on the subject of the Incarnation, while the others offer such answers as are possible to certain questions which do not enter into the ordinary teaching of Christian doctrine, but which are likely to suggest themselves to the mind of

every one who takes interest in the subject. These concern the possibility, convenience, and freedom of the Incarnation, in regard both to the form in which it occurred and to its actual end. It must be carefully observed that the speculations of theologians upon these subjects do not touch the substance of the dogma itself, the different points of which will be demonstrated in the coming chapters. The proof that we shall give would not lose a particle of its force, even if it were considered that these preliminary questions were such that no reasonable answer to them is forthcoming.

CHAPTER II.

GOD AND MAN.

514. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In the Apostles' Creed, we profess our belief in Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, our Lord; who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary. This doctrine is set forth somewhat more fully in the Athanasian Creed (n. 401), to the effect that Jesus Christ, our Lord, is God and Man: God of the substance of the Father, begotten before all worlds, and Man of the substance of the Mother, born in the world; perfect God and perfect Man, consisting of a rational Soul and human Flesh. In the present chapter we shall explain and justify the doctrine.

515. *Jesus.*—The Person whose preaching and sufferings are related in the four Gospels, is sometimes called by the full Name, Jesus Christ (St. Matt. i. 1; St. Mark i. 1; St. John i. 17), but more commonly the first of these Names is used alone. We shall explain the meaning of each Name.

Jesus is the form given in Greek to the name, the Hebrew form of which is represented in the Vulgate by Josue. The Greek spelling of this name has passed into Latin, and thence into English and

the chief European languages. (See n. 575.) The name is far from uncommon in the Old Testament (1 Kings vi. 14; 1 Esdras ii. 2, &c.), where the Vulgate has the form Josue, while in other places it uses Jesus (Ecclus. xlix. 14; Zach. iii. 1; 1 Mach. ii. 55); but there is only one person of much note who bore the name, Josue, the son of Nun, the lieutenant and successor of Moses. In the Book of Numbers (xiii. 9, 17) we read that Osee, of the tribe of Ephraim, was among the principal men who were chosen to view the land of Canaan, when the Israelites were on the point of invading it; his name at that time was Osee, but was altered by Moses to Josue. This change, which is much less violent in the original language than an English reader would suppose, does not affect the meaning, which is "Saviour," or "Yahveh, the Saviour" (n. 354); it occurs as an appellative in the Prophet Habakkuk (iii. 18), where the translators have treated it as a proper name, putting "in God my Jesus," in place of "in God my Saviour." The son of Nun is referred to as "Jesus" in the New Testament (Acts vii. 45; Hebrews iv. 8); and "Jesus, son of Josedec, the High Priest," is mentioned by Aggaeus (i. 1, &c.), and Zacharias (vi. 11.)

Clement of Alexandria, not being acquainted with the Hebrew language, sought for a Greek origin for the Holy Name, and found it in a word meaning "to heal." (*ἰάω*.) The sense is suitable, but the etymology is certainly wrong. (*Pædagog.* 3; *P.G.* 8, 677.)

The Son of the Blessed Virgin received the Name of Jesus by Divine appointment (St. Matt. i. 21, 25; St. Luke i. 31, 21), and the reason of the choice is assigned, that He shall save His people from their sins. This Name indicated that the work of the Son of Mary was to be of the same nature as the work of the son of Nun; as he led the people of Israel through the Jordan to the land that flowed with milk and honey, so his greater Namesake came to lead men through the cold flood of death to their heavenly country.

From the earliest days of the Church traces are to be found of the love and reverence with which the faithful regarded the Holy Name of Jesus, and their confidence in It (Acts iv. 10; Philipp. ii. 10): and St. Paul especially seems to delight in dwelling upon the Name. There is some difficulty as to the full meaning of the passage from the Epistle to the Philippians, where the Apostle speaks of every knee bowing "in" the Name of Jesus; but whatever else is meant, there is no doubt that the words have suggested the practice of bowing the head "at" the mention of the Holy Name, which the rubrics make incumbent upon the priest celebrating Mass, except when he is making some gesture of greater reverence, as kneeling. Devout Catholics are in the habit of marking their reverence by this act of devotion on all occasions, but there does not seem to be any decree of the Church requiring or encouraging this outward act; the use of it appears to have spontaneously and naturally arisen among the people, as was the case with many

other devotions. The Authorized Version of the Scripture in use among English Protestants, reads "at" the Name, which word clearly refers to bodily reverence; but the rendering is not justified by the original Greek, and is abandoned in their Revised Version, which here, as in many other places, conforms to the Vulgate.

The Church celebrates the feast of the Holy Name on the Second Sunday after the Epiphany. The object of this feast is the Name as a sign of Him that bore it, and also the Name itself is honoured because it was borne by Him. This feast was extended to the Universal Church no longer ago than 1721; it had previously been confined to certain Religious Orders, having been first granted to the Franciscan family in 1530. It was natural that the privilege should fall to the Seraphic Order (n. 447), for the practice of distinct reverence for the Name of Jesus originated with the friar, St. Bernardine of Siena, and his attached companion St. John Capistran. During the terrible corruption of morals which in Italy, as elsewhere, attended and followed on the Great Schism of the fifteenth century (n. 218), these Saints when preaching found the honour due to the Name of the Saviour to be a potent means of checking the blasphemy which was one of the worst of the prevailing vices. But this was a new devotion, and the Church is always rightly jealous of novelties; the result being that charges of heresy were brought against the Saint, whose practice, however, received the solemn approval of

Pope Martin V. in 1427. (Bened. XIV. *De Canoniz.* 4, 2, 31, and *De Festis*, i. 3.)

Although St. Bernardine and St. John Capistran were the first to give a definite form, suited for popular use, to the mode of honouring the Holy Name, the devotion itself is far older, and is met with in the writings of St. Bernard, four hundred years earlier. This Saint is the author of the well-known hymn, *Jesu, dulcis memoria*, which is used in the Office for the feast.

It is remarkable that the feast of the Holy Name was early celebrated in such dioceses of England as followed the Sarum use. The day assigned for it is the 7th of August, the morrow of the feast of the Transfiguration; perhaps this day was suggested by the closing words of the Gospel, which tells that after the great Vision, the Apostles saw no one "but only Jesus." Possibly the juxtaposition of the two feasts may have been connected with the fact that the devotion of St. John Capistran to the mystery of the Transfiguration led him to use his influence with Pope Callixtus III. to induce him to insert the feast in the Calendar of the Universal Church; the two feasts may have been brought together into the Sarum Calendar. The Calendar of the Anglican Establishment still mentions the feast on this day, but no proper service is provided for it.

The three letters I.H.S. are sometimes used as an abbreviation of the Holy Name, or symbol of It: these letters are sometimes ignorantly explained as if they stood for the Latin words (*Jesus Hominum Salvator*), which means Jesus, Saviour of Men: but

in fact they are of Greek origin, for in the Greek alphabet, the character H has the same sound as the Latin E. The letters I.H.S. therefore, are the first three letters of the Holy Name.

516. *Christ.*—As we remarked (n. 515), the words *Jesus Christ* occur in three passages of the Gospels as a proper Name; and this usage is very frequent in the Acts and the Epistles. (Acts ii. 38; Romans i. 1; Hebrews xiii. 20, &c.) But throughout the Scriptures of both Testaments, the word Christ is very often used alone; sometimes in its etymological sense of "anointed;" sometimes for the long-promised and expected Deliverer of the Israelites; and sometimes as a proper Name for the Son of Mary and an alternative for Jesus. The connection of these three uses will be easily understood.

Christ is a Greek word, and means "anointed." (χρίω.) We find in Scripture that the ceremony of anointing formed part of the initiatory rite employed by Divine appointment, when the duties of an office were assumed. It will be enough to mention the Prophet Eliseus (3 Kings xix. 16), the priest Aaron (Levit. viii. 12), and the Kings Solomon (1 Paral. xxix. 22) and Jehu. (4 Kings ix. 1—6.) The rite is used in the Christian Church when priests are ordained and kings are crowned: and in this, as in many other respects, the modern English coronation service is based on the Roman Pontifical: and it is understood that the claim to reign "by the grace of God" goes along with this unction. All holders of the offices just mentioned are accordingly entitled to be called Christs, and in fact are so

called: we may instance the Kings Saul (1 Kings xxvi. 23) and Cyrus (Isaias xlvi.), and the priest Aristobulus. (2 Mach. i. 10.)

In these cases, the word appears in the ordinary English version in its translated form, "anointed." But there are other places where it is left untranslated, as when we read that the Kings of the earth stood up, against the Lord and against His Christ (Psalm ii. 2); and when the High Priest adjured Jesus to tell if He were the Christ, the Son of God. (St. Matt. xxvi. 63.) Here, the word "Christ" is not used as a proper name, nor to denote a member of a peculiar class of men; but it is the designation of a unique position and office, familiar to the writer or speaker and to all concerned. We have a very clear instance of this use in the profession of faith made by St. Peter, in answer to a question put to him by Jesus: the answer, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," was made the occasion of conferring upon the Apostle the dignity of being the foundation-stone of the Church. (St. Matt. xvi. 16—18; and see n. 274.) In this sense, "Christ" is exactly equivalent to the Hebrew word "Messiah," which has the same meaning of "anointed," and was in ordinary use among the Jews to designate the Deliverer of whom the Prophets had spoken. (nn. 58—63.) The word Messias is retained, untranslated, in two passages of the Gospel of St. John; once in the mouth of St. Andrew (i. 41), and again, as used by the Samaritan woman (iv. 25): the change in the final letter is due to the exigencies of Greek grammar.

Those who believed and preached that Jesus was the promised Deliverer naturally spoke of Him by the name of His office, and this name insensibly passed into a proper name. It is constantly so used in the Epistles, and the change seems to have been complete when the name of Christian was first given to the disciples of Jesus, apparently by the heathen of Antioch. (Acts xi. 26.) There would have been nothing distinctive in calling them "followers of the Anointed One," for there were many claimants to the office of Messiah (St. Matt. xxiv. 24; Acts v. 36, 37), among whom it would be necessary to distinguish. The distinction between the uses of the word as a name of office or as a proper name is clearly marked in the Greek by the presence or absence of the article; it is lost in the Latin, but is attended to by the careful English translator, with great advantage to the sense. This will be understood if the seventh chapter of St. John's Gospel be read, in which we have many speculations as to whether the Galilean preacher were the Messias (vv. 26, 27, 41, 42), where the article should be used in every case; and the omission of it in the English version injures the sense of the passages where the Risen Saviour points out that His sufferings were the fulfilment of the prophecies concerning the Messias. (St. Luke xxiv. 26, 46.) We may compare what has been said on the use of the word "Lord." (n. 356.)

517. *The Messiah.*—In our first volume (nn. 57—63) we referred to some of the prophecies read in the Old Testament, in which we are told, with ever-

increasing fulness of detail, the circumstances of the Life and Ministry of the Saviour whom God would send. These prophecies were adduced as showing the divinity of the Christian religion, of which they furnish a most convincing proof. We must now go further and show from the Old Testament that the promised Messiah would be in the fullest sense God. And first, this is distinctly proclaimed in at least three passages of the Psalms. To the King who is to have the Gentiles for His inheritance, the Lord said, Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. (Psalm ii. 6—8.) The Person spoken of in the 44th Psalm (verse 7) is God whose throne is for ever and ever. And Jehovah bids the Master of David sit at His right hand, until His enemies be made His footstool. (Psalm cix. 1; and see n. 356.) These passages seem incapable of any reasonable explanation except that which ascribes Divinity to the Person to whom they refer: and this Person cannot be other than the Person of whom we read in the Gospels, and in whom all the prophecies that indicated the birth-place, date, work, and sufferings of the Messiah found their fulfilment. Immense ingenuity has been expended in the endeavour to find other explanations of these passages, but the futility of all such attempts may be seen in the commentators; and those who believe in the Divine Mission of Christ have a fuller assurance on the matter than any that criticism could give them, for the New Testament removes all possibility of doubt as to the interpretation. The application of the 2nd Psalm for which we

contend, is made once by St. Peter (Acts iv. 25), and repeatedly by St. Paul. (Acts xiii. 33; Hebrews i. 5, v. 5.) The Apostle also uses the 44th Psalm in the same sense (Hebrews i. 8), and for the 109th, we have the word of our Lord Himself. (St. Matt. xxii. 44.) He founded on the Psalm a claim to be greater than David, and nothing less than the Son of Jehovah; and His enemies found nothing to answer to the claim. They ceased to ask questions, but proceeded to take counsel together how they might apprehend Jesus and put Him to death (St. Matt. xxvi. 4); a course which has been frequently adopted in subsequent times when the heathen have raged, and the peoples have imagined vain things against the Lord and against His Christ.

Passing over other passages of the Psalms which declare the Divinity of the Messiah, we turn to the Prophets. The Branch of David is the Bud of Jehovah. (Jerem. xxiii. 5; Isaias iv. 2.) The Child of the Virgin is God with us (Isaias vii. 14; St. Matt. i. 23); the Redeemer is the Lord of hosts, the God of all the earth (Isaias liv. 5); He is the mighty God (Isaias ix. 6), God Himself. (xxxv. 4.) He is the Saint of saints (Daniel ix. 24); Jehovah, that will dwell in the midst of men (Zach. ii. 10); and Malachias speaks to the same effect. (Malach. iii. 1.) Many similar passages might be cited, where the words ascribe to the Messiah the nature of God, and there is no reason for refusing to allow that they bear their proper sense. In the light of the event, we see clearly that the Godhead of the

Messiah is contained in the written records of the revelation granted to the Chosen People; but it does not follow that this truth was known to the mass of the nation. It is probable that in fact it was unknown to them, although it was the common teaching that the Messiah had some kind of pre-existence (Edersheim, *Jesus the Messiah*, i. 171, &c.); but the Patriarchs, Prophets, and other holy persons were more enlightened, and understood the truth. Particularly, the Fathers see reason to believe that Adam had a knowledge of the future honour of his race, even before his fall. The reasoning that leads them to this conclusion is as follows: Marriage is a kind of representation of the Incarnation (Ephes. v. 32); but Adam, on awaking from his sleep, was divinely enlightened as to the nature of marriage (Genesis ii. 23), uttering words which were his own at the same time that they were the words of his Creator (St. Matt. xix. 4—6); and this cannot have been, unless Adam knew of the Incarnation. This is the doctrine of St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Leo, St. Anselm, and others, in their commentaries on the Epistle or on the Gospel. This subtlety of argument is curious, but it must not be regarded as coming to us with more authority than belongs to these writers as critics. It is to be observed that these Fathers do not necessarily hold that Adam knew for what end God would take human flesh, and therefore must not be understood as maintaining that the decree of the Incarnation was prior to the foreknowledge of Adam's sin. (See n. 512.)

A question is sometimes raised as to why the Incarnation took place at the particular time assigned for it, and neither earlier nor later in the history of the world. The ultimate answer must be that God was perfectly free in this, His greatest work (n. 512), and in all its circumstances; so that the date was fixed by a mere act of the Divine will, into the reasons of which it is bootless to inquire. But we may notice that the human race passed through a course of training, without which it would not have been so fit to receive the revelation brought by Christ (Galat. iii. 24); besides which, the preaching of the Gospel was immensely facilitated by the civilization which the Romans had imposed upon a large part of the world, by the roads which they constructed, and by the use of the Greek language which had spread so widely. Deeper causes for the choice of "the fulness of the time" (Galat. iv. 4) have been detected by writers on the subject, and the reader will find the theological "congruities" (n. 509) collected by St. Thomas. (p. 3. q. 1. aa. 5. 6.) It is to be observed that the grace of God, enabling all men to avoid mortal sin if they chose to use what was offered them, was given to all from the beginning; the Blood-Shedding on Calvary, by which this grace was merited for mankind, was present to God from all eternity. (n. 378.)

518. *Christ is God.*—Among the multitude of places in which the New Testament teaches the Divinity of Christ, we shall select a few of the plainest, and throw them into groups. We shall

assume, when necessary, the doctrine of the distinct personal existence of the Divine Word or Son of God, as explained in a previous Treatise. (nn. 406—409.)

First then, Christ claims for Himself a dignity raised above all creatures. He is greater than Abraham, the ancestor from whom He derived His Human Nature. (St. John viii. 52—58.) He is the one Son, more dear to God than were the Prophets who went before Him. (St. Mark xii. 6.) He is a Son in the family where Moses was no more than a faithful servant (Hebrews iii. 5, 6); and the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews describes Him as greater than the Angels; and if men are called, in some sense, sons of God, it is through Christ that they attain this dignity. (St. John i. 12.)

Again, Christ existed before His Birth in Bethlehem. He came down from Heaven (St. John iii. 31); and when the Jews who knew Him as the Son of Joseph murmured at this saying, He did not explain it away, but insisted upon the truth. (St. John vi. 38, 41, 52; see, too, xvi. 28.) At the same time, while He is on earth, He is still in Heaven. (St. John iii. 13.) He existed before Abraham was made, and this existence is eternal, expressed by the present tense, "I am," and is mentioned without indication of His origin (St. John viii. 56—59): and this saying, like the former, is persisted in when it gave offence. He had glory with the Father before the world was (St. John xvii. 5; and see 24); and this glory is claimed as something not shared by other men, so that it cannot be understood of eternal

predestination to glory, which is the gloss that heretics, ancient and modern, put on the words. (*Novatian de Trinit.* 16 [24]; *P.L.* 3, 944.)

Christ is one with the Father (St. John x. 30): He made Himself the Son of God (St. John xix. 7), equal to God (Philipp. ii. 5): His Blood was the Blood of God. (Acts xx. 28.) As to these and similar passages, it is to be observed that nowhere in Holy Scripture is the name of God, in the singular, applied to any creature, without clear indication of the figurative use; nor is any definite person, except Christ, anywhere termed the Son of God; and especially it is to be noticed that the phrase "Son of God" is nowhere used, like Son of David, as a name for the Messiah. The profession of faith of St. Peter (St. Matt. xvi. 16) contains two distinct affirmations; that Jesus was the Messiah (n. 516), and that He was the Son of God. (See St. Matt. xxi. 8, xxvi. 53; and St. Luke xxii. 66—71.)

The works of Christ are the works of God. (St. John v. 17—21; xiv. 10, 11.) He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. (St. John xiv. 6—11; and see n. 359.) He is to be honoured as the Father is honoured. (St. John v. 23.) He and the Father have one glory (Philipp. ii. 10), one Kingdom (Ephes. v. 5), one throne (Hebrews i. 13), one brightness (Apoc. xxi. 23); and their prophets are the same. (Apoc. xx. 6.) Eternal life is found in the knowledge of God and of Christ (St. John xvii. 3): we are to believe in God and in Him. (St. John xiv. 1.) He is our Hope (1 Timothy i. 1), both as promising us support in trouble (St. Luke

xxi. 15), and as being the Object whom we look to possess in eternal life. (Philipp. i. 23; Titus ii. 13.) The love which we are to give Him is nothing short of the love due from us to God. (St. Matt. x. 37—39, xxii. 37.) All things are to be done in the Name of Jesus (Coloss. iii. 17): and Baptism in the Name of the Holy Trinity (St. Matt. xxviii. 19) is described compendiously as given in the Name of the Lord Jesus. (Acts viii. 16, &c.) These texts will come before us again in the Treatise on the Sacrament of Baptism.

The passages cited tacitly assume that Christ is God, and they could be multiplied considerably. They are perhaps to many minds more persuasive than express declarations. But these are not wanting. St. Thomas saluted his risen Master as his Lord and God (St. John xx. 28), and it is indeed a far-fetched explanation which makes these words express merely the surprise of the Apostle who used them. We are expressly told that they were addressed to Jesus, and St. Thomas is pronounced blessed because of the belief that he expressed.

St. Paul (Titus ii. 13) speaks of the coming of the great glory of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, and this word "coming" is constantly used of Christ (2 Timothy iv. 1; Acts i. 11, &c.), to whom all judgment has been given (St. John v. 24; 1 Cor. xv. 24); it follows therefore that in this place, "God and our Saviour" are the same Person. And the Apostle distinctly declares that Christ is over all things, God blessed for ever. (Romans ix. 5.)

Lastly, the opening verses of the Gospel of St. John (i. 1—18) state with the utmost clearness that He to whom St. John Baptist bore witness was the Word who was with God in the beginning, who was God, and who was made flesh and dwelt among us. This statement of our doctrine is too plain to need commentary.

The result of this long discussion is, therefore, that the New Testament confirms the indications given in the Prophets that our Lord Jesus Christ, the promised Messiah, is the Word of God incarnate.

519. *Objections.*—The interpretation which we have given to the above texts of Scripture could be confirmed if necessary by citing the commentaries of the Fathers; but this is needless, for the faith of the Church in the Incarnation has been indisputable and notorious ever since the Council of Nice in 325. Moreover, the meaning is, as we believe, clearly established in each case by critical discussion. It is impossible for us to go through the several passages, in order to set aside all the suggestions, many of them sufficiently strained, by which monarchians (n. 400) have attempted to elude their force. We will, however, notice some general heads of objection to the Catholic doctrine.

First, it is said that the name and attributes of God are ascribed to Christ because He was the highest and most favoured of all the messengers of God. But Christ never calls Himself the messenger of God; nor, although meek and humble of heart (St. Matt. xi. 29), does He ever use a phrase that is inconsistent with His being the all-perfect God.

Nor can the Divine Sonship of Christ be explained as merely meaning that God dealt with Him after a special manner, in His virginal Birth and in His Resurrection, for there is no connection between these favours and the position of Son. Nor is it true that Adam is called Son of God, being in a peculiar manner the work of His hands: it is a merely unjustifiable interpolation to supply the word "son" in the verse where it is said that Adam was of God. (St. Luke iii. 38.) All that is alleged is that Adam came from God, and we know that he came by way of creation. (Genesis i. 27.) This is different from the way in which Joseph came from Eli (St. Luke iii. 23), which was by way of sonship: there is nothing, therefore, to require, or even to justify, the insertion of the word "son" in the last verse of the chapter.

It is urged that at some future time Christ will give up His Kingship, and become a subject. (1 Cor. xv. 24, 28.) But these words must have an interpretation consistent with the promise that of the Kingdom of Christ there shall be no end (St. Luke i. 33), and no other meaning can be given to them than that when the end comes, the Head of the Church will present the fruits of His work to His Father, with whom and the Holy Spirit He will reign as God for ever over the men whom He as Man redeemed, gaining for them admittance to His Kingdom.

In all this discussion we must never lose sight of the full Catholic doctrine, that Christ is Man as well as God. If this be remembered, there

is no difficulty in reconciling the seemingly contradictory declarations that Christ and the Father are one (St. John x. 30), and that the Father is greater than Christ. (St. John xv. 28.) He is equal to the Father according to the Godhead: lesser than the Father according to the Manhood; such is the clear account of the matter given in the Athanasian Creed.

But, in fact, these Scriptural difficulties are seldom heard of at the present day: controversy has shown them to be baseless. The adversaries of the Catholic doctrine find it necessary to mutilate the Scripture, and especially they deny the authority of the Gospel of St. John, which they represent as a work of the third century. The grounds of this contention are chiefly drawn from a *petitio principii*, that the doctrine of this Gospel is of later development than what is found in the other three. The whole subject is dealt with in a masterly manner in Bishop Lightfoot's Essays in reply to a book of pretentious learning called *Supernatural Religion*; and the strength of the Bishop's position is immensely increased by the recent discovery of the true nature of the *Diatessaron* (n. 51), which proves beyond doubt that our four Gospels were held in special honour, early in the second century.

The reader will have observed that a large part of the testimonies that we have used are drawn from the writings of St. John, which explains why his Gospel is singled out for attack. But it is altogether untrue that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ rests exclusively on the authority of one writer, for we find it assumed, not in the Old

Testament alone, but by St. Paul and other of the Apostles. The reason why St. John is so explicit upon the subject is seen when we remember that his Gospel was written at a later date than the other three, and that he had to deal not with Jewish adversaries, against whom St. Matthew had sufficiently proved that Jesus was the promised Messiah, but with the Cerinthians and other sects which had arisen within the Christian body, and which taught Docetic opinions, to the ruin of the doctrine of the Incarnation. (n. 507, i.)

520. *Christ is Man.*—It is scarcely necessary at the present day to labour at proving that Christ was truly Man. The historical existence of the Person described in the Gospels, and the general correctness of the account there given of His career are admitted by all writers whose studies have rendered them competent to have an opinion upon the subject. In the course of the eighteenth century, determined efforts were made to explain the origin and rise of the Christian religion without ascribing to it an historical Founder; but all such efforts broke down, and it became clear that to dispute the historic existence of Christ was mere scepticism which could not consistently admit the certainty of any record of the past. Those writers, therefore, of the present day who do not admit the Christian revelation, allow that Christ lived and died, though they endeavour to show that He was not in any special sense a Messenger from God. (See nn. 14, seq.)

In the earlier days of the Church, men were found who denied the true Manhood of the Person

described in the Gospels, and especially we find that Docetic (n. 507, i.) opinions were rife, even in the lifetime of the Apostles. Hence it is that St. John found it necessary to insist not only on the Divinity of the Word of God (n. 519), but also on the truth that the Word was made Flesh. (St. John i. 14.) This is why the Evangelist tells us of the conclusive test granted to assure St. Thomas of the truth of the Resurrection. (St. John xx. 27.) St. Luke, in the same way, relates how the Risen Saviour convinced the Apostles of the reality of the flesh and bones of His Body, and condescended even to eat before their eyes. (St. Luke xxiv. 39, 43.) If He had a truly human Body after He rose from the dead, it will not be questioned that His Body was truly human before His Passion. The Gospel tells of His Birth (St. Luke ii. 7), His hunger (St. Matt. v. 2), His thirst (St. John xix. 28), His weariness (St. John iv. 2), His sleeping (St. Matt. viii. 24); and, in fact, the Fathers whose work it was to maintain the true Manhood of Christ were justified in saying that to question it was to deny His truthfulness. Tertullian avows that he is more ready to believe that Christ was truly born than that He was a deceiver. (*De Carne Christi*, c. 5; *P.L.* 2, 762.) They further urge that if Christ were not true Man, the whole economy of the Gospel is upset: He was not truly delivered up for our sins, nor did He rise again for our justification. (Romans iv. 25.) If Christ be not risen again, our faith is vain, we are yet in our sins. (1 Cor. xv. 17.) The reality of the mortal Body of Christ is an integral part of the Christian religion.

The solitary passage of Scripture which can be represented as indicating the contrary is that where St. Paul speaks of God sending His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Romans viii. 3); but this phrase indicates no more than that the Flesh of Christ was not truly sinful, for He was not under Original Sin. In His Body He was like to men who are involved in the sin of Adam.

The reality of the human Soul of Christ was denied by many of the Arians, especially by the Apollinarist section. (n. 507, ii.) Some of these held that the place of the Soul was supplied by the Divine Word, not observing or heeding that this view involved the capacity of the Word to suffer pain; for its holders did not deny the reality of the sufferings of Christ. His Soul was sorrowful unto death (St. Matt. xxvi. 38), and on the Cross He commended His Spirit to His Father, expressions that are altogether inconsistent with the view which reduced His Manhood to an inanimate Body. The trichomistic notion of the Apollinarians explained how Christ was capable of pain; yet it not merely opposed the certain doctrine of the unity of the soul (n. 465), but it also represented the actions of Christ as being those of the Divine Word, not those of a Man; for an act deserves to be called human, so far only as it proceeds from a created rational soul informing a body. Nothing however is more certain than that the Scripture represents Christ as acting and suffering as Man; He is repeatedly called Man, the Son of Man, the Second Adam (1 Cor. xv. 45), and these terms certainly

imply that He was a perfect Man, and not mer a being with a body and sensitive soul, to which Deity was united. (St. Aug. Tr. 47, *In Joan.* n. 9 *P.L.* 35, 1737.) It is true that some of the earlier Fathers, writing before the Apollinarist heresy arose, insisted particularly on the Word of God having assumed a Body of Flesh, according to the text of St. John (i. 14); but this was natural in those writers, for their duty was to combat the forms of error which alleged the essentially evil character of matter, and they loved to expatiate on the condescension of God who had taken on Himself the lowliest part of human nature, along with that which is spiritual and of higher dignity. It is not wonderful, therefore, that passages can be cited from them in which they make no mention of the rational Soul; but they nowhere deny its existence, and in other passages they distinctly affirm it, insisting on the principle that Christ redeemed nothing but what was assumed by the Word. It is sufficient to adduce one plain passage from Tertullian, from whom it is possible to quote phrases which are in themselves ambiguous, but which must be explained in the light of his clear teaching. He argues, against the disciples of Marcion, that Christ having undertaken to free our souls by the action of the Soul which was His own, that Soul of His must necessarily have been ours, that is, of the nature of those that inform our bodies, whatever be the hidden nature of our soul, which at any rate is not fleshly. (*De Carne Christi*, c. 10; *P.L.* 2, 773.)

521. *Portraits of Christ.*—Faithful Christians, full of love for the true Man who shed His Blood to redeem them, would naturally wish to know what was the outward aspect of His Human Nature. Unfortunately, this desire cannot be gratified; no trustworthy likeness of Christ exists, and in all probability none ever existed. It is true that representations of Him were used in the churches from the earliest times, as is proved by the discoveries made in the Roman Catacombs (see Northcote and Brownlow, *Roma Sotterranea*), but for the first three centuries these are always symbolical figures, exhibiting Him on His Mother's breast, as adored by the Magi, as baptized, or as new-risen from the dead, or, most commonly of all, as the Good Shepherd. In the fourth century, artists began to give an individual character to the features of Christ, but, as we shall show presently, they were not guided by any tradition; at first they freely exercised their fancy, but at length one type came to be accepted. We have what seems a trustworthy record of one contemporary image of Christ, in which it is possible that the artist aimed at producing a correct likeness; but this image was destroyed more than fifteen centuries ago. Eusebius tells us (*H.E.* 7, 18; *P.G.* 20, 680) of a monument which the Syro-Phœnician woman (St. Mark vii. 26) set up in front of her house, to show her gratitude for her miraculous cure by Christ. The Healer was represented standing, wrapped in an ample cloak, and the woman knelt before Him in an attitude of supplication. After the time when Eusebius saw it,

this group disappeared, being broken up by order of the furious persecuting Emperor Maximin, about the year 305, as Asterius relates, or by the Apostate Julian, five-and-forty years later, if we prefer the authority of Sozomen. Some modern writers are prepossessed with the idea that no images were honoured among Christians before the time of Constantine, and they confidently declare that a mistake had been made as to the subject of this group, which must have represented the god Æsculapius, or the Emperor Hadrian, or anybody excepting Him who is named by the eye-witness. It is altogether improbable that Eusebius can have been so unobservant as to take for a likeness of Christ what was really the statue of a heathen deity or potentate.

We have seen that the Emperor Alexander Severus had an image of Christ in his private chapel (n. 68), but this can scarcely have been more than symbolical, and at any rate we know nothing of its form.

Nor do we derive any help from literature, in default of works of art, to teach us what was the outward aspect of our Saviour. There are two passages of Scripture which have been thought to bear upon the subject, but they point different ways. Isaias, forecasting the days of Christ, declares that there is no beauty in Him or comeliness; and that we have seen Him and there was no sightliness, that we should be desirous of Him (liii. 2); and these words were at one time universally accepted by Christians, and by their opponents also, as con-

clusively showing that the bodily presence of Christ was contemptible. Thus the heathen philosopher Celsus was ready enough to quote the Prophets when he found anything that suited his purpose, and Origen, replying to his remarks on this passage, says, that the Person of Christ was avowedly (ὁμολογουμένως) unshapely, but He was not wanting in majesty of mien nor in due stature. (*C. Celsum*, 6, 75; *P.G.* 11, 1412.) Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 6, c. 17; *P.G.* 9, 381) conjectures that Christ chose such a human form as would secure attention being paid to His words and not to the person of the Speaker. The same teaching is found in Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and others of the earlier Fathers, and even as late as St. Augustine and St. Cyril of Alexandria; the former says that, as Man, Christ had no form or beauty, but His beauty was in what He had above Manhood (*In Psalm.* xliii. n. 10; *P.L.* 36, 489); and St. Cyril gathers the same lesson, that human excellence is as nothing compared with what is Divine. (*Glaphyr. in Exod.* lib. 1, n. 4; *P.G.* 69, 396.) In later times, a contrary view prevailed, and the matter was believed to be governed by the words of the Psalmist (xliv. 3), Thou art beautiful above the sons of men; writers, therefore, and artists vied with each other in bringing before the mind the majestic beauty of the Saviour. The testimonies which we have adduced show that it is a mistake to regard the view founded upon the words of Isaias as confined to writers who lived in the days of persecution, and who knew no ideal of sanctity but that of the hermits of the desert.

The existence of this discrepancy in the views of various authors makes it clear that there was no one form of features accepted as the portrait of our Lord; and, in fact, we have the express testimony of St. Augustine to this effect. (*De Trinit.* 8, cc. 4, 5, nn. 6—8; *P.L.* 42, 951.) St. Irenæus (*Hær.* 1, 25; *P.G.* 7, 685) mentions the Carpocratian heretics as pretending to be in possession of a portrait of Christ made by Pilate, to which they paid honour, as they did to the likenesses of Pythagoras and other heathens; but he treats the pretence with contempt. The features assigned to Christ in modern art seem to have originated with Leonardo da Vinci in the sixteenth century. He probably improved upon an Eastern representation.

We have already had occasion to mention the letter said to have been written by Christ to King Abgar of Edessa. (n. 79.) Later writers tell us that this letter was accompanied by a portrait of the Saviour, drawn on a handkerchief; and the Armenian historian, Moses of Chorene, testifies to having seen it, as it was preserved in the city in the fifth century. It is said to have been taken to Constantinople, and for the last three centuries it has been shown in the Church of St. Sylvester at Rome; but it is very doubtful whether what Moses saw is still in existence, and still more doubtful whether it had the antiquity that he ascribed to it. The letter to King Abgar is undoubtedly spurious, and the portrait can scarcely be thought to have more claims to our respect. A claim is made on behalf of a church in Genoa to be in possession of the Edessan hand-

kerchief. It need hardly be said that the Church is not committed to the genuineness of either of these relics. (See n. 314.)

The same may be said of the handkerchiefs preserved at Rome, Milan, and Jaen, and supposed to bear a miraculous impression of the countenance of our Saviour. The Roman relic, in St. Peter's, is first mentioned in 705. The beautiful story of St. Veronica, who ministered to our Lord on His way to Calvary, and the reward that she received, is made familiar to all by the incident having a place among the Stations of the Way of the Cross; but the excellence of the devotion of the Stations by no means depends upon the truth of the story.

Besides those mentioned, there are many other portraits of Christ preserved in various places for which great antiquity is claimed, and which are in some cases said to have a miraculous origin; but they have not sufficient interest to call for further notice. The best known is the Volto Santo of Lucca.

522. *Origin of the Manhood.*—We read in the Gospel that when the Blessed Mother of God received the assurance that she should bear a Son, she inquired in her humility how this should be, for she knew it to be naturally impossible: and the explanation was given that the Holy Ghost should come upon her, and that the Holy which should be born of her should be called the Son of God. (St. Luke i. 30—35.) This, then, is the account we have of the origin of that Human Nature which was

assumed by the Divine Word. We read afterwards that the Virgin Mother brought forth her first-born Son (St. Luke ii. 7), and then the visible human Life on earth of the Incarnate Word began.

In the next Treatise (nn. 567, 568) we shall show, in accordance with the Gospel account, that the Blessed Mother of God remained a virgin before childbirth, in childbirth, and after childbirth, which doctrine of the Church we assume for the present. It follows that the Incarnate Son of God was true Man, but had no man for His father: the function that ordinarily falls to the father being in this one unique case performed by the direct action of the Blessed Trinity, who can always produce by His own power whatever effects are usually the result of second causes. As Man, however, Christ was the Son of Mary, and His Body was nourished within her, in exactly the same manner as is the accustomed course of generation. The human Soul of Christ was created and infused into that Body at the first instant of its existence, and in the same instant the Divine Word assumed this Human Nature. To hold otherwise would imply that for a while there was a Man having His own personality, which personality was somehow lost or destroyed when the Nature was assumed by the Word, for it is certain that there was but one Person in Christ, as will be shown in the next chapter (n. 528); and this destruction is unlikely, for God destroys nothing that He has made. St. Fulgentius is most emphatic in his expression of the faith of

the Church: Be most firm in your belief, and admit no doubt that the Flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin before It was assumed by the Word. (*De Fide*, c. 18, n. 59; *P.L.* 65, 698.)

It is the common teaching of theologians that the dignity to which the Human Nature was raised through its assumption by God involved the consequence that Christ, as Man, from the first instant of His existence, was sanctified by grace, had the use of free-will, was capable of merit, and enjoyed the clear Vision of God. This matter will be found treated by St. Thomas (p. 3. q. 33.) with his usual clearness. The Body grew as the bodies of other infants grow; but the Soul was not hampered in its operations by the imperfection of the Body which It informed.

523. *The Passible Nature.*—It need scarcely be said that the Human Nature of Christ was perfectly sinless and incapable of sin. This Nature was in no sense subject to Original Sin, for this by the Divine decree is transmitted to those only who have for father a child of Adam: and Christ had no human father. But a higher reason for the sinlessness of Christ is found in the substantial union of the Humanity with the All-Holy God.

It follows that there could be no place in Christ for contrition or any other affection which presupposes sin: nor was it His pleasure to take upon Himself certain infirmities of human nature, which are in us in consequence of the fall of Adam, and

which are on the one hand closely akin to sin, and on the other could have no part in the work which He came on earth to do: such are concupiscence and ignorance. (nn. 486, 487.) Concupiscence allures man to sin, and ignorance is never useful, except so far as it sometimes excuses from sin, as St. Anselm observes. (*Cur Deus Homo*, 2, 13; *P.L.* 158, 413.) With these exceptions, Christ in assuming Human Nature for the end of redeeming mankind, assumed all those defects and infirmities which are in us as a consequence of the sin of Adam; and these penalities, as they are called, may be reduced to liability to pain of soul and body, and death. What has been said on the reality of His Manhood (n. 520) sufficiently proves that He was not merely liable to suffering and death, but that He actually suffered and died. This point follows plainly from the two words, "Jesus wept." (St. John xi. 35.) If the tears shed were not truly tears of compassion, the bodily expression of mental pain, they were a mockery and deceit. But although Christ took on Himself these liabilities, yet they were under His control, and He could at any moment have allowed the perfection of His Humanity to assert itself and enjoy the happiness which was Its right, in virtue of the union with the Divine Word. In the light of this doctrine, we can understand the text of the Prophet (Isaias liii. 7): "He was offered because it was His own will;" and perhaps also that of the Apostle (Hebrews xii. 2): "Having joy set before Him, He endured the Cross," which pregnant passages also give us

instruction as to other points in the doctrine of the Incarnation.

It must be observed, however, that what has been just said refers only to the general liabilities of human nature, and does not extend to such afflictions as disease: He truly suffered from the stripes of the scourge, but He could not contract leprosy or epilepsy, to use the examples chosen by St. Thomas. (p. 3. q. 14. a. 4.) The meaning of the illustration is clear, even though we may think that the particular afflictions mentioned arise from causes that are in the nature of poisons, and are not due to inherent defects in the body. The reason is that diseases arise either from the body falling short of the perfection natural to it—from a bad constitution, as we say—or else from excess in eating, drinking, and the like. But the Sacred Humanity was perfect in its own kind, and It cannot have received injury from failures in the moral virtue of Temperance. It follows that It could not contract disease. The effects of poison would have been comparable to those of wounds.

It will be observed that all this doctrine is admirably in accord with the requirements of the work that Christ came upon earth to do. "He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows" (Isaias liii. 4), both in the sense of "enduring" and of "taking away." (St. Matt. viii. 17; see Father Knabenbauer, *ad loc.*; also n. 542.)

524. *Recapitulation.*—The chief matter of this chapter has been the proof that Jesus Christ was

God and Man: God from all eternity, but also true Man, formed in the womb of a Virgin Mother. Some of the results of this union of the infinitely happy God with a Nature capable of suffering and death, were illustrated; and incidentally some space was given to remarks upon the Names by which the Incarnate God is known, and on the absence of record as to His personal appearance.

CHAPTER III.

THE UNION OF THE NATURES.

525. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we shall give proof of the Catholic doctrine that in Christ the union of the two Natures is substantial, so that in Him there is one Person only, the Person of the Word; though at the same time the Natures remain unconfused. Some consequences of this doctrine will then be indicated, and will occupy us for a considerable time.

526. *Nestorius.*—We have already (n. 507, iv.) given as much as seems necessary of the history of the Nestorian heresy, which denied the oneness of Person in Christ, maintaining that Christ as Man was a distinct Person, with whom the Divine Word dwelt, being united by a merely moral union. The error of the Nestorians is set forth more fully by St. Thomas (p. 3. q. 2. a. 6.) They taught that the Person of the Son of God is not the same as the Person of the Son of Man, but that these two Persons were united, inasmuch as the Son of God dwelt in the Son of Man, as a deity in his temple; secondly, that there was a unity of affection, inasmuch as the will of the Son of Man was always conformed to the will of the Son of God; thirdly, that

as a workman is united to his tool, so the Son of Man was the instrument of the Son of God; fourthly, in this union is the unity of honour, for whatever reverence is exhibited to the Son of God is at the same time exhibited to the Son of Man, who is united with Him; and lastly, that there is an identity of name, for the Son of Man is called the Son of God, on account of the union. All these modes of union are, it is obvious, merely accidental, not touching the substance either of the Divinity or the Humanity, but establishing a connection between them which does not change either. Some Nestorians found themselves compelled to admit that in some sense there was but one Person in Christ, but this was a merely verbal concession to the arguments of their opponents: for they explained this unity in the ways that have been enumerated, just as there is a kind of unity of person when two or more men act together in any business: and this is what is understood by a moral union. An example of a substantial union is found in the union of soul and body in a living man, with which union the union of the Incarnation is compared in the Athanasian Creed: "As the rational soul and the flesh is one man, so God and Man is one Christ." (See n. 466.) The union of husband and wife is a moral union.

When the doctrine taught by Nestorius at Constantinople became known, the chief part in exposing its novelty and falsity was taken by St. Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria. The Catholic champion embodied the traditional teaching on the

point in twelve short propositions, which do not so much supplement each other as exhibit one and the same doctrine in different lights. Nestorius replied by a series of counter-statements, corresponding with those of Cyril, and in this way the exact difference between the two was exhibited in a small compass. It is a pity that this method of making clear the state of the question is so seldom adopted by disputants. We will quote the substance of the first and last of each set, for these contain the phrases on which it was finally agreed that the controversy turned. Both series are given at length in the second volume of Hefele's *Councils*, where the whole of the instructive history of the proceedings against Nestorius may be read.

St. Cyril gave the first place to the declaration that Emmanuel (Isaias vii. 14; St. Matt. i. 23) is in truth God, and, as a consequence, the Holy Virgin is Mother of God: for she corporeally brought forth the Word of God made Flesh.

Nestorius replied, condemning all who say that Emmanuel is the true God, and not rather God with us; that is, inhabiting that Nature like to ours which He received from the Virgin Mary. He includes in the condemnation all who call her the Mother of God the Word, instead of Mother of Him that is Emmanuel.

In the last of the series, St. Cyril required all to acknowledge that the Word of God suffered in the Flesh, and was crucified in the Flesh, and tasted death in the Flesh, and became the First Born of the dead.

Nestorius, on the other hand, condemned those who attribute to the Word of God the sufferings which were undergone by the Flesh which was His.

The kernel of the whole controversy was therefore found in the two phrases, "Mother of God" and "God suffering in the Flesh." The matter was brought before the General Council assembled at Ephesus in 431. The meeting had been appointed for Pentecost, but the first Session was postponed on account of the absence of John, Patriarch of Antioch, an old friend of Nestorius. At length John arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, but he declined to enter it, and sent word that the other Bishops were to proceed without him. It was clear that he foresaw what the result of the meeting must be, and wished to avoid taking personal part in it.

At length, on June 22, the first Session was held in the great church, which was already dedicated to the Blessed Virgin, under the title of Mother of God. The Acts tell us that Cyril presided, holding the place of Pope Celestine. Nestorius, who was in Ephesus, was summoned to attend the meeting, but declined; however, as his teaching was known from his writings, it was condemned, and he himself deposed and excommunicated. As many as ninety-eight Bishops took part in the meeting, and others subsequently gave in their adhesion, so that the number of signatures amounted to more than two hundred.

The Session began in the morning and lasted till dark. Throughout the day the neighbourhood of the church had been crowded with people anxious

to know the result of the deliberations. When this became known, they broke out into shouts of joy, and accompanied the Bishops to their lodging with torches and fuming thuribles. At night, the whole city was illuminated.

The Assembly did not think fit to embody their doctrine in any new creed (n. 401, v.), and there was no need for them to do so, for the Nestorian view was sufficiently condemned even by the Apostles' Creed, which declares that the Only Son of God was born of Mary. But from the day of the Ephesine declaration, the express avowal that Mary is the Mother of God, and that God suffered in the Flesh, has been the test and support of the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation.

527. *Eutyches.*—The Nestorian doctrine, though shallow and inconsistent with Scripture, as we shall show presently (n. 528), was at least intelligible. The same can hardly be said of the heresy which had its origin when Eutyches (n. 507, v.), in his zeal against Nestorius, pushed to unjustifiable extremes the arguments by which St. Cyril had supported the Catholic faith at Ephesus. Flavian was the Patriarch of Constantinople who took a leading part in opposing Eutyches, but we have no short statements of the doctrine upheld by each, such as we are able to quote from St. Cyril and Nestorius. In fact, the Monophysite (n. 507, v.) doctrine assumed very different forms at different times. As far as can be made out, Eutyches himself taught that in Christ the Human Nature was altogether absorbed and lost in the Divine Nature, as a drop

of water in a cask of wine; others, still more absurdly, made out that the Divine Nature was itself absorbed in the Human, and lost Its properties. A third form of the doctrine represented both Natures as lost and destroyed, with the result that a new Nature was formed by the union of the two; and this union was represented in two ways, some believing that the properties of each of the two Natures were wholly lost, as the properties of the elements cannot be detected in a chemical compound; while others thought that some part of these properties still remained, although others were lost. These last used the illustration of the union of soul and body in man: this illustration occurs in the Athanasian Creed, as a parallel to the unity of Person and in opposition to Nestorius; but if it be applied to the Natures, it is indefensible.

We shall not go into the tangled history of the controversy which arose, and which was far more largely personal and political than theological. Eutyches himself filled a part in the story altogether subordinate to that taken by Dioscorus, who in 444 had succeeded the saintly Cyril in the see of Alexandria. This able and pushing man saw in the new doctrine the means of asserting the jurisdiction which his own patriarchal see aspired to exercise over the Bishops of the Imperial City. This end would be promoted, if the successor of Cyril could gain the credit of being the true exponent of his predecessor's doctrine, and could procure the condemnation of Flavian on the charge of holding a doctrine identical with that which the

Bishops at Ephesus had condemned in Nestorius. In pursuance of this design, Dioscorus procured a second meeting of Bishops at Ephesus in 449. He had hoped that this assembly would have followed his lead, as the Council of 431 had followed the lead of Cyril; but there was this important difference, that St. Cyril acted by commission from Pope St. Celestine, whereas now the Legates of Pope St. Leo brought a letter from the Pontiff, declaring the Catholic faith as Flavian held it. (St. Leo, Letter 28, to Flavian; *P.L.* 54, 755.) Dioscorus finding that his attempt had failed, had recourse to violence, in spite of the protests of the Papal Legate; and in the tumult, Flavian was treated with personal outrage that soon proved fatal. It is even said by the historian Theophanes, that Dioscorus himself kicked Flavian and inflicted such injuries that he died on the third day. (*P.G.* 108, 261.)

This Ephesine *Brigandage* (St. Leo, Epist. 95; *P.L.* 54, 943) was no true Council, both because of the violence used and because of its defiance of the authority of the Roman Pontiff. A free Council was held at Chalcedon in 451, when the care of the Emperor Marcian and the Empress St. Pulcheria prevented any repetition of the scenes of murderous outrage that had disgraced Ephesus. The doctrine of St. Leo was solemnly recognized, and Dioscorus was deposed and excommunicated. However, he found a party to support him in his own city, and he became the founder of a line of heretical and schismatical patriarchs who subsist to the present

day, the humble dependants of the infidel sovereigns who for centuries have ruled in Egypt.

528. *The Catholic Doctrine proved.*—The Catholic doctrine that in Christ there is one Person only, while there are two Natures, entire, distinct, unconfused, and unmixed, hardly needs any further proof than what has been already given. We have shown that Christ is God (n. 518), and that Christ is Man (n. 520), and there is no need to repeat the texts by which we established these two independent, fundamental truths. It will be enough if we take one of these texts and show how the doctrine of Ephesus and Chalcedon follows from it. Thus, we may consider the words spoken by St. Gabriel to our Blessed Lady (St. Luke i. 35), "That holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." It will not be disputed that "shall be called" is equivalent to "shall be" (St. Luke i. 76; St. Matt. v. 9); nor that the Son of God is God, consubstantial with the Father (n. 406); it follows that He who is born of Mary is God. But He that is born of a Woman certainly has Human Nature: and if Christ had the Person of a Man, it would follow that there were two births; that the human Person was born and also that God was born in His own Nature, which last is of course inadmissible. No explanation of the certainties taught by the text can be suggested except that given by the Catholic doctrine that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assumed Human Nature and was born of a human Mother. This Mother, therefore, was Mother of God, for to be mother refers

to the person of the son: she is mother, because she has borne a person who received his nature from her: and Mary bore the Divine Person to whom she had supplied the Human Nature. In opposition to the Monophysite (n. 507, v.) doctrine, the same text tells us that the Son of Mary was the Son of God, and therefore had the Divine Nature, and this Nature cannot have been other than entire in Christ, for It is indivisible: but He was also Man, and therefore had the entire human nature. If the union were such that either Nature lost the whole of its properties, or even any part, then the name belonging to that Nature would no longer be applicable. The drop of water in the cask of wine is lost, and the contents cannot be called water (n. 527); nor can the chemical compound be called by the name of one of its components. A man can neither be called a spirit nor a mass of matter, although the names express the natures of the two elements of which he is composed, soul and body.

The argument here given may equally well be based upon any other portion of Scripture that establishes the Godhead and Manhood of Christ.

There is no need to copy passages from the Fathers to show that the doctrine of Ephesus and Chalcedon was in accord with the tradition of the Catholic Church from the beginning; it is, in fact, no more than a fuller statement of what is contained in the Apostles' Creed. Nor does it appear that the doctrine is open to any serious attack on grounds of Scripture or Tradition, beyond such as may be

urged directly against the doctrines that Christ was God and was Man; the difficulties that have been felt are of a philosophical nature, touching as usual the question *how* that can be which revelation has made known to us. This difficulty was urged against our Lord Himself (St. John iii. 4, vi. 53), and against St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 35), but the authoritative Teacher did not see fit to reply: He was content to reiterate His teaching, so as to leave no doubt that He meant to assert that which raised the difficulty. It is right for faith to seek for understanding (n. 346); but faith must come first, being based on the authority of the Teacher, and not on our understanding how the thing can be. An explanation is often forthcoming which makes that evidently true which at first sight seemed difficult, or even impossible; but sometimes the profoundest thinkers have to avow that the matter is beyond their powers of penetration. In these cases we must rest content with the assurance that God is true. (Romans iii. 4.)

In regard to the matter before us, the philosophical argument is not suitable for these pages: it would be impossible to make it intelligible without going more deeply into questions of General Metaphysics than is consistent with our plan. It is to be observed that, in this part of the argument, the Catholic side is on the defensive: it is enough to expose the fallacy of all attempts to prove that the doctrine of one Person in two Natures is self-contradictory. (nn. 17, 323.) The mystery of the Incarnation belongs to the class of which no man

probably would have conjectured the possibility, had not revelation taught him the fact: on receiving this teaching he considers the matter and perceives that he has no reasonable ground for the impression of its impossibility which he had hastily adopted: and in this way, revelation helps him to a step in advance in natural knowledge.

529. *The Two Wills.*—The story of the Monophysite error after the condemnation of it at Chalcedon is long and tedious, and of no theological interest: it recounts the history of a multitude of attempts at compromise between truth and falsehood, which were often promoted by Emperors, but steadily resisted by the Popes, some of whom suffered persecution rather than surrender the trust committed to them as guardians of the Catholic faith. The error in its original form disappeared, or rather came to be confined to the adherents of the Patriarchs of Alexandria, who regarded Dioscorus as a holy Confessor and execrated the Council of Chalcedon. But a scheme was devised for the purpose of winning back these heretics to unity, an object which was most desirable politically, and religiously also, if only it could be secured without sacrifice of the truth. The inventor of the new compromise was one Theodore of Pharan, in Arabia. He professed that he accepted the doctrine of the Two Natures, as defined at Chalcedon, but explained it as not involving the presence in Christ of two Wills or two Operations: he held that the Human Nature existed, distinct from the Divine, but in such manner that it never exercised its powers; it

had no will and never acted. The Catholic theologians pointed out that this human nature that never exercised the faculties of a man was a non-entity, and that the new doctrine of the Monothelites (n. 507, vii.) was nothing but a slight disguise assumed by the Monophysite heresy. Nevertheless, the hope of extinguishing the religious differences which severed Egypt from the rest of the Roman world caused the Emperors Heraclius and Constantine to show favour to the teaching of Theodore, which was embraced by some courtly Patriarchs of Constantinople, Sergius, Pyrrhus, Paul, and Peter. The controversy lasted with varying fortunes from 626 to 680. The heresy was condemned in a Synod held at the Lateran in 649 by Pope St. Martin I., whose reward was that he was arrested by order of the Emperor Constans, and hurried into exile, where he died, and is honoured by the Church as a martyr, on the 12th of November. The chief features of the controversy are the bad faith of Bishops, who were often ready to sign professions of faith and to deny their signatures as soon as occasion served: and the mischief done by Emperors, who endeavoured by their edicts to usurp the functions of the ecclesiastical authorities. The end came in 680, when the Sixth General Council, being the Third held at Constantinople, defined that there are in Jesus Christ two natural Wills and two natural Operations. As to the condemnation of Pope Honorius adopted by this Council, there is no occasion to add anything to what we have already said. (nn. 292, v. and 507, vii.)

The Second Council of Constantinople was held in the year 553, and dealt with certain aspects of the Monophysite controversy. There has been no need for our mentioning it, so far. (n. 535.)

It remains to give the proof of the Catholic doctrine that there are in Christ two Wills and two Operations. This is not difficult, for the Monothelites did not question that Christ willed and operated in virtue of the Divine Nature; and it is plain from Scripture that He also acted in virtue of the Human Nature, for it was as Man that He hungered, thirsted, suffered sorrow, and the like (n. 520); all which affections were certainly not suffered by God, except in consequence of the Incarnation. We have an express recognition of the double Will in the prayer made by Christ in the Garden, "Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me: but yet, not My will, but Thine be done." (St. Luke xxii. 43.) The Will of Christ due to the Divine Nature in Him was nothing different from the Will of the Father, who has the same Nature· but the text plainly distinguishes between the Will of the Father and some other Will that is in Christ and finds expression on His part, and this can be no other than the Human Will. The same argument may be based on many other passages of the Gospels. (St. Matt. xxvi. 39; St. John v. 30, vi. 38.) The virtue of obedience involves the submission of one will to another; hence, our doctrine is implied in all passages that speak of the Obedience of Christ (Romans v. 19; Philipp. ii. 8; Hebrews x. 7): a difficulty that is sometimes felt as to this Obedience

will be considered presently. (n. 531.) In fact, the Monothelite doctrine is untenable theologically, and philosophically it is undistinguishable from the Monophysite heresy; or so far as it pretended to make a distinction, it set up as an object of worship a thing as lifeless as were the idols of the heathen; for such is a nature that has no operation, as the Lateran Council held in 649 under Pope Martin remarks. It is not worth while to dwell longer upon this subject. We shall speak presently of the worship to be paid to the Sacred Humanity. (nn. 535, 536.)

530. *The Actions of Christ.*—Since the Will is the principle from which the actions of a rational creature immediately spring, it follows from the presence of two Wills in Christ that His actions fall into three classes. His union with Human Nature did not hinder the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity from exercising all the acts of the Divine Nature, including the Divine Will. The Divine Will in Christ was the Will that had created the world, and which unceasingly maintains creatures in existence (n. 438) and in the exercise of their powers: and when Christ healed the centurion's servant by a merely interior act without going to him (St. Matt. viii. 5—13), it would seem that the Human Will had no direct, physical part in the working of this miracle. Among acts belonging exclusively to the Divine Will we must reckon the dispensation of interior grace, not merely as this essentially necessary help to salvation is incessantly offered to all mankind, but especially as its peculiarly

abundant outpouring accompanied all the public ministry of our Lord, showing itself in miracles of grace. (St. Luke v. 27, &c., n. 25.) What is here said does not exclude the moral action of the human will of Christ.

Another class of the actions of Christ must be said to proceed wholly from the Human Will, and these are such as have been mentioned as proving that He was truly Man (n. 250), and had a true human Will. (n. 529.) To desire food, to weep, and the like, were purely human. These acts are sometimes called theandric, as being acts of the Person who was God and Man (*Θεός, ἀνήρ*); but this epithet is more properly applied to the third class.

This third class consists of those acts in which both Wills had a part, and we have examples wherever our Lord was pleased to work His miracles by the use of some material appliance. A good instance is the cure of the man born blind, recorded in the ninth chapter of the Gospel of St. John. Clay was spread on his eyes, and he was bidden to wash in the Pool of Siloam, and he went and washed and came seeing. No one worth listening to will maintain that the Evangelist has described a cure by purely natural means, for assuredly clay and washing have no natural power to give the power of sight to one born blind; it follows, therefore, that this incident was an exercise of the Divine Power, and that the Divine Will gave an efficacy to material substances which otherwise they would not have possessed. At the same time, it was in obedience

to the Human Will that the limbs moved to take the clay and apply it; and thus we have a specimen of an act that can properly be termed theandric.

531. *The Liberty of Christ.*—As we have already said (n. 529), a difficulty is sometimes felt as to the mode in which the certain doctrine of the freedom of the Will in Christ is to be reconciled with the absence of all liability to sin. It is certain that mankind are redeemed by the shedding of the Blood of Christ (Hebrews ix. 14; n. 542), and that this Blood-shedding could have had no merit, were it not free, as St. Jerome says, "God made us free, and where there is no freedom, there is no reward." (*Contr. Jovinian.* 2, 3; *P.L.* 23, 286.) Both these points will be developed hereafter, and are assumed for the present. On the other hand, Christ speaks of having received a commandment from the Father to lay down His life (St. John x. 18, and see xiv. 31), and it would seem that He who could not sin had no freedom left when He received a commandment.

The difficulty *how* to reconcile these two certain truths, that Christ was free at the same time that He was fulfilling the commandment of the Father, is esteemed one of the greatest in the whole range of Theology, and systems of explanation have been devised in strangely large number. As in so many other cases, a complete answer to the difficulty is perhaps not to be expected, and if we suppose that the commandment spoken of was rigorously binding, and that it was imposed by God upon the Sacred Humanity, independently of any act of the Human Will, it is hard to feel that we are not dealing with

a demonstrated contradiction. But the double supposition is unfounded in both its branches. The words translated "command" and "permit" are interchanged in the Scripture in a curious way; instances are found in the Old Testament: thus the Lord did not literally "bid" Semei to curse David, but merely allowed hi n, and David would not interfere (2 Kings xvi. 9, 10); and in the New Testament the "permission" given to the Jews to put away their wives (St. Matt. xix. 8) is called elsewhere a "precept" (St. Mark x. 5); both these texts, however, will call for our attention again when we treat of Matrimony. It is the business of criticism to determine the true meaning in each place. We shall therefore not be departing from the usage of Scripture if we understand the "commandment" given to Christ (St. John x. 18) as not amounting to a precept binding under sin; nor does the authority of the Fathers compel us to put this meaning on the passage, for the Fathers who have commented on it clearly maintain that Christ was free in dying for us. Nor is it necessary to conceive that this "commandment," whatever its nature, was independent of the acts of the Human Will; for it may be that the eternal decree that mankind should be redeemed by the death of the God-Man was, in the first sign (n. 378), conditional only, and became absolute only in view of the free consent which, as God foresaw, the Human Will of Christ would give. (n. 385.) This matter was proposed to His Will as being the Good Pleasure of God, the acceptance of which was not obligatory.

The explanation here given of a much-vexed difficulty is that which, with various modifications, recommends itself to many recent writers. (See Franzelin, *De Incarnatione*, Th. 44.) It is suggested, or we may even say clearly expressed by St. Anselm (Medit. 11, *De Redempt.; P.L.* 158, 764): "The Father did not give the Man Christ a precept compelling Him to die; but of His own accord He did that which He knew would please the Father and be profitable to men. . . . He rendered free obedience to the Father, when of His own accord He willed to do that which He knew would please the Father. And because this good Will, however free, was given Him by the Father, it is rightly said that He received it as commanded by the Father."

532. *The Union Permanent.*—We have shown (n. 522) that the Human Nature of Christ was assumed by the Word in the first instant of Its existence, and it is the general doctrine of the Fathers that what Christ once assumed He never put off, nor will put off. This doctrine is founded not only on the absence of any indication to the contrary in the records of revelation, but also on the text of St. Paul (Hebrews xiii. 8): "Jesus Christ, yesterday and to-day and the same for ever." Certain heretics who imagined that at the Ascension the Divinity alone returned to Heaven, leaving the Humanity on earth, are too obscure to require further notice.

Some difficulty arises from the words uttered by Christ on the Cross: "My God, My God, why hast

Thou forsaken Me?" (St. Matt. xxvii. 46.) We have seen (n. 507, i.) how the Docetæ turned these words to their own purpose, but it is plainly not necessary to push them so far as to suggest a dissolution of the substantial union of the two Natures, even during the time of the Passion and entombment. The words form the commencement of the 22nd Psalm, and have been used times out of number by Christians labouring under a sense of the privation of the sensible presence of God within them. Whatever difficulty there is about the use of them by Christ is only a part of the wider mystery, how the suffering of the Passion was compatible with the Beatific Vision, which the Human Soul of Christ was never without. In this respect the sufferings of the Body and of the Soul are alike. (n. 534.)

In accordance with the principle just stated, we hold that between the Death of Christ and His Resurrection, the Sacred Soul was separated from the Body, just as happens after the death of any other man, but that the Divinity remained united to the Soul and also to the Body. On this matter, Peter Lombard (n. 332) fell into a remarkable mistake. He taught (*Dist.* 3, 22, 1) that during the Three Days in the Tomb Christ was still to be called Man, for although the Body and Soul were separated, yet the union of the Godhead with each constituted such a union between them that they still constituted a Man. To the objection that there was no Man in the absence of an immediate union of Soul and Body, he replied by quoting St. Ambrose,

that Logic has no place in the things of faith, and that our faith rests on fishermen, not on logicians. (*De Fide*, 1, 5 [13], n. 84; *P.L.* 16, 548.) This principle is, of course, perfectly sound, but Peter failed to show how it applied, for he could not produce from the records of revelation any passage declaring that the lifeless Body in the Tomb was a Man. The result is that this opinion, along with some five-and-twenty other points of doctrine taught by the same writer, finds a place in a list usually printed at the end of the Four Books of Sentences, under the heading, Articles where the Master is not commonly followed by all. The existence of this short list speaks highly for the accuracy of the writer in whose great work so few mistakes were found, although no false feeling of respect hindered free criticism of his opinions.

Doubts were entertained by some of the older theologians whether the Blood be one of these integral parts of Human Nature which were assumed by the Word, and never put off; but the affirmative is now maintained by all. The Precious Blood (1 St. Peter i. 19), poured forth from the veins during the Passion, was therefore restored to the Body at the time of the Resurrection, for Christ ascended to Heaven with all that belongs to the integrity of Manhood. In the middle of the fifteenth century, a question was warmly disputed between the Franciscans and Dominicans, whether the Word remained united to the Precious Blood during the Three Days, or whether a re-assumption was necessary at the time of the Resurrection. The

latter alternative was maintained by the Franciscans, while the Dominicans held that the union was never suspended; both parties sought to have their opponents condemned by the Holy See, but Pope Pius II. did not see fit to decide the question, and, in 1464, forbade the members of these two Orders to stigmatize either opinion as heretical or sinful. (Denz. 609, and see n. 220.) Since the Council of Trent, the view taken by the Dominicans has found general acceptance, for reasons which will come before us in the Treatise on the Blessed Eucharist, when we speak of concomitance.

In various churches, relics are preserved that are said to show the Precious Blood, which has either remained on the Instruments of the Passion, or on the earth where It was shed, or has been poured forth by consecrated Hosts or Crucifixes, when pierced in mockery by sacrilegious hands. Such relics are obviously worthy of all reverence, supposing their genuineness to be established; but it must not be thought that the Divinity remains united with them. For such particles of the Precious Blood as retained the union between the Passion and the Resurrection were restored to the Sacred Body; and if any remained without being restored, these had been permanently separated, and had lost the Divine Union at the time they were shed; as was the case with the Blood of the Circumcision. As for the Blood that has come from Sacred Hosts and Crucifixes, it has never been united with the Word, but probably had a miraculous origin at the time when it was first seen.

533. *The Son by Nature.*—Although, as we have seen (n. 400), the Arianism that had prevailed in Spain yielded to the efforts of King Reccared and of Bishop Leander, who restored the country to Catholic unity, yet traces of the heresy survived far into the eighth century. About the year 783, the Primate Elipand, the aged Archbishop of Toledo, found it necessary to go deeply into the doctrines of the Blessed Trinity and Incarnation, in order to check some recrudescence of heresy, and he took as his associate the young and learned Felix, Bishop of Urgel. In the heat of argument, these disputants urged that the Divine Word is the true Son of God by Nature, which is the doctrine of the Nicene Council; but they went further, and maintained that He is the only Son of God by Nature, in such sense as to deny this Sonship to Christ as Man; they held that Christ as Man was Son of God by adoption only. They were able to quote in support of this view certain passages from writers deserving of respect, whose ambiguous expressions really referred to Human Nature having been adopted, or assumed, by the Word; or which were founded on the truth that in Christ all men have been enabled to become adopted sons of God. (St. John i. 12.) To be an adopted son belongs to persons only; the doctrine of Elipand and Felix, therefore, amounted to a revival of the Nestorian heresy, that there are two Persons in Christ, and it is refuted by the same arguments. The controversy fills a considerable place in the Church history of the last twenty years of the eighth century; the Catholic champion was

Alcuin, the ecclesiastical adviser of Charlemagne. Under his influence, and with the concurrence of Pope Hadrian, various Councils were held to consider the matter, in Germany, France, and Italy; and the Adoptianist doctrine was everywhere condemned. Felix conformed, finding that the Church taught the Natural Sonship of Christ as Man, which he had denied; but Elipand was obstinate, and died in his error in 800. As in many other cases, political considerations were mixed up with the theological controversy. The chief decree on the subject was adopted in 794, by a Council held at Frankfort, and generally received. (Denz. 253.)

534. *The Knowledge of Christ.*—That Christ as Man, from the first moment of His existence, enjoyed the Beatific Vision, by which He saw God as He is, follows from the substantial union between the two Natures, and from the dignity of true Son of God enjoyed by Christ as Man. (n. 533.) We have already referred to the difficulty felt by some, of reconciling this Vision with the reality of the sufferings of the mortal Life, and especially of the Passion. (n. 532.) The explanation does not seem difficult. Both truths being certain, we might, if necessary, suppose a special intervention of the Divine Will and Power, by which the happiness enjoyed by the Soul of Christ was hindered from flowing down and extinguishing all sense of pain in other parts of the Sacred Humanity. But this supposition does not seem necessary, for daily experience shows that it is possible for the same person, at the same time, to experience joy and

sorrow; the martyrs have often testified to the ecstatic happiness with which God filled their souls, at the very time that their bodies were suffering the extremity of torment; and, on a smaller scale, the same thing is constantly seen by those who have dealings with persons on whom misfortune has fallen; these may be enduring the pangs arising from disease, bereavement, ingratitude, and the like, and yet find in the higher region of their soul a happiness which nothing can disturb. We may be sure that joy and sorrow coexisted in the heart of St. Peter when he met his Risen Saviour, and knew that the sin of his denial was forgiven. (St. Mark xiv. 72; St. Luke xxiv. 34.)

Moreover, we must suppose that Christ, as Man, in virtue of the union with the Godhead, had every perfection which was not incompatible with His state; and especially that His Human Intellect was perfected by the fulness of the knowledge which is called infused. This is knowledge which is not acquired gradually by experience, but is poured into the soul in one flood. That Christ had such knowledge is indicated by the Scripture, for in Him are hid all the treasures of knowledge and wisdom (Coloss. ii. 3); on Him rests the Spirit of Wisdom and of Understanding (Isaias xi. 2); to Him, God doth not give the Spirit by measure (St. John iii. 34); He, even as Man, is Head of the Church and Lord and Master of the Prophets.

This infused knowledge of its very nature did not admit of advance. But besides what was infused, Christ had also acquired knowledge, gathered by

the natural use of His faculties. It is of this that St. Luke speaks (ii. 52) when he tells us that Jesus advanced in wisdom and age, and grace with God and men. The advance was not in the object of His knowledge, or things which He knew, but in the mode in which He came to know them.

We have already discussed the text which speaks of the knowledge of the Day of Judgment. (St. Mark xiii. 32, n. 409.)

535. *The Worship of Christ.*—No one that has really grasped the unity of Person in Christ, can feel any difficulty about the worship to be paid to Him. Worship is paid to a person who has claims upon our reverence, and when we worship Christ, we worship the Person who is God; and, therefore, the worship that we pay to Him is that highest worship, called *latria*, which is rendered to God alone; and it is *absolute latria*, for it is paid to God Himself, and not to some mere creature which may receive *relative* honour, on account of some particular relation that it has with God. These distinctions will be more fully explained when we speak on the honour due to the Saints and sacred images, in the course of our Treatise on the Four Last Things.

The Fifth General Council, held at Constantinople in 553 for the purpose of dealing with some obscure points connected with the doctrine of the Incarnation, thought it necessary to pass a decree (Denz. 180) condemning those who say that Christ is to be adored in two Natures, and in this way bring in two adorations, one paid to the Word of

God alone, and the other to the Man; and it teaches that one and the same adoration is to be offered to the Word made Flesh and to His Flesh. We have examples of this adoration in Scripture; it is true that these do not expressly distinguish between *latria* and other forms of reverence, but the commentaries of the Fathers make the traditional meaning clear. Thus St. Paul applies to Christ the words of the Psalmist: Let all the Angels of God adore Him (Hebrews i. 6); in the Name of Jesus, every knee is to bow, of those that are in Heaven, on earth, and under the earth (Philipp. ii. 10); the Magi falling down adored the Infant (St. Matt. ii. 11); and (St. John ix. 38) the man born blind fell down and adored, by way of protesting his faith in the Son of God. Catholics did not disclaim the charge of being worshippers of man, when brought against them by the Apollinarists and other heretics. Among the multitude of passages from the Fathers which might be quoted in proof of their belief that the Sacred Humanity is to be adored, we will be content with two. St. Augustine says that Christ took flesh from the Virgin Mary, and in this Flesh He walked upon the earth, and this Flesh He gave us to eat for our salvation; but no one eats that Flesh unless he has first adored. Not merely do we not sin by adoring, but we sin by not adoring. (*In Psalm.* xcviii. 9; *P.L.* 36, 1264.) And St. John Damascene points out that we do not adore mere Flesh, but the Flesh as united to the Divinity. We feel dread of touching a live coal, because of the fire united with the fuel; so too we

adore the two Natures of Christ, because of the Divinity united with the Flesh. (*De Fid. Orthod.* 3, 8; *P.G.* 94, 1013.)

Some of the Scholastics discuss the question whether it is possible by an effort of the mind to dissociate the Sacred Humanity from the Divinity, and offer to It, thus dissociated, a special worship. There are weighty names on both sides as to the abstract possibility, but what is certain is that such worship is useless, for it is included in the higher worship which we have just shown to be due; and it is dangerous, for it is apt to lead to false views, destructive of the reality of the Incarnation. When, in the prayers sanctioned by the Church, mention is made of the Sacred Humanity, no separation is made from the Divinity; the Object of honour is the Humanity as it actually exists, in union with the Word. It is so in the Secret prayer used in the Mass of the feast of the Nativity of our Lady: "O Lord, may the Humanity of Thine only-begotten Son be our succour;" and in the form for giving Holy Communion: "May the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve thy soul to life everlasting;" and in the indulgenced prayer said often by those who recite the Divine Office, glory is ascribed to the Thrice Holy and Undivided Trinity, and to the Humanity of our Crucified Lord. The Jansenists regarded this prayer with peculiar dislike.

536. *The Sacred Heart.*—The unloving sect of the Jansenists extended their dislike to the devotion to the Sacred Heart of our Lord, which, as we may conjecture, was in the designs of God intended to

counteract the mischievous tendencies of their teaching, and the false reverence that they endeavoured to enforce. The story is well known that a simple nun of Paray, since raised to the altars under the name of Blessed Margaret Mary Alacoque, received from Christ a revelation that she was selected to be His instrument to bring men to render honour to His Sacred Heart, which had so much loved mankind. This was about the year 1673. She was instructed to secure the assistance of the Jesuits, to whose Society the propagation of this devotion was especially entrusted, and it was heartily taken up by them. The Jesuits took the lead in withstanding the Jansenists, which may partly account for the opposition with which the devotion was received. It was denounced as new, a charge that was true in a certain sense, for never before had it been put into form and popularized; but the spirit of the devotion had long been familiar to the Saints. In particular, prayers are extant written by St. Bernard, which might seem to have come from a heart instructed by the revelation; and it will be remembered that this same Saint anticipated St. Bernardine of Siena in showing devotion to the Holy Name. (n. 515.) The two kindred devotions are alike in that they aim at giving honour to the Sacred Humanity. As to the novelty of form, this is no true objection, for every devotion used in the Church has been new at some time; and each that gains the approval of authority may laudably be used by those who find in it a help to advance in the love of God. The rapid spread of the devotion

to the Sacred Heart throughout the Catholic world, is sufficient proof that it has been found to be a means of grace to the faithful people; and perhaps no devotion has ever been so thoroughly tested by withstanding the attacks of embittered foes, nor has any received more solemn approval of the Church, as we shall show.

The Church has never pronounced any judgment respecting the visions of Blessed Margaret Mary, and herein the same caution is observed as in other cases of private revelations. (nn. 22, 326.) However, the reality and divine character of the visions have been tested in every way known to those conversant with such matters, and has stood their tests. On this subject we may repeat what we said before (n. 256) concerning miracles: no man can fairly judge the reasons for accepting any specific vision ascribed to a Saint unless he fully and frankly, in his own mind, admit that God can, when He sees fit, grant such favours; and that He actually did so, in some instances recorded in Holy Scripture. (Exodus iii. 2; Acts x. 10, &c.)

We believe, then, that a private revelation, given by God, was the origin of that wide spread of devotion to the Sacred Heart which the last two centuries have witnessed; but it would be quite a mistake to suppose that the devotion is dependent on the reality of the revelation, in such sense that it could not be lawfully and profitably used by a person who thought he saw reason to believe that Blessed Margaret Mary was the victim of some delusion. The hostility that the devotion excited only served

to secure for it the fullest and most authoritative recognition. This hostility found expression in certain decrees of the Synod of Pistoia (n. 189), and these were condemned, among the rest, by Pope Pius VI., in 1794. (*Auctorem Fidei*, 62 and 63; Denz. 1425, 1426.) The Synod rejected the devotion as new, erroneous, or at least dangerous; the Pontiff condemned this rejection, if understood of the devotion approved by the Apostolic See, as false, rash, harmful, offensive to pious ears, and insulting to the Apostolic See. The Synod also blamed those who used the devotion for not adverting to the truth that *latria* cannot be offered to the Flesh of Christ, or any part of It, or to His Human Nature as a whole, if separated from the Divinity. The Pontiff explained that there was no such separation, but that the worship is paid to the Heart, as it is the Heart of Jesus, the Heart of the Person of the Word to which It is inseparably united, just as the bloodless Body of Christ during the Three Days might have been adored in the tomb without any separation from the Divinity; and he declared that the decree was captious and insulting to the faithful who used the devotion.

We learn from this authoritative document that the Object of the devotion is the Heart of our Lord, a part of His Sacred Humanity, as He ascended with It to Heaven and retains It for ever. This Heart, being an integral part of the Humanity and inseparably united with the Divine Word, is a lawful object of *latria*, no less than the Precious Blood, or the Humanity as a whole. The motive

why special honour is paid to this particular Part is found in the text of the Gospel where Christ Himself speaks of His Heart as the seat of His affections: "I am meek and humble of Heart" (St. Matt. xi. 29); and this language is in accordance with the mode of speaking which is common among men, and is most frequent in almost every Book of Holy Scripture from Genesis (vi. 6) to the Apocalypse. (xvii. 17.) It does not belong to Theology to discuss what is the origin of the belief that the heart is the part of the body of man most closely connected with his affections; it is enough for our purpose to remark that this belief is held universally. This is why the worship of the Divine Heart is a mode of honouring the love with which Christ worked out the redemption of mankind, and especially that which moved Him to give us His perpetual Presence in the Blessed Eucharist.

Not only the Heart, but also other parts of the Sacred Humanity may be worshipped with *latria*, and such devotion would be laudable whenever there is found in it a sufficient motive. Thus, distinct honour has for three centuries been paid in the Church to the Five Wounds, as reminding us of the Passion of Christ; and it is probable that many similar devotions have been used from time to time by private persons, on their own responsibility.

It will be observed that the worship rendered by the Church to the Lance and Nails and other instruments of the Passion, is not *absolute latria*,

for these have never been substantially united to the Word.

537. *Rules of Language.*—One result of the union of the two Natures of Christ in the one Person of the Word is found in the mutual indwelling of these two Natures. This constitutes a kind of circumincession (n. 419), but the difference between this case and the mutual indwelling of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is evident. The one is founded in the unity of Person, the other in the unity of Nature. In the words of Leporius (*Libell. Emend.* n. 4), God contains, but cannot be contained: He penetrates, but is not penetrated: He fills, but is not filled.

Theologians who have considered the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation have deduced from it certain rules of language which must be observed by all who wish to speak with accuracy on the subject. These are grouped under the name of Communication of Characters. It is to be observed that such concrete names as God and Man, Son of God and Son of Man, denote the Nature as borne by the Person of the Word, not the Nature alone, whereas abstract words, such as Godhead and Manhood, denote the Nature itself. Hence, concrete words of either class may be used whenever the subject spoken of is the Person: so that we may say of the Son of Mary that He is God, or that He is Man, indifferently. But we must not say that the Humanity is God, or that the Divinity was born. We may say that God suffered and died, but not that the Godhead was crucified. In

all these matters, as was remarked in the parallel case of the mode of speaking about the Blessed Trinity (n. 422), the only safe rule is to be content with those forms of expression for which we have authority: novelties will at least raise doubts, even if they do not lead the unwary to positive error. It was on this principle that Pope Hormisdas, in the year 530, reprobated the use of the formula, "One of the Trinity suffered." (See Petav. v. 2; Denz. 142.) In cases of doubt, risk of mischief may be obviated by adding some explanatory clause: "In virtue of the Divinity," or "As Man," or the like, as the case may require. The suspicion of Nestorian or Eutychian heresy may thus be repelled.

538. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have explained the two opposing errors which were rife during the fifth century on the subject of the Incarnation, and we have proved the Catholic doctrine, which lies between the two. From this doctrine, various corollaries follow which needed to be developed at some length, and it is shown that all becomes clear when the union of two Natures in one Person is taken as the fundamental truth.

CHAPTER IV.

CHRIST THE REDEEMER.

539. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter, after speaking of certain titles which are given to Christ in the Holy Scripture, we shall state and prove the Catholic doctrine as to the mode in which He carried out the great purpose for which He came on earth. This purpose was, to save sinners. (1 Timothy i. 15.) We shall consider whether there is any sense in which this work can be called necessary, and then prove that Christ truly offered a full satisfaction for the sins of men, and that the redemption thus accomplished embraced the whole race of man, so that there is no man for whom Christ did not die. The whole of our knowledge of the matter, as is evident, depends upon revelation. Much of it belongs to the defined faith of the Church, though some points are still open to the discussion of theologians. Many of the conspicuous heresies of the present day turn on the matter of this chapter, some sects denying that any satisfaction was made for man, or needed by him, others confirming the benefit of the Death of Christ to the predestined only, to the exclusion of others.

540. *Titles of Christ.*—It will be sufficient to mention some of the titles ascribed to Christ in Holy Scripture, with such short explanation as may be needed. There are only three that present any difficulty, namely, High Priest, Mediator, and Redeemer. The full explanation of these will be found in the sequel of this chapter, which treats specially of the last.

I. *Son of God.*—This title, the chief of all, was given to Christ by a voice from Heaven, on occasion of His Baptism (St. Matt. iii. 17), and of His Transfiguration. (St. Matt. xvii. 5.) It was given also by St. Peter, and accepted by Christ (St. Matt. xvi. 16, 17); it was solemnly claimed by Him when adjured by the High Priest (St. Matt. xiv. 61, 62); and the truth expressed by it is the very foundation of Christianity. We have spoken fully on the subject in other places. (nn. 406, 518, 533.)

This title belongs exclusively to the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, who became Man.

II. *The Son of Man.*—The phrase Son of Man is used in the Old Testament, of Ezechiel (Ezech. iii. &c.) and Daniel (Daniel viii. 17), the two Prophets to whom such wonderful visions were granted during the Captivity. It seems to have been used purposely, in order to remind them of their frailty, and to hinder their being unduly elated by their admission to the knowledge of the secrets of God. The phrase is nowhere used in Scripture of any other individual person except Christ, although it occurs as a collective, as an alternative for "mankind." (Psalm viii. 5.) It is used of Christ

by the Prophets (Daniel vii. 13), by Himself (St. Matt. ix. 6, &c.), and by the people that listened to His teaching (St. John xii. 34, &c.), by whom it was taken, as appears, to be a name of the Messiah. The phrase is an expression of the true Humanity of Christ. (n. 520.)

III. *Head over Men and Angels.*—Christ, being raised from the dead, is set on the right hand of the Father, in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion; all things are subjected under His feet, and He is made Head over all the Church. (Ephes. i. 20—22.) This headship extends to the Church Suffering in Purgatory and Triumphant in Heaven, and is not confined to the Church Militant on earth. (n. 177.)

IV. *King and Lord of All.*—Christ is appointed by the Father Heir of all things (Hebrews i. 2); to Him is given power and glory and a kingdom (Daniel vii. 14); and since, as God, He had all this by nature, and not by appointment or gift, it follows that the titles belong to Him as Man. As to the character of His Kingdom, He declares that it was not of this world. (St. John xviii. 36.) The power that He exercised was spiritual only, as when He founded the Church, gave laws to it, instituted the Sacraments, and sent His Apostles to preach. He claims the right to perform these acts expressly on the ground that all power was given to Him in Heaven and on earth. (St. Matt. xxviii. 18.)

V. *Judge.*—The Father has given all judgment to the Son (St. John v. 42); and this, for the reason just stated, must be said of Him as Man. The

testimony borne by St. Peter is to the same effect (Acts x. 42), that Christ is appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead. We shall have more to say on the matter when we come to speak of the things that follow death, some of which are described by our Lord in His last public discourse. (St. Matt. xxiv. xxv.)

VI. *Prophet.*—In our ordinary speech, the work of a Prophet is to foretell future events, and this power is exercised at least by some of those who are called Prophets in Scripture. But they were also commanded to preach in the name of God, to rebuke vice, and to lead men to the performance of their duty. This was the work of Elias and Eliseus, who foretold little or nothing beyond the immediate future, as well as of Isaias and Daniel, who have recorded so much of what should happen in the days of the Gospel, and later yet. Christ was a Prophet in both senses. It was under this title that His coming was foretold by Moses (Deut. xviii. 15), and His claim to it was recognized by the people who heard Him. (St. Luke vii. 16, &c.) That last discourse recorded by St. Matthew, and to which we referred lately, contains a disclosure of the future as well as warning and exhortation. The heathen "sage," Epimenides, is called a prophet by St. Paul. (Titus i. 12.)

VII. *Doctor.*—The work of a Doctor is to teach in such a style that his hearers learn. Christ did this effectually, as Isaias had foretold that He would (Isaias lv. 4), and as we gather from all that is recorded in the Gospel. His miracles supplied an

accepted proof that His doctrine was from God (St. John x. 21), which was also proved by the permanence of His work (Acts v. 34—39), and by the experience of the Apostles. (St. Matt. xvi. 20.)

VIII. *High Priest.*—The work of a priest is to offer a victim in sacrifice on an altar. This whole subject will come before us again when we speak of the Sacrifice of the Mass, in our Treatise on the Blessed Eucharist. For the present it is enough to notice that these four words are so connected that no one of them can be understood except as implying the other three. Christ is a Priest inasmuch as, on the altar of the Cross, He offered Himself as a Sacrifice to His Father, in atonement for the sins of men. This will be proved when we show that Christ truly made full satisfaction for man. (n. 542.) Meanwhile, it is sufficient to refer to the Epistle to the Hebrews, the whole of which is filled with discussions as to the Priesthood of Christ, and the comparison between this and the priesthood of the sons of Aaron. (See Hebrews iv. 14, 15; vii. 26; ix. 14.) Christ is a Priest for ever. (Hebrews v. 6; vi. 20.) It is true that He was offered once for all on the Cross, with actual shedding of His Blood, and that in the Mass this one Sacrifice is perpetually renewed, as He offers Himself daily on countless altars in an unbloody manner by the hands of His ministers; but the eternity of His Priesthood is also seen in this, that in Heaven He is ever representing to His Father the satisfaction that has been made, and distributing to men the supernatural grace that He has merited for them. It is a matter

of dispute whether the Priesthood of Christ will not cease, as to acts, at the Day of Judgment,

The eternal Priesthood of Christ is foreshadowed in the Psalm (cix. 4) by the words, "Thou art a Priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech." We are assured that these words apply to Christ, for St. Paul uses them in the places that we have just quoted, and he enlarges on them as affording proof that the Priesthood of Christ was something higher and more perfect than that which offered the sacrifices of the Old Law in the Temple at Jerusalem. (Hebrews vii.) Besides the passage of the Psalm (cix. 4), and several places in the Epistle to the Hebrews, we meet with the name of Melchisedech nowhere, except in the short narrative contained in the Book of Genesis. (xiv. 18—20.) Few readers would have their attention attracted by this incident, nor would many suspect that it contained much instruction as to the Gospel dispensation; yet the inspired commentary of St. Paul assures us that this is so; and in that way we have a proof of the unity of authorship of the two Testaments. (n. 143.) We may point out the five respects in which the priesthood of Melchisedech was a figure of the eternal Priesthood of Christ.

First, the name Melchisedech signifies in Hebrew the King of Justice, or the Just King, the idiom being the same as when the fraudulent steward is called the steward of injustice (St. Luke xvi. 8); and Christ is in a special manner the Just One. (Isaias liii. 11; Acts iii. 14.) Then, Melchisedech is the King of Salem, or of peace, and it is Christ

that restores peace between God and man. Again, the Sacred Text makes no mention of the father and mother of Melchisedech, deviating herein from the ordinary usage of the Scripture; in like manner, Christ in His Human Nature is without Father, and in His Divine Nature without Mother. Also, nothing is said concerning the past or future career of Melchisedech, apart from this one incident; Christ, as God, is without beginning, and His Priesthood is eternal. Lastly, Melchisedech offered bread and wine; and it is under the species of bread and wine that Christ offered Himself at the Last Supper, and is offered by His ministers as often as Mass is said.

IX. *Mediator.*—Mediation is the word used when an effort is made by the Government of one nation to bring about peace between two other nations who are at war; and this use of the word helps us to understand the sense in which Christ is Mediator between God and man. He shares in the Nature of both, uniting the fulness of the Godhead to the infirmity of the Manhood; and thus is able effectively to use His good offices with the higher and more powerful of the contending parties on behalf of that one which is worsted in the war. That Christ is the Mediator between God and man is plainly declared by St. Paul, who says (1 Timothy ii. 5) that there is one God and one Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus. He is the Mediator of the New Testament (Hebrews ix. 15), our Advocate with the Father (1 St. John ii. 1), ever living to make intercession for us. (Hebrews vii. 25.) Christ is our Mediator, as being the Divine Person clothed

in Human Nature, for if He were not God, His Mediation could not have the infinite efficacy needed; nor would it be true Mediation if He were not Man, for He would have nothing in common with the Nature which was to be reconciled. In fact, the work of reconciling mankind to the Blessed Trinity would, like all other works outside itself, be common to all the Three Persons; but it is against the nature of Mediation, that the Mediator should Himself be one of the parties to be reconciled. (See n. 574.)

The work of a Mediator is sometimes said to be atonement, which makes the parties be "at one." (Latin, *adunare* from *unus*.)

X. *Redeemer*.—We shall understand what is meant by a redeemer if we think of the times when men were not uncommonly kidnapped by pirates and carried off to slavery: especially, for many centuries, the infidels who held the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, made frequent inroads on the neighbouring coasts, and led away captive as many of the Christian inhabitants as fell into their hands. This was the fate of St. Vincent of Paul in the year 1605. It was obviously a great act of kindness, when Christians bought back these unfortunates from their masters, and restored them to liberty; thus saving them from misery and from danger of apostasy. More than one Religious Order charged themselves with this work, and the brethren would often offer themselves to take the place of some miserable captive for whom they could find no other ransom. This

splendid work of charity was carried on under the peculiar patronage of the Blessed Mother of God, who suggested it to St. Peter Nolasco, a Spaniard, early in the thirteenth century. His Order took the name of Our Lady of Ransom, for the Redemption of Captives, and the Latin word for Ransom (*merces*) has passed into English in the form Mercy. The feast of Our Lady of Mercy is celebrated on the 24th of September. The Trinitarian Order, founded towards the end of the twelfth century by St. John of Matha, was devoted to the same work. This Order had houses in England, and its members were called Friars of the Cross, or "Crutchet" Friars, from the red and blue cross which they bore on their habit, in obedience to a vision granted to their founder.

To redeem, then, is to buy back: to pay a ransom to the master of a slave, and this whether the slavery had any pretence of lawful origin or is wholly and utterly lawless. It was in this sense that Christ is our Redeemer, for when we were slaves of Satan, He gave Himself a redemption for all (1 Timothy ii. 6), buying us with a great price (1 Cor. vi. 20), His own Precious Blood and Life. But this matter requires distinct treatment.

541. *The Need of Redemption.*—We have seen (n. 512) that the Incarnation was a perfectly free act of God on every supposition short of a Divine decree that It should take place, as the only mode in which a full and perfect satisfaction could be made to God for the sins of men. We

have now to show that on this supposition it was necessary for God to assume a created rational nature.

It is clear that God could not in His own Nature have made satisfaction for man, for no one can offer satisfaction to himself; besides which, to make an offer of satisfaction implies some sort of submission, of which God in His own Nature is incapable. And a pure creature could not offer a full and perfect satisfaction to God, for no finite act of satisfaction can be full and perfect when the difference of dignity between the Person offended and him that makes the satisfaction is infinite, as must be the case with every pure creature.

The argument here given was familiar to the Fathers, who also used the converse; and from the truth that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of men proved that He was God. There is no need to quote passages, for there is no dispute as to what they taught. It is objected that the malice of sin is finite, for it is the act of a finite creature, and this is true so far as the sinful act is concerned. But this act, though finite in itself, yet is infinite in its malice if we consider the infinite dignity of God who is offended: for when offence is given, one element to be considered in measuring the malice is the difference of dignity between the two parties. If it be said that forgiveness of sin is secured by an act of perfect contrition, which is finite, being the act of a pure creature, we reply that this effect belongs to perfect con-

trition only in virtue of the satisfaction given by Christ.

We have here shown no more than that no full and perfect satisfaction could be made except by God Incarnate. It must now be shown that in fact this satisfaction was made.

542. *The Redemption.*—That Christ by the shedding of His Blood satisfied for the sins of men and redeemed them is probably admitted by all who believe that He is God; but it is consistently denied by all who refuse to accept this fundamental truth. It is admitted that many places of the Holy Scripture contain language which in its obvious meaning implies the doctrine of the Atonement: but it is said that this obvious sense is not the true meaning, and that in fact Christ delivered men from sin, only by the effect of His preaching and example. Our business will be to set forth the passages of Scripture where our doctrine is taught, and then to reply to the arguments, philosophical rather than Scriptural, which are brought against it.

First, there is a series of passages where Christ is said to have redeemed us, and these are expressed in terms that suit the proper meaning of the word, Redemption. (n. 540, x.) We are bought with a great price. (1 Cor. vi. 20.) We are not redeemed with corruptible things as gold and silver, but with the Precious Blood of Christ, as of a Lamb unspotted and undefiled. (1 St. Peter i. 18, 19.) Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us (Galat. ii. 13); and, not to multiply citations, we have the assurance of Christ Himself

that the Son of Man came to give His Life a Redemption for many. (St. Matt. xx. 28.) In all these places, the Redemption is spoken of as accomplished by the payment of a price, which distinguishes them from a few places where Redemption is used in an improper sense, when, for instance, Moses speaks of God as having redeemed Israel out of Egypt (Exodus xv. 13), where the deliverance was typical of the great Redemption by Christ.

Another series of texts speaks of Christ as suffering in our place. Christ hath borne our infirmities; He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins; by His bruises we were healed; the Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all. (Isaias liii. 4—6.) The application of this chapter is taught us in the New Testament. (Romans xv. 21; St. John xii. 38; Romans x. 16.) St. Paul says expressly that Christ died for our sins (1 Cor. xv. 3), and St. Peter declares more fully (1 St. Peter ii. 24), that Christ bore our sins in His Body upon the tree, and that by His stripes we were healed. It is true that St. Matthew points out a partial fulfilment of the prophecy of Isaias, in connection with a miracle of healing performed by Christ (St. Matt. viii. 16); but the Evangelist does not represent this as the complete fulfilment, and the cure of bodily ailments is truly the removal of part of the penalties of sin.

We need not repeat the proof that has already been given that Christ was a true priest (n. 540, viii.), whose office is to offer sacrifice for sin.

(Hebrews v. 1.) This priest must have something to offer (Hebrews viii. 3); and the Victim that Christ once offered was Himself. (Hebrews vii. 27.) He delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness (Ephes. v. 2); we have, too, a striking argument when we consider the vision of Heaven to which St. John was admitted. He that was announced as being the victorious Lion of the tribe of Judah (Genesis xlix. 9) is seen under the appearance of the Lamb that is slain. (Apoc. v. 5, 6.) This Lamb was Christ (St. John i. 29), whose offering of Himself upon the Cross put an end to the need of that sacrifice of a lamb which for so many centuries had daily typified the more excellent offering that was to come. (Exodus xxix. 39.) It is true that if He had remained on earth after offering the one Sacrifice, He would not be a priest (Hebrews viii. 4), for He would have nothing to offer. (vii. 27.) Being in Heaven, He always lives to make intercession for us, representing the merits of His Sacrifice (ix. 24); just as the High Priest, once a year, entered the sanctuary, not without blood, and prayed for the Children of Israel and all their sins. (Levit. xvi. 14, 34.)

Our doctrine that Christ made satisfaction for men is not opposed to the teaching of Scripture, that our redemption is gratuitous (St. Matt. xviii. 27; Ephes. iv. 32; Romans iii. 24); for we who receive the benefit have not paid the price, which is paid for us by Another. Besides which, no one who has received personal offence is bound to accept

satisfaction offered by one who is not the offender. Speaking of the matter, as we must do, in human language, the offence of God caused by sin is not to be likened to a money debt, which is discharged when payment is made to the creditor, no matter who makes it; but it corresponds to the offence arising from an insult, the pardon for which must be sought by the offending party himself, unless he that is offended is pleased to waive a portion of his due.

Certain texts which seem to attribute our Redemption to the Resurrection of Christ (Romans v. 10) or to the preaching of the Apostles (2 Cor. v. 19), are easily seen to presuppose His Death for man. A difficulty which has much weight with some persons is that our doctrine represents God as unjust, in that He punishes Christ positively in satisfaction for sins not His own, for He has none. The reply is that the Human Nature of Christ freely accepted all that was proposed to It (n. 531), so that no injustice was done; nor need we think that the original decree of the Incarnation, if we may use this human language of the Eternal God, involved the extremity of suffering which was in fact endured by Christ. The purpose of the Incarnation would have been fully answered by any act whatever of a Person having the two Natures, provided it were offered in satisfaction for the sins of men, and that God were pleased to accept it for that purpose: the sufficiency of the Offering was due to the dignity of Him that made the offer, and not to the character of the work offered, whether it were laborious and

painful, or easy and painless. But besides satisfying for the sins of men, Christ did a great work, by His Life on earth, especially by His preaching and example: and it was foreseen, in the Divine Council, that among the sinners whom He strove to instruct some would be excited to hatred against One whose rebukes they felt to be well deserved, and that their fury would rise to such a pitch that they would persecute, revile, torture, and murder Him. For love of mankind, the Sacred Humanity accepted all the pains which were involved in this work, and even the Blood-Shedding and Death upon the Cross. This free acceptance being foreseen, the Divine Decree was made, that this free act of dying should be the act to be offered in satisfaction for the sins of men; and as a sequel to this decree, a peculiar, typical meaning was attached to all shedding of blood; especially, the sacrifice of living animals, lambs, bulls, and the rest became a mode of worship pleasing to God (Genesis iv. 4; Levit. i. &c.); and it passed into an established principle that without shedding of blood there is no remission (Hebrews ix. 22), in which words St. Paul sums up a large part of the ritual directions given by God through Moses.

We can see the "convenience" of the mode in which the Redemption of Man was actually accomplished, in pursuance of the Divine decree. The greatness of the love of God for man was shown by the sufferings which He accepted, because they were involved as consequences in the work of teaching us: and the extremity of this suffering forcibly

illustrates the evil that is in sin. Christ, too, in His Passion set us the example of patience, zeal, charity, and numberless virtues; and men are led to put a higher value on the grace that was purchased for them at so high a price.

The satisfaction of Christ is spoken of as made to God the Father, but this is by way of appropriation only, for the acceptance of it was common to the Blessed Trinity. (n. 421, vii.) In some sense then, Christ made satisfaction to Himself, but not in any way that involves an absurdity; for there is nothing to prevent a person in one character paying a debt which is due to himself in another character. This happens as often as an executor who is charged with the duty of paying the debts of a deceased person happens himself to be a creditor; in this case, the executor sets aside the sum of money that is due, and the creditor takes it to himself and gives a receipt; and no one sees any difficulty in the transaction, although he that pays and he that receives are the same person. So it is with the one Person who subsisted in two Natures, in Christ.

The satisfaction offered by Christ was of infinite value, on account of the dignity of the Person making the offering. The Victim offered was also of infinite value, but this alone would not give infinite value to the satisfaction, for otherwise, mankind might have been redeemed when the Blessed Mother of God made the offering of her Son to His Father, as no doubt she did with all her heart when she presented Him in the Temple.

(St. Luke ii. 22—24.) The Redemption was actually wrought by the offering which Christ made of Himself upon the Cross. A question is discussed by theologians whether the offering made by Christ was in justice sufficient. This is denied by Lessius, De Lugo, and other writers of the first rank, because they do not see that God was bound in justice to accept a satisfaction offered by One who had not offended. Scotus and Suarez, with many others of no less weight, reply that an obligation of justice arose from a promise made by God, the existence of which is gathered from the closing verses of that fifty-third chapter of Isaias which we have so often quoted, while its force to bind God even to a creature is recognized by St. Paul. (2 Timothy iv. 8.)

Scotus and Suarez are divided on the question whether Christ could be said to have a claim in rigorous justice that His offering should be accepted. Suarez, looking at the value of the thing offered, holds that justice is rigorously satisfied; but the consideration weighs with Scotus that satisfaction for a personal offence must be made by the person who has given the offence. We discussed this matter a few pages back.

543. *Redemption Universal.*—We have already shown (n. 389) that the will of God that man should be saved is universal, and little need be added to show that Christ died for all men. There is no express declaration of the Church to this effect, and there has been a small section of Catholic theologians by whom it is denied; these seemed to

doubt whether there may not be individual exceptions to the universality; yet they do not assign any class of exceptions, and it is hard to see what class could be established. No Catholic can hold, with the Calvinists, that Christ died for the predestined only (Con. Trid. Sess. 6, cap. 3; Denz. 677); or with Jansenius, that He died for those only who at any time hold the true faith (Prop. damn. Alex. VIII. Prop. 4; Denz. 1161); or again with Jansenius that it is a Semi-Pelagian error to say that Christ died for all men. (Denz. 970.) The proofs of the universal will to save that we have given in the place just referred to, and those which we shall give here, referring more particularly to the Death of Christ, seem hardly to admit of even individual exceptions; especially as there is no reason assignable for believing that any exceptions exist. The difficulties that may be raised as to the position of what are called "obdurate sinners," such as Esau (Hebrews xii. 16, 17), will be considered when we speak of the distribution of grace, in the Third Volume.

We have the express declaration of St. John (1 St. John ii. 2), that Christ is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world; and St. Paul teaches (Hebrews ii. 14—18) that Christ makes propitiation for the sins of all whose nature He took, with its infirmities; and this argument plainly extends to all mankind. He blotted out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us; and He hath taken the same out of the way,

fastening it to the Cross. (Coloss. ii. 14.) It should be noticed that this is said by St. Paul in a letter addressed to all the faithful of Colossæ, and not to any select body; and those to whom He wrote stood in need of some stern admonitions. (iii. 9, &c.) The Son of Man came to seek that which was lost (St. Matt. xviii. 11), and this phrase includes all who are involved in the fate that Adam's sin brought upon his posterity. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. (1 Cor. xv. 22.)

Christ offered Himself as a propitiation for those who had passed to their last account before His coming, including even such as had contracted the guilt of mortal sin and died unforgiven. This will be understood when it is remembered that among the results of the Eternity of God, all things are ever present to Him, without distinction of past and future: the Sacrifice that was to be consummated on Calvary was foreseen, and in virtue of It, the grace that made salvation possible was offered to all men from the beginning. We have already shown that the case of infants dying before Baptism is no exception to the universal antecedent will to save. (n. 389.)

544. *Recapitulation.* — This short but difficult chapter has justified the ascription to Christ of several titles found in the Scriptures, and especially it has been proved that He is Priest, Mediator, and Redeemer. The work of redemption called for more particular notice, and we showed in what sense it was necessary and in what sense free; that

the Death of Christ on the Cross was a real Sacrifice of propitiation for sin, and chosen among all the actions of Christ as that by which man was to be redeemed, in virtue of the Divine foresight that the malice of men would put their Saviour to death. Lastly it was proved from Scripture that the benefit of this Redemption, no less than the will to save, extends to all men.

CHAPTER V.

MYSTERIES OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

545. *Subject of the Chapter.*—It will be worth while to devote a few pages to remarks of a dogmatic nature upon certain incidents in the Life of our Lord. This is not the place for a complete biography of Christ, such as are admirably supplied by the Abbé Fouard and Père Didon: nor are we engaged on a commentary on the Gospels; we shall merely touch on a few passages as to which some theological questions arise. Nor is the list here given complete, for explanations of some difficulties are given in other parts of this work, especially in the Treatise on the Blessed Virgin Mary, which closes the present volume.

The incidents of which we treat are called Mysteries, and no doubt they all contain depths of hidden meaning which will never be fully understood on earth; but in many cases there is nothing on the surface that seems difficult to understand, so that they are not mysterious. (See nn. 4, 16.) The deep interest which the faithful have always taken in the minutest incidents in the Life of their Saviour is attested by a multitude of narratives supplementing what we have in the Gospels, the writers of which in many cases were merely in-

dulging their imagination as to what might have been, and have been misunderstood if they were taken to be writing history, derived from some authorities which are now lost. We doubt not there are some fragments of genuine tradition mixed up with much that is fanciful, if not downright falsehood, invented deliberately, to lend countenance to some heretical view; but it is impossible to feel much confidence in the result of any attempt to discriminate between the true and the false. Nor can use be made for our purpose of the meditations of contemplative Saints, nor even of the records of what are prudently judged to be revelations made to them; for it would appear clear that these revelations were not granted for the purpose of teaching history, but for the sake of spiritual instruction conveyed by the picture presented to the mind of the contemplative. It follows that, although the revelation as a whole is divine, we cannot be sure but what its "setting," as we may call it, may be due in part to the fancy of the person to whom it is granted; or Satan may have succeeded in mingling some falsehood with the truth, without the difference of source of the two portions of the revelation attracting notice. This danger is pointed out by St. Ignatius Loyola, in the eighth of his Rules for the Fuller Discernment of Spirits, given in his Spiritual Exercises, and the commentators enlarge upon the doctrine.

For these reasons, we must confine our remarks to the facts actually recorded in the four canonical Gospels.

546. *The Circumcision.*—We read in St. Luke's Gospel (ii. 21) that after eight days were accomplished that the Child should be circumcised, His Name was called Jesus. We have already spoken about the meaning of the Holy Name (n. 515); we must here speak of the occasion when it was given.

It will be observed that the Evangelist does not expressly state that the Child was actually admitted to the covenant of Abraham. (Genesis xvii. 12.) But there is no room for doubt of the fact, for when it is stated that the day had come and that the name was given, as was usual at the time of the performance of the rite, it is sufficiently implied that the rite was performed. To a Jewish mind it was a matter of course. The text of the Gospel, therefore, justifies the tradition of the Church.

It is true that Christ was not bound by the law of circumcision, not only because no lawgiver is bound by his own law, but also because the rite was instituted as a perpetual memorial of the promise that the Redeemer should come and bring forgiveness of sins. St. Epiphanius, being in controversy with heretics who denied the reality of the bodily frame of Christ, confutes them (*Hær.* 30, n. 28; *P.G.* 41, 453) by showing that their doctrine was inconsistent with the truth of the mystery that we are considering; and he finds many reasons why it was suitable that Christ should submit to the rite. From him and other authors, Suarez gathers the following: the rite proved the reality of the Body; it took away from the Jews an excuse which they would have put forward to justify their

obstinacy; it showed that the Old Law had the approval of Christ, and that He came not to destroy it. By this voluntary submission to a painful and humbling ceremony, Christ began early to satisfy for our sins and to set us an example of crushing pride by accepting whatever is most opposed to this vice.

It seems that the feast of the Circumcision has been celebrated in the Church at least from the fifth century, but the early history of the feast is difficult to trace because it falls on the same day as the octave of the Nativity of Christ. The earliest distinct mention of the feast of the Circumcision dates from the middle of the sixth century.

We are not concerned here with the character of the rite of Circumcision considered as a Sacrament of the Old Law.

547. *The Baptism of Christ.*—The Prophet Isaias had foretold (xl. 3) that there should be the voice of one crying in the desert, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the wilderness the paths of our God: and Malachias spoke (iii. 1) of the Angel whom the Lord should send, who should prepare the way before His face; and all the Evangelists testify that these prophecies received their fulfilment in the mission of St. John the Baptist. (St. Matt. iii. 3; xi. 10, and the parallels.) The work assigned to St. John was therefore to prepare the way before Christ, as a harbinger goes on in front, when a king is making a progress, and arranges all things in order before his lord arrive. We read much in the Gospel concerning the mira-

culous conception of St. John Baptist, at a time when his mother was past the age of child-bearing (St. Luke i. 18); his sanctification in his mother's womb, which is inferred from his recognition of the presence of the Virgin Mother and her Child (St. Luke i. 15, 44), and which is put beyond doubt by the admission of the feast of his Nativity into the Calendar of the Church, on Midsummer Day: no other birthday is kept holy, except those of Christ (December 25) and His Blessed Mother. (September 8.) St. John was a mere man, and not an angel in human form, as Origen (*In Joan.* i. 24; *P.G.* 14, 164) wrongly inferred from the passage of Malachias, where the Hebrew word used will bear the sense both of Angel and of Messenger; but he was a man who held an office which placed him above Moses and Elias and all the holy men whom God had employed to make known His will under the Old Law. Also, by the use of the grace given him, he had attained to a high degree of personal sanctity, and, as is commonly believed, never fell into mortal sin, besides living so as to secure the special crowns reserved in Heaven for martyrs, virgins, and doctors, who have triumphed over the world, the flesh, and the devil (St. Matt. x. 39; Apoc. xiv. 4; Daniel xii. 3); but there is nothing in Scripture to warrant us in making any comparison between St. John and other holy men in point of personal sanctity, for the text where it is declared that there hath not arisen a greater than he (St. Matt. xi. 11; St. Luke vii. 28), need not be interpreted as conveying more than we have said.

Having remarked so much on the person of St. John, we will speak of the rite which he was divinely ordained to administer (St. John i. 33), and from which he has received his familiar surname of Baptist. This rite did not confer grace, as is done by the Christian Sacrament of Baptism (St. Matt. iii. 11, and the parallels; Acts xix. 1—6), for the institution of which it prepared the minds of men. It is true that John is said to baptize for the remission of sins (St. Mark i. 4), but this means that the rite led men to abandon sin and do penance, in accordance with the Baptist's exhortation. Among the reasons why Christ, who had no sin, submitted to receive the rite, we may reckon that He wished to show His approval of the work done by John, and by His example to induce others to submit to it. Also, we may think that by going down into the water, He sanctified it, preparing it to be the matter of His own initiatory Sacrament; and His Baptism was the occasion when, in the presence and hearing of a multitude of Jews of all classes, He received the solemn recognition of His claims, at the mouth of one whom all the people held as a Prophet. (St. Matt. xxi. 24—27, &c.)

As we have already pointed out (n. 398), the Baptism of Christ was one of the occasions when distinct manifestations of the Three Divine Persons were given to the earth. Jesus being baptized, forthwith came out of the water; and lo, the heavens were opened to Him, and He saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove and coming upon Him; and behold, a voice from heaven saying,

This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. (St. Matt. iii. 16, 17, &c.) None of the Evangelists expressly tell us how many persons perceived these signs: we know indirectly that St. John saw the dove (St. John i. 32), and it is probable that all the signs were generally perceptible, for we cannot regard them as given for any purpose except the instruction of the multitude. It is impossible to tell what is precisely meant by the opening of the heavens, but it would seem that something occurred which called attention to the appearance of the dove. There is no need to suppose that this dove was an actual bird, either selected or created for the purpose. The Sacred Text does not require more than that the semblance of a dove was seen, the symbol of reconciliation (Genesis x. 11), of simplicity (St. Matt. x. 16), and other virtues.

This solemn manifestation accredited Christ at the opening of His Public Ministry, and is fittingly associated by the Church, in her Offices, with the Adoration of the Magi, when Christ was first recognized as King of the Jews. It is the teaching of St. Thomas (p. 3. q. 66. a. 2. c.) that the Baptism of Christ was the occasion when He gave to Christian Baptism its power of conferring grace; but that the necessity of this Sacrament was not intimated to men till after the Resurrection.

548. *The Transfiguration.*—The vision of the glory of Christ, recounted by the three Synoptics (St. Matt. xvii.; St. Mark ix.; St. Luke ix.), was granted to the three most favoured of the Apostles (St. Mark v. 37; xiv. 33) shortly after the first plain

intimation given by Christ of His coming Passion. The word expressing the change that took place in Jesus before their eyes is translated "transfigured," but there is no need to suppose that there was any alteration of form in His features; His face shone with exceeding brightness, as did His garments, which became white as snow, so as no fuller upon earth can make white: we owe this graphic expression to St. Mark, who doubtless had his information from the eye-witness, St. Peter. The Apostle, in his Second Epistle, refers to his having seen the vision. (2 St. Peter i. 17, 18.) This brightness was a telling image, by which the Apostles understood something of the glory which belonged to their Master by right. These witnesses also saw and heard Moses and Elias conversing with Jesus; they may have recognized these figures by some peculiar revelation, or by the expressions used in the conversation, the purport of which is told us in most general terms. As to the mode of apparition of Elias, there is no difficulty; for this Prophet, like the Patriarch Henoch (Genesis v. 24; 4 Kings ii. 11), had left the earth without as yet passing through death; he therefore appeared in the body. But Moses had suffered the common fate; he died (Deut. xxxiv. 5) and was buried; the place of his burial was not disclosed, probably lest the Israelites should make it the centre of unauthorized religious rites; but there is nothing to justify some attempts that have been made to treat his association with Elias as proof that he never truly died. Possibly, his soul and body may have been reunited, but it is

rash to assert that this was so; there is no positive ground for supposing it, and it is most probable that this anticipation of the general resurrection was a privilege which no one but the Blessed Mother of God shared with her Son. (n. 576.) Most probably, the mode of apparition of Moses came about by his blessed soul associating itself temporarily with some portion of matter, fashioned to the likeness of a human body; as we have seen, this is the manner in which the Angels show themselves. (n. 451.)

549. *The Sepulchres opened.*—Several questions of great interest, and sometimes of no small difficulty, arise out of the narrative of the Passion of Christ, and often the key to the solution has been lost, and we are driven to be content with guesses; but we leave these to the commentators, and touch only on such as concern some point of dogma. And first we will speak of a matter which is recorded by St. Matthew alone. (xxvii. 51—53.) We read that on the Death of Christ, the earth quaked and the rocks were rent, and the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints that had slept arose, and, coming out of the tombs after His Resurrection, came into the Holy City and appeared to many.

We get little help from other parts of revelation for understanding this mysterious narrative. It seems clear that the opening of the tombs was an effect of the earthquake, and we must therefore understand that the resurrection of the saints did not take place immediately, for they did not appear in the City of Jerusalem, the eminently Holy City,

until the third day, and it is incredible that they remained alive in their tombs during this time: besides which, Christ is the First-born from the dead (Coloss. i. 18), so that it is certain that before Him no one rose to glory. Also it would appear that the souls of the saints were reunited to true bodies, and that they did not merely assume the semblance of a body, as we suppose that the soul of Moses did, at the Transfiguration (n. 548): if merely a phantom body were assumed, there seems to be no meaning in the opening of the tombs. It is thought that the bodies which were assumed had undergone the change that St. Paul denotes by the contrast of a natural body and a spiritual body (1 Cor. xv. 44); we shall consider this contrast more fully when we treat of the general resurrection of the flesh. We are left in ignorance who they were that rose, but it is conjectured with probability that they included some of the holy people of the Old Testament who had been in a peculiar manner types of Christ, especially Abraham and Melchisedech. Whether these again passed through death, as did Lazarus and others who had been recalled from the grave; or whether they await the Last Day with Henoch and Elias; or whether they entered the glory of Heaven with their bodies when Christ ascended, is quite uncertain. The point is warmly disputed, but the considerations adduced have too little importance to be worth producing. The third opinion is opposed to the common belief of the faithful, that the bodily Assumption of our Blessed Lady was a privilege no less unique than her Imma-

culate Conception; the second opinion represents these Saints as detained in the body without the vision of God which is enjoyed by the souls of all other men who have died in the state of grace, and purged from the effects of sin, so that their early resumption of their bodies would be a grievous misfortune to them; and on this account, it seems best to suppose that soul and body again separated, the body returned to the tomb, and the soul awaited with the rest the day of the Ascension of Christ.

550. *The Opened Side.*—St. John tells us (xix. 32—37) that the soldiers who broke the legs of the two thieves broke no bone of Jesus, but one of them with a spear opened His Side, and immediately there came out blood and water; and he asserts with peculiar emphasis that this happened before his own eyes, and adds that in the incident two prophecies were fulfilled. (Exodus xii. 46; Zach. xii. 10.) The reading of the ordinary Greek text which is represented by the word "opened," is regarded by many scholars as an error for a very similar word (ἤνοιξεν and ἔνυξεν) signifying "pierced," but the sense is the same.

The passage obviously sets at rest any question that might be raised as to the reality of the Death of Christ, and it therefore adds to the interest of the controversy concerning the antiquity and historical trustworthiness of the Fourth Gospel. (nn. 51, 519.) It is also the basis of certain theories as to the proximate cause of the Death of Christ, for some physicians see reason to believe that the death was

caused by an actual bursting of the walls of the Heart, a not uncommon result of intense emotion. (n. 536.) There are difficulties of a medical nature throwing doubt on this theory, and especially it is probable that no heart ever bursts in this way unless it is already diseased, and no presence of disease can be admitted in the case of Christ; besides which, the theory is open to a grievous theological objection. It involves the supposition that what St. John observed to come from the Side was a flow of certain humours having their origin in the blood, but being neither blood nor water, to which there was merely a superficial resemblance. The theory therefore involves a departure from the strict meaning of the words which must not be allowed without stronger reason than is produced; and moreover it destroys the symbolism of the two Sacraments of Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist, which is attested by the universal opinion of commentators. Nothing but true Blood and true Water will serve as symbols of these Sacraments, and accordingly, Pope Innocent III. in 1216 condemned a view closely akin to that of which we here speak. (Denz. 347.) The blood and water must have been produced by a miracle. But the true force of this decree is doubtful, for the interpretation depends on certain physiological notions prevalent in the thirteenth century, so that the question seems to be an open one. (See Corluy, *Comment. in Evang.* ad loc. and compare n. 552.)

551. *The Descent into Hell.*—The Holy Gospels tell us nothing expressly as to where the Blessed

Soul of our Lord abode during the time that His Body lay in the tomb, but it is the faith of the Church, expressed in the Apostles' Creed, that He descended into Hell. In explaining the grounds and meaning of this belief, we necessarily assume most of what we shall prove hereafter concerning the condition of departed souls. We shall be able to point out how far the Soul of Christ went through what is the common course of all men, and how far His course differed from that of other men. We believe then that there are two permanent receptacles, in one or other of which every human soul will abide for ever; separated from its body until the day of the general resurrection, and thenceforward reunited to the body and never again to be separated. In one of these receptacles, to which the name of Heaven is given, the inmates enjoy that clear vision of God for the attainment of which every man was created, and the enjoyment of which is perfect happiness. None who are once admitted to this blessed abode ever leave it. In the other receptacle, called Hell, taking the wider sense of the word, are souls who for the time being are not in enjoyment of this vision, some of whom, indeed, will never be admitted to it; these last are they whom death found unclad with the garment of habitual grace. (n. 184, ii.) If any man be without this garment at the instant of his death, he does not receive it afterwards; and without it, no soul is admitted into Heaven. (St. Matt. xxii. 2—14.) All souls in Hell are suffering punishment, at least by privation, because their being there and not in

Heaven is a consequence of Adam's sin, transmitted to them. (n. 497.)

In the permanent receptacle called Hell, there are two parts, of widely different character. There is the Hell of torment, where those who have died with the guilt on their souls of actual grievous sin, suffer the double pain of loss and of sense; and there is also the part which is often called the border-land (*limbus*). This part receives such souls as death has found without the grace of God and without actual grievous sin; such is the condition of one who, having been born in original sin, dies without having been admitted to the favour of God, but before he has reached years of discretion with the attendant liability to sin. Besides these two permanent receptacles, there is the temporary prison of Purgatory, where the souls of some of them that die in the grace of God are detained for a time, while going through the purifying process without which they are not fit for Heaven; this will have no existence after the Day of Judgment. Further, there was formerly another border-land, rendered necessary by that decree of Divine Providence by which none of the souls redeemed by Christ were admitted to enjoy the fruits of His Redemption, until His own glorious Ascension to Heaven. This border-land was then a place of detention for all those who had died in the grace of God, and had gone through all the necessary purgation, from Abel (St. Matt. xxiii. 35) onward, until the day when Christ passed with His Human Body to the presence of the Father.

All that has here been said belongs properly to the Treatise on the Four Last Things, and will be repeated in that place; but the present brief sketch has seemed necessary in order that the doctrine on the descent of Christ into Hell may be understood. We know that Christ ascended into Heaven because He descended first into the lower parts of the earth (Ephes. iv. 9); and that He preached to those spirits that were in prison (1 St. Peter iii. 19), and the faith that we profess in the Creed is that truth, whatever it be, which is taught us in these passages of Scripture. No controversies of any note have arisen on the subject, and the Church has not seen fit to develope the Apostolic declaration; possibly she has received no further revelation on the subject, for we do not seem to find anything in the records of tradition to enlarge our knowledge. We are left therefore to some more or less plausible conjectures.

There is no time to which the descent into the lower parts, and the preaching to the spirits, can be assigned, except the interval between the Death of Christ and His Resurrection. We cannot believe that He was occupied during this interval in any work but that of mercy to His creatures, whom He visited for their comfort; He cannot therefore have gone to the Hell of torment, whose inmates are incapable of consolation, nor is it likely that He entered the border-land peopled by infants. The visit must have embraced the limbus of the Patriarchs, which was so soon tc be emptied. As to Purgatory, it is commonly believed that this prison was visited, and

perhaps it is to this place that the text of St. Peter refers; the souls of whom he speaks were once unbelieving, but had accepted the teaching of faith before their death. The visit to Purgatory does not necessarily imply that the prison was emptied of all then detained in it; but the Fathers use language suggestive of the belief that all the departed just souls accompanied Christ to Heaven; and this may have come about if a Plenary Indulgence were granted by the Divine liberality to all the souls then in Purgatory.

552. *The Resurrection.*—If we are required to select some one among the many proofs of the divinity of the Christian religion (nn. 21—72), we should certainly mention the Resurrection of Christ, which is proved to have taken place by the testimony of the Evangelists; and we have shown that they are historically trustworthy. (nn. 44—53.) Few sceptics are now found to deny that Christ was seen, alive and free, for some space of time subsequent to His Crucifixion; their attempts to upset the Christian edifice usually take the form of denying the reality of His Death. It is said that death would not follow in so short a time after crucifixion; that the soldiers were bribed not to break the legs of Christ, and that His feet were merely tied, not nailed, so that on recovering from a death-like swoon He was able to walk. The writers who put forward these views do not see that it would be more reasonable to reject the narrative altogether, as was done by many generations of unbelievers, than to pick out some parts to be accepted and

others to be rejected or explained away. The early death is sufficiently accounted for by the sufferings that Christ had undergone, and especially by the loss of blood due to the Scourging. We know (Hor. *Sat.* 1, 2, 41) how great was the severity of this infliction as in use by the Romans, but we must not think that the Church is committed to the truth of certain revelations, probably spurious and certainly untrustworthy, which profess to relate how many stripes were given. (See Suarez, *De Mysteriis*, disp. 35, sect. 2, n. 5.) The ordinary work of Roman lictors will suffice to account for the death. The suggestion of bribery having been used to induce the soldiers to spare the leg-bones is founded on a narrative occurring in the very same document as tells of the opened side (St. John xix. 32—34), and the wounded feet are mentioned by St. Luke. (xxiv. 39.) This selection of part of a narrative for acceptance and part for rejection is altogether arbitrary; besides which, none of the earliest Fathers, who must have been perfectly familiar with the Roman mode of crucifixion, indicate any doubt upon the subject.

The Holy One was not to see corruption. (Acts ii. 27.) It follows that no beginnings of decay had place in the lifeless Body of Jesus; and this presents a difficulty in the way of what we have called the medical account of the Blood and Water that flowed from the wounded side (n. 550); since there is good authority for saying that the separation of the two fluids that might be mistaken for blood and water is in such cases a result of incipient corruption.

The Body of Christ after His Resurrection possessed certain qualities which theologians sum up in its being bright, and not subject either to suffering, or to the laws of matter relating to penetration and local motion. These are the qualities which will be found in the bodies of all men who rise to Eternal Life, as we shall show in the proper place; and in these respects the Resurrection of Christ is the pattern to which that other Rising is to be conformed.

553. *Recapitulation.*—This necessarily fragmentary chapter has given some notion of the view taken by theologians on certain of the mysteries of the Life of our Lord. There is sometimes a tendency to believe that the minute study of the Gospel narrative and the comparison of its parts is a branch of inquiry of recent growth; if any one thinks this, he is recommended to look at the *Summa* of St. Thomas (p. 3. qq. 27—59.), and the commentators, and he will find that there are few questions which have not been anticipated, discussed, and answered by the Scholastics. It will be found that these early Catholic writers were animated by a single-hearted desire to find out what is the meaning conveyed by the Sacred Text, and that they neglected no source of information that could help them in the inquiry.

554. *Close of the Treatise.*—This Treatise has given our reasons for believing that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity became Man in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, was born and lived on earth, and died for us men and for our salvation.

The various points of this doctrine have been contrasted with the errors to which they are opposed. The Catholic doctrine has been explained and proved, and after these explanations, many of the ordinary objections brought against it need no answer; they are seen to be pointless. Some incidental matters have called for notice, especially the names of Jesus Christ, the titles that are His due, and the worship that is to be paid to the Sacred Humanity and all the parts necessary to Its integrity.

Treatise the Twelfth.

The Blessed Virgin Mary.

CHAPTER I.

THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.

555. *Plan of the Treatise.*—The doctrine concerning the Blessed Mother of God is an integral part of the Christian Revelation. We have already had occasion to mention her, and to vindicate her right to that title which was accorded to her at Ephesus (n. 526), and which puts the true doctrine of the Incarnation into the compass of a few words. It will be observed that the truth that Mary is the Mother of the Word of God Incarnate lies at the root of all the teaching of the Church and the belief and practice of the faithful in her regard; we believe that certain privileges were granted to her, and that we are called upon to render her peculiar honour. But we hold that the privileges which she enjoys, and the honour which is her due, are decreed by God as "convenient" (n. 509) sequels to the decree by which God willed that His Son should take upon Him Human Nature and be born

of a woman. This remark makes plain how grievously our faith and practice are misunderstood by all who imagine that in honouring the Mother we derogate from the honour due to the Son. We praise and trust in the Mother precisely because she is Mother of her Son; and in so doing we praise the Son Himself, and show our trust in Him. (n. 571.)

In the first and second chapters of the Treatise, we shall speak of certain privileges which, as the Catholic Church has declared, belong to the Mother of God; her Immaculate Conception, her perfect sinlessness, and her perpetual Virginity. The third chapter gives an account of some titles applied to our Blessed Lady and of some feasts by which she is honoured; and especially, it deals with her Assumption, a privilege which the common voice of Catholics, learned and unlearned, declares to belong to her, but which has not yet been made the subject of any express definition.

556. *Subject of the Chapter.*—The first privilege of our Lady in point of time is her Immaculate Conception. False views as to what this doctrine means are not uncommon, even among persons who might have been expected to consult the authentic definition on the subject put forward by Pope Pius IX. in 1854, and which we shall cite presently. We must, therefore, begin by explaining what is, and what is not, contained in the defined dogma; we shall next show how it harmonizes with what else we know as to the economy of redemption; and it will then be time to prove that the

doctrine is contained in the founts of tradition, when we shall find that, as in other cases (n. 113), three periods are to be distinguished: implicit belief, controversy, and that explicit universal acceptance which at length receives the seal of the solemn definition by the Church. This done, we can consider with profit the objections that are raised against the doctrine.

557. *The Doctrine stated.*—On December 8, 1854, Pope Pius IX. issued the Constitution called, from its opening words, *Ineffabilis Deus*. In this, the Pontiff defined that the Blessed Virgin Mary was, in the first instant of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege granted by Almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Saviour of the human race, preserved free from all stain of original sin. (Denz. 1502.)

The strangest misunderstandings are met with as to the meaning of the doctrine here laid down, which might have been thought easy of comprehension to any one who knows what is commonly taught as to the effects of the sin of Adam (n. 493), and as to the Death of Christ for all men (n. 543), without exception. First, we must indicate some points which are not contained in the definition. Fuller explanations will be found, if needed, in our chapter on the Fall of Man. (nn. 491—501.)

First, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception has nothing to do with the mode of formation of the body of the Blessed Virgin; with her active conception, as it is called. Her body was formed in the womb of her mother, St. Anne; and her father,

St. Joachim, had the same part in the work as is found in all other conceptions of children; the sole exception being the case of the Incarnate Son of God, whose conception in the womb of the Blessed Virgin Mary was a unique case. He alone of mankind was born of woman but had no man for His father, and the formation of His Body was altogether miraculous and out of the course of nature. (n. 522.) Further, the birth of our Blessed Lady differed in nothing from the births of other children. There are some obscure legends to a contrary effect, but they are of no authority.

The soul of the Blessed Virgin was created by God and infused into her body in the same way as is the case with other human souls, including the Soul of our Blessed Lord. (n. 522.) This is called her passive conception.

All this is presupposed by the definition, and is doubted by no one; but now we come to a difference. Had Adam not sinned, all his descendants would, in the first instant of their existence, have received the supernatural gift of the habitual grace of God, which would have rendered them capable of passing to the clear sight of Him, if only they were individually faithful in going through a probation. But by the sin of Adam, this supernatural gift was lost for all the race of man. The Divine decree was that, in consequence of this sin, all men should be conceived without the gift of grace, and therefore incapable, if left unaided, of gaining more than a natural end. This doctrine is expressed by saying that men are conceived in the

state of original sin. (nn. 493, &c.) It is true that provision was made for the redemption of man by the Death of the Son of God, but the virtue of this Redemption is ordinarily not applied to the soul of any man until after his birth, when he is baptized or otherwise attains the grace of justification, as will be seen hereafter.

But the hands of God are not tied. He can give His supernatural bounty when and to whom He pleases; and it is commonly believed that the Prophet Jeremias (i. 5) and St. John Baptist (St. Luke i. 44, n. 547) were favoured above what is allowed in the common order of grace, in that they were raised to the supernatural state some time in the interval between their conception and their birth—thus receiving the benefit of the death of Christ at an earlier stage of their lives than is usually allowed. There is the authority of Gerson and other ascetics for believing that St. Joseph, the Spouse of the Blessed Virgin, enjoyed the same privilege of sanctification between conception and birth. A treatise by Peter Marchant, the Minorite, in defence of this view, was placed on the Index in 1633; but perhaps this precaution was taken on account of some overheat in the maintenance of the author's view, and not on account of any objection being felt to the view itself. With these three exceptions, no case perhaps exists where there is reason to suppose that so special a favour has been granted; but on the other hand, we have no particular reason for denying that others may have received the like favour.

The privilege granted to our Blessed Lady was something higher than what these holy men received. They are like other men, in that, for some portion of their existence, they were children of wrath (Ephes. ii. 3) and servants of sin (Romans vi. 17), so that had they died in that state they could not have been admitted to the sight of God. Our Blessed Lady's singular privilege was that she was not in this state for an instant; in the very instant that her soul was created it was clad with the robe of grace, and was hereby raised to the supernatural state. The stain of sin (1 Timothy vi. 14) was not removed from her soul, for it was never upon her; her conception was stainless, or immaculate, if we use a Latin word of the same meaning. The Immaculate Conception is said to be her singular privilege, it being the only instance of the kind, as the Council of Trent teaches. (Sess. 5.)

The grant of this favour to the Blessed Virgin was in every sense the free act of God; on no supposition was He bound to act as He did. What she received was a perfectly gratuitous favour, or a grace; and it was granted to her, as the Pope declared, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Saviour of the human race. The doctrine of the Church is, therefore, in perfect harmony with the declaration of our Lady (St. Luke i. 47), that her spirit rejoiced in God her Saviour.

558. *The Doctrine probable.*—It is rash for men to consider what they think it likely that God would do in particular circumstances; for His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor our ways His

ways. (Isaias iv. 8.) Neglect of this principle is the fundamental error of those who claim for themselves the exclusive right to be called rationalists, as if they alone used their reason (n. 31); and who, with various degrees of clearness and persistence, declare that they will not believe any truth unless they see the intrinsic reasonableness of the proposition. A Christian, on the other hand, believes whatever comes to him on the authority of God, and his belief is no way weakened even though he be conscious that he does not see how the proposition can be regarded as reasonable. He sets down his inability to see it to his limited powers of intellectual sight; he is sure that the thing is reasonable, and he hopes that, being one day admitted to the clear sight of God, he will find all things plain.

Although this is so, it is a laudable pursuit to study the records of revelation, and compare its truths with each other and with all else that is known; for in this way an insight is gained into the designs of God, and more and more is discovered of the beautiful harmony that there is in all the works of His providence in the government of the world. In illustration of what is here said, we will consider some distinct points wherein we can see the accord that exists between the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception and other parts of revelation.

First, then, it seems that there is an incongruity in the supposition that the flesh from which the Flesh of the Son of God was to be formed should

ever have belonged to one who was the slave of that arch-enemy, whose power He came on earth to destroy. We feel it to be more likely that no such incongruity had place, although we cannot see that it would have amounted to such a positive inconvenience as can have no place in the works of God. (n. 509.) Some divines, therefore, have considered that there is no absolute impossibility in the supposition that the Son of God might have been born of a woman who had once been in sin, or even who was in sin at the time of the Divine Conception and Birth; but they feel, as all loving Christians must feel, that the actual arrangement is far more in harmony with what is fitting. If it be urged that these considerations apply to the whole line of the ancestors of the Blessed Virgin, we need only remark that the matter is in the hands of God, who distributes His favours as He pleases.

Again, it is remarked that a peculiar privilege was given to Jeremias and to St. John Baptist, apparently because by their preaching they had a special share in the work of preparing the way for the Sacred Humanity; and the unique position held by St. Joseph as foster-father of Christ is the cause why some think that the same privilege must have been granted to him; but if this is so, some much higher privilege seems due to her who contributed her own flesh to form part of the very substance of the Human Nature.

Scotus thinks that the perfect Mediator must, in some one case, have done the work of mediation most perfectly, which would not be unless there

were some one person at least in whose regard the wrath of God was anticipated, and not merely appeased. And again, the Mother of the Lord of all the Angels was destined to be the Queen of all these blessed Spirits, wherefore it would be most unseemly that she herself should ever have been the subject, still more the slave, of the vilest of the rebel host. We may omit many other reasons of convenience that might be adduced, and add one in conclusion. The honour and dishonour of parents redound to their children: wherefore, if the Mother of God had ever been under the yoke of sin, this would have been a dishonour to her Son; whereas He wins to Himself great honour by granting her so singular a privilege.

559. *The Holy Scripture.*—The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is not contained in express terms in the Holy Scripture, but this circumstance will have no weight against its acceptance, except with those who assume, without a scrap of reason, that the whole of the revelation given by God is contained in the inspired Books. We have said enough, in another place, to show how groundless is this assumption. (nn. 87—91.) Moreover, there are passages in the Holy Scripture, which certainly point to the Blessed Virgin as having received some high and peculiar spiritual favour, and which cannot be fully explained by anything short of what we are here maintaining.

Two of these passages are found in the New Testament. The Angel, St. Gabriel, salutes Mary as "full of grace" (St. Luke i. 28), and St. Elizabeth

was doubtless inspired to proclaim her "Blessed among women" (St. Luke i. 42); and these two forms of greeting are combined in the prayer for her help, now and at the hour of death, which is so familiar to all Catholics. The word which the Vulgate renders "full of grace" (κεχαριτωμένη), is sometimes translated "highly favoured," which is less expressive, for the Divine favour which she enjoyed was a high measure of the grace of God; and the word is certainly most full of meaning if we take it as implying that she had the highest form of grace that is consistent with her state; and this would be the grace of her Immaculate Conception. The same argument may be framed on the other text; for the words, "Blessed among women," according to the ordinary mode of expressing the superlative in Hebrew, signify "most blessed." It is to be observed that the function of being Mother of God was a most high dignity, but did not necessarily imply any particular degree or form of grace: this dignity, therefore, does not serve to explain the texts before us.

Leaving the New Testament, we will consider the passage of Genesis (iii. 15), to which the name of Earliest Gospel has been given. It clearly teaches not only that a Redeemer should come, to free the human race from the power of the Devil, but that the Mother of this Redeemer should enjoy exemption from that slavery as truly as her Son. The verse occurs in the rebuke addressed by God to the serpent, or rather to Satan who possessed the body of the serpent, and who had just succeeded in

perverting Adam and Eve, and leading them into that sin by which the race of man was ruined. The words are, "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel." We have followed the reading of the Vulgate, which was deliberately chosen by St. Jerome, but which cannot perhaps be defended critically. In place of "she," the Hebrew may be translated either It or He, there being nothing in the form of the word to show whether the pronoun refer to the Seed collectively or to some individual: the Greek of the Septuagint has a masculine form of the pronoun, although the word for Seed is neuter; this version, therefore, undoubtedly treats the Seed as one Person, and we must translate by "He."

Perhaps this question of translation has received more attention than it deserves. It has been discussed in connection with a peculiarity in the grammar of the language used by Moses throughout the Pentateuch, which is too technical to be worth explaining, but which serves to show how St. Jerome was led to adopt the feminine form. The traditional, and, as it seems, the only consistent interpretation of the text, is as follows. The latter part shows us that the head of the serpent is to be crushed, and this cannot but refer to the individual serpent there present, or to Satan in him: the image of crushing the head would be out of place if a multitude of evil spirits and of wicked men were meant. It follows that the Seed of the woman by whom the head is to be crushed must also be an individual

person, and not a class; no other Person can be indicated but Christ our Lord, for He alone of His own power destroyed the sway of Satan. Christ is spoken of as the Seed of the Woman, for He alone of all mankind was born of woman but had no man for His father: the Woman, therefore, is the Blessed Mother of God, and it is between her and Satan that God puts enmities, in the same way as there is enmity between Christ and the seed of the serpent, which phrase represents all forms of evil. As then Christ was never for an instant the slave of Satan, so neither was His Blessed Mother; otherwise, the phrase, "put enmities," must be understood to have different applications in two successive phrases, and this without any indication of change of meaning. It seems, therefore, impossible to interpret this Earliest Gospel except as teaching the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

Much more might be said on the subject of this text, but we must be content to refer to books that treat specially of the doctrine: Father Passaglia's great treatise is the storehouse from which all recent authors have drawn their materials: and the English work of Dr. Ullathorne is admirable.

There are certain passages of the Sapiential Books, such as Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom, which are more easily understood by those who know what privilege our Lady received, but which do not avail to prove our doctrine dogmatically. They are omitted from the Bull by which the doctrine is defined. We may quote one as a specimen: "The Lord possessed me in the begin-

ning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." (Prov. viii. 22.) This text plainly may bear the meaning that God had some possession of the Blessed Virgin, in some peculiar, early, manner: but it cannot be proved that the text refers to the Mother of God at all, and not rather to the Eternal Wisdom; it cannot, therefore, be employed to prove the doctrine.

560. *Tradition.*—If we were to attempt to set forth the full doctrine of the Fathers on the sanctity of the Blessed Virgin, we should be forced to transcribe a multitude of passages, and the nature of the argument is such that an imperfect exhibition would be not imperfect merely, but erroneous. The argument is cumulative, not dependent on single passages, but on the agreement of many, no one of which taken by itself is conclusive. All we can do is to indicate two great heads of the teaching of the early Church, by each of which the Immaculate Conception is implied. We shall have another opportunity (n. 562) of dealing with some remarks found in early writers of authority which might seem to look the other way.

In the early doctrine concerning the Blessed Virgin, two points are constantly insisted on: her absolute purity and her position as the second Eve. The virginal purity of her body is compared with the purity of her soul, and the latter is treated as no less absolute than the former. The force of this comparison will be better understood when we have discussed the doctrine of her perpetual virginity (nn. 566—569), and of her absolute freedom from

actual sin. (n. 563.) The other point is the very frequent use of the comparison of Christ, the Father of the world to come (Isaias ix. 6), with Adam, the father of the human race. This comparison was familiar to St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22), and it seemed perfectly natural to extend the comparison to those women who had a true, though subordinate part in the work done, when the race of man was ruined and restored. The word of Eve seduced Adam to ruin; the word of Mary was, in the Divine decrees, potent in carrying out the Redemption. (n. 572.) In this comparison it is implied that Mary was no less free from sin than Eve was before her fall: otherwise, the gift would be less than the offence, and the doctrine of St. Paul (Romans v. 15) would so far be falsified. Nothing short of the Immaculate Conception will justify the comparison instituted by the Fathers.

The Conception of our Lady was commemorated in the East by an annual feast at least as long ago as the fifth century. This event would have been no occasion of praising God if it had been believed to have merely brought another slave of the Devil into existence: she whose conception was thus honoured must have been regarded as being from the first the friend of God.

561. *The Controversy.*—The doctrine of the perfect sanctification of Mary for some centuries attracted less attention in the West than in the East: the reason was perhaps that the Pelagian heresy was more rife in Europe than in Asia, and forced theologians to insist more upon the wide reach of

Original Sin than upon the solitary instance where it never had sway. Whatever the reason, the fact is that the feast of which we just spoke remained for many centuries confined to the Greek countries, and was not seen in Europe till about the year 1100; it is said that St. Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was the first Western Bishop to celebrate it, and it is not improbable that he borrowed the idea from the Greeks of Naples, during his residence in Southern Italy. The new way of honouring our Lady spread rapidly, and when it was adopted by the Canons of the Cathedral at Lyons, St. Bernard deemed it his duty to publish a protest. He objected to the feast as being a novelty, and as not being celebrated in the City of Rome; also, it seems clear that he did not accept the doctrine which he supposed to be involved in the celebration. It is doubtful, however, whether he did not erroneously imagine that some special honour was to be paid to the *active* conception of our Lady. (n. 557.) The same confusion may have prevailed elsewhere, but gradually opinion seems to have hardened into opposition to the doctrine in any form. St. Anselm, St. Peter Damian, Peter Lombard, the two Franciscans Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, and the Dominican, Blessed Albert the Great, are quoted as opposing it: and Albert's yet greater disciple and religious brother, St. Thomas, expressly teaches that Mary must have incurred the stain of original sin, for otherwise she would not have had salvation through Christ, the Saviour of all men. (See n. 562.) It might have seemed that the question was con-

cluded, and would be heard of no more: but a knot of Paris theologians, however eminent, are not the Church. Both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas died in 1274, eight years after a child had been born in a Northumberland village who was destined to found the school that successfully upheld the privileges of Mary, even against the immense weight of authority that we have mentioned. This was Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor, from whom the Scotist school received its name. Scotus was a Franciscan, and when he began to teach he found himself at variance, even on some fundamental points, with the great Dominican school who were the sworn followers of St. Thomas. We are not concerned here with any points of difference between the two schools, except when they treat of the Immaculate Conception. Scotus, in his earliest writings, "would wish" to believe that Mary enjoyed this honourable privilege. But growing in years and in authority, he became more bold and taught absolutely that the privilege was hers. He perceived the true effect of the doctrine of the Fathers, and the nothingness of the difficulty that weighed with St. Thomas. The Dominicans maintained the opposite view, and both sides showed no little warmth in the controversy, so that Rome was forced to interpose, to moderate their ardour. But the view that favoured the privilege gradually gained ground, and one after another, weighty authorities gave in their adhesion to the Scotist view. The controversy was practically settled when, about the year 1480, Pope Sixtus IV. gave his sanction to the feast, with special Mass

and Office: this concession removed St. Bernard from the ranks of opponents of the privilege and placed him among its defenders: for in his letter to the Canons of Lyons, he declared that he waited only for Rome to approve the feast. The Council of Trent did not decide the controversy in form, but in effect it did so, for it expressly declared (Sess. 5) that it had no intention of including the Blessed and Immaculate Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, in its decree on the universality of original sin (Denz. 674): and long before the formal definition of 1854 there had been no doubt that the whole Church was agreed that the privilege was among the truths which had been revealed by God. The definition, therefore, did not teach anything which was not already known, but it caused the denial of the truth to constitute the peculiar sin and crime of heresy.

562. *Difficulties.*—On the principles that we have established concerning the Rule of Faith (nn. 78—91, 205, 206), the fact that the Church is agreed upon a subject as an article of faith is a proof that this is a truth revealed by God, and therefore no argument that tends the other way can raise any real doubt. But it will be worth while to illustrate the subject by discussing some considerations which raise difficulty in the minds of those with whom the authority of the Catholic Church is not supreme. First then we have the declaration of St. Paul (Romans v. 12) that all men sinned in Adam; and the Fathers assert the same, and insist on it, when they are establishing the doctrine of original sin

against the Pelagians. This universal language certainly forbids us to set up any exception to the rule without strong reason; but in the case of our Lady this strong and overwhelming reason exists. Not only do we learn the existence of this exception from the teaching of the Church, which is the authentic interpreter of Scripture; but we are prepared to learn that an exception was made in her case when we remember the altogether exceptional dignity to which the Mother of God is raised. And if we consider the purpose of the Pauline declaration, which the Fathers re-echo, we see that it is to insist on the need of redemption by Christ, under which all men lie: all men, because they are descended from Adam, are sinners, except so far as they have been rescued from the abyss by the merits of the Passion of Christ. Our Lady is no exception to this rule; her exceptional position has respect to the time when these merits were applied to her soul, and she was put into the state of grace, and this time is declared to have been the first instant of her conception.

As to what is called the silence of the earlier Fathers, we remark that later witnesses to the existing tradition of the Infallible Church have no less weight than belongs to those who lived earlier. And that the earliest are silent is true only in so far that they do not express the privilege in the terms that in the course of time turned out to be most appropriate. They speak of her perfect purity, and use comparisons in her regard which would be silly exaggerations in the case of one who had ever been

the enemy of her Creator; and so their teaching is merely what is summed up in the word Immaculate. In the same way, the Fathers who wrote before the Council of Nice teach the perfect equality of the Divine Son with His Father, and this is the doctrine summed up in the word Consubstantial. There was a time when this word was new, just as there was a time when the word Immaculate was new; but no one can make this newness a ground of objection to the Creed that embodies the declaration put forth by Pope Pius IX., unless he is consistent, and rejects the Creed of Nice on the same ground. (See n. 211.)

Certain phrases used by the Fathers who say that the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was the flesh of sin, that she was liberated, cleansed, and the like, are sufficiently explained by the consideration that she owed all the grace and favour that she received, including her exemption from the common lot of men, purely to the free-will of God, who applied the merits of the Passion of His Son in this peculiar way.

The adversaries of the privilege insist much upon the authority of St. Bernard and St. Thomas, which they believe to be in their favour. It may be so; the *charisma* of infallibility belongs to the Roman Pontiff alone, and, as we have already pointed out, St. Bernard avows himself ready to submit to the authority of Rome in this matter; nor will any one doubt that St. Thomas would have made the same avowal had the question arisen. At the present day, Rome has spoken, and these two great Doctors must

be reckoned as supporters of the defined doctrine. As to what their mind was upon the subject, there is great difficulty in coming to an assured conclusion. At first blush, both seem to be opposed to the privilege, and certainly they were commonly understood in this way while the controversy was raging. Now the controversy has ceased, and the truth been established, attempts have been made, and are still made, to show that what they denied was something different from the doctrine as now defined; or, at any rate, if at one time they denied it, on further consideration they modified their opinion. Further, in the case of St. Thomas, we have suggestions of forgery, such as are so often met with when one party to a literary controversy finds itself in difficulties. It is impossible for us to exhibit the arguments used on both sides, resting as they do on turns of expression in a large number of passages. We prefer to admit that possibly St. Bernard and St. Thomas were both in blameless error upon the subject; and in this way we shall escape the reproach that we jeopardize the truth by the use of inconclusive arguments in its defence. They who take this course seem to be profiting by the prudent advice of St. Thomas. (nn. 402, 439.)

563. *The Sinless One.*—Our Blessed Lady was not merely free from original sin; she was never guilty of actual sin, mortal, or even venial. This doctrine is nowhere expressly defined, but to deny it can scarcely be brought into harmony with the declaration of the Council of Trent. The Council, as we shall see in the Treatise on Grace, defines

that no man can throughout his life avoid all venial sin, except by a special privilege of God, such as the Church holds to have been given to the Blessed Virgin. (Sess. 6, can. 23; Denz. 715.) The proof of the doctrine is found in the general consent of the Fathers of which we spoke (n. 560); they declare with St. Augustine, that nothing must be said to link our Lady's name with sin (*De Natura et Gratia*, c. 36, n. 42; *P.L.* 44, 267); that entire and absolute purity which they ascribe to her proclaims the absence of actual sin no less than of original sin.

It is to be observed that some of the Fathers seem to have been in error on this matter. Thus, St. Basil (Epist. 317 [260], n. 9; *P.L.* 32, 965) thinks that the Blessed Virgin may have sinned by doubt at the time of the Crucifixion; and St. Chrysostom accuses her of ambition, and putting herself forward unduly. (Hom. 27 [28], *In St. Matt.*; *P.G.* 57, 347.) But their stray private opinions merely serve to illustrate human frailty, and to show that Theology is a progressive science. For many centuries there has been no doubt on the matter within the Church. (nn. 110—115.) At the time of the Reformation, some of the Lutheran leaders found that it was inconsistent with their views on justification to suppose that God has been pleased to gain glory for Himself by preserving any human being from the misery of sin; and they proceeded to endeavour to establish new charges against her, in addition to those that they read in the two Fathers whom we named lately. Thus, they accused her of carelessness, in letting her Son be separated from her, when

He remained behind in Jerusalem, and was found in the Temple. We disdain to say a word in reply to such frivolous charges; but as it is remarked that she doubtless used the Lord's Prayer, and asked our Father who is in Heaven to grant forgiveness of our trespasses, we may point out that in this prayer we pray for all men, and that she asked forgiveness on behalf of all that needed it.

St. Augustine, in the passage quoted above, leaves it doubtful whether this singular grace of sinlessness was ever granted to any other person; and we must be content to remain in the same doubt. There is no ground for denying that it may have been granted to some saints; but there is no ground for ascribing it to any one. It is probable that some saints have gone through life without ever sinning with full deliberation, but ordinary grace suffices for this degree of faithfulness.

Theologians are not agreed whether the sinlessness of our Lady is to be ascribed to the absence of concupiscence in her, or to the supply of grace in such abundance that she had no difficulty in repressing its promptings. Certainly she was free from all trouble on this score.

564. *Recapitulation.*—In this chapter we have explained and proved the doctrine of the Church on the exemption from sin which our Lady enjoyed, and we have dealt with the difficulties that are raised against it. The history of the controversy on the subject, which occupied theologians from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, is very briefly sketched.

CHAPTER II.

THE PERPETUAL VIRGINITY.

565. *Subject of the Chapter.*—In this chapter we have to deal with another singular privilege bestowed by God upon the Blessed Mother of His Son: she alone of women brought forth a Child who had no man for father. The proof of this part of the doctrine is not difficult, and it is not seriously questioned by any who admit that the Canonical Gospels possess supreme authority. But the same cannot be said of the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary, and the short history of the controversy on this matter, if controversy it can be called, is well worthy of attention, as illustrating the sense of the faithful that they have a guide to their religious belief who is more to be trusted than what at first sight may seem to be the clear teaching of Scripture. The Scripture difficulty which defenders of the doctrine of the Church have to face is nothing recondite. It meets the eye of every reader of the Gospel, and for a moment it seems conclusive; but it never affected the faith of the bulk of the Christian people, and was never urged except by those who preferred their own impressions as to the meaning of the Sacred Text, and disregarded the

voice of tradition. When the question was raised, the champions of orthodoxy had no hard task in showing that the passages quoted did not necessarily convey the meaning which the critics put upon them; and so, tradition stood unshaken, or rather, was the more firmly established, by the failure of the attempt to overthrow it.

566. *The Doctrine stated.*—In the year 649, Pope St. Martin I. held a Council at the Lateran, which dealt chiefly with the Monothelite heresy (n. 529); but the opportunity was taken of re-stating some points of the Church's teaching on the Incarnation, and among the rest it was affirmed that "the Mother of God, the holy ever-Virgin the Immaculate Mary," conceived without the aid of man, and brought forth a Son without detriment to her Virginity, and retained this Virginity after His Birth. (Denz. 204.) This Council could not be called Ecumenical, but its teaching met with general acceptance (n. 296); so that its decisions were recognized as being the voice of the Church even before the Vatican Council taught us (n. 290) that the infallible authority of the Pope was of itself conclusive. The declaration of the Council was nothing new, nor even was it called for by any prevalent opposition to the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity; the subject had been fully discussed and the teaching of tradition put beyond doubt, some two hundred and fifty years earlier.

The doctrine, it will be observed, consists of two parts: the one asserts the virginal conception and birth, the other denies that this virginity was lost at any time subsequent to the Birth of Christ.

The first part was denied in very early times by some of the Gnostic teachers, especially those of the sect who received the name of Ebionites, or Poor Men, as the word signifies in Hebrew. These maintained that Christ was a mere man, and refused to recognize the account given in the Gospels of His miraculous conception: such teachers soon ceased to be regarded as having any title to the name of Christian. Some of the more extreme Arians seem to have inclined to look kindly on the Ebionite doctrine, but they could not openly embrace it. The other branch of the doctrine which asserts that the Mother of God was ever a Virgin, seems not to have been attacked until the end of the fourth century, for though the obscure Arabian sect of Enemies of Mary, or Antidicomarianites, is mentioned by St. Epiphanius (*Hær.* 78; *P.G.* 42, 700), it is scarcely worth notice. He couples it with another sect which existed in the same country, consisting chiefly of superstitious old women who were accustomed to make sacrificial offerings of cakes to the Blessed Virgin, as to a goddess, and received the name of Collyridians, from the Greek word meaning "cake." (*Hær.* 79; *P.G.* 42, 744.)

A more serious attack on the doctrine of the Church was made between the years 380 and 390, by the Illyrian Bishop Bonosus, the apostate monk of Milan Jovinian, and the layman Helvidius. These men seem to have been moved by aversion to the practices of the ascetic life and self-denial which were held in honour by all Christians, and in some measure practised by many. Thus, Jovinian thought

that no answer could be given to his triumphant question, why God created swine and poultry, if not to be eaten. It is not surprising that men of this temper were little inclined to hold virginity in honour, and caught at any excuse for denying that the Queen of all Saints had set the example of perpetual virginity, as entering into the highest ideal of Christian life. These men maintained that after the Birth of Christ, our Lady bore children to St. Joseph, and they supported this view by quoting certain texts of the Gospel which we shall notice directly (nn. 568, 569); but their teaching was at once condemned and rejected with indignation by the general voice of Christendom, and it disappeared. Helvidius and Jovinian left no following; and although a sect of Bonosians is spoken of, they seem to have lapsed into the Arian heresy.

567. *The Virginal Birth.*—By virginity is here meant the preservation of that state of body which is lost to the mother who bears children in the ordinary course of nature. The virginity for which a special reward is reserved in Heaven (Apoc. xiv. 4) consists as regards women in the fixed resolve of maintaining this bodily state, and as regards men in a corresponding resolve; in either case, this resolve makes human beings in a peculiar way like to the blessed Angels (St. Luke xx. 36), and able to think on the things of the Lord. (1 Cor. vii. 34.) This is not the place to go more deeply into the matter, as it would involve a discussion of the difference between precepts and counsels, and other topics

that belong to ascetic theology. (n. 4.) It is treated by St. Thomas with his usual clearness. (*Summa*, 2. 2. q. 152.)

That Mary was a Virgin in the conception and Birth of her Son, cannot be questioned by those who admit the authority of the Gospels of St. Matthew (i. 18—25) and St. Luke (i. 26—38); and it is in harmony with this narrative that the genealogy given by St. Matthew ends with the name of St. Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus (i. 16), for here the relative points to Mary alone, as the Greek proves. (ἐξ ἧς.) This expression would not have been used by one who regarded Christ as the Son both of Joseph and Mary.

A difficulty is sometimes founded on the quotation from the Book of Isaias. (vii. 14, and St. Matt. i. 23.) It is said that the Hebrew word used by the Prophet does not properly mean Virgin, but Young Woman, as it is translated in the later Greek versions. (n. 152.) But it is to be observed that these versions were not uninfluenced by the necessities of Jewish controversy with the Christians; that the Septuagint, which represents the ancient Jewish view, gives "Virgin;" and that the passage of the Prophet is altogether void of force if it mean no more than that a child should be born of a woman, in the ordinary course of nature. The inspired comment, therefore, given by St. Matthew is critically justified.

That bodily integrity was maintained in the Birth is taught by the Fathers when they compare

the coming of Christ into the world to the Eternal Generation of the Divine Word, or to the mode in which the thought of man comes forth from his mind; in neither case is there any lesion of the principle of procession. (n. 396, vi.) They hold that we have an image both of the Birth of Christ and of His passing through the sealed stone of His Sepulchre, in the transit of light through the transparent glass, or through the membranes of the eye.

We are told (St. Luke ii. 23) that our Lady went to the Temple to present her Son to the Lord in compliance with the law (Exodus xiii. 2) which speaks of every male that openeth the womb. If these words were pressed, they might bear a sense inconsistent with our doctrine; but it is sufficiently clear that they do not necessarily mean more than "first-born," which is the term used in the account of the event that gave rise to this commemorative ceremony. (xii. 29.)

568. *The Perpetual Virginity.*—The first denial of the Perpetual Virginity of our Lady among those who admitted the Virginal Birth, occurred, as we have said (n. 566), at the close of the fourth century; and the immediate result of such a question being raised suffices to prove how heartily and universally the impugned doctrine was held. Church history scarcely affords a parallel to the storm of indignant protest that arose on all sides when the teaching of Helvidius and his fellows became known. The language used by St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Hilary, St. Augustine, and others, is that of sons resenting an attack upon the honour of their mother, and that these writers

expressed the general feeling of the Christian people is clear from the circumstance that the novelty at once ceased to be heard of. The adversaries of Mary had no party of followers: they were isolated as they published the results of their own prejudiced criticism.

The intensity of indignation roused by this novel suggestion adverse to the Perpetual Virginity is the more remarkable because, as we said (n. 565), there are passages of Scripture which if construed in themselves, without reference to tradition, might seem to show that Christ was not the last child born of Mary. These passages had been familiar to all Christians for two centuries at the least, and yet they did not control the belief of readers on the subject; it was felt that, whatever might be their true explanation, they did not mean what they seemed at first sight to convey. The truth of this was taught by tradition, which also pointed out how much is conveyed in the words whereby our Lady (St. Luke i. 34) expressed to St. Gabriel the difficulty she felt in comprehending the Divine message which he brought. "How shall this be done," she asked, "because I know not man?" If these words referred merely to the past they are pointless, as they would be now if spoken by a maiden betrothed, but not yet married. They must then refer to the future, and indicate a fixed resolve, or vow, to preserve perpetual virginity; and this resolve was respected by God, who had foreseen it when He inspired Isaias to utter the prophecy that we have quoted. And further, there

would be a tone of mockery about the repeated ascription of the title of Virgin to one who at the time of writing was known as the mother of a family. These considerations convince us that the words of St. Matthew (i. 25) that St. Joseph "knew her not till she brought forth her first-born Son," did not convey to men familiar with the idiom of the time that she afterwards bore children in the course of nature. St. Jerome supposes some one to say that Helvidius did not repent of his blasphemies until his death; and remarks that this expression would not imply that he repented after his death.

569. *The Brothers of the Lord.*—These remarks apply equally to the passages where we have mention made in the Gospels of the Brothers of the Lord, and also of His sisters. These are often mentioned without names (St. Matt. xii. 46, &c.; St. John ii. 12, vii. 3, seq.; Acts i. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 5), though on two occasions names are given: James and Joseph, Simon and Jude. (St. Matt. xiii. 55, &c.; Galat. i. 19.) These passages formed the chief support of Helvidius, and of those who thought with him, but several considerations tend to raise a doubt as to the true character of the relationship denoted by the word brother, even if we leave the Christian tradition out of account. It is to be observed that the word is used very widely in other places of Holy Scripture (Genesis xiii. 8, xxix. 12, 15, &c.); and if brotherhood in the ordinary sense is to be understood, it is hard to see why we have the phrase, "Mary the

Mother of Jesus and His brethen" (Acts i. 14), instead of "Mary and her sons;" nor should we have expected that the care of the Mother would have been committed to a stranger (St. John xix. 2, 27) to be to her as a son, if she had children living. In fact, the Greek original, by its use of the article, altogether excludes the idea that St. John was destined to be merely one among many sons of the bereaved Mother. What is said of the Brethren of Jesus applies equally to His sisters.

For these reasons we see how it is that the early Christians had no difficulty in reconciling their belief in the Perpetual Virginity with the text of the Gospel. We are not called upon to state and support any view as to the true meaning of the relationship of these Brethren of our Lord; it is enough for us that full natural brotherhood cannot be proved to have been meant. Some commentators believe that the New Testament affords demonstrative proof that these "Brethren" were first cousins, children of that other Mary, the wife of Alphæus or Cleophas (the names are identical) who stood beneath the Cross of Jesus with His Blessed Mother, and who seems to have been her sister. (Compare St. Matt. xxvii. 56, and Galat. i. 18.) We shall not develope this proof, lest we should seem to make too much account of it, and to rest our faith on a doubtful argument. (n. 402.) It is to be observed, however, that the Latin Fathers, and Origen with them, adopt this view; while the bulk of the Greeks think that the explanation is to be found in the suggestion that the

"Brethren" were the children of St. Joseph by a former marriage. But this notion is now generally rejected, and it seems to have been an invention of the Ebionites.

570. *Recapitulation.*—In this short chapter, we have shown how clearly the sense of the Church as to the Perpetual Virginity showed itself by the indignant protests called forth when doubts were raised upon the subject; and we have pointed out how far the testimony of Holy Scripture is from being opposed on this point to the Catholic Faith.

CHAPTER III.

TITLES AND FEASTS.

571. *Subject of the Chapter.*—It remains to make a few remarks on some of the Titles that are used in speaking of our Blessed Lady, and on the Feasts that are celebrated in her honour, especially on that of the Assumption. It will be seen that all the honour paid to her in the Church redounds to the honour of her Son, and that those persons are under a great mistake who imagine that the one devotion in any way rivals or obstructs the other. In Holy Scripture we find the Mother with the Son, from the time of His Birth (St. Luke ii. 16; St. Matt. ii. 11) to the hour of His Death upon the Cross (St. John xix. 25); and the two have never been separated in the worship of the Church, nor in the loving hearts of the Christian people. (n. 555.)

572. *The Mother of God.*—The title Mother of God expresses that truth which is the foundation of all the dignity of Mary. "In her womb, according to the ordinance of God, was our God, Jesus Christ, borne; sprung from the race of David, but of the Holy Ghost. Our Physician is one, God born in the flesh, begotten of Mary as truly as of God." These are words used by St. Ignatius the Martyr, the disciple of the Apostles (*Ad Ephes.* c. 7;

P.G. 5, 737); the writer had in mind the doctrine of St. Paul (Romans i. 3; Galat. iv. 4), a doctrine known even to St. Elizabeth, the mother of St. John Baptist. (St. Luke i. 43; and see n. 356.)

We have said enough in another place (n. 526) regarding the circumstances under which this Title was solemnly recognized by the Council of Ephesus in 431 as summarizing the true doctrine of the Incarnation. We may here observe that the dignity was not forced upon her; but when it was proposed to her by the Messenger of God she accepted it because she understood that such was the Divine will (St. Luke i. 38); and on this free act of acceptance, eternally foreseen, the whole scheme of redemption depended (n. 574), no less than on the free acceptance of a life of suffering and cruel death by the Human Will of Christ. (n. 542.) The Mother, too, knew the sorrows that were before her (St. Luke ii. 20, 35), but accepted them, for her love to man, and because she knew that such was the good pleasure of God.

The love of Mary for all mankind was that of a Mother, for her most Pure Heart shared all the feelings of the Sacred Heart of her Son, whose love for man was proved by His Death for our Redemption. No one will wish to dispute the correctness of the impression which has been widely entertained concerning the force of those words spoken to her from the Cross, "Behold thy son!" In the person of St. John, the whole race of man was commended by Christ to the care of His own Mother, and she accepted the charge.

573. *The Magnificat.*—The inspired song uttered by our Lady in the house of her cousin St. Elizabeth (St. Luke i. 39—56) is called the *Magnificat*, from its opening word in the Latin form, in which it is daily said or sung in the Western Church in the Vespers of the Divine Office. Remarkable parallels to the Song, in substance rather than in form, are furnished by two of the Psalms (cxii. and cxvii.), the latter of which is clearly Messianic (compare verse 25 and St. Matt. xxi. 9): also by the thankful canticle of Anna, on the birth of her son Samuel. (1 Kings ii. 1—10.) The song of Mary falls into two parts, in each of which two strophes may be distinguished. The first part (vv. 46—48 and 49, 50) has reference to the person of the humble Virgin herself who is to be exalted; the second (vv. 51—53 and 54, 55) is concerned with the dealings of God in the government of the world, and the new economy to be introduced by the Messias in fulfilment of the prophecies.

We have already noticed the second verse of the Song (n. 557), showing that our Lady knew that she needed a Saviour, as Catholic doctrine teaches. The prophecy contained in the third verse is daily fulfilled by the constant practice of the Church and of the children of the Church who speak of the Blessed Virgin.

It is noticeable that, although the scene of the Visitation has always been a favourite object of devout contemplation, yet the feast in its memory is of modern institution, being first heard of in France in the middle of the thirteenth century; and

some time elapsed before it was extended to the whole Church. The day assigned for the feast is the 2nd of July, the morrow of the octave of the feast of the birth of St. John Baptist. The date may be taken to refer to the close of the three months during which the visit lasted. (St. Luke i. 56.)

574. *The Co-redeemer.*—If the teaching of the Holy Scripture be studied, it will be found that there are many ways in which our Lady had a part in carrying out the Divine plan of the redemption of the world, and holy writers have not hesitated to speak of her as co-redeemer with her Son, and as mediator. These words must be understood in the sense of those that use them, and if the grounds on which their use is founded be considered it will be found that they are far from impeaching the infinite dignity of the Divine Son, who was pleased to admit His human Mother to have a share in accomplishing that work of redemption of which she herself stood in need. Those who apply the title Mediator to our Lady are perfectly aware of the doctrine of St. Paul (1 Timothy ii. 5), that there is one God and one Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus, and they see no opposition between this doctrine and that which they hold, that the Mother of Jesus has a true, though infinitely subordinate place in the work of mediation.

It was because Christ had a human Mother that He is known to be truly Man, and it is because of His true Manhood that we are able to apply to Him with full confidence and freedom. From His Mother

and with her free consent (n. 572) He obtained the Flesh which He offered in Sacrifice upon the Cross, and in her case the fruits of the Redemption are seen in their utmost fulness. The Mother of God helps the salvation of men, not only by her share in the work of the Incarnation as we have explained, but also by her bright example and by her powerful intercession. We shall speak on the general subject of the intercession of the Saints and of the worship due to them when we are dealing with the doctrine concerning Heaven and the state of its blessed inhabitants; for the present, it is enough to remark that as the Sacred Humanity came on earth through Mary, so we believe that all graces are distributed among men by her hands. In this way she is truly a mediator or channel of communication between God and man, and this in a fuller sense than is true of the other Saints, because by the Divine Maternity she is brought into closer union with God than are any among the Saints.

To see the difference between the mediation of Mary and that of her Son, we observe that she does nothing except in virtue of her admission to a share in His power: it is to Him that she and all the children of Adam owe the possibility of salvation. He is therefore the primary and necessary Mediator, she has a work which is secondary and not indispensable; and, as we have already pointed out, He is Mediator for all mankind, without exception even of His Mother. Nothing but perversity can overlook these differences, which are never absent from the minds of those who do not hesitate

to allow to our Blessed Lady all that is implied in the truths taught in Holy Scripture.

It has seemed useless to quote passages from the Fathers in support of our doctrine, for a reason which we have already used in another matter. (n. 560.) The honour due to Mary was not disputed in early times, and therefore the writers of those times did not state their sentiments in formal propositions. These are to be gathered by induction from a multitude of passages; but space does not allow us to quote them all, and our case would be weakened if we produced a few only. There are, however, many books in which they have been collected.

575. *The Name of Mary.*—We have said something already concerning the feast of the Immaculate Conception of our Lady (n. 561), in connection with the doctrine. This feast is celebrated on the 8th of December, and the feast of her Nativity follows on the 8th of September. The names commonly assigned to her parents are Joachim and Anna, and it may be observed that the two names Joakim and Eliakim, are identical, the first element in each being a name of God. (nn. 353, i. and 354.) Use is made of this identity by some critics who study the genealogies given by St. Matthew (i. 1—16) and St. Luke (iii. 23—38); for it is probable that our Lady and St. Joseph were first cousins. This point has its bearings on the question of the Brethren of the Lord. (n. 569.) We know nothing historically concerning the parents of our Lady, or the circumstances of her youth; the few traditions that are

current seem to be taken from the apocryphal gospels, and are totally untrustworthy.

The Church celebrates a feast in honour of the Name of Mary upon the Sunday within the octave of her Nativity. The name occurs in the Old Testament as borne by the sister of Moses. (Exodus xv. 20; Numbers xii. &c.) The Hebrew form of the name is Miriam. The derivation is not known with certainty; and according to different conjectures it may mean Contumacy, or Enlightenment, or the Bitter Sea, or the Strong One, or the Princess. It may possibly not be of Hebrew origin, in which case its meaning is altogether unknown. Until comparatively recent times, the reverence of Christian people for the Mother of the Lord hindered them from giving her name to children in Baptism (see Benedict XIV. *De Festis B.M.V.* cap. 10), just as now the Name of her Son is scarcely employed except among peoples of Spanish race; these also use the name of Mary for both sexes, whereas other nations confine it to females. About the year 1100, a Moorish princess, being converted, wished to take the baptismal name of Mary, but was not allowed.

The usage of celebrating this special feast arose in Spain, early in the sixteenth century. It was extended to the Universal Church, in 1683, by Pope Innocent XI., who in this way secured perpetual honour to our Lady, with whose aid the city of Vienna had been relieved by John Sobieski of Poland, and a blow given to the power of the Turks from which they have never recovered. In the same way, the feast of the Holy Rosary, on the first

Sunday of October, commemorates the destruction of the Turkish naval power by Don John of Austria at Lepanto, in 1571. This was ordered by Pope St. Pius V., who gave to the feast the name of Our Lady of Victory; his successor, Gregory XIII., changed the name, in order to encourage the use of the devotion of the Rosary. Our Lady, Help of Christians, is a feast kept on May 24, in memory of the release of Pope Pius VII. from a five years' long captivity at Savona, and his restoration to his temporal dominions in 1814. The day is the anniversary of his solemn entry into Rome. The title Help of Christians was introduced by St. Pius V. into the Litany of our Lady, on occasion of the victory of Lepanto, in 1571.

The feast of the Presentation of our Lady occurs on the 21st of November. It is of considerable antiquity in the East, but was not celebrated in the West till 1374. The day chosen is eighty days after the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin, and therefore is the anniversary of the purification of St. Anne in the Temple (Levit. xii. 5), but the ceremony is not the object of the feast. There was no law requiring that female children should be presented, as was done with the male first-born. (St. Luke ii. 22.) The legends on the subject of the Presentation of our Lady are untrustworthy, and we may be content to declare with Benedict XIV. (*De Festis B.M.V.* ii. 14) that she was presented in some way, but that we know no more.

576. *The Assumption.*—The last matter that we shall notice is the mystery of the Assumption of our

Lady. Nothing more strongly indicates the deep conviction of the Christian people that peculiar privileges might be looked for in the case of the Mother of God, than the doubt felt at one time whether she ever died. Even so learned a man as St. Epiphanius, writing about the year 400, hesitates to speak positively: "I cannot say that she is immortal, I cannot feel sure that she is dead." (*Hær.* 78, n. 11; *P.G.* 42, 716.) The existence of the doubt at least proves that no relics of her sacred body were known to exist; but the doubt itself was groundless, for it has no positive basis, and it is against all analogy that the Mother should be allowed a privilege which the Son did not take to Himself. There can be no question, therefore, but that the Blessed Virgin died, yet nothing whatever is known as to the date or place of her death; there are divers traditions, none, however, having much authority.

A feast has long been celebrated on the 15th of August, in honour of what is variously called the Sleeping, Pause, Departure, Removal, Transit, or Reception of the Blessed Virgin Mary; other terms also are used to denote it, the most common being the Assumption. But no stress can be laid on these names, since all of them are employed in the Martyrologies for the deaths of other Saints. Nor is it until comparatively late that we get proof of more being meant than the passing of the soul to Heaven. The bodily assumption is not excluded, but it is not indicated. The common story tells that our Lady dying at Jerusalem, in the presence of

all the Apostles except St. Thomas, was laid in the tomb; when, however, St. Thomas arrived, and the tomb was opened to enable him to look upon the hallowed corpse, it was found to be empty, and a revelation was granted to St. John that our Lord had taken His Blessed Mother's body, rejoined by her soul, to dwell with Him in Heaven. The best authority for this tale is Nicephorus, a writer of the fourteenth century, who quotes a letter which he alleges to have been written by Juvenal, Patriarch of Jerusalem, about the year 450. (Niceph. *Hist. Eccl.* 15, 14; *P.G.* 147, 44.) But the authority of Nicephorus is slender, and even if the letter were really written by Juvenal, we must remember that this prelate was an adept in the art of forgery (St. Leo, *Epist.* 119 [92]; *P.L.* 54, 1044), and that the credit of his Church was at stake. There seem to be no independent testimonies to the story, which is frequently copied, and sometimes ascribed falsely to writers of great name, such as St. Augustine and St. Jerome.

Nevertheless, the belief in the bodily Assumption of our Lady after her death has long been generally accepted in the Church, and cannot be questioned without rashness. There is reason to think that had the sittings of the Vatican Council of 1870 been prolonged, the doctrine would have been defined as an article of faith. The earliest Western testimony is perhaps that of Gregory of Tours, who died in 596 (*Miracula*, 1, 4; *P.L.* 71, 708); he gives the usual details, but does not indicate his source of knowledge. The true ground of our belief in

the reality of this privilege of our Lady is that the account is generally accepted; it is felt to be implied in what we know of the surpassing dignity of the Mother of the Lord, and the loving favour with which her Son treated her. No one can prudently accept the story unless he believe that God's providence secures the Church from error (nn. 205, &c.); and no one who believes that the Church is our infallible guide can prudently doubt it.

577. *Recapitulation.*—This chapter has dealt with some miscellaneous matters concerning the Blessed Mother of God, that seemed to have interest, and not to be too remote from dogma to merit a place in these pages.

578. *Close of the Volume.*—The subjects treated in this volume may be said to be God, and Man in his relation to God. What remains is to consider the need of grace, for securing to each man the benefit of the Redemption wrought by the Incarnate God; and then the Sacraments, which are the chief appointed channels of grace to our souls; after which, we shall consider what is known as to the condition of men after they have passed from this life, and have learned the true character of their acts.

INDEX.

The references are to the paragraphs indicated at the top of each page at the inner margin.

Abgar 521.
"Aberrant" species 472.
Abraham 350.
"Absolute" 369.
Absolute Power 387.
Achievements of man 462.
Actions of Christ 530.
Active spiration 421.
Adalbert 443.
Adam, Gifts and graces 484, 487, 488.
„ Knowledge of 517.
„ and Sin 487.
Adamite Heresies 502.
Adonai 354, 356.
Adoptianism 507, 533.
Aetius 351, 400.
Agnostics 338.
Alacoque, Blessed 536.
Alexandria 507.
Alleluia 354.
Anarchy and Polyarchy 363.
Anathema 494.
Angelic apparitions 451.
„ Doctor 457.
Angels, Nature of 445.
„ Existence of 443.
„ Origin of 444.
„ Language of 445, 452.
„ Distinctions among 446.
„ Probation of 448.
„ Ministry of 453.
„ in Creation 444.
Angels in the World 450—456.
„ Guardian 453.
„ Bad 454.
Anne, St. 575.
Annihilation 438.
Anointing 516.
Anomœans 400.
Anselm, St. 346, 531, 561.
Antecedent Will 385, 389.
Ante-Nicene Fathers 420.
Anthropomorphism 366, 371 381.
Anthropopathy 366.
Antidicomarianites 566.
Antipodes 498.
Antiquity of Man 475.
Apes 461.
Apollinaris 465, 507, 520.
Apostles' Creed 401.
Appropriation 421, 431, 508.
Archangels 446.
Archæology 475.
Arians 400, 407, 409, 413, 419.
Arles, Council of 390.
Arminians 496.
Arminius 390.
Arts of Man 462.
Aseity 361.
Assumption, The 576.
Athanasian Creed 401.
Atheists 338, 342.
Attributes of God 358—373
Audians 366.

Augustine, St. 389, 440, 448.
Augustinianism 371.

Baius 390, 478, 488.
Baltzer 465.
Bañez 381.
Bantain 335.
Baptism of Christ 547.
,, Effects of 498.
,, Form of 398.
Basilides 507.
Beelzebub 446.
Bentham 341.
Benedict XIV., Pope 430.
Bernard, St. 515, 536, 561, 562.
Bernardine, St. 515, 536.
"Binding" of Satan 454.
Blood of Christ 550.
,, The Precious 532.
'Body" 366.
Bohemia, Heretics in 502.
Bonald 335.
Bonaventure, St. 447.
Boniface, St. 498.
Bonosus 566.
Book of Life 391.
Bossuet 420.
Bountifulness of God 386.
Bourg-Fontaine, Project of 390.
Brethren of the Lord 569.
Brutes, Faculties of 464.
,, and Man 462.
Bull, Bishop 420.

Calvin 390.
Calvinists 543.
Capistran, St. John 515.
Cassian 390.
Cause 438.
Chalcedon, Council of 507, 527.
Cherubim 447.
Choirs of Angels 446.
'Christ" 516.
,, God and Man 518, 520, 523, 533.
,, the Son of God 406.
,, how begotten 522.
,, Knowledge of 409, 534.
Christ, Infirmities of 523.
,, Actions of 530.
,, Liberty of 531.
,, Death of 550, 552.
,, in Hell 551.
,, the Redeemer 539—544.
,, Sufferings of 534.
,, Titles of 540.
,, Portraits of 521.
,, Worship of 535.
Christians 516.
Cicero 467.
Circumcision of Christ 546.
Circuminsession 419.
Circumscribed 368.
Clement of Alexandria 430.
Climate and Man 462.
Collyridians 566.
Comma Pianum 478.
Communication of characters 537.
Compositum 463.
Comte 342.
Conception, The Immaculate 557—563.
Concupiscence 485, 486, 499—501.
Concurrence 438.
Condition 438.
Congruity of Incarnation 509, 512.
Consent of Men 349.
Consequent Will 385, 389.
Conservation 438.
Constantinople, Council of, I. 401, 412.
Constantinople, Council of, II. 535.
,, ,, III 529.
,, Creed of 401.
Consubstantial 400.
Contingent Being 347.
"Convenience" of Incarnation 509, 512.
Co-redeemer 574.
Coronation 516.
Council of Arles 390.
,, Constantinople I, 412, 535, 529.
,, Florence 413.
,, the Lateran 351.
,, Reims 359.
,, Sirmium 364.

Council of the Vatican 366, 372.
„ Vienne 342.
Create 428, 429.
Creation, First and Second 428, 444.
„ End of 433.
„ Free 434.
„ in Time 439.
„ by Creatures 432.
„ of Angels 444.
„ of Matter 437.
„ of Man 470, 471.
„ of Souls 473.
Creature 428.
Creeds 401.
Crucifixion 552.
Crutchet Friars 540.
Cyril, St, of Alexandria 526.

Darkness at the Crucifixion 446.
Days of Creation 440.
Death of Christ 550, 552.
„ through Sin 487.
"Definite" 368.
Denys, St. 446.
Deontology 341.
Dereliction of Christ 532.
Des Cartes 342.
Descent of Man 474.
Design, Argument from 348.
"Desire" 485.
Devil, Action of 367.
Diatessaron 519.
Dichotomy 465.
Dioscorus 507, 527, 529.
Divinity of Christ 518.
Docetæ 507, 520.
Doctor, The Angelic 457.
„ The Seraphic 447.
Dominions 446.
Dort, Synod of 496.
Doxologies 399, 454.
Druids 455.

Ebionites 566.
El 353.
Elias, Apparition of 548, 549.
Elion 353.
Elipandus 507, 533.
Eloe 353.
Elohim 353, 355, 364.
Embryology 472.
"Eminent" 362.
Energy, Conservation of 451.
Ephesus, Brigandage of 527.
„ Council of 415, 526.
"Essence" 395, 481.
Essence of God 361.
Eternity 371, 378.
Eusebius 521.
Eutyches 507, 527.
Eve, The Second 559.
Evil One, The 454.
Evil, Permission of 388.
Evolution 472.
Excommunication 495.

Face of Man 461.
Fall of Man 491—503.
Fallen Nature 483.
Father, The Creator 421, 431.
Felix of Urgel 507, 533.
Fetich 342.
Fidelity of God 365.
Filiation 421.
Filioque 413, 415.
Fire 462.
First Motions 485.
Flavian, St. 527.
"Flesh" 485.
Flint quoted 337, 338, 349.
Florence, Council of 413.
Food of Man 462.
Foreknowledge, Divine 381.
"Formal" 362.
Fossils 440.
Francis, St. 447.
Free-will 381.
Fruit, The Forbidden 487.
Fundamental Truths 348.

Gabriel, St. 443.
Gallican Liberties 420.
Gaunilo 346.
Generation 395, 421, 500.
Generationism 473.

Genus and Species 472.
Gilbert de la Poirrée 359.
Gloria in Excelsis 399.
Gnostics 427.
God, One and Three 332.
„ how known 336, 337.
„ and Reason 336.
„ Existence of 345—349.
„ Essence of 361.
„ The One 363.
„ Incomprehensible 351.
„ Ineffable 352.
„ Immense 368.
„ Unchanging 370.
„ Eternal 371.
„ Infinite 362.
„ Simple 365.
„ a Spirit 375.
„ Omnipresent 369.
„ Images of 367.
„ Names of 353.
God's Knowledge 374—382.
„ Will and Power 383—392.
Godeschalc 390.
Gomarists 496.
Good Pleasure 385.
Gospel, The Earliest 559.
Grace, Distribution of 388.
„ Efficacy of 381.
„ Full of 559.
Graces of Paradise 484.
Grammatical Forms 364.
Gratian 332.
Gregory of Tours 576.
Guardian Angels 453.
Günther 465.

Hand of Man 461.
Happiness of God 386.
Harvey 472.
Heart, The Sacred 536.
Heaven 551.
Hell, Descent into 551.
Helvidius 566, 568.
Henoch 549.
"Heterodox" Protestants 507.
Hierarchies of Angels 446.
Hilary, St. 419, 420.
History 475.
Holiness of God 386.
Homœusians 400.
Homoüsian 400.
Honorius, Pope 507, 529.
Horace quoted 367.
Horeb, Revelation on 355.
"How?" 370, 379, 528, 531.
Hypostasis 395.

Idolatry 367.
I.H.S. 515.
"Image" 43..
Image of God in Man 460.
Images of God 367.
Immaculate Conception 557—563.
Immensity of God 368.
Immortality of the Soul 467.
Immutable 370.
Incarnation, The 505—554.
„ Possible 508.
„ Free 512.
„ Congruous 509, 512
„ Date of 517.
Incomprehensibility 351.
Ineffabilis Deus 557.
Ineffable 352.
Infinity 362.
Integral Nature 483.
Integrity 486, 488.
Intelligence, Simple 377.

Jansenists 420.
Jansenism 335, 390, 536, 543.
Jansenius 478, 488.
Jehovah 354, 355.
Jeremias 557, 558.
Jerome, St. 353.
Jesus 515.
„ Name of 546.
Joachim, Abbot 418.
„ St. 575.
John, St., the Baptist 547, 557, 558
„ Gospel of 519.
Johnson, Dr. 338.
Joseph, St. 557, 558, 569.

Josue 515.
Jovinian 566.
Judas 389.
Julian 342.
Justice of God 386.
Justinian 332.
Juvenal of Jerusalem 576.

Kings anointed 516.
Knowledge, Adam's 487.
„ Christ's 534.
„ God's 374—382.
„ Tree of 487.

Lactantius 433.
Language 464.
„ of Angels 445.
„ Origin of 487.
„ Rules of 422.
Lateran, Council of 351, 418, 427.
Latria 535, 536.
Leibnitz 433.
Leo III., Pope 415.
„ XIII., Pope 440.
Lepanto 575.
Liberty of Christ 531.
Life, Book of 391.
„ of God 374.
„ Tree of 487.
Lightfoot, Dr. 519.
Limbus 551.
Lombard, Peter 332, 359, 418, 532.
"Lord" 354, 356.
Lubbock, Sir John 338
Lucidus 390.
Lucifer 448.
"Lust" 485.
Luther, Doctrine of 480.
Lutherans 478.
Lyons, Council of 413.

Macedonians 400.
Magi 455.
Magic 455.
Magnificat, The 573
Malebranche 342
Man, Body and Soul of 461, 463.
„ Excellence of 460.
„ Achievements of 462.
„ Master of Nature 462.
„ Progress of 464.
„ and Climate 462.
„ and Language 464.
„ and Religion 464.
„ Creation of 459—490.
„ Descent of 474.
„ Antiquity of 475.
„ Elevation of 477—490.
„ Fall of 491—503.
„ States of 483.
Manicheism 388, 427, 465.
Maranatha 494.
Marchant, William 557.
Martin, Pope St. 529.
Mary, The Blessed Virgin 555—578.
Mary, Ever Virgin 522, 566—569.
Mary, Sinless 563.
„ Immaculate 557—562.
Massilians 390.
Mastery of Nature 462.
Matha, St. John of 540.
Matter, Angels moving 451.
„ Creation of 437.
Mediation of our Lady 574.
Mediator, Christ our One 540.
Melchisedech 540.
Men, Spread of 474.
Mercy, Our Lady of 540.
Messiah, The 516, 517.
Michael, St. 443.
Microcosm, The 349, 511.
„ Man a 511.
"Mixed" 362.
Molestation, Demonic 454.
Molina 371.
Monarchians 332, 400, 507.
Monophysites 507, 527, 529.
Monothelites 507, 529.
Moral Sense 349.
Moses, Death of 548.
Mother of God 507, 526, 572.
Motions, First 485.
Mysteries of Christ 545—553.
Mystic Theology 454.

Name of Jesus 515, 546.
Names of God 353.
,, in the Trinity 421.
"Natural" 480.
Naturally Christian 363.
Nature 395, 480, 483.
,, State of Pure 448, 489.
Natures, Two in Christ 527, 528.
Necessary Being 347.
Nestorius 507, 526, 527.
Newton 472.
Nicene Creed 401.
Nicephorus 576.
Nolasco, St. Peter 540.
Nothing, Production out of 428.
"Notion" 421.
Novalis 342.

Occasion 438.
Omnipresence 369.
Ontologism 334, 341—343.
Ontology 341, 346.
Optimism 433
Orange, Council of 390, 391.
Ordering of Matter 437.
Ordinary Power 387.
Origen on Creation 430.
Origin of Man 469—476.
Original Sin 493—501.
,, Justice 483.
"Orthodox" Protestants 507

Padua 366.
Pain 388.
Pantheists 338, 342.
Paraclete 412.
Paradise, Grace of 484.
Parent, The One 474.
Passive Spiration 421.
Paternity 421.
Patripassians 400.
Paul of Samosata 400.
Paulicians 409.
Pelagians 390, 474, 478, 498.
Pelagius 496.
Pereyre 474.
Perfections of God 362.
Perichoresis 419, 421.
"Periods" of Creation 440.
Permission of Evil 388.
Permissive Will 385.
"Person" 395.
,, One in Christ 526, 528.
Petavius 420.
Photius 413, 415.
Pilate's Wife 445.
Pilgrimages 369.
Pipi 354.
Pistoia, Synod of 536.
Pius IX., Pope 557.
Plato 465.
Pliny 399.
Polyarchy and Anarchy 363.
Porson 398.
Portraits of Christ 521.
Positivists 342.
Possession, Diabolic 454.
Posture of Man 461.
Power, Absolute and Ordinary 489.
Power of God 387.
"Power on the Head" 451.
Powers 446.
Prayer, Places of 369.
,, The Lord's 454.
Preadamites 474.
Predestination 389, 391.
Premotion 371.
Presentation, The 575.
"Preternatural" 482.
Priests anointed 516.
Priest, Christ a 540.
Principalities 446.
"Procession" 395, 421.
,, The Double 413.
Progress of Man 464.
Prophecies, Messianic 516.
Prophets anointed 516.
Psychology 463.
Pure Nature 483.

Raphael, St. 443.
Reaction, The Catholic 335.
Redeemer, Christ the 539—544.
Redemption, Need of 541.
,, Difficulties against 542.

Redemption Universal 543.
Reims, Council of 359.
Relations in the Trinity 395, 421.
Relative 369.
Religion and Man 464.
Remonstrants 496.
Repaired Nature 483.
Resurrection 467.
,, of Christ 549, 552.
Revelations, Private 545.
Revolution, The French 335, 390.
Rosmini 342, 402, 433.

Sabaoth 353.
Sabellians 400, 413, 419.
Saddai 353.
Sapiential Books 559.
Sarum Missal 515.
Satan in Paradise 492.
,, Sin of 448.
,, Ignorance of 445.
Satan's Action in the World 455.
Save, The Will to 389.
Scholz 398.
Scientia Media 379.
Scripture, Interpretation of 440.
Scotist School 361, 448.
Scotus 512, 558, 561.
Seed of the Woman 559.
Semi-Arians 400.
Semi-Pelagians 390, 478.
Sepulchres opened 549.
Seraphic Order 515.
Seraphim 447.
Sergius 507.
Serpent in Paradise 492.
Shamans 455.
Shema 363.
Side, The Opened 550, 552.
"Sign" 378, 531.
Sight of God 350.
"Simple" 362, 365.
Sin 485, 486.
,, of the Angels 448.
,, of Adam 487, 492.
,, Original 493—501.
Sinless One, The 563.
Sirmium, Council of 364.
Six Days, The 475.
Socinians 400.
Son of God 405—410, 518, 519, 540.
Son of Man 540.
Sons of God 448.
Sonship, Natural and Adoptive 533, 540.
Soul of Man 463.
,, Origin of 473.
,, Unity of 465.
,, Union of, with Body 466.
,, Activity of the 464.
,, Immortal 467.
,, and Spirit 465.
,, Angels affecting 452.
,, Pre-existence of 473.
Soul of Christ 520, 522.
Space, Presence in 368.
Species of Angels 446.
"Species" 472.
Speech of Man 464.
Spinoza 342.
Spiration 421.
Spirit, The Holy 411—416.
,, God a 375.
,, and Soul 465.
Spirits, The Seven 443, 451.
,, Disembodied 446.
,, Evil 454, 455.
Spiritualism 455.
St. Cyr 390.
States of Man 483.
Suarez 371, 391.
Substance 395.
Supernatural 481.
"Supernatural Religion" 519
Supersubstantial 454.
Supposita 395.
,, Actions of 421.
Swedenborg 465.

Tatian 502.
Telegraph designed 348.
Temptation 485.
,, to sin 454.
,, of Adam 492.
Tentyra, Planisphere of 475.
Tertullian on Creation 430.
Tetragrammaton 354, 355.

Theandric 530.
Theodore of Mopsuestia 496.
Theology, Natural and Dogmatic 331
Theology, Progress of 420.
Thomas, St. 561, 562.
Thomism 361, 371.
Thrones 446.
Time, Evolutionary 472.
Tools 462.
Tradition, Office of 339.
Traditionalism 334—336, 341.
Traducianism 473.
Transfiguration 515, 548.
Trichotomy 465.
Tridentine Creed 401.
Trinitarian Order 540.
Trinity, The Blessed 332, 394—424.
,, a Mystery 402, 418.
Tritheism 418, 419.
Truths, Fundamental 340.

Unigenitus, The Bull 390.
Union of Soul and Body 460.
Unitarians 332, 400, 486.
Unity of God 363, 364.
"Unproduced" 421.
Uriel 443.

Vatican Council 336, 372, 401, 427, 433.
Veracity of God 386.
Veronica, St. 521.
"Vestige" 431.
Vienna, Siege of 575.
Vienne, Council of 342.
Vincent of Lerins, St. 390.
,, Paul, St. 540.
Vinci, Leonardo da 521.
Virgil, Bishop 498.
Virginity, The Perpetual 565—570.
Virtues 446.
Vision, Knowledge of 378.
Visions of Creation 440.
Visitation, The 573.

Will of God 383—392.
Will to save 543.
Wills, Two, in Christ 529.
Witnesses, The Three 398.
Word of God, The 405—410.
Worship of Christ 535.
Wisdom of God 386, 407.

Yahveh 354.

Zachary, Pope St. 498.

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